The influence of sovereignty and non-intervention on the development of humanitarian law applicable in internal conflicts. by Bouzid, Lazhari
THE INFLUENCE OF SOVEREIGNTY AND NON- INTERVENTION ON THE 




Dipl., LL. M. (University of London) 
Thesis submitted to the University of Glasgow for the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in International Law 
Faculty of Law and Financial Studies 
Department of Public International Law 
April 1990 
Q Lazhari Bouzid, 1990. 
ACKNOIATEDGEMENTS 
I should firstly like to thank my supervisor Dr. Anthony Carty for his critical 
guidance, without which I could not have completed this thesis. 
To my wife Nora and sons, Wassim and Sami, I would like to say thank you for their 
support and encouragement, also for their understanding of my absence from home for the 
preparation of this thesis. 
My special thanks to my friends Saad and Wanda Djebbar for all their help. 
To my beloved dead parents and my brothers: Abdelaziz, El Bahi, Ahmed, 
Mahiedine, Madjid and Djamel for all their consistent encouragement in all my endeavours. 
My gratitude to my parents-in-law, Mohamed and Clairette Maza and their children 
for their endless care and assistance to my wife and sons, while I was away from home. 
I should like to express my thanks to Dr. Abdelaziz Lahouasnia for his encouragment; 
and for Colleen Etheridge for typing this thesis. 
Finally, I am profoundly thankful toward all those who dedicated their lives to the 
liberation of Algeria, they changed our lives and gave us the opportunities we enjoy today. 
2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Acknowledgments 
................................................. 2 
Table of Contents ................................................. 3 
Summary 
....................................................... 8 
Abbreviations ...................................................... 9 
Table of Cases ................................................... II 
INTRODUCTION ................................................ 12 
CHAPTER ONE: SOVEREIGNTY 
.................................... 15 Introduction ............ * ' 15 Section 1: The Meaning of Sov;; eignt y 16 
A. The Western School ................................... 17 B. The Marxist Theory and the Meaning of Sovereignty ........... 24 C. Third World Views on the Meaning of Sovereignty ............ 26 D. International Courts and the Meaning of Sovereignty ........... 28 Section 11: The Role of Sovereignty in the Contemporary World Order ...... 33 A. Sovereignty in State Practice ............................ 34 B. The Doctrine and the Role of Sovereignty ................... 38 1. The Argument of Those who Defend Sovereignty ........ 39 2. Opinions against the Usefulness of Sovereignty .......... 
44 
Section III: Limitations of Sovereignty ............................. 50 A. Sovereignty and Human Rights ........................... 50 B. Self- De termination as a Limitation of Self-determination ....... 58 C. Prohibition of the Use of Force as a Limitation on State 
Sovereignty 
...................................... 60 
CHAPTER TWO: THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION 
.................. 
64 
Introduction ................................... ,******,, *,,,, **** Section I: Reasons for the Increase in Interventionary Activity .............. 
64 
64 
Section 11: Definition of Intervention 69 ................................ A. Intervention in Historical Perspective 
...................... 69 B. The Definition of Intervention ........................... 70 C. The Position of Intervention after the Charter ................ 74 Section III: Intervention in Civil Wars 
................................ 81 A. The Position in Traditional International Law ................ 81 B. Evaluation of the Traditional Rule ........................ 84 1. The First School: The Absolutist School ............... 84 2. The Second School: Assistance to Both Parties ........... 
86 
3. The Third School: The Pol icy- Orientated Approach ..... 88 A. Non- Intervention in Bilateral Treaties ..................... 94 B. Non -Intervention in Multilateral Treaties ................... 98 1. The UN Charter ................................ 98 2. Regional Organisations 
........................... 103 2.1. The OAU .............................. 103 2.2. The OAS 
......... - ** ' i ' i , * * 104 f ýra 2.3. The Pact of the Leagu e o b S ta t e s 104 
2.4. Other Cases ............................. C. Non -Intervention in the Context of Protocol Il of 1977 ......... 
105 
106 
D. The ICJ Decision in Nicaragua Case and its Impact on 
Intervention in Civil Wars ........ 110 1. The Status of Intervention in General International Law ... 110 2. The Content of the Principle of Non-Intervention ........ III 3. Assistance to Insurgents-Its Legality under 
International Law ............................... 112 4. Aid to Established Government ..................... 114 5. Self-Defence as an Answer to Intervention ............. 114 6. Evaluation of the Decision of the ICJ ................. 117 
3 
CHAPTER THREE: DEFINITIONS AND THE DELIMITATION OF THE SCOPE OF 
CIVIL WARS ............................................... 118 1. Introduction .............................................. 118 2. The Importance of Defining Civil Wars .......................... 118 3. Definition of Civil War Some Terminological Considerations ........... 119 Section I: Distinctions between Civil Wars and other Forms of Violence 
which Occur within the State .............................. 120 Section II: On the Legality of Civil Wars under International Law ......... 128 Section III: Definition of Civil Wars in Traditional International Law ....... 132 A. Classical Writers and the Definition of Civil Wars ............. 132 1. Grotius's Opinion ............................... 133 2. Vattel"s View ................... .* 134 B. Definition of Civil Wars and Recognition of Belýigerency 
and Insurgency ................................... 135 1. The Lieber Code ....................... ****'* : ** 
136 
2. The Recognition of Insurgency and Belligerency and their 
Impact on the Definition of Civil Wars ............ 138 2.1. Recognition of Insurgency .................. 138 2.2. Recognition of Belligerency ................. 
141 
2.2.1. The Conditions for the Granting of 
Belligerency .......................... 
142 
Section IV: Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
and the Definition of an Armed Conflict of a 
Non -International Character ......................... 
145 
A. Travaux Pr6paratoires and Definition of Armed Conflict not of an 
International Character, the Role of Sovereignty of Non- 
Intervention in that Process .......................... 
147 
B. Subsequent Practice and Situations to which Common 
Article 3 Applies .................................. 
159 
1. The ICRC and the Definition of an Armed Conflict 
not of an International Character and the 
Question of Determining the Existence of such 
a Conflict ................................. 161 2. The Doctrine and their Interpretation of the 
Situations to which Article 3 Applies ............. 
166 
Section V: Definition of Armed Conflicts of a Non -International Character in Protocol II of 1977 ........................................... 168 A. Definition: The Criteria ..... 168 B. Analysis of the Criteria of Armiý &nhiic't; ýi 
Non-International Character Included in Article I of Protocol 11176 
C. The Situations to which Article I of Protocol 11 
Applies ......................................... 177 D. Who Can Determine the Existence of a Non -International Armed 
Conflict within the Meaning of Article I of Protocol 11 ...... 179 E. The Relation of Article 3 to Protocol II ..................... 
183 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE PROTECTION OF THE VICTIMS OF INTERNAL WARS 191 
Introduction ....................... 191 Section 1: The Protection of the Victims of lntýrlnýl 
Conflicts under Customary International Law .................... 191 A. The Roots of the Protection of the Victims of War ............ 192 B. Customary Rules Concerning the Protection of the Victims of War 
in General ..................... ý: ............... 199 C. Customary Rules on the Protection of the ictims of War and 
Internal Conflicts ................................. 202 1. The State Practice in Cases of Civil Wars in which 
Recognition of Belligerency has Taken Place ........ 203 LL The American Civil War ................... 204 1.2. The Boer War ........................... 205 2. The State Practice in Cases where the Recognition of 
Belligerency has not Taken Place ................ 207 2.1. The Greek War of independence ............. 208 2.2. The Wars of Independence in Latin America ..... 209 2.3. Other Cases ............................. 210 2.4. Conclusions as to State Practice in Customary 
4 
International Law in Cases where the 
Recognition of Belligerency has not Taken 
Place ............................... 214 D. Can the Laws of War Apply in Situations of Civil Wars then the 
Recognition of Belligerency is Absent .................. 215 Section II: The Protection of the Victims of War in 
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention .......................... 219 A. The Travaux Prdparatoires of the Diplomatic Conference of 1949 
and the Protection of the Victims of Internal Wars ......... 220 1. The POW .. *:............................. 221 2. The Civilian ioýuiation ........................... 222 3. The First Working Group and its Work ................ 223 4. The Work of the Second Working Group ............... 225 5. Conclusions to be Drawn from the Travaux Prdparatoires .. 227 B. Analysis of the Actual Contents of Common Article 3 .......... 227 1. The First View ................................. 228 2. The Second View ............................... 230 3. Third View .................................... 230 4. Conclusion .................................... 232 C. Subsequent Practice Concerning Article 3 ................... 233 1. The State Practice in Actual Civil Wars ................ 233 I. I. The Civilian Population .................... 233 I. I. I. In Vietnam ...................... 233 1.1.2. Malaya ......................... 236 1.1.3. Algeria ......................... 236 1.1.4. Nigeria ......................... 239 1.1.5. Yemen ......................... 241 1.2. Captured Combatants ...................... 242 1.2.1. Algeria ......................... 244 1.2.2. Vietnam ........................ 247 1.3. The Wounded and Sick ..................... 251 1.3.1 In Vietnam ....................... 252 1.3.2. In Algeria ....................... 253 2. The UN Practice and the Protection of the Victims of 
Internal Wars ............................... 254 3. The ICJ and Article 3: the Nicaragua Case ............. 259 D. Conclusions ......................................... Section III: The Protection of the Victims of Internal Wars Under Protocol of 
261 
1977 ................................................ Introduction ............. .................................. 
263 
263 
A. The Concept of the ýictims of Internal Wars in Protocol 11 ...... 265 B. The Fundamental Guarantees of Article 4, the Contents and their 
Evaluation ...................................... 268 1. Persons Protected by Article 4 ..... ,****, ***, "*, **,, 269 2. The Content of the Guarantees of Article 4 ............ 272 B. Protection of Detained and Imprisoned Persons ............... 275 1. The Red Cross Experts" View ....................... 275 2. The Government Experts' View ..................... 276 3. The Diplomatic Conference Attitude ................. 276 4. Articles 5 and 6 of the Protocol 11 and the Protection of 
Detained Persons ............................ 278 4.1. Article 5 ............................... 279 4.2. Article 6 of Protocol Il (Penal Prosecutions) ..... 284 4.2.1. The Red Cross Experts" Opinion ....... 286 4.2.2. The Governments' Experts' View ...... 286 4.3.2. The Diplomatic Conference Attitude .... 288 4.2.4. Conclusions concerning the Evaluation 





1. The Distinction Between Combatants aný i4on- 
Combatants ................................ 2. The Definition of Civilians ............. 
299 
301 ........... 3. The Protection of the Civilian Population ..... ' * ', 302 4. Protection of Objects Indispensable to the Surviv ;1 W&ý 
Civilian Population .......................... 5. The Protection of Works and Installations Containing 
305 
5 
Dangerous Forces ............................ 308 5. Protection of Cultural Objects and Places of Worship ..... 309 7. Prohibition of Force Movements of Civilians ........... 311 8. General Conclusions Concerning the Articles on the 
Protection of Civilians ........................ 314 E. The Protection of the Wounded and Sick in Protocol II ......... 315 1. The Red Cross Experts' View ....................... 316 2. The Governments' Experts' View .................... 316 3. The Diplomatic Conference Attitude .*... ** ` ' * * ' 317 F. The Practice after the Adoption of the Two Prýtocol II 
s 
vis- :k -vi s 
the Protection of the Victims of Internal Wars ............ 321 1. The Practice in Relation to the Protection of Civilians ..... 321 LI. El Salvador ............................. 
322 
1.2. Nicaragua .............................. 
324 
1.3. Other Cases ............................. 
328 
2. The Practice vis-A-vis the Protection of Captured, Interned 
and Detained Persons in connection with Internal 
Conflicts after the Adoption of Protocol Il ......... 331 2.1. Emergency Legislation and Detained and Interned 
Persons in Connection with the Conflict ...... 332 2.2. The Practice in the Field ................... 
333 
3. The Practice and the Protection of the Sick and Wounded .. 336 
CHAPTER FIVE: COMPLIANCE WITH AND IMPLEMENTATION 
OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 
..................... 
339 
Introduction ................................................ 339 Section 1: Customary International Law, and the Question of Compliance with 
the Laws of War in General ....................... 
341 
A. Introduction ............................... * 
341 
1. Franciscus De Victoria .......................... 
343 
2. Balthazar Ayala ....................... 345 3. Alberico Gentili ...................... 345 4. Grotius 
............................. 346 5. Vattel ........ 347 ..................... 6. Conclusions as to the Views of Classical Writers .... 
348 
C. Internal Wars and Compliance with the Laws of War in Customary 
International Law ................................. 349 1. The Means of Compliance in Customary International 
Law ..................................... 350 I. I. Reprisals ...................... 352 2. Case Studies 
........ 353 2.1. The American War of Independence (1774-83) .... 
353 





2.2.2. Punishment of War Crimes: ......... 357 2.3. Other Cases ............................ 
359 
3. The Effects of Codification of the Laws of War and Means 
for Compliance with Them . .................... 
361 
D. The General Conclusions ............................... 
371 
Section 11: Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Compliance .......... 372 A. Travaux Priparatoires of Article 3 and the Question of 
Compliance 
...................................... 375 1. Protecting Power in Civil Wars .................... 376 2. The Legal Basis of Obligation of the Insurgents ......... 377 3. Reciprocity ................................... 378 4. Reprisals and the Taking of Hostages: ............... 378 5. Punishment of Violations ................. *'*** ... 379 6. The Role of the ICRC ........................... 380 7. Conclusions .................................... 381 B. Subsequent Practice of Article 3 and Means of Compliance with its 
Rules .......................................... 1. Reprisals and Taking of Hostages ................... 
381 
381 




1.3. Vietnam ............................... 385 4. The Nicaragua Case and the Question of Ensuring Respect 
for the Rules of Article 3 of Geneva Conventions .... 386 5. Conclusions on Compliance with Common Article 3 in 
Practice ................................... 
387 
Section III: Protocol 11 and the Question of Compliance ................. 388 
Introduction ................................................ A. The Travaux Prdparatoires and the Question of Compliance ...... 
388 
388 
1. ICRC Experts Conferences ........................ 388 2. The Government Experts Conferences ................ 389 3. The Diplomatic Conference: ............... 
391 
3.1. Reprisals ..... *'*........ ` 
396 
ons 
oFthe Rules of Protocol 3.2. Repression of Viýlati 
11: ................................. 
398 
3.3. The Relation Between Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions and the Protocol 11, in Relation to 
the Question of Right of Initiative of the 
ICRC . .............................. 
400 
3.4. Relief and Assistance ..................... 
402 
3.4.1. Humanitarian Aid and the Nicaragua 
Case .......................... 
405 
B. The Compliance with Humanitarian Law after the Adoption of 
Protocol 11 ...................................... 
406 
1. The Role of the ICRC ...... *****'***'******'*'*' , 
406 
2. The Role of Human Rights Instruments in the Control of 
Application of Fundamental Humanitarian Rules ..... 
407 
2.1. The UN System and the Control of Application of 




2.1.1. El Salvador Case ................... 
410 
2.1.2. Other Cases ...................... 
415 
2.1.3. Conclusions on the UN System and the 
Control of Application of Humanitarian 
Rules ......................... 
418 
2.2. The Practice in the Context of Latin-America .... 
418 
2.2-1. Nicaragua and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights and the 
Control of Application of Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law ............. 
419 
2.2.2. Other Cases ...................... 
421 
3. General Conclusions Concerning the Contribution of Human 
Rights Machinery to the Application and Enforcement 
of Humanitarian Rules in Internal Conflicts ........ 
425 
FINAL CONCLUSIONS ............................................ 
426 
A. On Definition of Internal Conflicts ........................ 
427 
1. In Customary International Law .................... 
427 
2. In the Context of Common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 ................................... 
429 
430 3. Protocol 11 .................................... 11. The Protection of the Victims of Internal Wars ..................... 432 A. In Customary international Law ......................... 
432 
B. The Protection of the Victims of Internal Conflicts under Common 
Article 3 ........................................ 
432 
C. In the Context of Protocol 11 ..,.......................... 433 11. The Question of Compliance and Implementation of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts ....................................... 434 A. In Customary Law ................................... 434 B. In the Context of Article 3 .............................. 435 C. In Protocol 11 ....................................... 435 
Bibliography ..................................................... 438 
SUMMARY 
Although internal conflicts are recurrent phenomena in the history of mankind. Their 
regulation by international law has been very slow. The usual explanation of this state of 
affairs is that such events touch directly on the survival of established Governments or 
even the existence of the State itself. 
States view with suspicion, fear and even hostility any attempt at the international level 
to regulate their conduct vis-1-vis their local enemies. 
They use the principles of sovereignty and non- intervention as a shield against any 
effective regulation of such tragic events by humanitarian law. 
However, no serious attempt has been made by international lawyers to study the issue 
of the influence of those two principles on the development of humanitarian law applicable 
in internal conflicts. 
This study tries to establish with exactitude how and where sovereignty and non- 
intervention have been resorted to, in order to hinder such regulation, and how other 
considerations (especially the concept of human rights) have opened the way to such 
regulation. 
In this respect the study after clarifying in the first two chapters, the meaning, the 
limitations, and the place in the practice of states of the principles of sovereignty and non- 
intervention, has concentrated on their influence on three main issues raised by internal 
conflicts, namely: 
1. The definition of internal conflicts. In this sphere, the question of the criteria or 
thresholds of internal conflicts to which humanitarian law is to be applied and the question 
of which authority has the power to decide the existence of an internal conflict, are dealt 
with in the context of customary law, common Article 3 and Protocol 11 of 1977. It is 
asserted that the claims of sovereignty and non -intervention have been used extensively to 
restrict any real progress in this area. 
2. The protection of the victims of internal wars. In this important area the study tries 
to trace the development of specific legal norms for the protection of the victims and to 
determine whether the concept of human rights has contributed in any way to better 
protection of those victims. 
Thus, a systematic examination and analysis of the travaux preparatolres of the 1949 and 
1974-1977 Diplomatic Conferences is undertaken, together with the subsequent practice of 
states, in order to establish where sovereignty and non -intervention have blocked progress, 
and where real development has taken place. 
3. Compliance and implementation of humanitarian law in internal conflicts. In this 
context it is established beyond any doubt that the claims of sovereignty and non- 
intervention have been used extensively, both in 1949 and also 1974-1977 to stop all 
attempts to institute measures for the control of application of humanitarian law, especially 
those measures which would involve third party supervision. However, it is asserted that 
human rights machinery may be used to fill this loophole as the UN practice shows. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of my thesis is to undertake a systematic study and research into the influence 
of two of the most important principles of international law of today, namely: sovereignty 
and non- intervention on the development in the field of humanitarian law relating to 
internal conflicts. 
Some may argue that the result of such an effort would be an exercise in the obvious, 
since there is a wide measure of agreement that the two principles have, to a large extent, 
simply blocked any real progress, in the field of humanitarian law applicable to internal 
conflicts. ' In my opinion, this is a very simplistic view; the issue is very complex and needs 
more thorough study and research to establish with exactitude where the two principles 
(sovereignty and non- intervention) have blocked progress and whether other considerations 
have led to some important developments. 
Such exercise will reveal the place and limits of these two principles in international law 
and also the extent to which humanitarian law has been developed in the very sensitive area 
of internal conflicts and eventually the relevance of international law to one of the most 
difficult challenges of our contemporary world, namely making civil wars more human. In 
other words, protecting human rights in very hostile circumstances, when the authority and 
legitimacy of the established Government is being challenged by force, by a section of its 
own citizens. 
In order to cover the subject, the thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter 
deals with the concept of sovereignty, its meaning, its place in State practice, doctrinal 
viewson its role, if any, in international order, and lastly, its limitations with human rights 
as one of the most important limitations. The chapter establishes that sovereignty is with 
us for the foreseeable future, it is a very important principle of international law though 
not absolute in character. Developments in international law are of capital importance in 
any assessment of the meaning and role of sovereignty in international law. 
1 
In this context, Best wrote: 
11... EA] strong doctrine of sovereignty statks through these protocots Like a riot squad. In one 
sense this is no change from 1949 or earHer; the Geneva Convention Like the rest of the taw of war, 
were buiLt on the presumption that Governments tawfulty were masters within their own territories 
and that State's sovereignty except in so far as they might votuntarity shed positions of it, was 
inviolabte". 
He further added that: 
"States, insistence on the plenitude on their sovereignty rights has been the mightiest obstacle, 
and international humanitarian Law, order and welfare were kept weak and undeveloped as a resuLt. 
Sovereignty's most striking positive assertion of itself in the protocols comes, not surprising in 
the opening 'scope' section of protocol 11 ... M. * 
(G. Best: Humanity In Warfare. Weidenfeld & Nicotson, London, 1980, pp. 322-323). Also, Aldrich, who was 
among the delegation which represented the US, stressed: 
"Excessive sensitivity to any provision that might be thought to give an Internationat status to 
rebeLs within such countries (newty independent States) or to retain the GovernmentaL forces in 
suppressing rebeLtions, resutted in a protocot 11 that affords very Limited protection and has 
escape ctauses designed to make its appLicabiLfty easHy deniablell. 
G. H. Aidrich: Some Ref tections on the Origin of the 1977 Protocols of Geneva, in C. Swinarski (ed. ): Etudes 
et essais sur te droit internationat humanitalre et sur tes principes de la Croix Rouge. Martinus Nilhoff, 
1984, p. 136. 
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The second chapter is about intervention or rather the principle of non- intervention, 
because this principle has also been always used against the extension of humanitarian rules 
to internal conflicts, its place and limits in international law. State practice, doctrinal views, 
in this sphere are extensive, my aim is to establish what does non -intervention mean when 
used in the context of internal conflicts. 
The other three chapters (3,4 and 5), which constitute the heart of my thesis will deal 
with three main aspects of humanitarian law in internal conflicts where the above two 
principles were used. These chapters, in effect, constitute an empirical research into how 
and where those two concepts have been used by States, and how they influenced the 
emergence of new humanitarian rules or conversely, how they toppled such prospects. 
The third chapter deals with the question of the definition of civil wars (non- 
international armed conflicts). In my view, this is a very important question since the whole 
application of humanitarian law to such conflicts depends on how the events which take 
place in a given State, can be characterised, by whom and on what grounds. 
Thus, in this context, the concept of recognition of belligerency in customary 
international law, the absence of definition of non -international armed conflict in common 
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and finally the definition of such conflicts in 
Article I of Protocol 11 of 1977, constitute different reactions on the legal level to the 
question of definition. 
My view is that the concepts of sovereignty and non-intervention have either directly or 
indirectly influenced the course of action in the above three contexts. As a result, the 
definition or non-definition policy was done with due regard to the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention in order to always give priority to the claims of the 
established Government which reflects, in effect, the preference of international law to the 
claims of legitimacy of the established Governments, rather than the plight of insurgents. 
Moreover, definition or non-definition constantly poses the question of who can 
determine the existence of the conflict. No answer can be found either in customary 
international law, common Article 3 or Protocol 11. This, in practice, means that the idea 
of objectivity (the existence of objective criteria which does not need any specific organ 
for their determination) gives way to the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, 
because those principles would give the Government in power the presumed right of auto- 
determination. 
The fourth chapter is a thorough study and research into the influence of the two 
concepts: on the development of humanitarian rules relating to the protection of the victims 
of internal conflict (the civilian population, the sick and wounded and captured 
combatants). The importance of this chapter stems from the fact that it deals with the fate 
of human beings during the tragic experience of civil wars. In effect, it is human rights 
of individuals against their own State which is at the root of the problem. 
The legal developments from customary international law to the Protocol 11 in this field 
are dealt with. While on one hand, more rights were granted to specific categories of the 
victims such as the civilians and the wounded and sick, on the other hand, captured 
combatants are still considered as criminals. The conclusion of this chapter is that the 
arguments of sovereignty and non- intervention were not used in a systematic way, to 
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eliminate humanitarian rules for the protection of the victims of internal wars because 
human rights were in general accepted as a valid limitation upon the conduct of States Vis- 
i-vis their own citizens. 
The fifth chapter deals with the question of enforcement and implementation of 
humanitarian law in internal conflicts: it asks the question of compliance, its importance 
since the significance of the rules adopted with respect to the protection of the victims of 
internal conflicts, depends in the final analysis, on their respect and application in practice. 
A general investigation into the question in humanitarian law as a whole and not only that 
part concerning internal conflicts is carried out. It is established that if arguments of 
sovereignty and non- intervention have directly or indirectly slowed down the development 
of legal mechanisms for the control of applications of humanitarian law between States. In 
contrast, in the sphere of internal conflict, they destroyed any prospect for such a control. 
The travaux prkparatoires of Article 3 and Protocol 11 especially are very clear in this 
respect. 
However, my argument is that the ICRC, and the mechanisms of human rights can, to 
some extent, (in practice) fill this gap (of the absence of mechanisms of control). The 
practice of the ICRC, the UN, and some regional organisations (such as the OAS) in internal 
conflicts, by using the mechanisms of control of human rights, in this respect, is very 
important. This shows again the importance of human rights as a limitation upon State 
sovereignty, since States are not systematically opposed to such attempts. 
The method used in dealing with the subject matter of my thesis, is generally an 
historical- legal and positivist approach. Legal development are traced according to three 
main periods: in customary international law, in the context of common Article 3 and 
finally in Protocol 11. This has been done especially with the chapters which deal with 
humanitarian law (the third, fourth and fifth chapters). In all these periods the aim is to 
discover the influence of the concepts of sovereignty and non -intervention and by the same 
token to find how international law responds to the problems posed by internal conflicts. 
The positivist element in my method means essentially that State practice will be of 
importance, that of course does not exclude my use of the doctrine which is a secondary 
source of international law, and at the same time may afford different interpretation of 
State practice. However, I must make it clear that travaux pr6paratolres occupy a very 
special place in my approach, especially in the context of chapters 3,4 and 5. The reason 
is that in order to discover the influence of the principles of sovereignty and non- 
intervention, either positively or negatively, on the development of humanitarian law 
relating to internal conflicts, a review and analysis of the position of States, during the 
discussion of different rules is essential to establish the extent and the result of the use of 





The State is still the most important unit in the composition of contemporary international 
society and also the most important subject of international law, sovereignty is the main 
legal characteristic of the State. Internal wars, on the other hand, touch the heart of States, 
they challenge directly or indirectly, the legitimacy and authority of the established 
Government. States resort to the invocation of the principle of sovereignty in order to have 
a free hand to deal with their internal enemies, and at the same time use the principle (of 
sovereignty) to oppose normative innovations at the international level. 
Hence, I begin my thesis with a chapter dealing with sovereignty, its meaning, its place 
in State practice and its limitations. Doctrinal views on the role of sovereignty will also be 
dealt with. This exercise will show the exact position of sovereignty in modern international 
law. 
My opinion is that sovereignty (which goes throughout the study), is the main pillar of 
the existing international order and a central element in any discussion of a new world 
order. However, sovereignty must be constructed and understood within the framework of 
the fundamental changes which have been introduced in international law especially since 
the advent of the UN Charter in 1945. 
With the above qualifications in mind, sovereignty cannot be used by States to justify 
massive violations of human rights, or to deny the exercise of the right of self- 
determination or to ignore the constraints and limitations placed upon their conduct when 
dealing with internal strife. 
Moreover, sovereignty cannot be used as a plea to pursue policies which contradict the 
obligations that international law has placed upon States when dealing with each other such 
as respect for independence and territorial integrity of others, and banning of aggression 
in its different forms. Thus, sovereignty can be a guarantee for peace in international 
society and not an obstacle to it, viz. when understood and acted upon with respect for 
international law and not outside it (international law which has been developed since the 
UN Charter). That law which is changing slowly to suit the new 'rapport de force' in 
international society and becoming more and more truly 'international' in character. In my 
view, sovereignty can also be a guarantee for peace and justice at the national level, that 
is within States, however, when full respect for self-determination and human rights is 
adhered to. 
In order to cover the subject of this chapter, I will deal with the following points: First, 
the meaning of sovereignty by the differents shools of thaught such as the Western, 
Communist and Third World ones and the pronouncements of international courts on this 
subject; secondly, the role of the concept of sovereignty in the contemporary international 
order, i. e., in State practice and the doctrine. Last but least, the limitations of sovereignty 
such as the human rights, self-determination, and the prohibition of the use of force. 
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Section I: The Meaning of Sovereignty 
Sovereignty is the natural product of the history of Christian Europe, but the concept is not 
strange to other civilizations and cultures. Thus, the idea that 'God' is the supreme 
sovereign of the universe is at the heart of the Islamic religion and thought, the Holy Koran 
states: 
"Allah, is He beside Whom there is no god, the sovereign, the most Holy, the Source 
of peace t the 
Bestower od Security, the Protector, the Mighty, the subduer, the 
Exalted". 
This means that sovereignty in Islamic tradition belongs only to God; it is absolute in 
character and covers the whole universe. In this context, in March 1949, the PM of the then 
new State of Pakistan introduced a resolution, which he wanted to be the Preamble of the 
new Constitution, and which was adopted by the Constituent Assembly, it stated: 
"Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God almighty alone and 
authority which he has delegated to the State of Pakistan through 3 
its people for being 
exercised within the limits prescribed by him is a sacred trust". 
In Europe, the contradictions which plagued the feudal society resulted in the triumph of 
the King over his competitors, he concentrated the power in his hands in a defined territory 
and succeeded in eliminating his rivals in the competing centres of influence and power 
within his State. In fact, sovereignty was one of the necessary elements in the building of 
the modern State on the basis of feudalism. It permitted the establishment of a national 
organisation in the form of one centralised administration, with the King as the supreme 
sovereign, which meant that all officials within the State were obliged to give their 
obedience to only one person. This opened the way in turn for the unifying of the legal 
system of the country, the steady flow of revenues which led to the establishment of strong 
national armies. 
Sovereignty has also eliminated any foreign influence or intervention. Thus, practically 
speaking sovereignty was a very useful tool in the emergence of the concept of State. 
Actually, it (sovereignty) can be legitimately seen as a valid description of Statehood. The 
fundamental changes which occurred in Europe in the structure of the feudal society from 
the political, economic and social spheres, were translated in the political and legal thought 
in the form of the concept of sovereignty. Medieval doctrine, especially Brodin who dealt 
extensively with the notion of sovereignty, the meaning of the notion, was exposed. It 
served essentially to support the building of unified strong States. Sovereignty was seen as 
absolute, indivisible and embodied in the King, he has the absolute legislative power within 
his realm, externally he is not subject to any other higher authority or legislator. 
Sovereignty was also adopted as from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 as the guiding 
principle of relations among States. it is to be observed that the European origins of 
2 
The Ouran. Transtated by K. Zafruttah, Curzon Press Ltd., London & Dubtin, 1971, Chapter 59, part 28, 
p. 557. 
3 
cited by J. H. W. Verzijt: Internationat Low in Historicat Perspective. Vol. l. A. W. Sfjthoff, Leyden, 1968, 
p. 265. 
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sovereignty in the context of international law, meant in practice that it has been recognized 
firstly only to Christian European States, which have been characterized as 'civilized'. This 
meant that those States accepted that any attempt by any one of them to establish any kind 
of hegemony over the others is a clear violation of the rules of international law. 
Consequently, less developed and uncivilised peoples and territories have been for a long 
time denied any recognition. As a result, their territories were occupied. Their legal systems 
were not recognized and their resources exploited. 4 
After these preliminary observations, I will now proceed to the meaning of sovereignty 
(as the different definitions of the notion will reveal) in modern international law. It must 
be stressed, that the meaning of the concept of sovereignty has been and is being dealt with 
by the doctrine, since it is a fundamental key to the understanding of the relevance of the 
limits of international law, in internal, as well as external, of the State's activities. 
International courts (the PCIJ and the ICJ particularly) have, also, in many instances found 
it necessary to pronounce themselves upon the meaning of sovereignty in order to decide 
many concrete cases. 
The simplest definition of sovereignty (a dictionary definition) concentrates on the main 
formal attributes of the concept. Thus, it is "the freedom of State from outside control in 
the conduct of its internal and external affairs". 5 In fact, there are two aspects in this 
definition, the internal and external ones. The former means "freedom to manage its 
domestic affairs without interference. This implies the power to establish its own 
constitution to make and administer its own laws, and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over 
6 all persons and things within its territory". Whereas the latter means "to conduct its foreign 
relations without control on the part of another State", 7 in other words, it means 
independence. 
This often used definition is neutral and formal. Neutral in the sense that all regimes can 
claim sovereignty because the nature of the regime (democratic or otherwise) is irrelevant. 
It is as well formal in the sense that it hides the realities of the 'working sovereignty' where 
abuse of using sovereignty as a justification for illegal actions such as violations of human 
rights and intervention in the internal affairs of weaker States are a common feature and 
widespread. 
A. The Western School 
In this connection Brierly maintains that sovereignty 
"... [S]tands for the power of modern States to decide and act without consulting 
4 
In this context, see H. But t and A. Watson (eds. ): The Expansf on of International Society. Clarendon Press, 
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others and without concern for anything but their own interests as they themselves 
conceive those interests". 8 
It seems to me that this definition does not differ much from the one which has been 
advanced by Vattel. The latter observes that: 
* .... Cest une consiquence manifeste de la liberti et de l'ind8pendance des nations, que toutes sont en droit de gouverner comme elles le jugent ä propos et qu'aucune 
n'a le moindre droit de se m81er du gouvernement d'une autre. "9 
And he then adds: 
"De tous les droits qui peuvent appartenir A une nation, la souverainet6 est sans doute 
le plus prdcieux, et celui que les autres doivent respecter le plus scrupuleusement si 
elles ne veulent pas lui faire injure". 10 
In my opinion, Brierly's definition would mean in practice, that firstly, powerful States will 
enjoy more sovereignty than others, since they have the might to decide and act according 
to their interests whereas weaker States cannot do the same. Secondly, this definition would 
not guarantee internally the enjoyment of human rights of any State (whether weak or 
strong) and the maintenance of public peace, since the Government has a very wide range 
of discretion to do what it sees and considers as its own interest. 
Schwarzenberger maintains that the meaning of sovereignty as a principle of international 
law can be found in the Island of Palmas Case, when the sole Arbitrator, Max Weber, 
stated: 
... [S]overeignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the riýht to exercise therein to the exclusion of 
any other State, the functions of a State". 1 
On the basis of this opinion, it seems that sovereignty is generally of a negative character 
as its main element is the prohibition of intervention in the internal affairs of States. 
Levi takes as a point of departure in his analysis of the meaning of sovereignty, Max 
Huber's statement (cited above). He writes that. 
"... [S]overeignty signifies in the political and legal sphere the people's insistence that 
8 
M. Whiteman: Digest of Internationat Law, Vot. 1, US Dept. of State, Washington D. C., 1963, p. 237. 
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and political sovereignty. To him, sovereignty in its internal aspect is concerned with the identity of the 
bearer of supreme authority within a State. Whereas political sovereignty is 'the necessary concomitant of 
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superstructure which has been so far grafted on the taw of unorganized international society,. G. 
Schwarzenberger: International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals. VoL. I. 3rd ed. Stevens 
& Sons Ltd., London, 1957, p. 144. See also the same author: International Law and Order. Stevens & Sons 
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their State shall be supreme and its individuality inviolate". 12 
He then remarks that: 
"... [A] State is sovereign when there is no higher auýhority directing its behaviour, 
when it is free to make its own political decisions". ' 
He also stresses that because interactions between States are growing all the time '... the 
mutual sensitivities among States allow only for varying degrees of independence. ' 14 In 
other words, there is in fact, no absolute independence, the question is relative and depends 
upon the degree of co-operation between States at a given time. He maintains that legal 
sovereignty is easy to define since the language of law is more precise than that used in 
politics, however, the problem which faces lawyers '... is that State's submissions to 
international law may not be reconcilable with legal sovereignty'. 15 Such a problem, in his 
opinion, does not exist in the political arena, because politicians always look for pragmatic 
solutions, they understand very well that there is no absolute independence, and that it is 
always a 'question of more or less' so they try at all times to enlarge independence and 
diminish obligations. 16 
The main criticism of this view is that it is not only in politics that the concept of 
sovereignty is seen as relative, but as well in legal theory and State practice where the 
overwhelming view is that sovereignty is not absolute, and that the submission of the State 
to international law has never been questioned by States, at least verbally. 
Visscher shares Levi's view to some extent. He writes: 
".... [T]he politician does not usually mistake the limits imposed on State actions by the 
existence of other States. In the ordinary course of things he accepts the duties and 
burdens which these limits imply". 17 
However, he concedes that 'the fact remains that over and against the law the State holds 
in reserve the plea of sovereignty'. 18 
I believe if the daily business of politicians (bargaining, accepting concessions, gaining 
advantages due to factual strength etc. ) is taken into account when defining sovereignty, 
a great number of States will be considered as simply having no sovereignty, or at least only 
having a small portion of it. Hence, it is important to know that in law each State has an 
12 
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equal degree of sovereignty, the right to invoke it in case of need and that limitations upon 
sovereignty are not factual differences, however important, but only agreed standards. 
Fenwick sees sovereignty of the State as 'the independence of any higher control of its 
right to take the law into its own hands when what it believes to be its vital interest at 
stake'. 19 This is an extreme view of the meaning of sovereignty because it is conceived as 
a concept outside the bounds of international law, especially the developments introduced 
by the UN Charter (e. g. Article 2/4). This kind of meaning suits the powerful; might would 
be right seen in the context of civil wars, this attitude would allow the State to oppose any 
normative development and would open the door for a wealth of cruelties to human beings. 
On the other hand, Verzijl introduces some important clarifications as to the meaning of 
sovereignty. According to him, sovereignty has ceased to be a single concept and that it 
disintegrated into different notions. As a result, the legal theory distinguishes between three 
aspects of the notion (of sovereignty) in his words 'one directed inward, one outward, one 
sideward and one upward'. 20 Then, the inward aspect made sovereignty appear as the 
absolute power of the King over his country without any competitors inside the land. The 
outward and sideward aspect affected his relationship with his fellow Kings, on the one 
hand and his position vis-k-vis the once paramount powers of the Emperor and the High 
Pontiff on the other hand. 21 
The third upward aspect related to the crucial problems as to whether the 'sovereign' is 
supreme inside and independent outside was completely exempt from any bounds or 
remained subject to higher command. 
Verzijl argues that historically even the most absolute monarchs were supposed to be 
subordinated to God and his higher authority, however, it was the work of legal philosophy 
and Statesmen who carried sovereignty to the extreme. Hence, he writes: 
"The notion of sovereignty disintegrated into three completely distinct concepts: 
Those supreme power within the state, of independence from any other earthly 
power; ang. of an initially denied exemption from any legal or moral bound 
whatever ". 2 
He then makes the point that "by nevertheless maintaining the same word for three such 
23 different notions legal doctrine sowed the seeds of a fatal confusion of ideas'. He suggests 
that it is better to remove the term 'sovereignty from the juristic vocabulary" because it 
covers a series of homonyms that threaten to make any rational discussion of 'sovereignty' 
as such a Babylonian confusion of tongues, and leave it as a subject of speculation to legal 
philosophers [the notion of Rechtssouver Anitat] theologians [the sovereignty of God] or 
politicians [the Netherlands Anti -Re vol utionary Party's slogan 'sovereignty in one's own 
19 
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c, ircle'". 24 He then went on to argue that: 
the word 'sovereignty' is to be banned from the vocabulary of international 
law, then, it is possible to replace it by other Words which denote equivalent ideas 
in accordance with the context in which it was to be used such as independence, 
territorial supremacy, higher authority etC. "25 
It follows that it would be possible to dissolve the notion of sovereignty understood as the 
'power of the State to act according to its own free will within the limits of the law of 
nations'26 into a number of competencies' as reflected in the relations of a State to other 
States, regarding respectively its powers of exclusive territorial supremacy, of command 
over its nationals even abroad and the protection of its vital interests against foreign 
infringement. 27 
Seemingly. the general theme of Verzijl's argument is that there is no such thing as 
sovereignty, if we want to be legally precise, there are different elements (competences) of 
sovereignty in international law. It is better to use the name of any element, according to 
the needs of the context. In my view, this suggestion would, in practice, create many 
problems, States may differ as to the number and the subject of those competencies and the 
relative importance of each of them. Nevertheless, the importance of Verzijl's view lies in 
the fact that he sees sovereignty as a legal concept which is regulated and influenced by the 
state of development of international law. In that sense he is one of those who see 
sovereignty inside and not outside international law. This is very important for our subject 
since sovereignty may mean that States can be under obligation to respect certain standards 
of human behaviour in internal conflicts. 
Lauterpacht takes approximately the same view as Verzijl. He writes: 
"... [S]overeignty to a State is a condition for its recognition as a subject of international law, thus the State must not be sovereign in the sense of being independent of any other State only but it must also possess legal sovereignty in the 
accepted meaning of international law". 28 
This implies that sovereignty is made as the most important condition for the coming into 
existence of the State onto the international scene. According to him, sovereignty on the 
internal level gives the State the complete freedom of action within its borders. However, 
it must respect its obligations arising from treaties to which it had given its consent. Also, 
it must treat aliens in accordance with the minimum standards of civilization. As regards 
the external level, he observes that: 
24 
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"... [A]Ithough the subjection of the State to international law is b? Jh indispensable, 
hypothesis and an acknowledged principle of the law of nations". 
He then quickly notices that this subjection to international law is purely formal and that 
the 'present day international law recognises that each State is independent not only of other 
States but also of the totality of States acting as organs of what is known as the international 
community,. 30 This means that by law each State is the sole judge of its own cause, and that 
it is free to proclaim and insist upon its views in relation to other States, however, always 
within international law rules. 
Moreover, Lauterpacht, after a detailed study of sovereignty, arrives at the conclusion 
that 'a State's sovereignty is a quality, a competence conferred by international law'. 31 He 
adds: 
"... [S]overeignty is a delegate's bundle of rights, it is a power which is derived from 
a higher source and therefore divisible, modifiable and elastic". 32 
We can infer from Lauterpacht's opinion that sovereignty is seen as a legal concept capable 
of being defined in international law, the meaning of which is closely linked with the state 
of advance of international law. He stresses that sovereignty is still extensive, internally and 
externally. Furthermore, he expresses the view that in the absence of a world legislature and 
an obligation to submit disputes to a world court, the role of international law in the 
international society is nominal. 
In my opinion, Lauterpacht's view which received wide credence in the West, is not 
accurate in many respects. Thus, to bind the effectiveness of international law to the 
existence of a world legislature and a world court is to make a specific idea of law prevail, 
that is the Western tradition which stresses the importance of a third party adjudication. 
However, international law can be effective without a real need to a central parliament 
and a world court because States can use, especially in the area of settlement of disputes, 
different methods which international law provide and among them but not exclusively the 
courts. 
McLaurin defines sovereignty as 'making decisions that are primarily adjustments to 
33 conditions and demands of others'. This definition may be considered as a description of 
the factual situation of the relations between States, nonetheless, its weakness lies in the fact 
that it omits the relevance of international law, which may very well be used to safeguard 
States (inparticular the weak ones) against demands which may compromise their 
independence. 
Brownlie emphasises that 'the sovereignty and equality constitute the basic doctrine of 
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the law of nations. '34 He writes: 
"If international law exists, then the dynamics of state sovereignty can be expressed 
in terms of law, and, as states are equal and have legal personality, sovereignty is in 
a major aspect a relation to other states (and to organizations of states) defined by 
law. The principal corollaries of the sovereignty and equality of states are: (i) A 
jurisdiction, prima facie, exclusive over a territory and the permanent population 
living there; (ii) a duty of non-intervention in the area of exclusive jurisdiction of 
other states; and (iii) the dependence of obligations arising from customary law and 35 treaties on the consent of the obligor". 
He adds: 
"... [T]he manner in which the law expresses the content of sovereignty varies, and 
indeed the whole of the law can be expressed in terms of the co-existence of 
sovereignties". 36 
He concludes by stating that '"in general 'sovereignty' characterizes powers and privileges 
resting on customary law and independent of the particular consent of another State". 
37 
The importance of Brownlie's view stems from the fact that, first, he stresses the 
importance of equality in dealing with sovereignty. This factual inequality in sovereignty 
between States does not infringe the legal equality. Secondly, he regards sovereignty as a 
legal phenomenon capable of being defined, at any given moment, and the importance of 
international law is emphasized in such exercise. 
However, the weakness of Brownlie's view lies in the fact that he still stresses the formal 
aspects of sovereignty. He sees sovereignty primarily as a legal category, there is no 
emphasis on the influence of self-determination, or the impact of the participation of many 
new States on the meaning and content of sovereignty. The latter has ceased, in my view, 
to be a primarily formal concept. It is a very comprehensive concept which covers 
economic, social and cultural aspects as well. 
It can be concluded that the Western view on sovereignty is much more concerned about 
analyzing the legal meaning of the concept, rather than its political and economic 
implications. Thus, sovereignty is a number of legal competencies which can be defined and 
which every State can enjoy under the auspices of international law. Yet, the Western view 
does not dwell on whether those competencies can be exercised in practice by every State 
without any obstacles taking into account the de facto inequality between States. 
On the other hand, the positive side of the Western view is that it can be easily reconciled 
with the contention that human rights must be respected in all events and especially in cases 
of internal wars. Because the view stresses that sovereignty must be exercised within the 
bounds of international law, hence once we can prove that human rights have been accepted 
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as a legal limitation on sovereignty by States, then the competence of the Government to 
maintain law and order especially in cases of civil wars is not unlimited. 
B. The Marxist Theory and the Meaning of Sovereignty 
In 1949, the representatives of Canada, China, France, the UK and the US reported to the 
UNGA (concerning the difference between the UN and Soviet plans for an international 
control systems for atomic energy). They stated: 
"All the sponsoring powers other than the USSR, put world security first and are 
prepared to accept innovations in traditional concepts of international co-operation, 
national sovereignty and economic organization, where these are necessary for 
security. The Government of the USSR put its sovereignty first and was unwilling 
to accept measures which may iM inge upon or interfere with its rigid exercise of 
unimpeded state of sovereignty". 
W 
This, in effect, means that the USSR clinged to a very rigid concept of sovereignty like that 
of the 18th and 19th centuries. Despite of the above statement, it seems that this is not 
wholly true, the Soviet Union in fact, stressed the importance of international law as a real 
means of settling different problems between States, which indirectly means that 
sovereignty it not seen as absolute. 
In this context, the Soviet representative at the 1964 Mexico City meeting of the UN 
Special Committee on the Principles of Friendly Relations is reported to have stated that 
9some countries have even considered that international law too was an invasion of State 
sovereignty and that his own delegation did not share such a view. He maintained that his 
country held the view that the rules of international law restricted the freedom of States 
with a view to safeguarding international peace and security, without infringing the 
sovereignty of the States concerned'. He added that his country's politics and Soviet legal 
doctrine were consistent with that view. '39 
However, the truth of the matter is that Communist writers in general, stress the 
importance of sovereignty in international law, it guarantees the development of different 
social and economic systems, it is one of the democratic principles of classical international 
law. They see sovereignty as a fundamental political rule which all States adhere to since 
it "excludes by its very nature any 'ideological reconciliation' between socialism and 
imperialism". 40 The meaning of sovereignty in their view is not a static one. Krylov writes: 
"... [A]t different stages of the evelopment of class society the concept of sovereignty 
had different class rneaning". 
ý' 
He stressed that: 
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"... [F]rom the standpoint of the theory of international law, sovereignty means the 
independence and autonomy of the State in domestic and foreign relations". 
42 
Tunkin, on the other hand, stresses that sovereignty in the present era of the development 
of international relations is not an obstacle to the realisation of the principles banning 
recourse to force, the co-operation between States and peaceful co-existence of opposing 
social systems. He stated: 
"Cest la politique de force suivie par les Etats impdrialistes dans les intdrdts des 
grandes compagnies priv6es qui emp8che ]a r6alisation du principe de non-recours 
A la force". 43- 
This means that sovereignty among other things is not an absolute concept. Another Soviet 
author, Mouchan maintains that the notion of jus cogens contained in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties (Article 53) is not confined to the law of treaties but it 
is applicable to all actions of States in every sphere of international life. He observes: 
"Under the circumstances the notion of Jus cogens fills the gap and should be 
interpreted as applicable to all both unilateral and joint, acts by States in their 
relations with one another; it is an integral component of the concept of modern 
international law and order". 44 
It is inferred from the above that the principle of sovereignty cannot be used to justify any 
action on the part of States which contradict any norm of Jus cogens. 
Some Communist writers tried to give a full picture of the meaning of sovereignty in 
Communist thinking. In this contex, Gedmanu, a Romanian lawyer, gives a detailed 
definition of sovereignty. He writes: 
"The unique, full and indivisible supremacy of the State power within the limit of 
the territorial frontiers and the independence of this power in relation to any other 
power, which is expressed in the State's exclusive and inalienable right to lay down 
and carry out its home and foreign policy independently to discharge its functions 
to implement the practical measures for organizing its social life at home and its 
foreign relations on the basis of respect for the sovereignty of other States for the 
principles and norms of international law accepted of its own will #. 45 
Other Communist writers consider sovereignty as being the facility or an aptitude of a 
people to shape their fate and destiny freely. 46 Nastasesco notes that the main elements of 
sovereignty are: (i) exclusive State power in discharging the functions specific to the State; 
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(ii) indivisibility, that is full freedom of choice in using the whole set of prerogatives of 
State power; and, (iii) inalienability which means the impossibility of ceding State power 
either to some foreign power or to some international body. 47 
Chaumont maintains also, that sovereignty still has a very important role to play in the 
age of nuclear confrontation, in the tradition of dialectic analysis. He stresses that 
sovereignty is not 'un pouvoir illusoire de tout faire ni un pouvoir irr6el de tout refuser'. 48 
He writes: 
"... [La souverainet6] ne peux jamais disigner que l'aptitude de l'Etat ä participer au 
maximum ä la vie internationale dans la situation oü la giographie et l'histoire l'ont 
place ff . 
49 
He sees a direct link between sovereignty and self-determination. Thus, according to him, 
'la souverainet6, c'est le droit des peuples & son stade de rialisation. '50 However, Chaumont 
warns that sovereignty is not a static concept, he adds: 
"Mais dans apj! cu; Lq4s, il ne s'agit d'un concept statique car la souverainetd rdalis6e, 
tout comme le droit des peuples dans la phase de revendication, est une cr6ation 
continue et une vigilance de tous les instants". 51 
From the above definitions, it seems that Marxist lawyers take sovereignty very seriously, 
it is important for a Communist State since it excludes foreign interference in its internal 
affairs and it gives the ruling class every power they need for the consolidation of the 
Communist regime inside the State. In other words, sovereignty can play a very progressive 
role as it will be used for the benefits of the great majority of the population. 
C. Third World Views on the Meaning of Sovereignty 
Third World lawyers in general regard the traditional concept of sovereignty as very 
negative and restrictive in its meaning. They advocate like Socialist lawyers a broad 
meaning. In this respect, Bedjaoui for example. argues that the classical concept of 
sovereignty which has been translated into the UN Charter is only defined by its political 
elements whereas the economic elements are absent. This leads to the inevitable consequence 
that sovereignty to a new State is a 'drapeau, hymne national et siýge aux Nations UnieS'52 
while the reality of power resides elsewhere. 
in my opinion, Ghozali seems to have made the best attempt by a Third World lawyer to 
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participate actively in international affairs. In his view, sovereignty must mean other things 
than the mere proclamations of legal equality. He writes: 
"Elie [la souverainet6] implique la prohibition de l'intervention, et toute forme 
d'ingdrence. Comme toute menace dirig6e contre la personnalitd d'un Etat, ou contre 
ses 616ments politiques, 6conomiques et culturels. Elie se traduit par le droit 
imprescriptible de chaque peuple de d6terminer librement son destin, et de choisir 
son r6gime politique, 6conomique et social". 53 
He then adds: 
"La souverainet8 ne signifie plus uniquement l'ind8pendance nationale. Elle 
s'accomplit dans le diveloppernent. Elle signifie 'le droit au diveloppement'n. 54 
As a result, sovereignty is seen by this writer as a political arm against inequality and 
intervention in the internal affairs of States. 
Third World writers then stress that sovereignty has to be broadened and strengthened. 
It has to give the State the necessary powers to transform the economic, social and cultural 
structures of the society and guarantee that no forms of interference in that process by 
outside powers is allowed. On the external front, they advocate that a real and positive 
meaning must be given to 'independence', so that it allows a just participation in the 
economic relations and in other fields also such as communications, etc. 
The position of Third World countries in the Diplomatic Conference (1974-1977) in 
relation to the application of that law to internal conflicts confirms their attachment to a 
very rigid version of the concept of sovereignty. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that their 
opposition to the extension of humanitarian rules to internal conflicts, was not because they 
were inhuman. The real reason was, in fact, that they feared that such extension would, in 
practice, open the door to foreign intervention and would violate their sovereignty. They 
wanted to have a free hand to deal with internal rebellion, and consequently the concept 
of sovereignty offers them the best defence. 
In this context, the Indian representative in the Diplomatic Conference (1974-77) best 
described the state of mind of the majority of States and especially Third World countries 
when he argued that: 
" 
... 
[I]f a world government existed, there would be no reason to fear violations of 
sovereignty but things being what they were, developing countries were bent on 
protecting their sovereignty and had set their hearts on working for their own 
"55 development without external interference. 
It must be noted that even among Third World countries the feeling was that sovereignty 
must not be seen as an impregnable fortress, inroads into it were necessary if mankind is 
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to be respected. Illustrating this view, the Algerian delegate noted that: 
"... [H]umanitarian law and national sovereignty should not be considered 
irreconcilable and ... hoped that a suitable 
balance could be reached". 56 
The fact is that the fear of the Third World countries from the extension of humanitarian 
law to internal conflicts, stems from their belief that they are the real theatre of such wars 
which means that allegations of violations of its rules would, in practice, be directed against 
them. Moreover, they always suspect European humanitarianism of concealing realms of 
interference and domination. 
Against this background, Bedjaoui has, in a recent report, stressed that: 
"... [T]hird world should not distrust humanitarian law because of its apparent Western 
flavour. Concern for the integrity and dignity of the human person is a sort of 
'common heritage of mankind' not the property of one specific society". 
He added that humanitarian law must not become a victim of the reactions of the Third 
World to alien domination. " These comments relate to humanitarian law in general which 
presumably includes the part of that law concerned with internal conflicts since concern for 
the integrity and dignity of mankind cannot be different according to the formal nature of 
the conflict. Better, sovereignty must not abstract the application of humanitarian law to 
internal conflicts. 
D. International Courts and the Meaning of Sovereignty 
The PCIJ and later the ICJ have in some actual cases, dealt with some aspects of 
sovereignty. In general, sovereignty is seen as a bulk of competencies exercised by the State 
within the ambit of international law. Thus, in the Lotus Case, the PCIJ held: 
"International law governs relations between independent States ... the rule of 
law 
binding upon States therefore emanates from their own free will ... restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed". 58 
Accordingly, it is independence which gives international law its ralson d'etre, its existence 
and development, it is directly connected with the existence of independent States. 
Independence is given here a very broad scope, so it is in essence unlimited which means 
that the State retains full freedom of action. Only when it accepts restrictions in the form 
of binding legal rules can that State be considered prohibited from doing or not doing the 
sort of action agreed to. 
Many other statements of international courts stress either directly or indirectly that 
sovereignty means the right of the State to exercise freely all its competencies inside its 
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territory without any interference. The only restriction is to respect international law, 
however, when the subject is dealt with and regulated by that law, in the absence of such 
regulations sovereignty reigns. 59 
In the Customs Reeime between Germanv and Austria (advisory ODInlon), the PCIJ had 
an occasion to define independence. It stated that: 
"The independence of Austria must be understood to mean the continued existence 
of Austria within her present frontiers as a separate State with the sole right of 
decision in all matters economic, political, financial or other with the resultthat that 
independence is violated, as soon as there is any violation thereof, either in the 
economic, political, or any other field, these different aspects of independence being 
in practice one and indivisible, a violation of any of them would mean a violation of 60 Austria's independence". 
Seemingly, the Court uses independence as meaning sovereignty, it is more than the external 
aspect of sovereignty, which is essentially negative in character, it includes positive aspects 
as well, since the State is by virtue of that independence capable of acting positively by 
taking decisions in different matters affecting the life of the nation. The Court has also 
emphasised that independence is indivisible, in other words, it cannot be broke up in parts 
which belong to more than one State. 
Judge Anzilotti has, in his Individual Opinion in the above case, as well dealt with the 
meaning of independence. He writes: 
"... [I]ndependence 
... 
is really no more than the normal condition of States according 
to international law, it may also be described as sovereignty (suprema potestas) or 
external sovereignty by which is meant that the State has over it no other authority 
than that of international laW". 61 
He then added that: 
"... [I]independence in the legal sense is affected neither by a State's submission to international law or by constantly increasing of de facto dependence between 
countries". 62 
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Consequently, increased international co-operation between States and adherence to 
international law by those same States, does not mean the end of independence as a legal 
notion. 
Moreover, in his Separate Opinion in the Case Concerning Right of Passage Over Indian 
Territory, Judge Willington Koo has made two important observations concerning 
sovereignty: (i) International law makes no distinction between one sovereignty and another; 
and (ii) it is inconceivable in international law that one sovereignty exists only by the will 
or caprice of another sovereignty. 63 
Hence, equality is presumed between the sovereignty of all States whatever their factual 
and real differences. It must be also noted that the jurisprudence of international courts and 
tribunals has stressed in many cases that sovereignty is essentially territorial. In this context, 
in the award of the Tribunal of Arbitration in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case 
(Great Britain v. United States of America) it is clearly held that: 
"[One of the essential elements of sovereignty is that it is to be exercised within 
territorial limits and that, failing proof to the contrary, the territory is coterminous 
with the sovereignty". 64 
Thus, there is a presumption in favour of the full sovereignty of the State over its territory 
unless a contrary rule can be shown under which international law limits such sovereignty, 
the State has the exclusivity of competencies over its territory. In the Island of Palmas 
_Cg1k, 
this point was made very clear when it was held that: 
"Territorial sovere i gnty,.... involves the exclusive right to display the activities of 
StateS". 65 
Furthermore, Judge de Castro made an interesting analogy between sovereignty and 
property in his Dissenting Opinion in the Nuclear Test Case. He stated that: 
"The applicant's complaints against France of violation of its sovereignty by 
introduction of harmful matter into its territory without its permission, is based on 
a legal interest, which has been well known since the time of Roman law: The 
prohibitions of Immissio (of water-smoke fragments of stone) into a neighbouring 66 property was a feature of Roman law". 
He then added that: 
"The principle 'sic utertuoutalia errurn non Was' is a feature of law both ancient and 
modern-it is well known that owner of a property is liable for the intolerable smoke 
or smells, because he oversteps the physical limits of his property". 67 
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So, territorial sovereignty of each State imposes corresponding duties of abstention and non- 
interference in whatever form on the part of other States. 
Further, Judge Alvarez in his Individual Opinion, in the Corfu Channel Case gave a very 
interesting definition to sovereignty. He writes: 
"... [B]y sovereignty, we understand the whole body of rights and attributions which 
a State possesses in its relations with other States. Sovereignty confers rights upon 
States and imposes obligations on them. These rights are not the same and are not 
exercised in the same way in every sphere of international law. I have in mind the 
four traditional spheres: territorial, fluvial and lacustrine-to which must be added 
three new ones: aerial, polar and floating (floating islands). The violations of these 
rights is not of equal gravity in all these different sphereS. "68 
He concluded by stating that: 
"The sovereignty of a State has now become an institution, an international social 
function of a psychological character which has to be exercised in accordance with 69 the new international law". 
In this opinion, there is an emphasis upon the relative importance of the rights which 
sovereignty confers upon States. In my opinion, it seems that it is difficult to prove that 
States regard the violations of particular rights as grave, whereas the same violations of 
some other rights as not important, States regard all violations of all their rights as of equal 
importance. This is the logic of the concept of sovereignty itself. 
In the Nicaragua Case Merits). the ICJ had an occasion to deal with the meaning and 
limits of the concept of sovereignty in our present era. Its pronouncement on the subject 
(of sovereignty) is very interesting since it is the product of a court which is composed in 
a way that all cultures and civilizations of our world are represented. The Court stressed 
that the principle of sovereignty is closely linked and inevitably overlaps with the principles 
of the prohibition of the use of force and non-intervention, 70 which means that any 
unlawful use of force or any illegal intervention is a real infringement of the sovereignty 
of the State. 
The Court then and implicitly divided sovereignty into two aspects: internal and external 
and thoroughly explained the two aspects. Concerning the internal aspect it held that: 
"A State's domestic policy falls within its exclusive jurisdiction, provided of course 
that it does not violate any obligations of international law. Every State possesses a 
fundamental right to choose and implement its political economic and social 
systeMS". 71 
On the question of the possibility of a State binding itself by agreement to a question of 
domestic policy (such as that relating to the holding of free elections on its territory), the 
68 
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Court, after observing that it cannot discover, within the range of subjects open to 
international agreements, any obstacle to hinder a State from making a commitment of that 
kind, stressed: 
"A State, which is free to decide upon the principle and methods of popular 
consultation within its domestic order isýovereign for the purpose of accepting a 
limitation of its sovereignty in this field. " 2 
This, in effect, means that whatever the importance of any given internal competence, the 
State can always give it away or limit its exercise. Moreover, on the finding of the US 
Congress that the Nicaraguan Government had taken 'significant steps towards establishing 
a totalitarian Communist dictatorship', the Court declared that: 
"However, the regime in Nicaragua be defined, adherence by a State to any particular 
doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary international law; to hold 
otherwise would make nonsense of the fundamental principle of State sovereignty, 
on which the whole of international law rests and the freedom of choice of political, 
" 73 social, economic and cultural systems of a State . 
In other words, whatever the nature or character of the domestic policy options of a 
country, third States must respect that choice and must not use any force or threat of it 
either directly or indirectly to change those options. Otherwise they will be seen as 
committing an infringement of that State"s sovereignty. 
However, on the external aspect of sovereignty, the Court when considering the criticisms 
expressed by the US on the external policies and alliances of Nicaragua, held that: 
"Whatever the impact of individual alliances on regional or international political- 
military balances. The Court is only competent to consider such questions from the 
standpoint of international law. From that aspect, it is sufficient to say that State 
sovereignty evidently extends to the area of its foreign policy and there is no rule of 
customary international law to prevent a State frýrn choosing and conducting a foreign policy in co-ordination with another State w. 4 
Then, in the absence of clearly established legal obligation the State is free to shape and to 
conduct its foreign policy which is in effect the external aspect of its sovereignty. The main 
conclusion to be drawn from the jurisprudence of international courts concerning 
sovereignty are: 
721bid, 
par& 259, p. 1082. 
73 
lbid, para 263, p. 1083. 
74 
Ibid, para 265, p. 1083. it must be noted here also that the ICJ when dealing with the question of the 
militarization of Nicaragua which was raised by the US and which was seen by the tatter as proving the 
aggressive intent of Nicaragua, held: 
"It is irrelevant and inappropriate, in the Court's opinion, to pass upon this attegation of the 
United States, since in International, taw there are no rutes other than such rutes as may be 
accepted by the State concerned by treaty or otherwise, whereby the tevet of armaments of a 
sovereign State can be timited and this principte Is vatid for att States without exception, $. 
lbid, para 269, p. 1084. 
32 
1. The confirmation of the importance and necessity of sovereignty in international law 
is upheld, it is in fact said to be the real basis of such law and relations. 
2. In general, a broad interpretation is given to the meaning of sovereignty, it is limited 
only by rules of international law, which were consented to by the State; which means, in 
the last analysis, that international law itself owes its existence and development to the 
working of the principle of sovereignty. 
3. However, the jurisprudence of the courts also emphasized that the sovereignty of the 
State, consists generally of competencies granted by international law. This means that the 
notion of sovereignty is relative in character, and its content depends on the development 
of international law at any given moment. This has been confirmed in the Nationality 
Decrees in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone) Case, where the PCIJ rightly held: 
"The questions whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of 
a State is an essential!; relative question, it depends upon the development of 
international relations. " 5 
4. In the Nicaragua Case, the Court answered one of the biggest worries of Third World 
States by stressing the close link between sovereignty and the use or threat of force and 
interventions. Since any such use of force or threat of it or resort to intervention in the 
internal affairs of others is considered by the Court to be a direct infringement of 
sovereignty. 
5. It seems to me that the jurisprudence of international courts in general, confirms the 
Western doctrine's view that sovereignty is in the last analysis a bulk of legal competencies 
exercised under the auspices of international law (in fact many cases point to that direction 
such as the Island of Palmas Case, the Wimbledon Case, the Corfu Case and to some extent 
the Nicaragua Case). Thus, the concerns of Socialist and Third World doctrine which 
underlined the importance of the issue of inequality, intervention and other problems of a 
political nature in studying the notion of sovereignty, are not well represented although, as 
I noted above, the Nicaraguan Case seems to signal a shift in the direction of satisfying 
Socialist and especially Third World worries about what the notion of sovereignty should 
mean and contain. 
Section 11: The Role of Sovereignty In the Contemporary World Order 
This section is concerned with the inquiry into the role and the place of sovereignty in the 
present international society. The importance of such inquiry spring from the fact that some 
lawyers, especially in the West, see sovereignty as basically against the idea of humanity, 76 
which means that as long as sovereignty survives there is no hope for the protection of 
human dignity and consequently humanitarian law would, in cases of internal conflicts, find 
in sovereignty a real adversary, if not a killer. 
This section, however, demonstrates that sovereignty is not withering away, it is with us. 
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State practice in its different forms (treaties, UN declarations, State pronouncements) 
confirms unequivocally that verdict. Similarly, Socialist, Third World and a majority of 
Western doctrine stress for different reasons that the idea of sovereignty is a fundamental 
guarantee for peace in our world and that basically (sovereignty) is not against the idea of 
the protection of human dignity and development of international law. 
A. Sovereignty In State Practice 
In bilateral and multilateral relations between States, sovereignty occupies a very important 
place. Thus, it is rare not to find insistence upon it in important treaties and declarations 
of international organizations. The most important multilateral treaty in our present time, 
the UN Charter, lists sovereign equality as the first principle upon which the organization 
is based. Its Article 2/7 protects States from the intervention of the organization in their 
domestic jurisdiction. Moreover, Article 14 of the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties 
of States prepared by the ILC in 1949 provides that: 
"Every State has the duty to conduct its relations with other States in accordance with 
international law and with the princi le that sovereignty of each State is subject to 
the supremacy of international law. "W 
However, it must be noted that Korestsky of the USSR considered that Draft Article as a 
'maximum attack against the principle of sovereignty'78 because of its reference to the 
supremacy of international law, which means in essence that at that time, the Soviet Union 
clung to a very rigid and absolutist concept of sovereignty. This in turn, can be explained 
in my view by the fact that the Soviet Union was suspicious of the content of that 
international law and was afraid to see itself being forced to accept a law which it has not 
consented to. 
The UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV) (The Declaration on Friendly Relations Resolution) 
gave in fact an important place to the principle of sovereign equality, it stipulates that: 
"All States enjoy sovereign equality, they have equal rights and duties and are equal 
members of the international community, notwithstanding differences of economic, 
social, political or other nature". 79 
Sovereign equality includes among other things, that: 
"... [E]ach State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty". 80 
This Declaration makes it clear that the principles embodied in it constitute the basic 
principles of international law and as such would be the guidelines which all States and not 
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only members of the organization should conduct their mutual relations. It must be noted 
that the ICJ has, in the Nicaragua Case. stressed the importance of this Declaration in 
relations between States. It held: 
"The effect of consent to the text of such relations cannot be understood as merely 
that of a 'reiteration or elucidations' of the treaty commitment undertaken in the 
Charter. On the contrary, it may be understood as an acceptance of the validity of 
the rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by themselves". 8' 
This means in effect that the court has given a binding legal force to Resolution 2625 
independently of its relation to the UN Charter. Thus, within the UN, there is no 
diminishing importance for sovereignty, it is the central feature of the organization. 
Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State, was right when he stated that: 
"The United Nations Charter is based on the proposition that the United Nations is 
composed of sovereign States and therefore the United Nations has never been 
intended as a world government superseding the sovereign government ". 82 
Such an opinion indicates that sovereignty is the central pillar of contemporary international 
system. There is no evidence that sovereignty is regarded within the UN as an obstacle to 
the maintenance of peace or the protection of human dignity or as an idea whose time has 
past. In this context, Chaumont was right when he wrote: 
"Ainsi, loin que I'ONU A considdrer la souverainetd de I'Etat comme une notion 
" 83 depassde elle lui reconnait au contraire une valeur dynarnique et fondamentale . 
It is to be also noted that all regional organizations of States mention in their constituent 
instruments, 'sovereignty and independence' as fundamental principles and that their 
observance and respect is the real basis of their organizations. The latter it must be 
remembered consist of the membership of an important number of States in different parts 
of the world. The Charter of the OAS stipulates in its first Article that: 
"The American States establish by this Charter the international organization that they have developed to achieve an order of peace and justice to promote their sovereignty, 
their territorial integrity and their independence. "84 
Articles 9,10,11,15 and 16 insist as well upon different aspects of sovereignty. The latter 
is not regarded in the Charter as incompatible with struggling for peace and justice or 
attachment to human rights and human dignity. 
The OAU Charter, due to the specific history of the continent, which is characterised by 
foreign domination and intervention, respect for sovereignty and independence has a very 
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special place. One can speculate that it (non- intervention) is, in fact, the other name of the 
organization. In this respect, the Preamble of the OAU Charter makes it clear that the 
organization is 'determined to safeguard and consolidate the hard won independence as well 
as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our States'. 85 Article 3 of the OAU Charter 
which deals with the principles of the organization, mentions respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence. 
Article 4 makes independence the fundamental criteria, which must be satisfied by any 
entity willing to join the organization as a member. 
In the Arab world, aspiration for the unity of all Arab people in one single State has been 
in the front, at least, from the time of decolonization. However, the Pact of the League of 
Arab States stressed in Article 2 that the League will work towards a closer relationship 
between member States and co-ordinate their political activities with the aim of realising 
the closer co-operation there, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty 86 which 
means that the rhetoric of unity has given way to the reality of sovereignty. 
What emerges from these three important organizations is the fact that sovereignty plays 
a dominant role in their constituent instruments and also in daily practice of their different 
organs. The whole movement towards more human rights has not affected the attachment 
of these organizations to sovereignty, on the contrary, it is (sovereignty) considered to be 
the real guarantee for the enjoyment of such rights. Nevertheless, it is important to note, 
that the attachment to the notion of sovereignty and insistence on its fundamental role in 
international relations is not the monopoly of Third World countries. The Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe held in Helsinki in 1975, and which was attended by 
more than 30 countries among them the US and the USSR, gave in fact a large place in its 
Final Act (August Ist, 1975) to sovereignty. Thus, the Final Act provides that: 
"I(a)l. Sovereign equality, respect for rights inherent in the sovereignty. 
The participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality, 
as well as all the rights inherent and encompassed by its sovereignty, including, in 
particular, the right of every State to jVdicial equality, to territorial integrity and to 
freedom and political independence". 
The Act also stresses the right of every State to choose and pursue freely the political, 
social, economic and cultural systems which it wishes and their right to determine their laws 
and regulations, all these rights are, in fact, fundamental ingredients of the concept of 
sovereignty. 
President Ford, who signed the Final Act for the US, in an address to the Conference on 
August Ist, 1975, observed that the documents agreed upon 'are more than the lowest 
common denominator of Governmental positions. '88 He adds that: 
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"[The documents] ... reaffirm the 
basic principles of relations between States, non- 
intervention, sovereign equality, inviolability of frontiers and the possibility of 
peaceful change". 89 
Even the US, the richest country in the world adheres to the principle of sovereignty and 
sees in it a basic principle of international relations. 
The Charter of the Islamic Conference also makes out of the 'respect of the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity of each member'90 a fundamental principle of the 
Conference. This despite the fact that Islam encourages the unity of the Umma (the Islamic 
Nation) and deplores fragmentation which leads to the weakening of Islam and Muslims in 
the face of their enemies. Moslem States were not deterred from proclaiming their strong 
adherence to the principle of sovereignty. 
The Charter of the Council for Mutual Assistance (COMECON) which consists of the 
membership of most Communist States except China, proclaims in its first Article that the 
Council is based on the principle of 'sovereign equality of all member countries of the 
Council'. 91 The same Article indicates that co-operation between the members in economic, 
scientific and technical fields shall take place and be guided by the principles of 'complete 
equality of rights, respect for sovereignty and national interest, mutual advantage and 
friendly mutual aid'. 92 This means that the the unity of ideology between Communist States 
did not weaken their adherence to the concept of sovereignty even in their mutual relations. 
The Marxist prediction that sovereignty would wither at some stage of the history of 
Socialist States seems very far away indeed. 
In Western Europe also, we can detect that adherence to the principle of sovereignty is 
not fading away. In this context, President Auriol of France in an address to the US 
Congress in 1951, stated that: 
"Convinced of the need for supranational institutions, France has declared herself 
prepared to grant these bodies (of the steel and coal community) in conformity with 
her constitution and under the condition Of reciprocity, part of her sovereignty. And 
she hopes to convince the still hesitant nations that they will not curtail their 
sovereignty but on the contrary strengthen it by associating it with others, by uniting 
"93 their resources and labour to increase their forces. 
In 1989 and with the prospect of a united Europe in 1992, most European Leaders still 
believe that the EEC has no business meddling in security matters. The UK PM, Mrs. 
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that the time was not ripe to talk about a central bank. 94 Moreover, when Jacques Delors 
the President of the European Commission and arch-champion of a united Western Europe 
was asked whether Europe is moving toward a political federation, he answered: 
"The 12 members have repeatedly and solemnly reaffirmed their will to build a 
political union. The creation of a single economic and social space by 1992 constitutes 
the foundations, not for Gorbachev's 'Common European House' but for a European 
Community House ". 95 
He then adds that: 
"... [B]ut the rest of the house will remain to be built. The cultural part, the foreign 
policy part, the security part". 96 
In other words, European States, after nearly 40 years of close co-operation, are not ready 
yet to give up the last and the most important elements of sovereignty. 
The conclusion is that State practice, as the instances studied here reveal, proves beyond 
any doubt that sovereignty has an important place in the relations between States. It also 
has a role to play in an international society which is divided among territorial units that 
differ greatly in size, population and wealth. They have different ways of life, different 
cultures and ideologies too. Sovereignty then is the guarantor of the co-existence of such 
differences and above all it helps the weaker units of international society to survive 
without fear. 
Thus, the illusion which is entertained by some people that there is an ineluctable force 
called integration which will destroy weak States and cause them to seek unity and 
incorporation with one another in order to survive, has no basis of truth in the State 
practice. Sovereignty has proven its vitality, since without it, the majority of today's States 
would have little chance of independence. 
B. The Doctrine and the Role of Sovereignty 
On the doctrinal level, we can distinguish two main tendencies concerning the role of 
sovereignty in international law and relations. Some scholars maintain that the concept of 
sovereignty 'as primarily responsible for insufficiencies of the law of nations'97 or see it as 
'a rigid barrier against the spread of internationalism and peaceful relations between 
States'. 98 Others, on the contrary, regard it as a guarantee for democracy inside the State 
and for peaceful and orderly international relations on the outside. 
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1. The Argument of Those who Defend Sovereignty 
Sovereignty is seen by some as the point of departure in settling most questions that 
concerns international relations and any attempt at spiriting away from it must remain 
meaningless. 99 Goodspeed rightly stated that: 
"The facts of present day international life make it appear that despite the need for 
good faith in interstate relations and the development of complex interrelations 
among States, each State in the final analysis seeks to be its own interpreter of 
international obligations and maintains the right to determine its own standards of 
international conduct". 100 
Sovereignty then is not lost in the fog of interstate relations, it is still a very important 
element of such relations. Beitz invokes a moral basis for defending sovereignty. He states 
that: 
"States, like persons, have a right to be respected as autonomous sources of ends". 
101 
He argues that the claim to autonomy by a State must rest on the conformity of its 
institutions with some 'appropriate principles of justice' 102 because the autonomy of the 
State is the other face of its legitimacy. 
Other writers stress that the notion of sovereignty has its foundations in ihe psychology 
of nations and peoples. It is, as a matter of fact, the expression on the political and legal 
levels of the feeling of belonging to one community, which shares many common virtues. 
Carty, however, argues that lawyers must take into account the phenomenon of nationalism 
because "its appearance in the form of the right to self-determination touches upon so many 
aspects of what is commonly regarded as providence of international law'. 103 He then adds 
that 'in some way or another, one still has to suppose that the nation State is an individual 
subject of law with conscience'. 104 
It seems to me that it is possible then to infer from Carty's opinion that nationalism can 
be the basis for adherence to sovereignty, since the latter is the supreme form of self- 
determination and also because nationalism insists on particularism and distinct identity, 
sovereignty then is the legal and political shield which protects that particularism and 
distinctness on the level of international society. Sovereignty is, in the final analysis, the 
major criteria which differentiates between nationalism and internationalism. 
A radical approach to defending sovereignty has been taken by Kennan. He insisted that 
'the interest of the national society for which a Government to concern itself are basically 
those of its military security, the integrity of its political life and the well being of its 
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people'. 105 He sees these needs as having no moral quality, they arise simply from the status 
of national sovereignty which the State is supposed to enjoy, and that those needs cannot 
be classified as either good or bad for when the Government accepts to govern it is implicit 
in that. He adds that: 
"[I]t is right that the State should be sovereign, that the integrity of its political life 
should be assured, that its people should enjoy the blessing of military security, 
material prosperity and a reasonable opportunity for, as the Declaration of 
Independence put it, the pursuit of happiness". '06 
In my opinion, this is a dangerous way of defending and asserting sovereignty because the 
notion (of sovereignty) is conceived of as outside the realm of law, this is a going back to 
the Hobbesian 'state of nature'. It is an argument which hides a strong claim to intervention 
in the affairs of others whenever one of the 'needs of the society" are threatened. 
Brierly indirectly refutes such a kind of argument. He writes: 
"... [T]hat sovereignty has come to imply that there is something inherent in the 
nature of States that make it impossible for them to be subject5d to law, it is false 
doctrine which the facts of international law do not support". I 
He then correctly adds that: 
"... [B]but to the extent that it [sovereignty] reminds us that the subjection of States 
to law is an aim as yet only very imperfectly realised and on which cannot afford to disregard". 108 
In fact, he rejects the idea of sovereignty as an idea outside the realm of law, it is within 
law, otherwise intervention in the affairs of the weak members of the international society 
would become a daily event. 
Levi, after arguing that interaction and interdependence among States made the concept 
of sovereignty murky, he states: 
"... [N]evertheless the demand for independence everywhere is responsible for the 
organisation of international society, in forming its institutions, including law, all 
designed to give substance to the demand". 109 
Interdependence which is undeniably a real fact of international life, did not in any way 
hinder the importance of sovereignty. The latter, as we have seen, has been maintained and 
insisted upon in the most adverse circumstances and situations. Also, interdependence did 
not lead to a world Government; on the contrary, it led to fresh demands for giving 
sovereignty a real substance, by a real reform of the existing mechanism of the international 
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economic relations. 
On the other hand, Wildhaber correctly pointed out that: 
"... [S]overeignty expresses the essential position of the State in the international system 
(or lack of a system). it is a 'constitutional principle of international relations not 
because it can claim a higher sacredness, morality or cogency, but simply because it 
is, at bottom, an empirically correct description". 110 
Similarly, Van Kleffens stressed that: 
"The notion of sovereignty is not at all a ghost we can exorcise at will. It is a spirit 
which is very much alive and very wide awake. Some may regret it but if they fail 
to recognize this fact, they abandon the firm foundation of reality". "' 
These views confirm once again that despite the growing interaction between States, people 
and international institutions and despite the rapid extension of international law to regulate 
many new fields in the relations between States, sovereignty is still safe and well, and it 
seems that it is here to stay, in fact, it is the other name of Statehood. 
The Soviets lawyers, like their Statesmen, are hard advocates of the doctrine of 
sovereignty, arguing against it, is a reactionary thinking since it is an implicit advocacy of 
domination and intervention by the Capitalist States and their corporations. In this respect, 
Korovin stressed that: 
"The Soviet Union is destined to act as the champion of the doctrine of 'classical' 
sovereignty in so far as its formal seclusion acts as a legal armour protecting it from interference of those factors under the pressure of which the frontiers of 
contemporary capitalist States are changed and the forms of their law altered". 112 
This means, in effect, that as long as there are Capitalist States in the international society, 
any limitations of State sovereignty would not be in the interests of Communist States. In 
fact, the majority of Soviet writers maintain that sovereignty is pre-existing to international 
law and that the latter is limited by the former. In this respect, Koretsky observed in the 
ILC, in 1949, that: 
"The sovereignty of States must so regulate relationships between States that the 
mastery of superiority of one State over another could not exist ... to limit the power of one's own State was to open the gates to the intervention of other States. The 
international field must not be dominated by those who interfere in the internal 
affairs of others, by reactionaries who sought to organize other countries by force". 113 
This is a recourse to 18th and 19th century theories of sovereignty. However, the 
justifications of such positions is always political, it is the protection of the most advanced 
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social system in the world, it is the liberation of oppressed peoples in colonies and 
dependent territories from the imperialist yoke. 
In the last analysis, we can State that the Soviet jurists use sovereignty as a legal and 
political weapon in their theoretical struggle against some Capitalist views on sovereignty, 
and generally against those who believe that sovereignty is an obstacle to peace and 
development of international law. Moreover, it is obvious that Soviet defence of sovereignty 
is not eternal, it is dictated by the realities of the international relations where Capitalist 
States are a fact of life, and their transformation into Communist States is not near by any 
means. 
It is to be noted that sovereignty in the relations between Socialist States do not seem to 
be very rigid, in reality, it no longer means complete internal and external independence 
in the running of the affairs of the State. It simply means in the words of Anand 'freedom 
to act in the interests of the Socialist world and the interests of the world revolutionary 
movement'. 114 According to this logic, the sovereignty of the Socialist State cannot be 
used to claim the return to Capitalism since this would not be in the interests of the Socialist 
camp. It undermines the gains of socialism and would be contrary to the progressive 
movement of history. Nonetheless, as the "Breshnev doctrine' has, in practice, showed that 
there is no difference between this alleged 'general interest of the Socialist world' and the 
national interest of the Soviet Union. 
Third World lawyers are, like their politicians, ardent champions of sovereignty. In this 
context, Prakash Singh rightly points out that: 
"... [S]overeignty is the most treasured possession of the newly independent States. On 
one hand it makes them the masters of their houses, on the other hand, it provides 
them with a legal shield against foreign incursion or attempts threat by strong 
States". ' 15 
It is also natural that sovereignty is seen as a means of achieving demands for a fair share 
in the participation in the international decision-making process in different fields of 
international relations. 
On the internal sphere, sovereignty as Okoye correctly remarks that: 
"... [I]s a powerful instrument for shaping national identity, breaking the chains of 
subordination which are factors of backwardness and furthering social and economic 
progress". 116 
However the danger in the Third World, is that sovereignty in the internal sphere may well 
be used (and indeed it has been used) in many instances, as a wall which masks and justifies 
violations of human rights' 17 and (as indeed chapters 3 to 5 will reveal) to resist the efforts 
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at humanizing the conduct of internal conflicts. 
In this context, it seems to me that insistence upon sovereignty can be justified only when 
the State conduct itself in accordance with the basic standards of the protection of human 
Tights and human dignity in times of peace or war. Those standards and norms can be found 
in the different instruments of human rights and humanitarian law as developed and 
codified first, in Common Article 3, Protocol 11 of 1977 and in the practice of regional and 
universal Organizations in the field of human rights. This stand will be discussed in the 
coming chapters. 
On the external sphere of sovereignty, Third World lawyers insist on the necessity of 
giving independence its real meaning especially on the economic sphere. In this respect, 
Terki that: 
"... [F]ace A la puissance financiýre et technologique des Etats du Nord ou de leur 
socidtds multinationales. 11 [the independence concept] est presque vid6 de toute sa 
substances &s I Wil est mis en oeuvre dans le domaine des relations 6conorniques 
internationales". 'a 
For this reason, Bedjaoui stressed that the classical concept of sovereignty needs to be 
reformulated. He writes: 
"ll convienderait de lui chercher une formulation nouvelle capable de restituerA I'Etat 
les bases 616mentaires de son ind6pendance nationale sur le plan 6conomique". 119 
He then argues for the importance of the economic independence as a legal principle which, 
in practice, means the real sovereignty over natural resources and Teal participation in the 
structure of the decision-making process concerning international economic relations. 
This is not an exhaustive survey of the doctrine on the question of the role and the place 
of sovereignty in the international society. However, it showed that those who are attached 
to sovereignty and maintain that it still has a role to play, invoke many grounds for their 
assertions. They are basically as follows: 
1. The State is still the main unit in the framework of the international society, 
sovereignty is on the legal and political levels the expression of Statehood. 
2. In an international society, in which States follow different paths of development, 
share different ideologies, sovereignty means something. It indicates the preservation of 
national identity and national wealth. 
3. Some believe that the other alternative to the idea of sovereignty would mean a Pax 
Americana or a Pax Russia. 
4. Others, especially from the Third World fear for their hard won independence and see 
that only sovereignty can preserve it. They insist at the same time that the idea of real 
sovereignty has not been attained yet, it must include the economic aspects as well. 
5. Others, the Communists in particular, believe that the time is not ripe yet for the 
abolition of sovereignty. Thus it is glorified and struggled for, since the realities of 
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contemporary international society are against any opposite solution. 
My conclusion is that without sovereignty small States which are the majority of today's 
world would have very little chance of becoming free from outside domination. 120 Then. 
this instrument (sovereignty) of liberation, must not become the instrument of killing 
freedom inside those very States, sovereignty must protect human rights and human dignity 
and further their development. 
2. Opinions against the Usefulness of Sovereignty 
There is a growing tendency, generally in the West, which considers that the notion of 
s overeignty is obsolete and that it does not correspond to the developments which have been 
taking place in the international society. Nevertheless, it must be noted that attacks upon 
the notion of sovereignty are not a new phenomenon. In this contexet, as far as 1925 Politis 
wrote that: 
"On peut m8me dire qu'elle [la notion de la souveraintfl est d6s A pr6sent 
virtuellement abolie, si elle reste encore usit6e dans le language officiel et un peu 
moins dans celui de la science, c'est par d6faut d'adaptation visuelle A la disposition 
d'une lumiýre qui pendant longtemps a briII6 d'un vif 6clat". 121 
He then added confidently that: 
Vest un ecran qui viole la r6alit6.11 faut donc sen d6barrasser si Pon veut voir 
c la i rot. 122 
He then suggests the replacement of sovereignty by the notion of liberty because: 
',.. [A] la diffirence de la souverainet6, la liberti n'eveille pas l'id8e d'omnipotence 
et d'absolutisme. Elle fait, au contraire, penser que l'Etat, dans la communaute 
internationale, a une situation analogue ä celle de Pindividu dans la societ8 
modernem. 123 
In my opinion, the weakness of Politis's argument lies, first, in the fact that it is in very 
clear contrast with the reality of State practice at that time. The League of Nations was, 
actually, built upon the collective guarantee of the independence of each member (Article 
10 of the Covenant). 124 Secondly, sovereignty, is seen as basically absolute in character, it 
is seen as an extrajudicial notion which makes the State an institution above the law. This 
is simply not the case, sovereignty knows certain limits which the State by its consent has 
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assented to. 125 
It is to be noted that some contemporary international lawyers continue the attack against 
sovereignty, using different grounds for their stands. Thus, it is argued that the advent of 
nuclear weapons have created the objective social basis upon which it is possible to build 
a new political order for world affairs. This means implicitly that the nation State as the 
'prime organizing and value realising unit in world politiCS'126 is no longer viable. 
Falk made an interesting observation when he stated that: 
"My approach to international law has been influenced by a growing conviction that 
the present structure of international society cannot solve the problems of 
technetronic man". 127 
According to him, we have only two or three decades to bring a new system of world order. 
A system that is arranged to identify and implement human interest on a planetary scale. 
But, he notes: 
"... [I]f the sovereign State remains the organizing center of polilical life in 
international affairs, the outlook for human affairs is indeed bleak". 12 
According to his logic, the problems which face humanity such as violence, population 
explosion, hunger and pollution can only be solved on a planetary basis, which impliedly 
means that only a world Government can do the job of solving such delicate problems. 
Nevertheless, if one looks at the realities of international relations, it is very hard to find 
a move in the direction with Falk advocates. Of course, States are doing their best to solve 
those problems not by relinquishing their sovereignty, but on the contrary, they insist that 
sovereignty must have a central role in that process. 
On the other hand, Friedman maintains that only three States may claim rightly that they 
are sovereign (the USSR, China and the US) because they are capable of making an 
effective military plan. In contrast, other States which claim the traditional attributes of 
sovereignty such as the 'diplomatic and jurisdictional immunity' cannot survive or develop 
by themselves. 129 He argued: 
"The tension between the explosive outbursts of nationalism, seeking expression in 
the symbols of national sovereignty in the non-Western world and the utter 
inadequacy of nationalism as an effective expression of military, political and 
economic realities of our time, onstitutes one of the major problems of 
contemporary international politics"Y30 
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He sees no solution to this problem except by turning away from sovereignty and its 
symbols, he maintains that. 
"The necessity to form partial and more closely knit organizations of a military, 
political or economic character, transcending the constricting bounds of national 
borders, is an inevitable corollary to the last orgy of national sovereignty". 131 
To him, the contradictions between the symbols of national sovereignty and the realities of 
international life 'is a principal cause for the development of international relations on three 
levels: of universal supranational organisations, of regional integration and of diplomatic 
coexistence'. 132 The main problem for Friedman, in my opinion, is that he sees sovereignty 
as basically an obstacle towards more integration and hence real development. This cannot 
be so, since sovereignty is adapting itself to the realities of international relations for more 
co-operation in order to solve the dire problems which our world faces. 
Moreover, it must not be forgotten that any rejection of the role of sovereignty in 
international society would, in practice, be in the interest of the developed countries and 
their multinational corporations since the latter are struggling for the abolition of borders 
and jurisdictions in order to have direct access to markets and national resources. Bedjaoui 
refutes suggestions of integration and interdependence by going back to history. He notes: 
"Les visages de l'interddpendence d'hier sont connus, l'interdipendence 6conomique 
6tait impos6e grAce i une d6pendence juridique organis6e. C6tait les temps des 
'solidarit6s A sens unique' celle du "loup et de I'agneau' ou encore du 'cavalier et de 
sa monture'". 133 
According to him, the logic of these old times are not over. He states: 
".... [E]t A chaque instant il est encore loisible de d6busquer les thurif6raires de I'ordre 
itabli Wambitionnent, selon la formule de 'Guepart' qu'l 'changer pour tou-r, 
conserver' c'est dans cette logique que s'incrivent les tentatives de r6cuperation du 
nouvel ordre". 134 
The crux of the matter is that any call for integration and the abandon of sovereignty will 
never be in the interest of the weak units of international society who will, by abandoning 
their sovereignty, lose everything, control over their destinies and their social cultural and 
political particularism. Whereas the strong, the multinationals and their protectors (their 
Governments) will inevitably gain everything because of their strengths, might and know- 
how. The relinquishing of sovereignty would give them a free hand to shape the economic 
face of the world and consequently gain the maximum of profits. 
Colliard, in a reference to the views of Scelle on sovereignty observes: 
"Cet esprit g6n8reux [of Scellel a pu voir dans la souverainet6 un obstacle ä la 









In fact, Colliard shares the humanist and internationalist view of Scelle that human beings 
are the supreme essence of the law. This idealist tradition is far away from the realities of 
the world, the individual, because of the development in the field of human rights, can 
aspire to the protection of his minimum rights, by his Government or in some cases, by 
international machinery either regional or universal. 
The contention that it is necessary to abolish sovereignty in order to assert the supremacy 
of the individual is not on the agenda. Some political scientists, like McLauren simply 
maintains that we need not write many words on sovereignty because: 
"... [T]he world is interdependent socially, economically and even juridically and the 
sovereignty of a government consists in making decisions that are primarily 136 adjustments to conditions and demands determined by others". 
He further asserted that the sovereignty of a Government is not: 
".... [E]ssentially different from the sovereignty enjoyed by the prisoner on his way 
to the scaffold, he is free to de ide whether he shall take short steps or long, smile 
or breathe defiance or weep . . 
1; $ 
This kind of argument tries to show that, in practice, sovereignty does not exist and that 
interdependence is taking over. This under-estimates the realities of international life 
where even with the interdependence in economic life, States still have a great measure of 
freedom in running their affairs and, are very attached to their sovereignty, especially when 
their vital interests are at stake. 
Furthermore, within international organizations which are supposed to be the vehicles of 
such integration, sovereignty is indeed their main pillar. Thus, McLauren's argument that 
the role of the UN consists in enabling 'Governments to make this loss of sovereignty 
beneficial rather than injurious planned rather than haphazard'138 is not the case. since the 
contrary argument is that precisely since sovereignty at the UN is not working effectively 
in keeping peace and order in the world. McDougal observes that: 
"The ascendancy of the nation State has been such that it has built into the 
perspectives of the world community a bias in favour of perceiving advantages and 
disadvantages in terms of the individual nation State". 139 
Thus, the State in a territorially organised world, became a dominant participant in the 
shaping and sharing of all values. Because of this state of affairs 'both the search for and 
135C. A. Cottiard: Institutions des relations internationates. Dattoz, Paris, 1978, p. 91. 
1360p. 
cit., supra. n. 33, p. 427. 
137 Ibid, p. 428. 
138 Ibid. 
139M. S. McDougat, H. D. Lasswett, and Lung-Chu Chen: Human Rights and Wortd Pubtfe Order. Yate Unfv. Press, 
1980, p. 44. 
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the discovery of common interests are impaired' 140 (proclaims McDougal and his associates). 
They also added that: 
"... [T]he emphasis on State 'sovereignty' in expression of excessive 'nationalism' has 
further exacerbated by the rival ideologies representing the contending systems of 
public order". 141 
Then, demand for human dignity and its fulfilment is largely dependent upon the 
performance of Governmental functions, this is true, however, we must not forget that 
developments within the field of human rights in some instances (the European Convention 
of Human Rights) have led to the establishment of some machinery, which allows 
individuals to take their cases outside the jurisdiction of their own State. 
Further, it is Jenks, who waged the hardest attack on sovereignty. He writes: 
*... [Sovereignty] holds no promise of peace. It affords no prospect of defence. It 
provides no assurance of justice. It gives no guarantee of freedom. It offers no hope 
of prosperity. It furnishes no prescription for welfare. It hardens the opposition to 
orderly and peaceful social change. It disrupts the discipline without which scientific 
and technological innovations become the Frankenstein of our society (but a 
remorseless Frankenstein perpetually making new monsters). It is a mockery not 
fulfilment of the deepest aspirations of humanity". 142 
He also thought that the conscious rejection of the dogma of sovereignty is an essential step 
in 'releasing our creative faculties that we can build together the prosperity and welfare 
of a free commonwealth in which peace with justice, freedom and welfare rest solidly upon 
the common law of mankind'. 143 He holds a firm view that the world has Outgrown 
sovereignty. He agrees with Max Huber that 
"... [T]he concept of sovereignty which existed long before the Renaissance may have 
been necessary for transforming feudal medieval States in modern ones but for any 
ethic of a supranational community it is mortal poison". 
"ý 
In his view, sovereignty is a mortal poison precisely it alters the movement toward a world 
community. He maintains that the UN is moving towards that end. 
In my opinion, sovereignty is not a mortal poison, it is a healthy medicine. People need 
it to keep their national identity, for which they had fought hard. Moreover, it makes them 
the masters of their destiny, it ensures that they have a full right to choose the forms of 
their political economic and social organization without any interference. Hence, big powers 
cannot impose or prohibit small States from choosing their ways of life as indeed the ICJ 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid. 
142 C. W. Jenks: A New World of Law? A Study of Creative imagination in International Law. Harlow Longmans, 
1969, p. 134. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Cited by Jenks, ibid, p. 133. 
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has noted in Nicaragun Case. 145 
In fact, the Court implicitly refuted any illusions that we are moving towards a 'world 
Government'. Sovereignty is still the main pillar of international organization. My 
conclusion concerning the rejection of sovereignty by some Western scholars would be my 
agreement. Hector Gros Espiell rightly stated that: 
"The concept of sovereignty is a necessary and fundamental part of international law 
and international life and politics today. To seek to eradicate the concept and confirm 
its incompatibility with international law as certain doctrinaire schools has attempted 
constitutes a useless and anti-historical effort incompatible with the world as it is and 
the inescapable and undeniable political and mythical force of the idea of 
sovereignty". 146 
Furthermore, I can confidently state that the arguments against sovereignty come from a 
section of Western doctrine. However, even within that section, two basis for rejecting 
sovereignty were advanced. The first school is the idealist and humanist which regards 
sovereignty as a real obstacle against the full realisation of human rights on a plenatary 
level, to this school, all individuals in all countries are the same and they need to be treated 
alike, only the fiction of sovereignty separates them. The main criticism of such opinion is, 
that in practice, it is doubtful whether all peoples and individuals aspire to live under the 
umbrella of one world Government, especially in our time which is characterised by 
different and opposing ideologies, values and ways of life. 
The second school seems to base its rejection of sovereignty on the basis of the advances 
made in technology, communications, and the expansion of business. To this trend, in our 
modern world sovereignty has become a real brake in the face the demands of trade, 
business and international communications. In my view, this kind of argument is in the 
interest of big business since a territorially- organized world would be a very serious 
obstacle'for the expansion of mighty multinational corporations which possess the necessary 
know-how in the sphere of industrial and technological production. 
Bearing in mind that developing countries especially have a very long experience with 
the exploitation of their natural resources and their wealth, they seem to consider that in 
order to escape another wave of sophisticated domination in the economic field and other 
fields, it is best to cling to sovereignty and demand its full achievement. In other words, 
Third World countries and even Socialist States use sovereignty as a political weapon in their 
struggle against inequality. 
It is my opinion that if the Third World countries are justified in defending sovereignty 
to protect themselves from economic and cultural hegemony of the West. They nonetheless 
must accept that sovereignty should serve the protection of human dignity inside their 
territories. Sovereignty must not be used to justify violations of human rights either in times 
of peace or emergencies like internal wars. 
145op. cit., supra. n. 70, para. 263, p. 1083. 
146M. Gross Esplett: Sovereignty, Independence and Interdependence of Nations, In A. Graht Madson and Jirl 
Toman (eds. ), op. cit., supra. n. 76, p. 279. 
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Section III: Limitations of Sovereignty 
From the above discussion the main conclusion to be drawn is that developments in 
contemporary international law makes any claim to unlimited and absolute sovereignty 
meaningless and irrelevant. But, it is certain also that any neglect for the role of sovereignty 
in the present and future structure of the international legal order is a sheer fantasy. The 
first and most important limitation seems to be that States cannot be free to respect or reject 
international law to which they have given their consent. 
In fact. it seems that this fundamental limitation is deeply rooted in the conscience of 
States, since there is no single example that they dared to declare in an official public act 
that they would not be bound by rules of international law. The jurisprudence of the 
international courts has also established in many instances that in cases of conflict between 
municipal law and international law, the latter prevails. In this respect, the PCIJ in the 
Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Oriffln or SDeech In the Danzie 
Territorv (advisory ODInlon), held: 
"According to generally accepted principles, a State cannot rely, as against another 
State, on the provisions of the latter's constitution but only on international law and 
international obligations duly accepted ... and, conversely, a State cannot adduce, as 
against another State, its own constitution with a view to ýv ding obligations 
incumbent upon it under international law or treaties in force. " 4ý 
Implicitly then, it is established that international law limits the sovereignty of State, since 
national law is the most important symbols of that sovereignty. 
The contemporary State practice shows clearly that many important inroads and 
limitations of the classical concept of sovereignty have been made. They cover a wide range 
of issues (e. g. communication, the law of the sea, environment, air and space law, etc. ). The 
creation of international organizations had in fact accelerated the process. 
A. Sovereignty and Human Rights 
Human rights as legal rights, first appeared in the context of internatfoýa laws. In Britain 
important instruments were proclaimed (e. g. the 1628 Petition of Rights, the Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1676 and the Bill of Rights of 1689). In the US, the Declaration of 
Independence in 1776 and the Bill of Rights of the State of Virginia in the same year 
contained many important political and civil rights. 
The most important internal instrument was the French "136claration des droits de 
I'homme et du citoyen" of 1789, which contained a modern formulation of human rights. 
However, on the international plan sovereignty reigned supreme. In this context, Shaw 
rightly observed that: 
"Virtually all matters that today would be classified as human rights issues were at 
147Treatment-of Polish Nationals ard Other Persons of Polish Origin (w Speech in the Denzig Territo 
(Adivisory 00nion), PCIJ Series A/B No. 44, p. 24. The same point was made very clear also in The Greco- 
Bulgarian OComnunitiesm (Advisory OpiniMI, the PCIJ held that: 
"It is a generally accepted principle of international taw that in relations between powers who are 
contracting parties to a treaty, the provisions Of municipal taw cannot prevail over those of the trestyN. 
PCIJ Series B, No. 17, p. 32. 
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that stage (the 19th cintury) universally regarded as within the internal sphere of 
national jurisdiction". 48 
The advent of the League of Nations did not change the situation much, its main concern 
was the preservation of peace between nations (Article 11). The result was as Mandelstarn 
rightly noted: 
"Mais en ce qui concerne la paix intirieure, en ce qui concerne la protection des 
droits primordiaux de Phomme contre des atteintes i116gitimes de la part de l'Etat, la 
communauti internationale s'incline encore devant la souverainet8 des Etats ä moins 
que ceux-ci n'y aient derogi eux-m8mes en vertu des trait6s particuliers". 
149 
He then adds: 
"Il faut donc reconnaltre CLue la neutralit6 devant les crimes de lese-humanit6 est 
encore le droit commun". '-')u 
In contrast, the Minorities Treaties (14 in all) were seen as modest steps in the direction of 
the protection of human rights but their main weakness was they were confined only to 
some new small States in central Europe. The latter protested of discrimination and the 
unilateral limitation of their sovereignty. 151 Moreover, the Mandate System was mainly a 
political move, and was applied only to ex-colonies of the vanquished in the First World 
War. 
The turning point came after the Second World War, it was realised that there is a link 
between violations of human rights and resort to war, the Nazi atrocities against their own 
citizens first, and later resort to war against independent States was a very good case. It was 
realised that maintenance of peace between States begin at home by respecting human rights 
and human dignity. 
In the era of the UN Charter, the law of human rights has been developing and 
expanding in an unprecedented way and no one can deny that human rights constitute today 
an important part of contemporary international law. The UN Charter lays down the 
foundation of human Tights in the Preamble and in Articles 1/3.13/16,55(c), 56,62/2,68, 
76(c) and 78. These provisions were, however, formulated in a general and rather vague way 
which led some lawyers to speculate that they are not legally binding. 
In this respect, Hudson stated: 
148 M. N. Shaw: International Low. 2nd ed., Grotius, Cambridge, 1986, p. 175. 
149A. W. Mandetstam: La protection internationate des droits de Phomme. RCADI, 1931/IV, p. 131. 
150 See also in this connection J. Dumas: La sauvegarde internationate des droits de Phomme. RCADI. 1937/1, 
pp. 321-419. 
15'Thus, 
on Sept. 14th, 1925. Lithuania proposed in the 6th Session of the Assembly of the League of the 
Nations the elaboration of a general convention dealing with the rights and duties of States vis-h-vis their 
minorities between all members of the League. Its delegate observed: 
"It nly aura pas d'unit& morate possibte entre tes membres de ta Sociftk des Nations ... tant que ta 
souverafnet6 des uns; sera timit6e par un fnt6r6t sup6rieur, ators qua tvaction des autres ne 
connaltra pas cette timitem. 
Mandetstam, op. cit., supra. n. 149, p. 143. 
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"Whenever the question of respect for human rights appeared in the Charter ... 
it was 
an aim to be achieved. The Charter did not in any way impose on the members of 
the UN a legal obligation io respect human rights and fundamental freedoms". 152 
However, this interpretation cannot be accepted. First, because the provisions in question 
are part of a binding legal instrument. Secondly, the practice of the UN shows very clearly 
that neither the generality nor the vagueness of those provisions have stopped the 
organization from considering them as legally binding on its members (e. g. the case of South 
Africa). 153 
It must be noted that the mission of translating the provisions of the UN Charter in 
concrete individual rights was left to other instruments. The first and most important 
general instrument was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was adopted 
without a negative vote on December 12th, 1948. It contains 30 Articles which covered a 
wide range of human rights. The Declaration in itself is not legally binding because it 
is a UNGA Resolution. Nevertheless, there is a wide measure of support that after 40 years 
it must be considered as binding. Thus, the ICJ in the Hostages Case (United States v. 
Iran) seems to treat the Declaration as a binding legal instrument, it held: 
* ... Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their 
freedom and to subject them to 
physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with 
the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as with the Qndamental 
principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights". 15 
The Court considers the latter (the Declaration) as declaratory of 'fundamental principles' 
of international law which means that it has a legal obligatory effect. 155 After the 
Declaration, an endless host of conventions and resolutions on human rights have been 
adopted not only by the UN, but in some instances by specialised agencies such as 
UNESCO, the ILO and by some regional organisations. 
The instruments dealing with human rights can be classified as Boven rightly suggested 156 
1520ted by N. Singh: Enforcement of Human Rights. Martfnus Nijhoff, 1986, p. 21. 
153 lbid, pp. 24-27. 
154 Case Concernina United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran) Case, ICJ 
Reports, 1980, p. 42. 
155 moreover, it is necessary to note that even the Soviet Union, which was one of the seven nations which 
abstained during the adoption of the Universal Declaration seems to take the Declaration as having a binding 
effect. Thus, in a debate in the UNCHR in Feb. 1968, its representative stated that: 
0 ... His governemnt has never considered United Nations activities in connection with the UniversaL 
Dectaratfon of Human Rights to be theoriticat". 
He then added that his deLegation: 
N... Mow appealed to all States to ensure that the Declaration did not remain a dead letter and 
that the Commission's obligations were honored in deed as well as words". 
Cited by T. J. H. Zuijdwijk: Petioning the United Nations: A Study In Human Rights. Martin's Press, Gower St., 
New York, 1982, p. 22. 
156T. Van Boven: Survey of the Positive Internationat Law of Human Rights, in Karet Vasak (ed. ): The 
Internationat Dimensionof Hum&nR! ghts. Transtated, ed. & rev. byPhitipAtston, GreenwoodPress. Westport, 
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into two main categories: First: general instruments of substantive human Tights law, they 
are: the Universal Declaration, the two Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on 
Social and Economic Rights. The European Convention on Human rights and the African 
Charter of Human Rights can be added to these documents. 
The UN documents represent in fact a worldwide system for the promotion and 
protection of human rights. They contain a comprehensive enumeration of a very wide 
range of human rights, also the limits that States may impose on the exercise of those rights 
were set out clearly. The two Covenants are legally binding instruments. They were adopted 
on December 16th, 1966, entered into force in 1976 and by the Ist January 1989 the Social 
and Economic Covenant was ratified by 92 States and the Political Civil Covenant was 
ratified by 87 States. 157 
The regional instruments can be considered as a counterpart of the universal instrument, 
they contain specific versions of human rights which reflect the priorities of each region 
in that field together with a detailed procedure for their implementation. ' 58 
Secondly, in addition to these comprehensive instruments there are other human rights 
instruments, which are devoted to one specific subject, the UN has adopted a substantial 
number of them. 159 The ILO especially, has adopted a great number of treaties dealing with 
different aspects of human rights in the world of employment. 160 The UNESCO adopted 
few instruments dealing essentially with discrimination in education. 161 Likewise, regional 
organisations adopted many conventions and protocols dealing with specific human rights 
subjects. 162 
It must be noted that human rights instruments either general or specific, universal or 
regional, contain generally a system of implementation which is designed to make these 
conventions work in practice. The methods of such implementation, however, differ from 
convention to convention. 163 
It is also interesting to note that the UN has devised other mechanisms of implementation 
which are not linked specifically to any given instrument of human rights, but apply to all 
157 10 HRLJ, 1989. pp. 111-112. 
158The European Convention on Human Rights entered into force on the 3rd September 1953; on the 1st January 
1989 it was ratified by 21 States. 8 Protocols were added to the Convention, some of them are in force (see 
for complete details, ibid, pp. 112-114). The European Social Charter entered into force on February 26th, 
1965, on the Ist January 1989 it was ratified by 15 States. fbid, p. 114. The American Convention on Human 
Rights entered into force on July 7th, 1978, on the Ist January, 1989, it was ratified by 20 States, ibid, 
p. 114. The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights entered into force on October 21st, 19B6, on 1st 
January, 1989, it was ratified by 35 States, ibid, p. 114. 
159See for details, Ibid, pp. 114-124. 
160See ibid, pp. 116-126. 
161 Ibid, p. 124. 
162See ibid, pp, 112-123. 
163 For a detailed discussion of the problem of implementation see: M. Schreiber: La pratique r6cente des 
Nations Unies dans le domaine de ta protection des drolts de I 'homme. RCADI, 1975/11, pp. 303-389; N. Singh: 
Enforcement of Human Rights. Martinus Mijhoff, Dorderecht, Eastern Law House Private Ltd., Calcutta, 1986, 
pp. 36-83; and L. B. Sohn: Human Rights: Their implementation and Supervision by the United Nations, in T. 
Meron, (ed. ): Human Rights In International Law: Legal and Policy Issues. Clarendon Press, Oxford, VoL. 2, 
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human rights, such as the reporting system, where States are requested to make periodic 
reports to the UN on the progress achieved in the field of human rights in their country. 164 
However, the most important device is that of the well-known Resolution 1503 (XLVIII) 
adopted by the ECOSOC in 1970. This resolution in fact, authorizes the UNCHR to receive 
and examine communications from individuals or groups of individuals and non- 
Governmental organizations which reveal 'a constant pattern of gross and reliably attested 
violations of human rights'. 
In this context, it is important to note that in 1982, over 27,000 communications relating 
to 76 countries were received by the UN, 318 replies were received from 41 
Governments 165 which indicates that the procedure has given the UNCHR a useful means 
of curbing human rights violations. In addition to the UN Charter (provisions on human 
rights), and the Conventions which are confined exclusively to human rights, the State 
practice is also full of references to human rights, either in the form of bilateral or 
multilateral treaties or in declarations of State representatives in international conferences 
and in organs of the UN. 
Thus, the communlqu6 of the Asian-African Conference (Bandoung 1955) included 
among the principles of the movement: "I. Respect for fundamental human rights and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations". 166 The attachment of this group of States 
to the principle of sovereignty did not prevent them claiming their adherence to human 
rights too. 
Moreover. in Stella Niadzimbamuto v. Desmond William. Lardner-Burke and Frederick 
Philip George Case, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council went even further. It held: 
"In modern international law criteria, a regime which does not conform to certain 
minimum standards of human rights is not in 'effective control' so as to entitle it to 
recognition. The regime in southern Rhodesia does not conform to these standards 
and it is thus not in effective control as evidenced by the absence of recognition by 
any other State in the international community". 167 
This is very important, human rights have been made in fact a central criteria of the 
legitimacy of any regime in the eyes of the international community. Furthermore, the 
recent 'Agreement for Peaceful Settlement in Central America (August, 7th, 1987)' between 
the States of Central America, stipulated that: 
"I Democratization: The Governments commit themselves to promote authentic 
participatory and pluralistic democratic process involving promotion of socialLustice, 
respect for human rights, sovereignty, territorial integrity of States ... etc. ". 
164See Sohn, op. cit., supra. n. 163, pp. 373-376. 
165Cited by R. Chatterjfe: The United Nations, in R. J. Vincent (ed. ): Foreign PoLicy and Human Rights: Issues 
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166Supra. n. 77, p. 33. 
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Thus, again States confirm that they do not see any contradiction in proclaiming their 
attachment to the two principles of sovereignty and non- intervention and their adherence 
to human rights. 
These developments in the field of human rights rise directly the limits of the concept 
of sovereignty in present day international law. It is argued here that the sovereignty of 
State has shrunk substantially in this particular field and it seems very doubtful whether the 
argument that human rights are solely within the domestic jurisdictions of the State can 
hold any longer. In this context, Buergenthal rightly observed that: 
"If one looks at the evolution of the past 75 years there is probably no other dramatic, 
more revolutionary development than the transformation of human rights from a 
subject deemed to be almost exclusively of domestic concern to one acknowledged 
to be of international concern". 169 
Human rights then have become a matter of international concern, and the claim of 
sovereignty cannot be used in cases of their violation. Indeed Warren Christopher, the US 
Deputy Secretary of State in President Carter's administration has rightly stated before the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (he was advocating the ratification of 4 major 
human rights instruments): 
nAlthough there have been in the past differences of opinion as to what is and is not 
a matter of 'international concern' it seems clear today that no matter how widely or 
narrowly the boundaries of 'international concern' be drawn, a treaty concerning 170 human rights falls squarely within them". 
Furthermore, President Carter at a White House meeting on November Ilth, 1978, 
commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stated 
specifically: 
N ... [W]e will speak out when 
individual rights are violated in other lands. The 
Universal Declaration means that no nation can draw the cloak of sovereignty over 
torture, officially sanctioned bigotry, or the destruction of freedom within its own 
borders". 171 
This is important, sovereignty can no longer mask or allow violations of human rights, third 
parties may and indeed can intervene at least verbally by denouncing such violations and 
thus creating a hostile world public opinion to any Government committing such violations. 
On the other hand, Higgins summarised the position in the UN practice by pointing out 
that: 
'At first glance at the cases involved seems to indicate that the United Nations has 
long assumed that it has jurisdiction over matters concerned with human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, certainly it is difficult to think of a case where the United 
169 Remarks by T. Buergenthal: Proceedings of the 75th Anniversary Convocation, American Society of 
Internationat Law. Washington D. C. Aprit 23-25,1981, p. 96. 
170M. L. Nash: Digest of United States Practice in International Law. US Dept. of State, Washington D. C., 
C1979), 1983, p. 488. 
1711bid, C1978), 1980, p. 429. 
55 
Nations has refused to pass a resolution. "172 
This reading reading of the UN practice clearly leads to the conclusion that human rights 
are no longer within the domestic jurisdiction of the State. 
However, Socialist writers who in fact, reflect the official positions of their States, seem 
to differ from Western doctrine in their assessment of the relationship between sovereignty 
and human rights. They stress two important points, namely Article 2/7 of the UN Charter 
and the idea that individuals can never be considered as subjects of international law. In 
this context, Szabo maintains that the matter of the relationship between sovereignty and 
the international protection of human rights since 1945 'has hinged upon Article 2 (7)". 
173 
He then stresses that: 
"The fact is that the recognition of human rights opens up a new area for 
international law at the United Nations in which the question of sovereignty remains 
entirely open. Here the State senses a threat on the part of the international 
community and out of principle takes a stand against the community". 174 
The reason, it seems, is that those States fear that the UN may use human rights as a cloak 
for intervention in their internal affairs. Moreover, they (human rights) may serve as a 
weapon of attack between States which adhere to different political and social systems and 
in many cases they are used as pretexts for fomenting international incidents. 
Soviet doctrine and State official policy, seem to favour international control of human 
rights in cases of non -self- governing territories, trust territories and in cases of gross 
violations of human rights which may constitute a threat to international peace in the 
meaning of chapter VII of the UN Charter. This means that they distrust international 
control in the cases of individual situations of violations of human rights, in other words, 
they are against complaints by individuals to international organs. 
In this context, a Soviet author, Kartshinkin stresses: 
* ... [I]magining themselves to be fighters for human rights and freedoms, bourgeois 
scholars, diplomats and Statesmen are trying at the same time to sow distrust of Soviet 
internal and external policy ... They are trying to replace the solution of problems of 
cardinal importance. The liquidation of large scale and gross violations of human 
rights and freedoms ... with the question of so-Falled individual complaints and the 
protection of the rights of individual people". ' 5 
However, in a clear contrast to Karshinkin"s view, a Polish lawyer Michatska maintains that: 
"... [U]nder the present realities the thesis that the leaving of human rights to the 
exclusive competence of the State is the only progressive and democratic solution is 
172R. Higgins: The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations. Cup, 
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unacceptable". 176 
And she then added: 
*An analysis of Article 2 (7) in connection with the remaining provisions of the 
Charter, in the light of the travaux prkparatoires and finally, of practice, justifies, 
in my opinion the thesis that human rights do not belong to the internal competence 
of the State". 177 
This is a revolutionary view in the context of Communist doctrine, which sees its task as 
primarily of defending official positions of State. 
However, it seems to me that it is important to distinguish between two questions, namely 
the implementation of international law that governs massive violations of human rights on 
one hand and that which governs the protection of specific individual rights, in this 
context, Buergenthal seems to me to be correct when he noted that: 
"... [T]he universal consensus about gross violations cuts across cultural and ideological 
boundaries that consensus is much weaker when it comes to specific individual civil 
and political rights'. 178 
In the last category of rights, one can speak of differences in ideology of regionalism and 
of cultural differences, he admits. 
The conclusion which can be drawn from the above discussion is that sovereignty has 
been limited to a certain degree, it cannot be used especially to justify massive violations 
of human rights. In fact, the international community in the form of the UN, can validly 
intervene by way of discussion, taking resolutions, or even by using force under chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, if it can be established that the conduct of any State Vis-&-vis its own 
citizens constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The latter example has never 
happened in practice, not because of the lack of the legal basis but because of the absence 
of political will and divergence of interests between the big powers. 
The principle effect of this important conclusion is that in the context of internal 
conflicts, where massive violations of the most basic human rights (such as the right to life, 
prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment and the right to fair trial) are by no means 
uncommon. The international community may and indeed, can intervene by different means 
including force and that under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in order to put an end to 
cases of massive and gross violations of human rights. The State concerned in my view is 
barred from using sovereignty to justify its inhumanity or to prevent the intervention of 
the international community either in peace times or even in cases of emergencies such as 
internal conflicts. 
On the other hand, we must not exaggerate the impact of human rights on the traditional 
concept of sovereignty. In this perspective, I do not share the view that we are witnessing 
(in the era of the UN Charter) the emergence of sovereignty of man. This idea has been 
176 lbid, p. rM. 
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advanced by an eminent jurist, H. Lauterpacht, who argued: 
"An international legal system which aims at effectively safeguarding human 
freedoms in all its aspects is no longer an abstraction. International law, which has 
been excelled in punctilious insistence on the respect owed by one sovereign State to 
another, henceforth acknowledges the sovereignty of man. For fundamental human 
rights are rights superior to the law of the sovereign State". 179 
This statement raises fundamental theoretical questions of international law, such as the 
relation between the State and the individual (whether the latter is an object or subject of 
international law) and the relations between domestic and international law. However, I am 
not going to dwell upon these fields but it is indeed clear to me that Lauterpacht's statement 
is a pure wish, it has no support in practice. 
Thus, Joyce is right when he pointed out that: 
"This passage might well become an opening call for the supreme battle of the 
twenty-first century. For twentieth century is dominated by the sovereign State. 
National sovereignty permeates countless resolutions and declarations that flow 
nowadays from the world forum. "180 
In my opinion, Lauterpacht's predictment ignores and underestimated the attachment 
especially of the newly independent State to sovereignty and their fierce fear of using 
human rights issues as grounds of intervention. 
However, I think that whatever the merits of that fear, it cannot be used in any event to 
justify massive violations of human rights and the reign of terror. Sovereignty in order to 
be respected by the international community must guarantee first that human rights and 
human dignity, must be respected and not suppressed. 
B. Self -Determination as a Limitation of Sovereignty 
Self-determination is more than a simple human right, it is an essential condition for the 
enjoyment of all other human rights, because as the Egyptian delegate stated at the 1977 
session of the UNCHR that: 
"The real enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms could be attained 
only when the right of self-determination has been achieved". 181 
This explains in part why both the Two Covenants of the UN of 1966 begin with a common 
Article (1) on self-determination. My concern is not to trace the historical development of 
the right of self-determination or its meaning but only its relation to the principle of 
sovereignty. Generally, there are two main views on this question. The first sees that there 
is a contradiction between the two principles. In this context, Pornerance writes: 
179Cited by J. Joyce. The New Politics of Human Rights. MacMillan, London, 1978, p. 225. 
1801bid. 
1811bid, p. 157. 
58 
"It is no less true today than it was in Wilson"s time that the prineigle of self- 
determination clashes inevitably with other principles equally sacred". 1 2 
She lists among those principles: sovereign equality and non-intervention. She seems to 
argue that the prohibition of the right of succession would subordinate the right of self- 
determination to sovereignty, hence empties self-determination of any real meaning. 
Western practice seems to support such contention, self-determination is viewed as 
including the right of the people to choose the political form of their association with their 
own State, their right to determine freely the form of their Government and especially the 
right to reverse by democratic means the prevailing political and social order in their State. 
This interpretation of the right of self-determination will implicitly allow secession. 
However, Pornerance's view and even the practice of Western world express the minority 
view. 
The second and popular view sees no contradiction between sovereignty and self- 
determination, the UN practice supports this position. Sovereignty according to this view 
cannot be used as a justification for denying colonial peoples and territories under alien and 
racist regimes, their right to self-determination, in this case their self-determination is a 
very strong limitation on the sovereignty of States which control those peoples and 
territories. 
In the case of independent States which do not subjugate other peoples and territories, 
the Friendly Relations Resolution 2625 of 1970 seems to put respect for the two principles 
on equal footing. The Declaration stresses that the effective application of the principle of 
self-determination is based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality, which 
includes among other things total respect for territorial integrity and political independence 
and the right of every State to choose its political and social systems. 
Nevertheless, the State in order to enjoy these rights, it must as the Declaration 
emphasises, act in 'compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples'. This means, in my view, that self-determination is a limitation on the sovereignty 
of all States including the newly independent States, in the sense that they can invoke 
sovereignty against intervention in their internal affairs, but they must first conduct 
themselves in accordance with the right of self-determination, by respecting the totality of 
human rights. Respect for human rights is the new name of self-determination in my view. 
The conclusion is that self-determination limits the sovereignty of the State in the sense 
that the latter is obliged to respect human rights, if it is to enjoy the benefits of 
sovereignty. 
C. Prohibition of the Use of Force as a Limitation on State Sovereignty 
Before the advent of the League of Nations, resort to war and the use of force in its 
different forms such as reprisals and retorsion, were accepted and recognised as cardinal 
components of State sovereignty. In fact, resort to war was recognized as a legal means by 
which the State can conduct its external affairs. As a result, the State can either negotiate 
182M. Pomerance: Setf-determination In Law and Practice. Martinus Nilhoff, The Hague/London, 1982, p. 43. 
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or resort to war, everything depends on the vitality of the interests at stake. Randelzhofer 
summarises the position before the 20th century as follows: 
"Prior to this century [the 20th] no prohibition of the use of force existed. States were 
free to resort to war. The medieval theory of bellum justurn was developed by 
theologians and was never a valid rule of public international law. Furthermore this 
theory lost its war-preventing properties when it became accepted that war could be 
just for both sides. 183 
This means that international law at that period did not impose any limits of the sovereignty 
of State in the field of resorting to war. 
The League of Nations system did not in fact prohibit war or resort to it, it merely sets 
up some procedures which States have to observe before resorting to war. Members should 
according to the Covenant (see especially Articles 10-16) submit disputes likely to lead to 
a rupture, to arbitration or judicial settlement or inquiry by the Council of the League. 
Members were prohibited from resorting to war until three months after the arbitral award 
or judicial decision or report by the Council. Implicitly then the League did not limit the 
sovereignty of the State in any significant way, since ultimately the State can resort to war 
if it wishes so, it has only to wait for the expiration of three months. Wehberg notes in this 
respect that: 
"Mdme des esprits progressistes ä cette ipoque (1919) consideraient le jus belli ac 
pacis comme un attribut dicisif de la souverainet6 de l'Etat". 184 
However, in order to close the gaps in the covenant a very important step was taken, by the 
signing in 1928 of the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (The Kellog-Briand 
Pact) The first Article stipulates: 
"The High Contracting parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective 
peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the resolution of international 
controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations 
with one another. " 185 
The Pact, in fact, contained major deficiencies among them: Firstly the absence of any 
specific sanctions for its breach, Secondly it did not prohibit the use of force in cases short 
of war and thirdly it contained no machinery for the control of its execution. But, its major 
setback was that it was not able to prevent the outbreak of World War Two. 
Despite all these shortcomings, the Pact has never been terminated which indicates clearly 
that there is a widespread acceptance that resort to war, except in self-defence is a very 
valid limitation on State sovereignty. 
However, the most important development in contemporary international law concerning 
183A. Randetzhofer: The Use of Force in Bernhardt (ed. ) Encyclopedia of Public international Law (instalment 
4 (1982) pp. 265-2661. 
184H. Wehberg: Interdiction clu recours A ta force: te principe et tes probtbmes qui se posent. RCADI, 
1951/1, p. 33. 
185H. W. Briggs: The Law of Nations: Cases, Documents and Notes. 2nd ed., Appteton Century Crofts, New York, 
1959, p. 968. 
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the prohibition of the use of force, has come with the advent of the UN Charter. Article 
2/4 stipulates that: 
"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations". 186 
The UN Charter does not prohibit the use of force in cases of self-defence (Article 51) or 
when a decision by the UNSC for collective actions is taken in accordance with its Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter. 
Moreover, the UN practice has established that the use of force for the purpose of 
attaining self-determination, by colonial peoples and peoples under alien and racist regimes, 
is not in breach of Article 2/4, the Friendly Relations Resolution (2625) and the Declaration 
on the Definition of Aggression of 1974, among other resolutions support such contentions. 
The ICJ in the Nicaragua Case has in fact stressed that the rule contained in Article 2/4, 
has become a rule of customary law or even a rule of jus cogens. It held: 
"... [A] further confirmation of the validity as customary international law of the 
principle of the prohibition of the use of force expressed in Article 2 (4), of the 
Charter of the United Nations may be found in the fact that it is referred to in 
statements by State representatives as being not only a principle of customary law but 
a fundamental or cardinal principle of customary law". 187 
Implicitly then, the Court confirms strongly the proposition that the ban on the use of force 
is an important limitation on State sovereignty. It is to be noted that the Court also made 
a very important statement concerning the use of force for the protection of human rights 
by individual States. It stressed that: 
"In any event, while the United States might form its own appraisal of the situation 
as to the respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force could not be the 
appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect". 188 
The effect of this statement is that individual States cannot claim by their individual 
capacity to have the right of the so-called humanitarian intervention, in the era of the UN 
Charter. However, there is nothing in the statement of the Court which can exclude the 
organization of the UN to exercise such rights. It must be remembered in this context 
that especially in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, some writers have 
pretended that under international law States can intervene in other States to stop violation 
of human rights. Borchard states that: 
".... [W]here a State under exceptional circumstances disregards certain rights of its 
own citizens over whom presumably it has absolute sovereignty, the other States of 
the family of nations are authorized by international law to intervene on grounds of 
1861bid, p. 971. 
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humanity ". 189 
This position, however, which was supported by some prominent lawyers such as Stowell, 190 
and Hall, 191 was not supported by the whole doctrine. Thus, Rougier noted that: 
"It must be recognized that the grounds of humanity is the most delicate of the causes 
which may be expected to justify the right of intervention and that it raises judicial 
difficulties in regard to the basis and the extent of this right". 192 
Those who support humanitarian intervention point to the State practice such as the 
intervention of Britain, France and Russia in Greece in 1827 and especially the intervention 
of France in Syria in 1860. However, in my opinion, those classical interventions were 
arbitrary and politically motivated. They were mostly against the Ottoman Empire which 
has a different religion and was very weak militarily. 
Moreover, there is evidence that even the intervention of France in Lebanon in 1860 
(which is seen even by Brownlie as a true case of humanitarian intervention), 193 that the 
Christians were the party which provoked the crisis, knowing in advance that their 
Christian brothers would come in help in the event of their plans failing. 194 
However, I think that the most important evidence that humanitarian intervention is a 
political device only is provided by the case of Nazi regime. That regime committed terrible 
atrocities against its own citizen but no State claimed resort to humanitarian intervention 
despite the fact that all its conditions were present, since a policy of extermination was 
planned to get rid of a section of the population because of difference of religion. 
Even in the era of the UN Charter, some writers mostly Americans (Lillich, Moore and 
Reisman among others) still insist that humanitarian intervention is legal. Their main 
argument is that since the UN cannot act in cases of flagrant violations of human rights by 
one State against its own citizens, because of the use of the veto, individual States may in 
such cases and circumstances resort to humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, 
humanitarian intervention has been advanced as one of the many grounds for the use of 
force and intervention in many cases (e. g. Hungary in 1956; the Dominican Republic in 
1960; Congolese (Zaire) intervention in 1960,1964 and 1978; Czechoslovakia in 1968; South 
Africa in the Angolan civil war in 1975; Bangladesh in 1971; Indonesia intervention in East 
Timor in 1975, Kampuchea in 1979; the US and six Caribbean States in Grenada (1985) and 
189 L. B. Sohn and T. BuergenthaL: International Protection of Human Rights. The Bobbs-MerriLL Cie., Inc., 
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the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda 1979-1980). 195 However, the UN has never endorsed 
any of those actions. Thus, for instances in the case of the Vietnamese intervention in 
Kampuchea, the US delegate after observing that no State has the right to impose one 
Government on another stressed that: 
"The international community could not allow to pass in silence the acts that had just 
taken place to do so would only encourage Governments in other parts of the world 
to conclude that there were no norms, no standards, no restrictions ". 196 
Also, in the case of the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda, Wani after revealing the real motives 
behind the Tanzanian invasion, concluded that: 
"The Tanzanian invasion had at least the single most positive attribute of removing 
Amin from power and raising the hopes of Ugandans for a new life where they were 
once resigned to suffering. The Teal objective of the invasion had more to do with 
Nyrere's and Tanzania's prestige and a deep seated commitment by NyTere to return 
his friend Obote to power". 197- 
This state of affairs confirms Brownlie's conclusion that: 
"There is little or no reason to believe that humanitarian intervention is lawful within 
the regime of the Charter. " 198 
He then adds: 
"There is virtually no modern State practice to support that such a right exists". 199 
The above mentioned ICJ view confirms the correctness of such assertions. It must be 
stressed that it is only humanitarian intervention by one State or a group of States acting 
outside the UN which is prohibited since the UN can always act by intervening in any State 
which violates consistently and grossly the most basic human rights of its own citizens, 
either in peace time or even in internal conflicts. It can do so under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, when it sees that the situation in the country constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security. However, the UN has never acted in that way, mainly because of 
political reasons. The legal basis in the UN Charter does exist and is waiting of its use. 
Thus, there is nothing to prevent the UN from intervention in internal conflicts, when 
widespread and massive violations of human Tights exist. This is another important 
limitation on State sovereignty. 
195 WiLd-Verwey: Humanitarian Intervention, in A. Cassese (ed. ): The Current Legal Regulations of the Use 
of Force. Martinus Niihoff, 1986, pp. 60-67 
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THE PRINCIPLE OF NON- INTERVENTION 
Introduction 
Together with the principle of sovereignty, the principle of non- intervention has also been 
advanced as a justification for the non-extension of humanitarian law to internal wars. It 
has been said that the principle, among other things, excludes any international regulations 
of the conduct of the established Government vis-i-vis its local opponents, any such 
exercise will result inevitably in opening the door for outside interventions and this leads 
to the worsening of the internal conflicts. A careful reading of the proceedings of the two 
Diplomatic Conferences of 1949 and 1974-1977 would confirm that the principle was used 
extensively by States, first to resist any attempt at regulating internal wars and thereafter 
to restrict and limit the content of such regulation. 
This state of affairs, in my view, imposes the need for a real investigation and analysis 
of the concept of non- intervention, its place, meaning and limits in traditional and 
contemporary international law. Moreover, it is necessary to elucidate the question of 
intervention in civil wars, as it is the most relevant to my research. 
Section 1: Reasons for the Increase In Interventionary Activity 
According to one view intervention is the natural product of the existing system of 
international society, the combined effect of the absence of a central authority on the 
universal level, on one hand, and the existence of great powers, on the other hand, will lead 
automatically to the situation, where the big will intervene in the affairs of the weak. 
Intervention then, in the opinion of some writers, is the logical consequence of greatness, 
Barnet states such idea as follows: 
"Intervention, with all its paraphernalia- the aid missions, the CIA operations, the 
roaming fleet bristling with nuclear weapons, the Green Berets, the pacification 
teams, and ultimately the expeditionary forces-is the inevitable consequences of 
greatness-it is the burden and the glory of the republic". 1 
Intervention in the internal affairs of others, is then among the means by which the great 
power conducts its own affairs. Halpern in fact stresses that: 
" ... [A] great power 
intervenes in the domestic realm of other States when it says 'yes' 
and when it says 'no' indeed by its sheer existence". 2 
The logical consequences of such assertions is that the independence of especially weaker 
members of the international community is pure fiction, also any attempt at proclaiming 
1 
R. J. Barnet: Intervention and RevoLution: The US in the Third WorLd. Mac Gibbon & Kee. 1970, pp. 112- 
13. 
2 M. Hatpern: Morality and Potftfcs, in J. Rosnau, (ed. ): InternationaL Aspects of CiviL Strife. Pup, 
Princeton. New Jersey. 1964. p. 251. 
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the principle of non- intervention in the relations between States, would go against the logic 
of the composition of the international community. 
To me, these kinds of arguments are not convincing because they are in contradiction with 
contemporary international law, which stresses the sovereign equality of its members on the 
legal level. Besides, even 'greatness' must be subjected to law which is based, among other 
things, on respect for sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity, otherwise 
we will go back to the bad old times, where the strong behaved as in the state of nature (in 
the Hobsian sense) by intervening, invading, and colonizing weak communities. 
However, in the face of the rapid increase in interventionary activities especially, as from 
the 1960s up to now, intervention has become an increasingly prominent feature of 
international system. This led a host of political scientists and lawyers to study the subject 
of intervention and thereby suggest the main reasons for its increase. 
In this context, Little suggests three main reasons as an answer: (i) The proliferations of 
nation States, most of which were not considered to be capable of maintaining their 
independence. (ii) The existence of a sharp ideological cleavage between the two 
'superpowers' which precipitated attempts to gain support from new States. (iii) Finally, the 
production of nuclear weapons which eliminates the possibility of war between the two 
major actors and encourages them to employ subversive tactics. 3 
On the other hand, Moore advances four reasons for explaining the phenomenon of 
intervention in internal conflicts: A. The nuclear confrontation. 
B. The shift from a stable to a revolutionary system. 
C. An accelerating rate of social change in developing countries with the result of a 
decrease in stability. 
D. Finally, the militancy of some new leaders who advocate full use of force for the 
expansion of ideology. 4 
Thus, if the prospect of nuclear confrontation and its obvious consequences of mutual 
defeat for the superpowers, has protected Europe from violence, and has given it the 
longest peace period in the recent history. The fate of the Third World is the opposite. It 
has become the battle ground for the confrontation between the superpowers. The dire 
problems of underdevelopment and the inequalities of the distributions of wealth within 
those societies have, in many instances, given rise to widespread dissatisfaction within the 
population, and have induced parts of that population to take arms against their own 
Governments. 
The superpowers, especially have mercilessly exploited such situations, by aiding and 
assisting the faction which can further their ideology, interests and influence. Civil wars 
in the words of Falk: 
*... [P]resent expanding nations and blocs with opportunities for strategic expansion 
that does not involve the high risks of reaching those self-destructive levels of 
conflict that are likely to attend major armed attacks across international 
3 R. Littte: Intervention. Rowman & Lftttefietd, Totow, New Jersey, 1975, p. 4. 
4 J. N. Moore: Law and the Indo-China War. PUP, Princeton, New Jersey, 1972, p. 83. 
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boundarieS". 5 
This means that the rule of non-intervention is under heavy pressure, in fact, it is either 
the observance of the law in the form of abstaining from interference (which in the opinion 
of the intervening States will result in political defeat), or non-observance which may very 
easily lead to political victory. 
The behaviour of the superpowers especially, in this period (of the 1980s) confirms to a 
large extent the above observation. The arrival of president Reagan's administration 
indicated that the Americans are not in the mood of tolerating any more Soviet moves in 
the Third World. In this respect, the US President, Mr. Reagan warned that: 
"... [T]he US should intervene in wars in the Third World countries whenever there 
is a chance to fight Soviet or Marxist influence, it should do so all round the world, 
without regard to particular local conditions. Constraints on American power too must 
yield to the ideological imperatives". 6 
The Americans seem to give precedence to their ideological preferences over the duty of 
adhering to the law. 
The mood of the Soviets, however, was stated in the Report of the CPSU Central 
Committee to the 27th Congress in the following terms: 
"Capitalism regarded the birth of Socialism as an 'error' of history which must be 
'rectified', it was to be rectified at any cost by any means irrespective of law and 
morality: by armed intervention, economic blockade, subversive activity, sanctions 
and "punishments' or rejection of all cooperation. But nothing coul interfere with 
the consolidation of the new system and its historical right to live'. 
9 
The Soviets believe deeply that the spread of socialism to all parts of the world is a 
historical verdict, no force can stop that process. Moreover, they see that the conditions in 
many Third World countries are ripe for social revolution, and that their duty is to help and 
assist the progressive forces to take over political power. 
The Americans on the other hand, believe that their duty, on behalf of the free world, is 
to stop the process of revolutionary change whenever Communists are involved. They are 
certain that without Soviet intervention, internal conflicts and upheavals will not end in the 
victory of local Communists. Rostow argues in this regard that: 
"... [W]e Americans are confident that, if the independence of this process (of 
Modernisation) can be maintained over the coming years and decades, these societies 
(the developing ones) will choose their own versions of what we would recognise as 
a democratic, open society". 8 
5R. Fatk: The Internationat Law of Internat War, in J. Rosman, (ed. ): op. cit., supra. n. 2, p. 188. 
6New York Times (Dec. 9th, 1985) cited in the International Affairs (Moscow) 10/1986, p. 12. See also 
P. J. Schraeder: Intervention in the 1980s. US Foreign Policy in the Third World. Lynner Rienner Pub., 
Boulder, London, 1989. 
7 International Affairs (Moscow) 10/1986, p. 12. 
8W. Rostow: Countering Gueri its Attack, Army Magazine, Sept. 1961, reproduced in R. Falk, (ed. )., The 
Vietnam War and International Law. PUP, Princeton, 1968, p. 129. 
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This means that the Americans too believe that the fate of humanity in its poor parts is 
connected with the values of the open society, and they see it as their mission to protect this 
process. 9 
The struggle sometimes takes the overtones of the religious language of bygone ages, 
Rostow insists that: 
* ... [D]espite all the 
Communist talk of aiding the movements of national independence 
they are driven in the end by the nature of their system, to violate the independence 
of nations"10 
He then confidently asserts the 'noble' American motives: 
"Despite all the Communist talk of American imperialism we are committed, by the 
nature of our system to support the cause of national independence and the truth will 
come out". " 
However, the 'support for the cause of independence' which Rostow talks about, includes 
among other things "learning to deter guerilla warfare, if possible and deal with it if 
necessary". 12 This philosophy which advocates intervention to the maximum has been 
applied to Vietnam, and everybody knows the high cost for international law, and especially 
the terrible human sufferings of the population. 
Also, as I stressed before, in the 1980s the Americans are again buoyant, feeling that the 
Soviets must be stopped in the Third World, since in their view the Communists are behind 
all internal conflicts, in this respect Shultz the American Secretary of State wrote: 
* ... [TIen to 
fifteen years ago when the US was beset by economic difficulties 
neglecting its defences, and hesitant about its role in the world, the Soviets exploited 
the conditions". 13 
He then added: 
* ... [T]hey [the Soviets] and their clients moved more 
boldly in the geopolitical arena, 
intervening in such places as Angola Kampuchea, Ethiopia and Afghanistan, 
believing that the West was incapable of resisting". 14 
The Secretary of State does not advocate restraints and non -intervention as the best policy 
for keeping order in the world. On the contrary he feels that the US must react by assisting 
and aiding any faction which resists the Communists, he seems to be proud that in the 
1980s, the picture has changed precisely because the Americans are on the offensive in the 
struggle for the Third World. 




12 Ibid, p. 131. 
13G. P. Shultz: New Realities and New Ways of Thinking, 63 Foreign Affairs, 1985, p. 706. 
141bid. 
67 
He thinks that communism is on the retreat and the Western values of peace, democracy, 
liberty and human rights are on the offensive, he confidently asserts that: 
"... [T]oday we see a significant new phenomenon, after years of guerrilla insurgency 
led by Communists against pro-Western Governments, we now see dramatic5and 
heartening examples of popular insurgencies against the Communist regimes". ' 
His strategic shift in the struggle between the superpowers which, taking place in the Third 
World, will mean in practice that the US in the opinions of the Reagan Administration, has 
a duty to assist the anti-Communist insurgencies in Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua and 
many others; otherwise, as he put it: 
"... [I]f we turn our backs on this tradition (the American tradition of supporting the 
struggle of other peoples for freedom and democracy) we would be conceding the 
Soviet Union that Communist revolutions are irreversible while everything else is up 
for grabs, we would be in effect, enacting the Brezhnev doctrine into American 
law". 16 
This is a clear advocacy of intervention in civil wars, which are taking place especially in 
the Third World, no legal restraints seem to be taken into consideration. The argument is 
simple, because they intervene we have to intervene, as he States: 
"... [S]o long as Communist dictatorships feel free to aid, and abet insurgencies in the 
name of 'Socialist internationalism' why must the democracies-the target of thi 
threat-be inhibited from defending their own interests and the cause of democracy". 'ý 
This is a summing up of the mood of the decision makers of a great power, which, in my 
opinion, leads to a very dangerous situation, where international law has no impact 
whatsoever on the actions and decisions of the most powerful nation on earth. The 
conclusion is that intervention activities, especially in internal wars, has increased. The 
underlying reasons for such State of affairs are connected with the rift between the 
superpowers and their mutual distrust. Third World countries are the first target of such 
activity, because of their internal contradictions, and the absence of democracy, this makes 
rebellion attractive to the unsatisfied part of the population. 
This situation led Third World countries especially, to see in any action, even that aimed 
at making internal wars more human, as opening the door to more intervention in their 
internal affairs by external countries, and by consequence as attempts at undermining their 
independence. 
151bid. 
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Section 11: Definition of Intervention 
A. Intervention In Historical Perspective 
The history of intervention is the history of the State itself, it is in the words of Fawcett 
man old political habit even a necessity"18, the same author emphasises that: 
"... [Slince th Tý emergence of nation-States has there not been intervention in progress 
somewhere" . 
Verzijl stresses in the same context that: 
"If we look at the subject (of intervention) from a historical point of view we find 
ourselves faced with an endless series of interventionS". 
20 
Thus, on August 25th, 1215, England's Magna Carta was declared by Pope Innocent III to 
be null and void. However, this was in the era before the birth of the modern State. 
Nevertheless in practice, even after the birth of the modern system of States after 1648 
(Treaty of Westphalia) which was based upon independence and non- intervention, 
interferences occurred and alliances were created to intervene in the affairs of other States, 
in order to prevent change of the political authority, or to force such change. 
The history of the actions of Russia, Prussia, Great Britain and Austria are well known 
after the fall of Napoleon, the Quadruple Treaty of Alliance between those powers of 
November 20th, 1815 stipulates that: 
"Le repos de I'Europe est essentiellement H6 A I'affermissement de l'ordre des choses 
(de le dernier attentent de Napoleon Bonaparte avait momentandment subvertu) 21 fond6 sur le maintain de I'autorit6 royale et de la charte constitutionnelle". 
In practice, this policy meant that any attempt to rebel against the Royal regimes in any 
part of Europe, even when the revolt is widespread will be crushed by the intervention of 
the said powers on the side of the established Royal regime. 
22 
Pitman B. Potter reveals that: 
"On peut donc rdsumer I'histoire de la pratique de l'intervention en Europe depuis 
la revolution Frangaise jusquI nos jours, en disant que l'intervention s'est 61argie 
en ce qui concerne sa base, ses m6thodes, ses objectifs et sa reconnaissance 23 juridique". 
18 J. Fawcett: Intervention in International Law: A Study of Recent Cases, RCADI, 1961/11, p. 347. 
19 Ibid. 
20 J. H. W. Verzfjt: International Law In Historical Perspective. VoL. I: General Subjects. A. W. Sijthoff, 
Leyden 1968, p. 238. 
21 Cited by Verzill. ibid, p. 239. 
22 Thus, In 1821, following successful revolutions against Royal Absolutism in Spain and NapLes, French 
and Austrian troops. respectively dispatched wider aegis of the Holy Alliance, intervened to restore 
eager Monarchs to their full prerogatives. Cited by T. J. Farer: The Regulation of Foreign Intervention 
in Civil Armed Conflict. RCADI, 1974/11. p. 320. 
23 P. S. Potter: L'Intervention en droit internationaL. RCADI, 1930/11, p. 633. 
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He adds that intervention had been resorted to more often than the I 8th century especially 
by the European powers and the US. 
in my opinion, colonialism includes among other things intervention in the internal affairs 
of non-European States and entities, thus for the Third World the experience was even 
worse. conquest, aggressions and military interventions, were accepted as legal devices, in 
order to gain new territories, influence and markets. 
In this context, it is not strange that Stewart Mill advocated non- intervention between the 
States which possess the same degree of civilization and intervention in States and entities, 
which are of a 'low grade of social improvementS24. He writes: 
*The sacred duties which civilized nations owe to the independence and nationality 
of each other are not binding towards those whom nalionality and independence are 
"15 either a certain evil, or at least a questionable good. 
He calls them 'barbarians' and to him they have no rights as nations. Thus, according to 
him: 
*The criticisms therefore, which are so often made upon the conduct of the French 
in Algeria and on the English in India, proceed it would seem, mostly on a wrong 
principle "26 
This means that the right principle justifies morally and legally interventions in barbarian 
States without limits. On the other hand, between civilised States intervention was not 
justified at least theoretically. 
However, especially after the advent of the UN, and under the influence of the newly 
independent States, the former and the actual victims of interventions, a real legal stock of 
treaties bilateral and multilateral, UN resolutions and the ICJ pronouncements, especially 
the last one in Nicaragua Ciat 1986, non-intervention has acquired a very important place 
at least on the normative level. 
B. The Definition of Intervention 
If it is clear that the control of intervention, in general, and intervention in domestic 
conflicts, is one of the most difficult problems, confronting the future of peace and security 
in the world and also the future of international law, then the question of definition of 
intervention is very important since it will help in identifying what constitutes that activity 
and reveal the extent to which international law has tried to limit the legality of 
interventions. 
On the other hand, it must be noted that many Western lawyers especially, express the 
opinion that any attempt at defining 'intervention' will lead to confusion. Part of the 
confusion as Moore feels, lies in 'the tendency to define intervention in high level 
24 J. S. Mitt: A Few Words on Non-Intervention, In Falk (ed. )., op. cit., supra. n. 8, p. 32. 
25 Ibid. 
26 lbid, p. 33. 
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generalisation without careful separation of the issues and contextS"27 whereas Potter 
attributes the situation to: 
"A cause de sa large utilisation (intervention) par tant d'auteurs qui l'ont appliqu6 a 
nombre de phdnom6nes, qui diMrent considdrablement entre eux, ce terme est arriv6 
"28 maintenant A poss6der une significance emminemment variable et uncertaine. 
He then adds: 
"Il suffit, A I'heure actuelle, de prononcer le mot intervention pour provoquer, chez 
beaucoup de spdcialistes de droit international un sourire, voir un froncement de 
sourcilS. "29 
In my opinion, lawyers who think that there is a great confusion in the definition and the 
law of intervention are generally those who think that any flat prohibition of intervention 
in whatever form, is not a realistic exercise and that the rule of non -intervention must yield 
to the exigencies of the real international life, where interventions are sometimes welcomed, 
due among other things, to the inactivity of the UN, in the face of some important 
problems. They maitain, or at least, a portion of them think, that it is imperative to review 
the rule of non- intervention because it is sometimes in contradiction with State practice. 
On the other hand, it must be noted that the talk of the existence of a great confusion in 
the subject of intervention, did not prevent the doctrine from attempting at formulating 
definitions of the subject. 
Vattel who is to be the first lawyer who tried to lay down the theoretical foundations of 
non-intervention, as the corner stone of a system of international law, which is based on 
equal sovereign members, in his view, non-intervention is the logical consequence of 
freedom, it indicated that all States have the full right to govern themselves in any way they 
choose. No third party can intervene in such a process. 30 
This means in my opinion that intervention is principally forbidden in whatever form, 
the reason used by Vattel is that States are like persons. They are obliged to refrain from 
doing anything to each other even for a supposed good. 31 
However, it is to be observed that in the era before the UN and even after the UN at least 
for some Western lawyers, the element of coercion and the use of force have played a 
significant role in defining some actions of States as interventions, which means that all 
forms which do not involve military force were considered not constituting interventions. 
Winfield typifies this trend when he states: 
'70p. 
cit., supra. n. 4, p. 127. 
28 Supra. n. 23, p. 611. 
29 Jbid, p. 612. 
30 OP. cit., supra. chapter 1, n. 9, p. 297. 
311n 
this context, Carty stresses that Vattet "drew upon a tradition of natural law which especially 
rejected the possibility that any individual could enjoy a divine or natural authority over another", 
COp. cit.. supra. chapter 1, n. 103, p. 89). 
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*As to the amount of meddling necessary to constitute intervention, there must be 
compulsion or the threat thereof, and the threat is to be understood as a direct or 
indirect request by one State to the parties or one party in the context to do or refrain 
from doing something upon pain of violence"32 
He accepts the view of Westlake that tender of advice may be injudious, but it is not 
intervention, he suggests that such advice may be treated as a 'pacific intervention'. Also 
to him bloodshed is undesirable but it is an inevitable incident. Lawrence is even more 
explicit, he writes: 
*There can be no intervention without on one hand, the presence of force naked or 
veiled, and, on the other hand, the absence of the consent on the part of both the 
combatants". 33 
This means that other acts which do not involve force, are not to be seen as constituting 
intervention. Stowell on the other hand, observes that: 
"Depuis longtemps dijä, le mot d'intervention est employ6 dans les affaires 
internationales pour designer le recours ä des misures de force, soit sous forme de 
menace, en vue d'obtenir que les autres Etats adoptent une certain ligne de conduite, 
ou de mettre fin ä des hostilitis ou autres activit8s indisirableS«. 34 
For Hall, intervention is 'not a means of obtaining redress for a wrong done, but a measure 
of prevention or of police, undertaken sometimes for the express purpose of avoiding 
35 war'. Intervention is then viewed as a 'surgical operation' its goal is to oblige the victim 
to do or to refrain from doing some particular action. 
It is very easy to infer from these definitions that intervention will be used in practice 
only by powerful nations, since no small power can oblige a strong State to do or refrain 
from doing a particular action. Moreover, we can infer that the powers which resort to 
intervention are the final judges in deciding whether to intervene or not. In this respect, 
Winfield cites the examples of France sending naval forces to Korea in 1866, the reason was 
the murder of a French vicar, also in 1838 France intervened in Argentina, by instituting 
32 Supra. n. 30, p. 140. 
33 T. J. Laurence: The Principles of International Law. 4th ed. Rev. & rewritten, MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 
London, 1913, p. 124. In the same context, P. H. Winfield effoasised the prevailing view in that era 
by saying that: 
"The essence of interventf on is compu I sf on, actua I or threatened, by one State against another, 
or against one or both of two disputant parties in another State". 
He then cited 33 grounds on which intervention was supported by jurists and Statesmen, among them: 
0... [TIhe balance of power, to maintain the existing order of things, to secure perpetual 
peace, a crime of a Government against its subjects, maltreatment of aliens. On grounds of 
morality, humanity, nationality, necessity, policy and religion". 
The Grounds of Intervention In Internationat Law. 5 BYIL, 1924, pp. 149-150. 
34 E. C. StoweLL: La thdorie et La pratique de tlintervention. RCADI, 1932/11, p. 91. 
35Hati, W. E.: A Treatise on InternatfonaL Law. 7th ed., Higgfns, A. P. (ed. ). CLarendon Press, London, 
New York, Toronto, Bombay, 1917, p. 293. 
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a blockade on the coast of Buenos Aires, the reason being the 'unjust imprisonment of two 
French subjects' and because six other French subjects have been obliged to serve in the 
native army. 
Oppenheim gives a definition which is often quoted as reflecting the view of classical 
international law on the subject. He States: 
"... [I]ntervention is dictatorial interference by a State in the affairs of another State 
for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual conditions of things". 36 
The word 'dictatorial' has been interpreted as meaning first that the intervening State acts 
without being invited by the target State. Secondly, that the intervening State uses the 
threat or use of force. He stresses that intervention in order to be forbidden by international 
law '... must be always dictatorial, not interference pure and simple'37 which means that 
other forms are legal in principle. Oppenheim's definition which is used as a standard 
definition of classical international law, has been attacked by Moore, who after quoting the 
definition observed: 
"Such definitions are by themselves so devoid of content that any real meaning they 
convey is little more than pseudo -knowledge comparable t saying that sleeping pills 
put one to sleep because they contain a dormative agent".? 
ý 
This remark enters in the whole policy of the school of policy oriented approach, which 
stresses that any simplistic definition, will not cover the complex nature of the phenomenon 
of intervention. 
The conclusion is that intervention, from Vattel onwards has been seen as violation of the 
sovereignty and independence of the State against which it is used. This is a very important 
result for international law, and the survival of the international system as a whole. It 
means, at least theoretically, that States aspire for a more orderly world, where the strong 
has some limits which must be respected in his relationships with the weaker members of 
the international community, non -intervention excludes by its nature any state of nature 
approach to international relations. 
On the negative side, the concrete definitions of intervention, did not adhere completely 
to the declared general principle of non- intervention advocated by Vattel and others. 
They defined the prohibited intervention, as that which contains the elements of coercion 
and force, thus other forms which were widespread (such as economic and diplomatic 
interventions) and even more dangerous were not considered to be worthy of prohibition. 
State practice is, in fact, in many respects, opposite to the general principle (of non- 
intervention) and even to the definitions of the prohibited intervention suggested by 
lawyers. Thus, the Holy Alliance, considered intervention by whatever means against any 
36 
L. Oppenheim: Internationat Law: A Treatise. Vot. l. Peace. H. Lauterpacht, (ed. )., 8th ed., 
Longmans, Green & Co, London, New York, Toronto, 1955, p. 305. 
37 Ibid. 
38 op. cit., supra. n. 4. p. 128. 
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rising against Monarchy in Europe as legitimate and acted upon that premise in many 
instances. 
The US intervened extensively in central and Latin America essentially for the protection 
of economic interests of its subjects in the area. 
European powerful nations also intervened extensively in the internal affairs of Asian and 
African States and communities, the flagrant examples are the repeated interests of 
different European powers in the ottoman Empire, which led to its eventual disintegration, 
also the intervention of France and then Britain in Egypt, and the intervention of France 
in Tunisia and Morocco. 
This state of affairs leads me to conclude that non-intervention was basically derived from 
natural law and the logic of State sovereignty, rather than State practice. 
C. The Position of Intervention after the Charter 
There are in general two currents, concerning what intervention includes and whether there 
are exceptions to the rule of non- intervention in contemporary international law. The first 
view holds that the situation after the Charter, has changed dramatically for the legal 
position of the principle of non-intervention. 
Thus, when reading closely Articles 2/4 and 2/7 of the UN Charter together with the 
legal stock of treaties, Charters and resolutions condemning intervention in the internal 
affairs of other States, the result is clear. the principle (of non- intervention) has been 
strengthened, the rule is absolute, no exceptions can be admitted. 
Moreover, according to this view intervention has been defined in a way that it does not 
cover only coercive intervention, but any other form of intervention such as economic, 
diplomatic and ideological interventions. 
This view is held generally by the victims of intervention in the past and in the present 
(Third World States) and by socialist States. However, for the Soviets the principle of non- 
intervention is adhered to and insisted upon in the relations with the non-socialist world, 39 
but with socialist States, the principle of 'proletarian internationalism' is the rule. This rule 
in practice meant that Socialist States can intervene in any socialist State, whenever 
socialism is threatened. The Brezhnev Doctrine is a concrete example of such an 
interpretation. 
According to that doctrine 'the sovereignty of each socialist State country cannot be 
opposed to the interests of the world of socialism and of the world revolutionary 
movement,, 40 which means that any antisocialist move, even by the legal Government let 
alone by antiGovernment forces, will be crushed mercilessly, sovereignty cannot stop such 
interventions. In this context, it is stated that: 
"Naturally the Communists of the fraternal countries could not allow the socialist 
States to be inactive in the name of an abstractly understood sovereignty, when they 
39 
See for detai is on this point, T. Carotine: New States Sovereignty and intervention. Gower Pub. Co. 
Ltd., Atdershot/Hants, 1985, pp. 9-21. 
40 Cited by A. S. Bozeman: The Future of Law in a Multicultural World. PUP, Princeton, Princeton, 1971, 
P. 188. 
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saw that the country stood in the peril of antisocialist degeneration"41. 
In other words, when it comes to the sphere of influence, non-intervention is impossible, 
socialism overrides sovereignty and non -intervention. However, I think that the need of the 
Third World countries for non- intervention, is more or less genuine, since they are the real 
target of intervention, due to their weakness economically, and to their social Problems, 
which can be easily exploited by outside forces. 
The second view, sees with scepticism any general prohibition of intervention in whatever 
form. They see such an approach as simplistic and unrealistic. They argue for the 
reformulation of the rule of non -intervention in order to open the door for exceptions, 
especially since the premise upon which the prohibition of intervention was based, has not 
been concretisised. They mention as an example the deadlock in the UNSC, which paralysed 
the UN, in these circumstances they claim States must act even individually and intervene 
in the affairs of other States. 
However, I think the central question on the conceptual level, is whether it is better for 
international law and the international community of States to have a flat prohibition of 
intervention on the theoretical and normative levels, and live with intervention in practice, 
where the rule of non- intervention is breached daily on one hand, or on the other hand 
we must open on the normative level some ways for legalising certain interventions. This 
real dilemma makes the subject of intervention a very serious challenge to international law 
and its future. 
In this context, some Western lawyers, especially Americans from the school of policy 
oriented approach, are tireless in suggesting that the approach of classical and some modern 
lawyers, and also the practice of the UN, is very simplistic, since any general and vague 
prohibitions of intervention, is simply out of date, since it does not face to what is going 
on the daily life of States. It is better, in their view, for the cause of international law, that 
the treatment of the subject of intervention must go hand in hand with the sophistication 
of international life, with all its different phenomenon, and the needs of the international 
order. 
To me, the non-respect of the rule of non- intervention by especially strong States in our 
contemporary world, does not mean that there is something wrong with that rule, on the 
contrary there must be something wrong with the policies of those who break the rule. Since 
the flat prohibitions of intervention in all its different forms, is very essential for keeping 
a minimum world order, in a society which lacks an effective central institution, which has 
the means of suppressing any breach of the rule. 
Turning now to some actual definitions of intervention which have been advanced in the 
era of the Charter, two trends can be distinguished, the first advocates an extended notion 
of activities considered to be intervention and thus contrary to international law. This is the 
doctrine held by Third World and socialist States. 
The second trend held by especially some Western lawyers and by Western States stressed 
that the term is still even in the era of the Charter 'ambiguous' and maintains that the use 
41 lbid, p. 191. 
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or threat of the use of force, is still the main condition of the activity to be labelled as 
intervention, and some of them (especially from the school of policy oriented approach such 
as Moore) even advocate that in some circumstances even the use of force or its threat 
cannot be seen as intervention, hence illegal when undertaken to uphold some community 
values such as human rights and self-determination. 
An example of the first trend, Soviet lawyers advanced some definitions, which shed some 
light on the Soviet view. Thus Tunkin who maintains that the principle of peaceful 
coexistence presupposes the existence of other important principles of international among 
1.2 them non -interference in the internal affairs of other States, wrote: 
"... [T]he principle of non -interference means that no State may interf re 
authoritatively in the affairs within the domestic jurisdiction of another State". 4S 
It seems here that the definition is restricted by the word 'authoritative', however, another 
Soviet scholar was very specific, to him non- intervention means: 
"... [The] inadmissibility of intervention in any form whatsoever. Military diplomatic 
economic as well as rendering support in any form to forces waging as ruggle on the 
territory of foreign State to overthrow the Government of the latter". 
14 
This definition, it seems, covers a wide range of activity and allows no exceptions. A recent 
Soviet definition of intervention reads as follows: 
"... [I]ntervention forcible interference by one or several States into the internal affairs 
of another State or States, directed against their territorial integrity or political independence or otherwise incompatible with the aims and principles of the UN Charter. There are armed economic and diplomatic intervention i. e. armed intervention or aggression is most dangerous to the cause of peace and to the independence of a country which has become the object of encroachment". 45 
Although 'forcible' interventions are singled out as the most dangerous ones, other forms 
of intervention are nevertheless prohibited. Soviet writers are keen to give a detailed 
examples and analysis of what constitutes every form of intervention. 46 
42 G. I. Tunkin: Theory of International Law. Translated with an introduction by W. E. Butler. George 
Allen & Unwin, London, 1974, p. 73. 
43 Cited by W. E. Butter: Soviet Attitudes Toward Intervention, in John N. Moore, (ad)., Law and Civil 
War in the Modern World. John Hopkins Univ Press, Battimore/London, 1974, p. 384. 
44 Jbid, p. 387. 
45 A Dictionary of international Law. Progress Pub., Moscow, 1982, pp. 139-40. 
46 Thus, all acts of aggression (e. g. declaration of war, invasion, bombardment, naval blockades and 
giving support to armed bands) are also interventions. Economic Intervention is essentially the 
adoption of measures of economic pressure which isolate the sovereignty of another State obstruct its 
economic independence and jeopardise the basis of Its economic life. Such measures include economic 
and action taken in respect of another State to prevent the exploitation of its natural resources or 
the nationatisation of those resources. Ideological intervention is present when the State encourages 
talks of recourse to war, when it encourages the use of ABC weapons when It promotes the propaganda 
of Nazi or Fascist views, racial and national exclusiveness, or hatred and disdain for other nations. 
Cited by Thomas, op. cit.. supra. n. 39, pp. 55-57. 
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Third World countries in general argue for a simple, flat and general prohibition of 
intervention in the internal affairs of any State. Intervention in their view covers a wide 
range of activities which may compromise the political independence and the territorial 
integrity of any State. 
Latin American States were as from the 19th century the advocates of an absolutist 
approach to the question of prohibition of intervention The Calvo doctrine (1868) and later 
the Drago doctrine (1902) were real attempts in that direction, however, in the 20th century 
the Latin American States succeeded in the introduction of non-intervention clause in some 
important treaties. The 1933 Montevedeo Convention, and the 1936 Protocol of Buenos 
Aires are prime examples. 
The real development, however, came after the Second World War and after the 
emancipation of a large number of African and Asian countries. The cries for non- 
intervention, and the need for a very extended definition of the concept of intervention 
were advocated forcefully. The practice of the OAU, the Non-Aligned movement in its 
different conferences is very rich in that respect. 
For Western lawyers and Western States intervention even after the Charter is still an 
ambiguous term. Thus, Higgins notedthat: 
"... [I]t is apparent that intervention can mean many different things to many 47 people" . 
This clearly means that there is no accepted meaning of the term in contemporary 
international law. The explanations for such state of affairs lies in the view of some 
lawyers, in the fact that intervention is a very complicated phenomenon, which makes the 
task of its definition a very complicated exercise. 48 Another explanation has been advanced 
by Carty, who writes: 
* ... [Non- intervention] is stated in remarkably absolute terms, that no State has any 
right whatsoever to intervene in any way whatsoever in the affairs of other States. Yet it is a well-known fact interventions are a persistent feature of international 
relationS". 49 
In other words, the rift between the principle and the practice of States in the domain of 
intervention stands in the way of clarifying the real meaning and limits of non- intervention. 
Despite the above observations some Western lawyers were ready to advance some 
definitions of intervention. The acts mentioned in those definitions are in their view the 
1*7 R. Higgins: Intervention and International Law, in H. Butt, (ed. ): Intervention in WorLd PoLitfcs. 
CLarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 29. 
48 In this respect, FaLk after noting that 'intervention is one of the most ambiguous terms in the 
titerature of internationat taw,, observes that: 
0... ET)he task Of formulating limits for a complicated phenomenon is never easy. Nowhere, 
perhaps. It is more difficult than in an attempt to discuss the legal outer limits of Possible 
inftuenceu. 
R. Fatk: Legat Order in a Vlotent Wortd. PUP, Princeton, 1968, pp. 156-159. 
490P. 
cit., supra. n. 31, p. 87. 
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only ones covered by the principle of non -intervention. 
In this context, a very important number of lawyers (Western) still follow the traditional 
view, which characterises as intervention only acts which involve the use or threat of the 
use of force. Thus, Brierly stated before the ILC in 1949 that: 
"... [H]e felt that an act of intervention was an act of dictation by one State to another 
with regard to its internal or external policy backed by the use or threat of force, 50 express or implied". 
He then emphasised that where there was no force or threat of force any action, however, 
improper or unfriendly could not be qualified as intervention. 51 
Sanders on the other hand, stressed that: 
Wthough international law does not provide a complete answer to the questions of 
the exact scope of intervention, there appears to be general agreement among 
publicists that intervention is dictatorial or arbitrary interference of a State, acting 
on its own individual judgement, in the affairs of another State for the Pvrpose of 
maintaining or altering the actual condition of things in the latter State. ""' 
Similarly, Lauterpacht reached the conclusion that: 
"['Intervene' as used in Article 2/7] ... can only be taken 
in its accepted technical 
meaning, as denoting dictational mandatory interference intended to exercise direct 
pressure upon the State concerned but not action by way of discussion, study, inquiry 
and recommendation falling short of intervention proper". 53 
This definition largely confirms the practice of the UN, it relates to the meaning of 
intervention between the organisation and its members but it seems that Lauterpacht still 
adheres to the view that in relations between the States themselves, intervention must be 
dictatorial and mandatory in order to be prohibited. 
To me, all these views reflect the position of the stronger unity of the international 
society, which want to keep a large number of activities outside the scope of the prohibition 
of intervention. Moreover, the adherents to the policy-oriented approach, are generally 
sceptical about strict definitions and flat prohibitions of the phenomenon of intervention. 
Their reason is that any such exercise would be unrealistic. 
Thus, Falk after defining intervention as a term which is used 'to identify any 
consequential impact that the actions of one State have upon the events in another'. 54 This 
is, in fact, a broad definition of intervention, however, Falk insists that 'it is highly 
doubtful whether it is desirable to commit international law to a maximum principle of 
50 whitemann, OP. cit., supra. chapter 1, n. 8, Vot. 5, (1965). p. 329. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid, p. 321. 
53op. 
cit., supra. n. 20, p. 237. 
54R. Fatk: United States Practice and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in the Internat Affairs of Sovereign States, supra. n. 48, p. 156. 
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non-intervention'. 55 He cites instance where intervention was, in his words: 
;... '[P]rompted by humanitarian considerati ns that one can condemn only by waving 
SS6 oo vigorously the banners of sovereignty . 
It is obvious that here, he is speaking about humanitarian intervention as a possible 
exception to the rule of non- intervention. Sadly humanitarian intervention has never been 
used for absolute humanitarian motives, also it is always used by the strong against the weak 
and never the opposite. On the other hand, Higgins notes that: 
"The purpose of the international law doctrine of intervention is,... to provide an 
acceptable balance between the sovereign equality and independence of States on the 
one hand and the reality of an interdependent world and the international law 57 commitment to human dignity on the other" . 
She maintains that it is not profitable to seek a definition of intervention. She gives two 
reasons for that. Firstly, as she put it: 
"... [O]ne cannot indicate a particular part along the spectrum and assert that 
everything from there onwards is an unlawful intervention and everything prior to 
that point is tolerable interference, and one of the things we put up with in an 
interdependent world 1.58 
Thus, she is using the usual argument that certain cases and instances of intervention are 
quite normal exercises in the daily intercourse of nations, and sovereignty has to be limited 
in order to absorb these interventions and accept them as a necessary consequence of living 
in the world today. Secondly, she stresses that: 
"... [T]he term intervention only has a meaning measured against the question 
'intervention against what? ' and the answer has to be 'intervention against a State 
domestic jurisdiction". That is intrusion upon that which is for a State alone". 59 
However, since the constituent elements of 'domestic jurisdiction' is a relative matter as 
the PCIJ has indicated in the Tunisia and Morocco Nationality Decrees Advisory ODInlon. 
This will mean that the area of unlawful and lawful intervention, and also what constitutes 
intervention, are questions which are changing with the development of international law 
and international relations, which indicates that there is a real impossibility of giving a clear 
definition of intervention, and by consequence any attempt toward such definition is 
unrealistic. 
The practice of Western Governments in general is against extended definition of 
intervention and its flat condemnation. Thus those States were generally hostile to the 
550P. 
cit., supra. n. 48, p. 160. 
560P. 
cit., supra. n. 48, p. 161. 
570P. 
cit., supra. n. 47, p. 30. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid, p. 31. 
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approach of the Friendly Resolution to intervention, that resolution in fact, states that: 
"No State or group of States has the right to intervene directly or indirectly for any 
reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State". 
In their (Western States) view, such approach is very rigid since, it condemns 
indiscriminently even innocent actions of States, and turns any gesture into 'intervention'. 
Thus, in the last meeting (I 14th) of the 1970 Friendly Relations Special Committee, Sir Ian 
Sinclair, the UK representative stated the prevailing view of the Western delegates. He 
noted: 
"In considering the scope of 'intervention' it should be Tecognised that in an 
interdependent world, it is inevitable and desirable that States will be concerned with 
and will seek to influence the actions and policies of other States, and that the 
objective of international law is not to prevent such activity but rather to ensure that 
,, 60 it is compatible with the sovereign equality and self-determination of their peoples. 
Similarly, Sir Kenneth Baily attacked Resolution 2131 on non -intervention in the following 
terms: 
"The language of that resolution was so wide that, in its ordinary meaning, it would 
prohibit not only all normal practice of diplomacy but every type of endeavour to 
influence other Governments by negotiation: and we thought to be dangerous as well 
as silly". 61 
To me, this is the view of the strong powers, who possess the real means of influencing the 
actions and policies of other States, but for the weak members of the international 
community extended definition and flat prohibitions of intervention are better. They will 
benefit from them at least in the war of rhetoric for the hearts and minds of the public 
opinion, which can in some cases deter the stronger States from engaging in certain 
interventions. 
The conclusion is that there is a general consensus that non-intervention is a fundamental 
pillar of international relations, and it is the natural consequence of State sovereignty. 
The difference of opinion, it seems, lies in what constitutes intervention and whether 
there are any limits or exceptions to the principle. Western doctrine and State practice in 
the name of realism, stresses that it is impossible to include everything in the definition of 
intervention. Some instances of intervention are either part of the daily practice of States 
or are desirable in some instances such as humanitarian intervention. In this way they are 
relativists in their approach to the problem of definition and prohibition of intervention. 
On the other hand, Third World and Socialist States seem to advocate an absolutist stand 
to them interventions must be defined in a very broad way to include all acts that might 
endanger directly or indirectly the political independence, security and the territorial 
integrity of States. 
60 Cited by G. Arangio-Ruiz: The LIN Frierdly Retations and the System of Sources of Internationat Law. 
Sijthoff L Noordhoff. 1979, p. 126. 
61 lbid, p. 130. 
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Section III: Intervention In Civil Wars 
In the last section, I dealt with the concept of non- intervention in general its meaning and 
limits. In this section, I will concentrate on the very important question of intervention in 
civil wars. It must be stressed that internal upheavals, among them civil wars '... ont W la 
cause ou au moins le pretexte de presque toutes les intervention enregisterdes par 
I'histoire'62 as Rougier notes. In fact, the situation is still the same even in our 
contemporary world. 
A. The Position In Traditional International Law 
In general, traditional international law places respect for the sovereignty of State as its 
most important task. Consequently, it favoured and guaranteed the status quo inside the 
State. The golden rule was that assistance to the established Government is legal, whereas 
any aid to the insurgents is illegal. 
However when the recognition of belligerency is established, the rules of neutrality apply 
in the relation between the two belligerent and third States. The latter has to abstain from 
any direct or indirect assistance to either party in the civil war. The 1928 Havana treaty on 
rights and duties of States in the event of civil strife is seen as a correct codification of 
customary international law on the subject, Article 1/3 stipulates: 
"... [T]o forbid the traffic in army and war material except when Intended for the Government, while the belligerency of the rebels has not been recognised, in which latter case the rules of neutrality applied. "63 
Likewise, the ILA at its 1900 session at Neuchatel emphasised in Article 2/2 of its 
'r6glement' that: 
"Elle [tierce puissance] est astreint A ne fournir aux insurg6s ni armes, ni munitions, 
ni effects militaires, ni subsideS". 64 
Although, State practice is not always consistent, since politics and interests play a major 
element in their calculations, reveals many instances of interventions of third States on the 
side of the established Government and a denial of assistance to insurgents. Thus, in 1912 
and 1922 the US Congress enacted resolutions which allowed the President to impose 
embargoes on the shipment of arms from the US to Latin America and China, whenever he 
has reason to believe that they are likely to be used to promote domestic violence. 
Borchard observes that the US has respected the rule during the Cuban Insurrections 
(1868-1878 and 1895-1898) and emphasises that at the beginning of the American Civil 
War, several of the important arsenals were located in the South '... had England or any other 
foreign country undertaken to embargo arms to both the North and South, the North might 
62A. Rougier: Les querres civites at te drolt des gens. L. Larose, Paris, 1903, p. 350. 
63 D. Schindter and J. Toman (eds. ): The Laws of Armed ConfLicts. 2rd ed. rev. & compLeted. Slithoff 
& Moordhoff, Atphen aan den Rigin, 1981, pp. 805-806. 
64 Cited by D. Schindter In his Rapport provisoire: Le principe de non-intervention dans tes guerres 
civftes. 55 AIDI, 1973, p. 477. 
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65 
easily have lost the Civil War'. 
Simirlarly, during the 19th century Britain assisted the Portuguese throne when it was 
challenged. Europe sided with the Ottoman Sultan against the Egyptian Revolt in 1840, also 
France, Russia, Prussia and Austria responded to the appeal of the King of the Netherlands, 
whose Belgian subjects had declared themselves independent. 
66 
During the Spanish Civil War the assistance given by Germany, Italy and to a lesser 
extent by Portugal to the rebel forces, has been generally seen by international lawyers as 
against international law. Garner argued in 1937 that: 
"... [T]he Government of Spain, for the overthrow of which this aid was intended was the 
established legitimate overnment of the country whatever might be said in criticism of its 
character or policies" 
He then adds: 
"Juridically, therefore, the aid furnished by the three powers mentioned to the rebels 
arrayed against the Spanish Government was an act of intervention of the kind which 
cannot be justified on the ground of self-preservation, protection of nationals or any 
other reasons commonly recognised as justifying intervention by one State in the 
"68 internal affairs of another State. 
Indeed, the whole policy of non- intervention instituted after the outbreak of the Spanish 
Civil War (for some obvious political and ideological reasons by France and Britain and 
many other countries), was never accepted by the Spanish Government as reflecting the true 
stand of international law on the question, and it always insisted on its right under that law 
to request and receive aid alone, since it is the only legal Government. 69 
In my view, the traditional rule was in effect a logical consequence of the principle of 
sovereignty. The latter gives the established Government the right to exercise in full its 
sovereign powers, and among them without any doubt to request assistance from third States 
65 E. Borchard: Neutratity and Civit War. 31 AJIL, 1937, p. 306. 
66 See Ch. Zorgbib6: La guerre civiLe. PUF, 1975, p. 64. 
67j W. Garner: Questions of Internationat Law in the Spanish Civit War. 31 AJIL, 1937, p. 67. The 
writer defines the term Itegitimate government' as 'one which had been set up in conformity with the 
constitution and the taws of the country and as a resutt of the free potiticat etections'. (p. 67). 
68 Ibid. 
69 Thus, on May 13th, 1938, when the Spanish Question was discussed by the Councit of the League of 
Nations, the Foreign Minister of Spain addressed the British and French deLegates in these terms: 
" ... (11f irrespective of the AngLo-ItaLian agreement, Italy and Germany continue to intervene in Spain, and neither France nor UK undertake to prevent this continued intervention, in the 
rk-ww of what morality and justice can you go on depriving the legal Spanish Government of its 
rights under international law". 
Spain in fact submitted to that meeting a Draft Resotution which wouLd invite the League member 
States: 
"... ET)o envisage as from the moment the end of the policy of non-intervention". 
The Resotution was, however. rejected by the Councit of the League of Nations. Keesing's, 1937-40, 
May 15,1938, p. 3467. 
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when its survival is at stake. 
However, it must be mentioned that even in the era of the UN Charter the classical rule 
has been invoked and used by States, indeed most of the interventions after the UN Charter 
in cases of civil wars or internal disorders have been justified on the ground of the request 
of the legal Government. Brownlie noted in this respect that: 
"... [T]here can be little doubt that this type of intervention (intervention by request 
or consent) is compatible with the Charter of the United Nations. The provisions, of 
the Charter do not contain any provisions related to the question and the legality of 
such intervention flows from major principles of general international law: the 
principle of consent and the legal personality of the State producing the request for, 70 or consent to intervention". 
In this context, Britain justified its interventions in Jordan in 19587, in Muscat and Oman 
in 195772 on the ground of request by the established Government, France did the same in 
its frequent interventions in Black Africa and the US in its many interventions in Latin 
America (Guatemala 1960, Dominican Republic 1961, Nicaragua 1960 and now in El- 
Salvador). 73 Also in Lebanon in 1959 and especially in Vietnam in the 1960s. 74 The Soviet 
Union has done the same in Hungary in 195675 and lately in Afghanistan. 76 
70 1. Brownlie: The UN Charter and the Use of Force, in A. Cassesse, (ed. ), op. cit., supra. chapter 
1, n. 195, p. 501. 
71 
Thus, on July 17th, 1958 the British PM, H. Macmillan informed the House of Commons that HM 
Government, has on July 16th, 1958 received a request from the King of Jordan and his PM for immediate 
dispatch of British Forces to Jordan since their country was faced with an imminent attempt by the 
United Arab Republic to create internal disorder and overthrow the existing regime. The British PM 
stressed that his Government has accepted the offer to send troops to Jordan. He added that the 
purpose of this military assistance was 'to stabitise the situation In Jordan by helping the Jordanian 
Government to resist aggression and threats to the integrity and independence of their country'. 
Supra. n. 50, p. 517. 
72 Thus, in HM Queen Elizabeth It speech on January Ist, 1957, the Parliament that in view of the tong-standing ties of friendship between Muscat and Oman and the UK, my Government took prompt actf on in response to a request from the Suttan for armed assistance In quelling rebellion in his Dominions, 
etc.,. Supra. n. 50, p. 517. 
73 
op. cit., supra. n. 50, pp. 534-5. 
74 Thus, the Memorandum of the US Dept. of State on the Legal basis for US actions against North 
Vietnam of March 8th, 1965 states: 
"We had been providing Vietnam since 1950-51 with both economic and military aid. This 
assistance was continued after the conclusion of the 1954 Geneva Accords, within Limitations 
prescribed by those agreements. It had become apparent, however, by 1961 that this limited 
assistance was not sufficient to meet the growing Communist threat. Consequently in 1961, the 
Government of the Republic of Vietnam requested additional aid from the US. The US responded 
with increased supplies and with a larger numbers of training and advisory personeL to assist 
the Vietnamese Forces In prosecuting the war against the Viet Cong. This response was 
proportionate with the design of sustaining Vietnam in its defense against aggression without 
extending the conflict beyond the borders of the country". 
US Senators Ernest Grevening and Herbert Witton Beaser: Vietnam Folty, The Nationat Press Inc., 
Washington D. C., 1968, pp. 570-571. 
75 In this case, the USSR always claims that its assistance was requested by the legaL Government in 
conformity with the Warsaw Treaty of 1955. For further details, see supra. n. 50, pp. 667-76. 
76 In this context, on December 28th, 1979, the Afghan Government issued a statement which read as 
foltows: 
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B. Evaluation of the Traditional Rule 
Three schools of thought are against the traditional rule, to some it simply does not 
represent a true statement of State practice and that on the theoretical level it is in flagrant 
contradictions with the spirit of the principle of non- intervention. 
To others the rule is not just, since justice implies that both sides must be treated alike 
and third States should be free to choose to which side their assistance will go to, and 
finally a third school stress that the search for a single norm to regulate the complex issue 
of intervention in civil wars is simply a meaningless exercise. 
1. The First School: the Absolutist School 
This school advocates a strict adherence to the rule of non-intervention, the rule in their 
view is against unilateral intervention on any side, the legal Government included. 
According to this view the legal Government is entitled to request and receive assistance 
from third parties in times of peace only, however, in times of internal disorders the 
Government has to be let alone to deal with the situation. 
The reasons advanced to justify this stand, differ from lawyer to lawyer, however, 
examples include: 
1. The absence of effective control by the established Government over its territory and 
population. 
2. Lack of legitimacy of the established Government. 
3. Its lack of representativity. 
4. Assistance is against the right to self-determination and social change and lastly the 
uncertainty of the outcome. 
Hall was the first lawyer who advocated such an absolutist view, he exposed his opinion 
in a well-known passage: 
"Supposing to be directed against the existing Government, independence is violated 
by an attempt to prevent the regular organs of the State from managing the State 
affairs in its own way. Supposing on the other hand, to be directed against the rebels, 
the fact that it has been necessary to call in foreign help is enough to show that the issue of the conflict would without it be uncertain, and consequently that there is a 
doubt as to which side would ultimately establish itself as the legal representative of 
"The government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan taking into account the continuing 
and broadening interference and provocations of external enemies of Afghanistan, and with a 
view to defending the gains of the April Revolution [of 19783, territorial integrity and 
national Independence, and maintaining peace and security, proceeding from the treaty of 
Friendship, Good- Nei ghbour t iness and Cooperation of December 5th, 1978, has approached the USSR 
with the insistent request to give urgent political, moral and economic aid, Including military 
aid, which the Government of the Democratic of the Republic of Afghanistan repeatedly requested 
from the Government of the Soviet Union. The Government of the Soviet Union has met the request 
of the Afghan side". 
Moreover, in a statement published by Pravda, President Brezhnev stressed that: 
Me increasing armed intervention, the wett-advanced ptot by externat forces of reaction, 
created a reat threat that Afghanistan woutd toose its independence and be turned into an 
faiperiatfst miLftarybrfdgeheadonour country's southernborder. Inother words, the time came 
when we coutd not but respond to the request of the Government of friendty Afghanistan. To have 
acted otherwise woutd have meant leaving Afghanistan a prey to imperiaLism, etc. @, 
26 Keesing's, 1980, pp. 30229-30236. 
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the State". 77 
He then adds: 
"If intervention is based upon an opinion as to the merits of the question at issue the 
intervening State takes upon itself to pass judgement on a matter which having 
nothing to do with the relations of States, must be regarded as being for legal 
purposes beyond the range of its visionm. 78 
It is clear that Hall, advocates an absolutist non- intervention rule, as from the moment the 
insurrection began and here he differs from the traditional view, which institutes neutrality 
only from the moment of the recognition of belligerency. It is to be noted that some 
distinguished international lawyers still even in the era of the Charter advocate Hall's view, 
among them Wright, Chaumont and Friedmann. 
In this context, Wright after observing that Hall's view is the predominant one, which 
implies that he does not consider the traditional rule as the correct statement of customary 
law, develops another argument to justify his position in advocating abstention of assistance 
to either side, he states: 
"It clearly belongs to the sovereignty of a State, as recognised by the Charter, to ask 
for help, but it must be emphasised that sovereignty belongs to the State and not to 
the Government and a Government beset by internal revolt of such magnitude that 
the result is uncertain is not in the position to speak for the State". 79 
Thus, the criteria of the lack of representative coupled with the uncertainty of the result 
of the context are the prime reasons for pursuing a full policy of non -intervention. 
Chaumont on the other hand develops the argument of self-determination as basis for 
non- intervention on either side in civil wars, 80 whereas Friedmann after reviewing the 
77 W. E. Hatt: A Treatise on International Law. 8th ed.. Oxford, 1924, p. 347. 
781bid. 
79.0. Wright: US Intervention in Lebanon. 53 AJIL, 1959, p. 122. SfmiLarly, in another article, he 
stressed that: 
W. - JT3he handling of insurection, rebellion, cIvf I strife, or other forms of Internal violence Is presumed to be within the domestic jurisdictions of the State, and that neither a foreign 
State nor the UN can intervene to suppress It, even on the invitation of the Government, in 
case the revolution is so serious that the result Is uncertain, etc". 
op. cit., supra. n. 50, p. 462. 
BoHe 
writes: 
" lie droit d'un Etat de choisir son systbmelentraine dans te droit international 
conteffporain, Pobtigation pour tes tiers de taisser te people de cet Etat rigter tui-ff&* tes 
qui s4t6vent en son sein en ce sens que ta position du gouvernement 6tablie 
West jý-r-Gi-icp7iýent ni memeure. ni plus mauvalse, vis-h-vis des tiers, que ceLLe des 
insurg6s". 
Op. cit., supra. chapter 1, n. 48, p. 406. Moreover, in his observations on the Rapport provisoire, 
"Concerning Non-Intervention in Civil, Wars" prepared by SchindLer, Chaumont stated that: 
"Soutenir de tlext6rfeur un governement contest6 par ta vlotence revient tout come te soutien 
des insurgis & prendre parti clans cette contestation et par suite estimer ing6rence dans tes 
affafres Intdrfeures d'un Etat". 
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different attitudes towards intervention in civil wars makes the statement that "what on 
balance favours the view that in civil war the two sides are to be treated on a par, is the 
consideration that international law should not be used to prevent social change. "81 
Implicitly then, the proposition is if social change has to take place and pursue its natural 
course, abstentions from assisting any side is the correct measure to follow for third States. 
However, the main criticism of the neutrality argument, is that it is very idealistic, since 
it is very hard to be concreticised in practice. The Spanish Civil War is a case in point, since 
the policy of non- intervention has been violated systematically by even the signatories of 
the non- intervention treaty. 82 
Similarly, the doctrine can be said to go against the spirit of the system of international 
law, which favours established Government, indeed the principle of sovereignty goes in that 
direction. Also it is in a way against the stand of the UN, which does not prohibit assistance 
to peoples struggling for self-determination in colonial, racist and alien domination 
situations. 83 
2. The Second School: Assistance to Both Parties 
This school advocates assistance to both parties of the internal conflict, States are free to 
choose which party their assistance is to go. Vattel, it seems is the father of such stand, he 
states: 
"Toutes les fois donc que les choses en viennent & une guerre civile, les puissances 
dtrangýres peuvent assister celui des deux parties, qui leur parait fond6 en justice". 84 
It is the justice of the cause of the internal war which is the essential element, which States 
have to take into account when giving their assistance. However, it must be noted that 
Vattel who champions the rule of non- intervention in relations between States, advocates 
such a stand, because to him civil war breaks the State into two distinct units, which for all 
purposes are similar to two States and thus the war is like a war between States, and third 
Op. cit., supra. n. 64, p. 530. 
81 Friedmann, op. cit., supra. chapter 1, n. 129, p. 267. 
82 
Also, in the Russian Civil War, Britain proclaimed that the contest was a purely domestic affair, 
whereas in practice it was very active in assisting the rebels. See for det a its, W. P. Coates and Zelda 
K. Coates: Armed Interventf on fn Russia 1918-1922. London, Victor Got lancz Ltd., 1935. See especial ty, 
pp. 94-95 and 210. 
83 In this context, Shupinder Singh Chimni criticised the absolutist doctrine* on the fol Lowing basis: 
"But the norm (absolutist norm) has been set out in a mechanical manner. It assumes a priori 
in that intervention necessarily interferes, say, with the right of self-determination. This 
does not happen to be true. Moreover, ft overlooks the fact that, in some contexts unf lateral 
intervention is considered permissible by the international community. It can be mentioned that 
the international community today permits assistance to peoples struggling for self- 
determination in a war of national Liberation" and then he added "therefore the presumption 
would impair the legitimate claims of people struggling for self-determination. The absolute 
non-interventfonist policy demonstrates thereby an adequate understanding of the value 
preferences of the contemporary international community". 
Towards a Third World Approach to Non-Intervention through the Labyrinths of Western Doctrine, 20 
IJIL, 1980, p. 248. 
84 Vattet, op. cit., supra. chapter 1, n. 9, p. 299. 
86 
parties may assist the party which has a just cause on his side. 
Vattel introduces the elements of resisting tyranny and the struggle for liberty as the real 
criteria of the justice of the cause in internal wars, hence it is ideology rather than legal 
rules which govern the question of assistance. 
This situation led Cutler to state that: 
"Vattel's rules would have suited the Reagan Administration view of the world to 
perfection. These rules would support the legality of military aid to the Duarte 
Government, the Nicaraguan Contras and the Afghan freedom fighters. They would 
provide no legal comfort for the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and 
Afghanistan ... Aid to democratic 
forces in or out of power would be lawful, aid to 
tyrants or would be tyrants, would not". 85 
In practice, Vattel's stand would mean that there is no strict rules of non-intervention, 
everything will depend on the rhetoric of the warring factions in the civil war, and the 
interpretations given by tlýird parties to that rhetoric. 
However, even in era after the UN Charter, some international lawyers argue for 
assistance to be given to either party to the civil war, the established Government must not 
have the monopoly of receiving aid and assistance. The arguments advanced to justify that 
attitude differ from those of Vattel. 
In this respect, Falk observes that: 
"... [T]he facts of participation contradict the norms of non-intervention. Behaviour 
does not conform to the claims of traditional legal order. "86 
In other words, the traditional rules are no longer valid in our world. 
In his view whenever the insurgents succeeded in establishing themselves as the de facto 
Government over a substantial part of the contested territory, third States are legally 
entitled to deal with the insurgents as with the established Government. " On the other 
hand, he conditionally justifies intervention on the side of the legal Government. He writes: 
*If substantial participation on behalf of the insurgents is identified by the 
incumbent, then it provokes notes of protest and perhaps a proportionate response 
especially an appeal for help to third States in order to neutralise the insurgents 
strength that is claimed to be attributable to external sources". 88 
The result is that both sides to the internal conflict can receive assistance from third parties 
without a real difficulty, 89 especially in real situations of civil wars, when the two sides of 
85 L. N. Cutter: The Right to Intervene. 64 Foreign Affairs, 1985, p. 97. 
86 op. cit., supra. n. 5, p. 235. 
87 See R. Falk: Vietnam War and International Low. Vol. 2, PUP, Princeton, 1968, p. 238. 
as 
op. cit., supra. n. 5, p. 237. 
89 In fact, Falk seems to suggest that international taw is beginning to adjust itself to the claim 
that both parties to a civil war can receive assistance on an equat. footing from foreign States. He 
states: 
UThis continuing tolerance by the legal system of participation on the side of one's choice 
in an internal war gradually assumes a place in the horizontal, self-detimiting portion of 
87 
the conflict hold and struggle for different kinds of society, in other words when the two 
parties champion different ideologies. 
Pinto on the other hand, bases his argument for assisting either party in the civil war, on 
the question of 'effectivity'. Thus, once the insurgents establish their military and civil 
organisation, and exercise full jurisdiction over the population and the territory, they are 
entitled to request foreign assistance. In this context, Pinto writes: 
"Sa qualit6 d'autorit6 de fait I'autorise i demander et obtenir une assistance dtrangýre 
sans que soit par la viol6s les droits du gouvernement legal dont 1'effictivit6 est 
limit6e par son existence et son action". 90 
It seems to me that such views may be in the end exploited by the big powers. 
Moreover. the views which try to justify assistance to both sides in civil wars, are in 
flagrant contradiction with the law of the UN Charter especially Article 2/4, since they 
open the way for the use of force in the form of military interventions against the political 
independence and territorial integrity of States engaged in civil wars. 
Furthermore, State practice at least in the form of statements by decision makers, 
supports the stand of non-intervention in civil wars, rather than interventions on the side 
of one's choice. 91 
They can assist the faction which is in line with their strategic conceptions, be it the 
Government or its opponents. Thus, instead of diminishing the illegal activity of inventions 
these views will lead to its escalation, by offering legal justification. This in my view will 
not serve the course of international law. 
3. The Third School. The Policy- Orientated Approach 
According to this school, any search for a single norm which can regulate intervention in 
civil wars is a useless and unscientific exercise. The reason is that situations of civil strife 
differ, community policies at stake in such conflicts are also different, values struggled for 
also differ. and finally, the number of participants in such conflicts and those who may 
help them vary. Thus, any attempt to go for a single norm would be illogical and 
irresponsive to the situations involved. 
The traditional and the neutrality doctrines were attacked by adherents of the school of 
international low". 
Op. cft., supra. n. 5, p. 237. 
90 R. Pinto: Les r6gtes du droit International, concernant ta querre civite. RCADI, 1965/1, p. 482. 
91 Thus, many statements Issued by States either individuatly or cottectivety support the stand of non- 
intervention, e. g.. in the context of the Chinese Civit War. the foreign Ministers of the UK, USSR 
and the US meeting at Moscow on Dec. 27th, 1945 issued a statement part of which read as fottows: 
"The three foreign secretaries exchanged views with regard to the situation in China. They were 
in agreement as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the nationat Government, 
for broad participation by democratic eLements in at L branches of the nationat, Government, and 
for a cessation of civiL strife. They reaffirm their adherence to the poLicy of non- 
intervention in the Internal, affairs of China". 
Op. cit.. supra. n. 50, p. 599. See atso the same reference for further exavlptes of State practice, 
especlatty pp. 460-462. 
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policy orientated approach, because the first (the traditional rule) could be used as shield 
against any kind of reform and would encourage totalitarian regimes92 whereas the second 
would not cover all forms of interventions especially covert actions. 
93 
The search in this school is for different rules to different situations, the whole effort of 
the school in my view is to find sophisticated ways of interventions and their necessary 
legal justifications, in order to suit the necessities of the war against Communism. Since 
Communists can be sometimes in power in countries plagued by civil war, and sometimes 
they could be insurgents fighting a friendly pro-Western Government; in this atmosphere 
any single norm will not be in the interest of a big power such as the US. 
In this context, Falk maintains that the situation in our world differs fundamentally from 
the situation in which the traditional rule prevailed, thus the conditions of the 
interdependence of internal and international conflicts, the attitudes of Communist and 
Third World countries towards the outcome of internal wars conducted for political reasons 
and the danger of escalation to nuclear war. These factors impose that: 
"The rules and processes of law must be revised to take appropriate account of these 
extra-legal developmentS. "94 
In accordance with this philosophy, he advances that whenever community institutions, 
chiefly the UN: 
"... [F]ail to perform in a situation where an internal war is an arena within which third 
powers seek to extend their national domain of political influence. Then it is essential to 
authorise neutralizing participation". 95 
In his view, the rules of non-intervention in internal conflicts will be suspended in the 
event of their violation by a major international actor in other words counter intervention 
would be legalised, either on the side of the established Government or the insurgents. 
However. among adherents to the school (Policy-orientated) it is Moore who devoted 
much effort to the study of intervention activity. Thus, he classifies six situations in which 
claims of intervention ma y arise 'together these six situations make up an intervention in 
92 In this context, Moore attacks the traditional rule in these terms: 
"ET3he principat. dangers of the traditionat. rute are that it may serve as a Maginot Line for 
vested priviteges, deterring necessary reforms in feudat or totatitarfan societies, and that 
it may be invoked by recognising a puppet Government as in the Soviet-Finfsh War or the Soviet 
Intervention in the 1956 Hungarian Uprising". 
Op. cit., supra. n. 4, p. 88. However, he did not add that the US also used the traditional rule to 
justify many of its interventions in Latin America and Vietnam. 
93Simitarly, Moore maintains that: 
"The principal danger of the newer 'neutral rule' is that by focusing normative weight on the 
more visible overt response it may provide a shield for aggressive take over through covert 
attack". 
Op. cit., supra. n. 4, p. 88. 
94 
op. cit., supra. n. 5, p. 209. 
95 Ibid. 
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internal conflict spectrum". 
96 Those situations are as follows: 
1. Situations, claims not relating to authority structures. 
2. Situations, claims relating to anti-colonial wars. 
3. Situations, claims relating to wars of secession. 
4. Situations, claims relating to indigenous conflict for control of internal authority 
structures. 
5. Situations, claims relating to cold war divided nations conflicts. 
6. Situations, claims relating to authority structures. 97 
After an exhaustive study of the above situations, he recommended the rules which should 
govern intervention in civil wars: 
A. Intervention is permissible if authorised by the UN, and it is impermissible once the 
UN calls for its cessation. 
B. It is impermissible to assist a faction engaged in any type of authority-oriented internal 
conflict or to use the military instrument in the territory of another State for the purpose 
of maintaining or altering authority structures. 
However, this attractive proposition would be subjected to three qualifications, which in 
effect devoid it from any real sense in practice. The qualifications are: 
1. Assistance to the recognised Government is permissible prior to insurgency, when the 
conflict becomes an insurgency the assistance to the recognised Government can continue, 
however, it has to be maintained at preinsurgency level, in other words the assistance must 
be maintained at the preinsurgency level, and must not be increased. 
In my view, this is a highly impractical suggestion. First, it is very difficult to State when 
the internal disorder has attained the insurgency level, secondly third Governments may 
very well increase their assistance in order that the insurgents will lose any real hope of 
attaining insurgency level, and finally it is very hard to prove the assistance to the 
recognised Government has remained at its preinsurgency level, in cases of the recognition 
that the insurgents have reached insurgency. 
2. Assistance to a widely recognised Government is permissible when it is an answer to 
impermissible assistance to insurgents. If assistance to insurgents or the use of military 
instruments against another State amounts to an armed attack, within the meaning of Article 
51 of the UN Charter, it is permissible to reply proportionally against the territory of the 
attacking State. 
This last point has been developed by Moore who advanced a very wide and dangerous 
interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter, Judge Schwebel also used the same argument in 
his Dissenting Opinion in the Nicaragua Case (1986). However, the ICJ refuted their 
opinions as not reflecting the proper interpretation of Article 5 1, as I will show later in the 
sections dealing with the impact of the ICJ decision on the law of intervention in civil war. 
3. The use of military force in the territory of another State for the purpose of restoring 
orderly processes of self-determination in authority oriented conflict involving a sudden 
96 Op. cit., supra. n. 4, p. 175. 
970P. 
cit., supra. n. 4, pp. 175-79. 
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breakdown of order is permissible, however, according to certain conditions. 98 
This is another dangerous proposition, since it is not difficult for especially the 
superpowers to 'engineer' an invitation from the 'widely recognised Government'. Also, it 
is very difficult to imagine a power who intervenes just for the sake of self-determination, 
bearing in mind that there is a wide disagreement between Governments especially the 
superpowers on the exact meaning of self-determination. 
On the other hand, Reisman has endeavoured to develop the idea of intervention by 
military force to overthrow Governments which are assisted by foreign States and which 
violate the right of self-determination of the population, to him such kind of interventions 
would 'increase the probability of the free choice of peoples about their Government and 
political structure'99 in fact he advocates assistance to insurgents, whenever a 'pro- 
democratic Government' has been ousted, in other words intervention can be legal, 
whenever it is used against Communist or left-wing Governments who ousted a pro-Western 
Government. 
Schachter rightly attacks Reisman's argument in these terms: 
*The difficulty with Reisman's argument is not merely that it lacks support in the 
text of the Charter or in the interpretation that States have given Article 2 (4) in the 
past decades. It would introduce a new normative basis for recourse to war that would 
give powerful States an almost unlimited right to overthrow Governments alleged to 
be irresponsive to the popular will or the goal of self-determination". 100 
Moreover, it seems to me that Reisman implicitly advocates a Western 'Brezhnev doctrine' 
in other words, whenever a pro-Western Government is unseated, Western Governments and 
especially the US should intervene in order to reinstall the ousted Government and the 
former constitutional and ideological order. 
Cutler advocates the return to Vattel's standards in deciding on what side to intervene in 
civil wars. In this context, he writes: 
'"The most significant thing about how modern international law treats interventions is that Vattel's standards of oppression and justice are not even mentioned. The law 
as now formulated, appears to treat the democratic or dictatorial nature of 
government as wholly irrelevant". 101 
He insists that Vattel's ideas can be reconciled with Article 2/4. He adds: 
*1 would therefore interpret Article 2/4 as permitting third States to intervene only 
98 The conditions are: (f) A genuine Invitation by the widely recognised Goverment, and if there is 
none by a major faction. (ii) ReLative neutratity among factions especiaLLy neutraLlty in miLitary 
operations. (III) Immediate Initiation of and compliance with the decision machinery of appropriate 
regionat organisation. (iv) Immediate fuLL reporting to the UNSC. (v) A prompt disengagement, 
consistent with the purpose of the action. (vi) An outcome consistent with seLf -determination 'based 
on etections which are internationaLty observed, with the participation of alt factions on equaL 
footing'. Ibid, pp. 281-282. 
99W. M. Reisman: Coercion and SeLf -Determination: Construing Charter Articte 2 (4). 78 AJIL, 1984, 
pp. 644. 
100 0. Schachter: The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion. 78 AJIL, 1984, p. 649. 
101 op. cit., supra. n. 85, p. 101. 
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when two conditions exist- first an indigenous pro-democratic insurgency is engaged 
in civil war with the repressive regime, and second ýome other third States has been 
giving military assistance to the repressive regime". 102 
Obviously, democracy to him means what the West understands it to be, thus insurgents 
waging a civil war and holding 'democratic ideas' can expect aid from the West, also 
implicitly a 'democratic regime' which is involved in a civil war against 'Anti - Democratic 
insurgents' can receive the necessary assistance from the West, however, on the condition 
that the insurgents are receiving help from outside. 
The heart of the argument then, is for a right of counter-intervention on either side of 
the internal conflict (Government or insurgents). The crucial element of making the 
decision of assistance for third States, is which side uphold the democratic ideals as 
understood in the Western liberal tradition. 
This right of counter-intervention in Cutler's opinion: 
"... [H]as solid toots in the principles of the eighteenth century enlightenment that 
inspired the democratic ideal and remain valid today. It gives meaning to the 
reaffirmation of this ideal in Article I of the Charter. It does so without emasculating 
the principle of non- intervention set out in Article 2/4. "103 
In my view, this kind of argument which in practice would satisfy the necessities of 
American interventions, is first inconsistent with the UN Charter, because there is nothing 
in Article 2/4 which indicates that counte r- intervention is allowed, also to hold that Article 
I of the Charter upholds the ideas of the Western liberal tradition is not true, at least the 
majority of the UN members would not support such an assertion. Secondly the argument 
supposes from the start that the UN can do nothing in the face of interventions, which is 
not wholly true. Thirdly, the introduction of highly controversial elements of 'Democracy- 
justice- oppression' would not support and serve the cause of peace and international law. 
Farer, on the other hand, maintains that the traditional rule: 
"... [A]side from the dangerous ambiguity of just when the insurgency has achieved 
sufficient status to require equal treatment, the norm simply is not respected. It is 
wholly out of joint with actual practice". 104 
He regards any flat prohibition of intervention would be unenforceable and unacceptable 
since 'the sheer problem of definition would seriously jeopardise effective application'. 105 
Then economic aid the training of personnel and when the norm becomes operative-are 
thorny problems to solve in practice, different interpretations would confuse the matter. 
Besides, he stresses that: 
*Even if States could agree on a definition of non- participation, I cannot conceive 
102 Jbid, p. 106. 
103 Op. cft., supra. n. 89, p. 107. 
104 T. Farer: Intervention In Civil War: A Modest Proposal, in R. Falk, (ed. ): Vietnam and 
International Law. Vot. l. PUP. Princeton. 1968, p. 514. 
105 Ibid, p. W. 
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of one which would be generally acceptable as the substance of a norm - ideological 
passion has made trust a rare possession. "106 
In this context, Farer proposes another approach. He writes: 
"A more realistic possibility is a flat prohibition in tactical operations either openly 
or through a medium of advisers or volunteers, in more concrete this means that a 
country could not send its own forces on patrol in support of indigenous military 
unj s. . 107 
Under this proposed norm then, third States would be allowed to send any type of quantity 
or aid other than direct military involvement to the established Government and also to the 
insurgents, in fact assistance to insurgents would not constitute an act of aggression against 
the country in which the civil war is raging. 
In my view, this is an attempt to make the Charter of the UN, and the whole legal 
developments which limit the use of force including intervention as irrelevant. Also 
although the intention of Farer is to limit the activity of intervention, in practice, his 
suggested norm would in fact increase that activity, since the intervening States and 
especially superpowers because of the world public opinion which is against direct military 
intervention prefer a norm along Farer line, that rule would save them the embarrassment 
before world public opinion. 
To conclude, it is fair to say that many of the opinions expressed in the above school 
(policy orientated approach) enter in the vision of the confrontation which is taking place 
between the Communist block and the Western one. These opinions are the reflection in the 
legal field of that confrontation. The Communists are convinced that social revolutions will 
sweep the world, and indeed the conditions of explosion are ready in many parts of the 
world especially in the Third World. The West see the Communist hand in every internal 
upheaval and reacts by interventions and counter- interventions as the particular situation 
dictates. 
However, in many instances local conditions are the primary causes of revolution and 
internal strife, but the superpowers see things in absolute terms. They interpret situations 
of civil wars according to their global strategies, in this atmosphere interventions and 
counter- interventions, will take place and the rule of non -intervention will have no effect 
on their actions. 
This attitude in my view is against the moral foundation of international law, which is 
based on diversity and pluralism, and hence in non -intervention. Thus any attempt to shape 
the world (through intervention) according to a specific need of a philosophical or religious 
conception, would only lead to more violence, and hence would not serve the cause of 
international law and peace in the world. 108 
106 Ibid, p. 518. 
107 Ibid. 
108 In this context. T. Nardin rfghtty observed that: 
"It is one of the greatest achievements of European International taw that it acknowledged the 
claims of pluralism. it reflected an appreciation of the fact that the most likely consequence 
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Section IV: The Non-Intervention Norm In State Practice 
This section will concentrate on the place of the principle of non-intervention in the 
practice of States. The proposition is that since at least the advent of the UN Charter, there 
has been a continuing adherence to the principle, despite the frequency of its breach. 
In my view, violation does not force us to abandon the principle in the name of realism, 
instead it strengthens our insistence that the rule should be upheld. This stand would be 
beneficial in the long run, since the public opinion and probably the UN under the pressure 
of that public opinion, would grow more and more sensitive to interventions, and 
intervening States, especially stronger nations, may find it better not to intervene, since any 
contrary option can be very costly politically, internally and externally. 
However, it must be stressed that references to the principle of non- intervention in 
treaties, statements and resolutions must be taken to include intervention in civil wars 
because the latter are fought primarily for the control of political power within the State, 
which is essentially the heart of the internal affairs of States, against which intervention is 
prohibited. 
A. Non-Intervention In Bilateral Treaties 
In important bilateral treaties, it is very common to insert a provision on non-intervention, 
either on the preamble or in the first Articles. This means that States prefer always to build 
new relationships with other States on strict basis of non -intervention. They view it as an 
essential ingredient of any lasting and serious relationships. 
In this context, the Soviet practice offers a good example. Thus one of the first treaties 
of the new regime of Russia after the 1917 Revolution, the Treaty of Friendship between 
Persia and the Russian Soviet Republic of February 26th, 1921 stipulates in Article 4 that: 
'In consideration of the fact that each nation has the right to determine freely its 
political destiny, each of the two contracting parties formally express its desire to 
abstain from any intervention in the internal affairs of the other. "109 
This treaty has been concluded in the time of the fierce civil war, which was raging in 
Russia, hence there is no doubt that the non -intervention clause specifically includes total 
abstention of intervention in the civil war. However, there is no specification whether the 
attitude of withholding assistance applies also to the established Government. Also, many 
'Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance' which have been concluded 
between the USSR and many other countries, always include a reference to 'non- 
interference in the internal affairs'. 
However, if reference to 'mutual assistance' in these treaties may be taken to mean 
assistance in times of peace. reference to 'Principles of Socialist Internationalism' in treaties 
with Eastern Block countries may indicate that if there is any internal conflict in any 
of attempts to shape international society, according to some particular Ideal conception of 
religious truth. political legitimacy or human good would be perpetual war or universal 
tyrany". 
Law, morality and the Relations of States. PUP, Princeton, 190, p. 55. 
1099 League of Nations Treaty Series. 1922, No. 268. p. 403. 
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socialist country, other sister States would have the right to intervene to save 'Socialism'. 
The Brezhnev Doctrine is, in fact, a codification of that stand. Thus, if nearly all the 
treaties between socialist countries contain a mixture of references to 'mutual assistance, 
socialist internationalism and non-interference in the internal affairs', 110 it seems that the 
principle of 'socialist internationism' overrides the other principles, which in practice 
empties the principle of non- intervention especially from any real meaning. 
It must be stressed that in practice the Soviets have never intervened in situations of 
internal disorders in other countries without first establishing that they acted under a 
formal request by the established Government of the country. This happened in Hungary 
1956 and Afghanistan 1979, which means that the Soviets cling to the traditional rule which 
allows assistance to legal Governments only. 
That stand it seems is confirmed also in the bilateral treaties concluded by the USSR with 
non-Communist States, and especially Non-Aligned States. Thus, the first Article of the 
important Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between USSR and India, stipulates 
that: 
*Each party shall respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integity of 
the other party and refrain from interfering in the others' internal affairs". 1 
However, the consistent Soviet condemnation of the US, China and Pakistan for their 
alleged assistance to rebel groups in some States of the Indian Federation, and the support 
given to the legal Indian Government in all fields, suggest that the Soviet Union does not 
see its assistance to Indian Government as infringement of the principle of non- 
intervention. 
Similarly, the Treaty of Friendship between the USSR and Angola of November II th, 
1976 stipulates in its first Article that: 
"Respect for sovIrSignty and territorial integrity, non -interference in one another's internal affairs". I 
This treaty was signed in circumstances of a violent civil war, which is going till now, it 
(the treaty) was never seen by the USSR as a legal barrier against its important assistance 
in all fields to the established Angolan Government. The USSR views itself as acting 
lawfully, whereas those who assist the rebel UNITA especially South Africa and the US, 
are acting against international law and the character of the UN. 
In this context, the Treaty of Friendship between the USSR and Poland of April 21st, 1965 
stipulates in Its first Article that: 
"The High Contracting Parties shall in accordance with the principles of Socialist 
internationalism strengthen their Internal and unshakeabLe friendship. develop all round co- 
operation and render each other assistance on the basis of equality of rights, respect for 
sovereignty and non-fnterference in the internal affairs of the other party". 
540 UWTS, 1965, Wo. 7845, p. 106. 
ill 10 ILM, 1971, p. 905. 
112 Op. cit., supra. chapter 1. n. 87. p. 485. 
95 
This means that the traditional rule still find a very strong friend in the era of the Charter. 
However, it must be stressed that the Soviets are not alone in that respect, France especially 
i5jean toward the traditional view, since in many respects and the Third World seem also !h 
it favours the status quo. 
In this respect, France concluded many agreements with the former French colonies in 
Black Africa, which always includes a reference to the principle of non- intervention. 
However. when the legal Governments faced some internal troubles, which vary from a 
full scale civil war to mere riots, the French intervened on the side of the Government, and 
always see themselves as acting lawfully. Thus they intervened in Zaire in 1977 and in Chad 
especially from 1968 up till the present day. 
In this context, the General Agreement between the Government of the French Republic 
and the Republic of Dahomey (now Benin) of February 27th, 1965, stipulates in its 
preamble that: 
W ... Desiring to strengthen their friendly relations on the 
basis of respect for each 
other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, the equality of States and non- 
interference in their internal affairs in accordance with international law and the 
obligations arising therefrom". 113 
It is interesting to note that the agreement speaks of 'non- intervention in accordance with 
international law' which means that the two parties take non'- intervention as a legally 
binding principle, and above all that it does not contradict with assisting the legal 
Government facing a civil war. This interpretation is confirmed by Kiss who writes: 
011 est admis que les Etats itrangers peuvent aider le Rouvernement legal d'un Etat 
en guerre civile dans l'accomplissement de sa täche. m1T4 
Also the accord of non-aggression 'The Accord of Nkomati, signed on 16th of March 1984 
between the Republic of South Africa and Mozambique provides in its first Article that: 
"The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect each other's sovereignty and 
independence and, in fulfilment of this fund mental obligation, to refrain from 
interfering in the internal affairs of the other"115 
Article 3 of the same agreement lists with a great detail the practical application of the 
principle of non-inteTvention in the Circumstances of the civil war which is going on in 
Mozambique, where the insurgents, the Movement of National Resistance (MNR) are 
heavily assisted by the Government of South Africa, and also the duty of Mozambique to 
refrain from giving assistance in whatever form to ANC of South Africa. However, the 
agreement is silent on the question of the legality of assistance to the established 
Governments. 
1131088 UNTS, 1979, No. 16675, p. 332. 
114 A. CH. Kiss: Rfpertolre FranCafs de droft international. pubtfc, Tome 2, CNRS, Parts, 1966, p. 411. 
115 SCOR, 39th Year, (Supptement January. February and March 1984). UN Doc S/16 451 (Annex), 1986, 
p. 124. 
96 
On the other hand, there is strong evidence in the practice of States, that when third 
countries are blamed for intervention in civil war on the side of the insurgents, their usual 
answer is the rejection of the blame and the claiming of innocence, which indicates that 
there is a general agreement between States that assistance to insurgents is always illegal. 
Thus, when Nicaragua protested against the Honduran help to the Contras, the 
representative of Honduras in the UN wrote to the President of the UNSC a note of 
protest, part of which reads as folows: 
"... In rejecting as unfounded the aforementioned protest, I wish to inform you again 
that the Government of Honduras is not intervening, either directly or indirectly, in 
the armed conflict besetting Nicaragua". 116 
Moreover, when Sudan accused Libya of conspiracy, plotting and financing all kinds of 
sabotage against its security and independence, '" and in this violation of all international 
and regional charters and customs, which prescribe non-intervention, the Secretary of the 
People's Committee of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison of the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya stated in a letter to the Secretary- General that: 
*The Sudan has, for a number of years, been experiencing continuous revolutions and 
disturbances by force, using the ugliest means it is trying to find external 
justifications through empt accusations against the States neighbouring on the Sudan, 
among them my country". lyg 
Implicitly. then, Libya does not view intervention on the side of insurgents as legally 
justified at least in its rhetoric. 
However, Governments engaging in civil wars, are not ashamed of acknowledging their 
receipt of foreign assistance in fighting their opponents, or even publicly asking for 
assistance in order to be able to fight effectively and protect their sovereignty. 119 
To conclude we can say, that States accord a very important place to the principle of non- 
intervention and view it as an important element of any solid relationships. Practice 
1161bid, 
UN Doc S/16365, p. 71. See atso UN Doc S/16413, p. 97. 
1171bid, UN Doc S/16419 (tetter of the Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary Generat 
of the UN). (March 17th, 1984), pp. 100-102. 
1181bid, UN Doc S/16421 (tetter of March 19th, 1984), p. 102. 
119 Thus, in a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic RepubLic of Afghanistan 
(ApriL 22rd, 1984), it is stated that: 
0 It Is well known to sit that the limited Soviet contingency have been invited by the legal 
Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in order to help our people defend their 
freedom and independence against external dangers and aggressions and against attempts to 
reimpose on the country a system suitable to imperialism and reaction". 
I bid UN Doc S/16445, p. 121. On the other hand, in an off fci at comiunfqu6 issued by the governing Junta 
of mationat Reconstruction on March 26th, 1984 It is pLainty stated that: 
"- Mhe Government of Nicaragua has felt obliged to call upon the governments of the World 
to provide it with the technical andmititary assistance necessary for defending Itself against 
the State terrorism practised by the United States Government against the people of Nicaragua". 
Ibld, UN Doc S/16440, p. 118. 
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establishes that. within States party to treaties with non- intervention clauses, should a civil 
war ensue in one of the party States, assistance given to the established Government has 
never been seen as an infringement of that non-interventionary principle. Whereas any 
assistance to insurgents is always seen as a breach of the principle, this is a codification of 
the traditional rule in the era of the Charter. 
B. Non-Intervention In Multilateral Treaties 
1. The UN Charter 
There is no straightforward statement concerning non-intervention in the UN Charter, 
Article 2/7 being primarily concerned with the relations between the organisation of the 
UN on one hand, and its members on the other. However, the rule can be deduced easily 
from other principles of the Charter, such as respect for sovereign equality, and the 
prohibition of the use of force or its threat in the relations between States. In this respect, 
Arangio-Ruiz rightly argues that: 
"... [A] sweeping prohibition such as that of Article 2 (4) w? s found to cover at least 
some problems met by the principle of non-intervention". '20 
Likewise, Chaumont stresses that: 
"On peut admettre en effet que l'Article 2 (4) en visant ä prot6ger Tind8pendance 
politique de tout Etat' contient l'obligation de non-intervention". 121 
However, Shaw maintains that: 
*The United Nations Charter does not provide any guidance as to the legitimacy of 
intervention in internal conflicts, being primarily concerned with in r-State armed 
aggression and the corollary of the right of States to self-defence". Ils 
In other words, the UN Charter has left the question of intervention in civil wars 
unresolved. 
In my view, the situation has been clarified in the subsequent practice of the UN. A very 
important range of declarations and resolutions have dealt with the principle of non- 
interventions in general, and stressed that non- intervention in civil wars is a very important 
component of the principle. Among the most important resolutions dealing the subject; 
Resolution 2131 (XX) 1965 on the inadminissibility of intervention- Resolution 
ý625 (XXV) 
1970 the Friendly Relations Declaration. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States Resolution 3281 (XIX) 1974. The definition of aggression and the very important 
declaration on non-intervention contained in UNGA Resolution 36/103 of September 12, 
1981. 
It seems to me and without entering the great discussion on the legal force of UNGA 
120 Op. cit., supra. n. 60, p. 120. 
121 Op. cit., supra. n. 80. p. 406. 
122M. Shaw: International. Law and Intervention in Africa. 8 Journal, of Internationat Retations, 1985, 
(David Davies Memorial, Institute of International, Studies), p. 341. 
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resolutions, one may advance safely, that non -intervention is established as one of the 
fundamental elements of the actual legal order. The principle also is seen as a legally 
123 binding principle, or even a rule of jus cogens. 
Moreover, it must be stressed again that the practice of the UN, has upheld the legality 
of assistance to insurgents waging war against colonialism, racism and alien domination. 
Thus, the UNGA has affirmed the right to rebel in respect of the said situations in its 
Resolution 2728 (XXVI) 1971 which 'confirms the legality of the people's struggle for self - 
determination from colonial rule and foreign domination and alien subjugation ... by all 
124 means consistent with the Charter'. Also the UNGA made assistance to those peoples a 
legal duty Resolution 2621 (XXV), in fact, it stipulates that: 
"Member States shall render all necessary moral and material assistance to the peoples 
of colonial territories in their struggle to attain freedom and independence". 125 
The Friendly Relations Declaration 2625 (XXV) further confirms that in the folowing 
terms: 
*In their actions against and resistance to such forcible action in the exercise of their 
right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek Pnd receive support in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter". 126 
And lastly, the latest declaration on non -intervention indicates in its Part III/b: 
"The right and duty of States fully to support the right to self-determination and 
independence of peoples under colonial domination, foreign occupation and racist 
legimes as well as the right of these people to waýj both political and armed struggle 
27 in accordance with the purposes of the Charter" . 
123 In fact, even the US seems to agree that the principle of non- intervention has attained the status 
of a jus cogens; rule. Thus, in a memorandum dated December 29th, 1979 to the acting Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher, the Legal Adviser of the US State Dept. and concerning the legality of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan It is stressed that the Soviet action violated Article 2/4 and Article 1/2 of the UN Charter and the Friendly Relations Declaration principles forbidding the use of force 
and non-interventfon and specifically it was stated that: 
"3-No treaty between the USSR and Afghanistan can overcome these Charter obligations of the 
USSR, etc. 
4-Nor is it clear that the treaty between the USSR and Afghanistan concluded in 1979 between 
the Revolutionary Taraki government and the USSR, is valid, if it actually does tend itself 
to support of Soviet intervention of the type in question in Afghanistan, It would be void 
under contemporary principles of international taw, since it would conflict with what the 
Vienna Convention of the Law of the Treaties describes as a $peremptory norm of general 
internatinal law (Article 53) namely that contained in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter'$. 
And then he adds: 
"... Mhile agreement on precitsety are what the peremptory norms of international taw is not 
broad, there is a universal agreement that the exemplary illustration of a peremptory norm is 
Article 2, paragraph 4". 
M. L. Wash: Digest of United States Practice in international Law, 1979. US Dept. of State, 1983, P. 35. 
124 Djonovich, (ed. ), op. cit., supra. chapter 1, n. 79, Vol. 13, p. 439. 
125 
Ibid, p. 218. 
126 Ibid, p. 340. 
12735 UNY. 1981, p. 148. 
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It is clear here therý_the UNGA does not see assistance to insurgents as a violation of the 
principle of non -intervention, and also there is no contradiction between the principle of 
non- intervention and the principle of self-determination. 
However, some Western lawyers and Governments see in the pronouncements of the 
UNGA in the context of assistance to insurgents, a total confusion of the exact relationship 
between the principles contained in the Charter. In this respect, Pomerance notes that: 
"The impression gathered from a review of relevant Assembly declarations and 
pronouncements is that of a shopping or sales catalogue. A package of principles, 
inherently conflicting is presented without any indication of how a desirable balance 
might be struck between them". 128 
Although the observation is general it was essentially directed at the relationship between 
the principles of non- intervention and self-determination. 
Hasbi insists that there is no contradiction between the two principles. he Tightly writes: 
"La question qui se pose, clest de savoir si la 16gitimation de I'aide aux peuples et leur 
mouvements de libdration signifie, comme d'aucuns le pr6tendent, le recul du 
principe de non- intervention au profit du droit des peuples i disposer d'eux rnýrnes? 
S'il ya eu recul, celui-ci ne s'est pas fait au profit de Wimporte quel droit des 
peuples A disposer d'eux mernes. 11 sagit d'une remise en cause du principe de non- 
intervention qui ne touche en rien I'Etat en tant que tel. Car si le principe de 
l'intervention aW tol&6, il I'a W en faveur de situations internationales, 
potentiellement itatique, dans la m6sure oii la prise en considdration des peuples et 
des mouvements de lib6ration par la sociw inter-dtatique s'est faite sur la base de 
la vocation dtatique des entitds reconnues". 129 
The heart of the argument is that since 'the peoples' struggling for self-determination, have 
been recognised as possessing international personality, then assistance to them by third 
parties does not offend the principle of non -intervention, since it is in the end an assistance 
to a 'legal Government'. Moreover, we can say, that Article 1/4 of the first Protocol which 
made wars of national liberation international conflicts has confirmed that national 
liberation movements possess international personality at least in connection with 
humanitarian law, hence assistance to them does not offend the principle of non- 
intervention. 
Apart from self-determination conflicts, the UN practice as reflected in its resolutions, 
seems to establish non- intervention as the rule which must be adhered to in non- 
international conflicts. 
Thus, in civil wars stricto sensu, assistance to insurgents in all forms is made very clearly 
illegal, whereas there is a total silence concerning assistance to the established Government 
against whom an internal conflict is fought. Thus, the ILC, in its Draft Code of Offences 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, considered in its Article 2/4 as acts against 
peace and security of mankind: 
"4- The Organisation, or the encouragement of the Organisation by the authorities of 
a State. of armed bands within its territory for incursions into the territory of another 
128 Pomerance, op. cit., supra. chapter 1, n. 182, p. 46. 
1 29 A. Hasbi: Les mouvements de tib6ration nationate et te drolt international public. LGDJ, Rabat, 
Morocco, 1981, p. 352. 
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State, or the toleration of the organisations of such bands in its own territory as a 
base of operation or as a part of departure for incursions into the territory of another 
State, as well as direct participation in or support of such incursions". '" 
However, the UNGA in its Resolution 2131 (XX) on Inadmissibility of Intervention of 1965 
listed in a clear way the acts considered to constitute intervention in civil wars, and 
prohibited their commission by third States. Article 2 of that declaration stipulates that: 
"No State shall organise, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist 
or armed activities, directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another 
State". 131 
The Friendly Relations Declaration made it a duty not to commit any subversive acts against 
established Governments, it stressed that: 
"Every State has the duty to refrain from organising or encouraging the organisation 
of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursions into the 
territory of another State". 132 
It then adds that: 
"Every State has the duty to refrain from organising, instigating or participating in 
acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organised 
activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the 
acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force. " 133 
It is clear here that there is a consensus in the international community that apart from 
assistance to insurgents in wars of self-determination, the priority is to the respect of the 
sovereignty of the State and the preservation of the status quo. In fact the 1981 Declaration 
on Non- Intervention is very explicit in that respect. It states that: 
"The Duty of a State to refrain from the promotion encouragement or support, direct 
or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities within other States under any 
pretext whatsoever or any action which seeks 1140 
disrupt the unity or to undermine 
or subvert the political order of other States". 
The Declaration reflects in effect the real concerns of the Third World countries since it 
speaks about secessionist activities and the need to preserve the unity and political order of 
States. 
130 Op. cit., supra. n. 50, p. 328. 
131 D. J. Djonovich, Op. cit., supra. n. 124, Vol. 10, (1974), p. 108. 
132 
Ibid, p. 339. 
133 lbid, p. 339. 
134op. 
cit., supra. n. 127. p. 148. 
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The Declaration was in the eyes of the Third World countries as the representative of 
Guyana said 'a shield to be used by all States rather than a sword'135 and the representative 
of Yugoslavia stressed that: 
"The Declaration contained precise definitions of all unlawful acts of intervention and 
should serve as standard for assessing such behaviour from whatever quater it might 
corne*. 136 
On the whole the UN practice on the normative level as the resolutions and declarations 
cited demonstrate, uphold the principle of non- intervention as containing a prohibition on 
all forms of assistance and aid to insurgents waging war against their legal Government, 
however, nothing is said explicitly concerning the legality of assistance to the Government 
in power. The UN itself, is banned from intervention according to Article 2/7, but in the 
event of the situation becoming a threat to peace and security, there is nothing to prevent 
the organisation from intervention. 
On the other hand, it seems that States act on the basis that the UN prohibition of 
intervention in civil wars, does not apply to assistance to established Governments. Thus 
even India, which is a traditional champion of non- intervention, did not hesitate to sign a 
treaty with Sri-Lanka which specifically states in Article 2/16/A that: 
"India will take all necessary steps to ensure that Indian territory is n used for 
activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and security of Sri-Lanka". 13ý 
In other words India admits the illegality of any assistance to insurgents, however, 
concerning the position towards the established Government of Sri-Lanka the situation is 
different the same Treaty (of July 29th, 1987) stipulates in Article 2/16/C that: 
"In the event that the Government of Sri-Lanka requests the Government of India 
to afford military assistance to implement these proposals the Government of India 
will cooperate by giviný to the Government of Sri-Lanka such military assistance 
as and when requested". 38 
A more revealing case on the intention of States concerning assistance to legal Government 
in cases of civil wars, can be seen in the discussions which took place in the UNSC (26- 
31 March 1976) concerning the Angolan Civil War. Thus, the Angolan representative 
stressed that: 
"... In reality Angola was exercising its sovereignty by asking assistance from those 
1351bid, 
p. 146. In fact, the Dectaration was adopted by 120 votes for, 22 against and 6 abstentions, 
among the dissenting States were: the US, UK, France. Germany and Japan. The US stated: 




1376 ILK, 1987. p. 1181, (India/Sri-Lanka: Agreement to Establish Peace and Wormality in Sri-Lanka, 
July 29th, 1987). 
138 Ibid. 
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that from the beginning had a clear understanding of the Angolan struggle. It was 
Angola's right to appeal to any country for help when necessary. Any concern of that 
kind ab9ut Angola was unquestionably an unjustified interference in its internal 
affairs". ' 39 
The majority of those intervening were in support of Angolan view. Pakistan in particular 
was very clear, concerning the extent of the right of a sovereign State to request assistance, 
its representative stated that: 
"The representative of Angola was within his Tight in suggesting that Angola, as 
sovereign and independent country might choose to seek help where it wished, even 
to invite and retain within its borders the military forces Of foreign countries that it 
considered friendly to its cause and whose assistance it felt it needed". 140 
The African countries in the Council (The Congo, Guinea-Bissau and Mali) stressed in 
substance that the socialist States assistance to Angola needed no justification 
whatsoever. 141. Only the UK and the US were against Angola's plea, 142 they implied in 
their statements that the policy of non-intervention, should be applied to the two sides of 
conflicts. On balance, it seems again that the traditional rule, is still a suitable to the 
international community, which is still based essentially on distinct independent territorial 
units. 
2. Regional Organisations 
2.1. The OAU 
The OAU Charter states among the principles of the organisation in Article 111/2 that: 
"Non- interference in the internal affairs of States". 143 
At the same time the organisation is dictated to the eradication of colonialism in all its 
aspects. For that reason a liberation committee was created to coordinate assistance in all 
aspects (financial, training and educational matters) to liberation movements. This assistance 
has never been seen as a violation of Article 111/2 of the UN Charter. 
However, the principle of non-intervention has been upheld strongly in the post-colonial 
era (Biafra, The Congo, Eritrea, etc. ) in those cases the OAU was swift in condemning 
foreign interference on the side of the insurgents but concerning assistance to the 
13930 
UNY, 1976, p. 173. 
140 
Ibid. p. 175. 
141 Ibid. 
142 
The us representative In fact, appeated for a comptete non-Intervention poticy. He stated: 
"Just as the end of South Africa's wrongful intervention was very welcome ... so the 
continuing Cuban and USSR interventions was wrong, because it deprived the Angolan 
people of the ability to exercise self-determination freely and because of its size". 
lbid, p. 177. 
143 
OP. cit.. supra. chapter 1. n. 85, p. 74. 
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established Governments, it seems that the organisation does not see it as a violation of the 
Charter. In fact, in a 1978 resolution the OAU Ministerial Council emphasised that by 
virtue of its sovereignty each country had the right to call foreign aid when it sees that its 
independence is in danger. 
In my view this is a natural stand, in the circumstances of Africa, where the objective 
conditions of revolt exist in many countries because, among other things, of ethnic, social 
and economic problems. Hence, the organisation, which is after all an organisation of States, 
must appear as favouring the status quo and the existing political orders. In this context, 
any attempt to table assistance to legal Governments as illegal, would be seen as an 
encouragement to violence and secession. 
2.2. The OAS 
Latin America has historically been a fertile ground for interventions, especially US 
interventions, but at the same time it was the place where struggle for non-intervention has 
never diminished. The Charter of the OAS in its Article 18 provides that: 
"No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any 
reason whatsoever in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing 
principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or 
attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic 
and cultural elements". 144 
However, despite this far reaching prohibition, it seems that the practice seems to go in line 
with the traditional rule, concerning civil wars, in that respect Havana treaty of 1928 is 
still valid. Thus, on January 7th, 1960 following almost simultaneous armed disturbances 
in Guatemala and Nicaragua the American President (Eisenhower) issued a statement in 
which he indicates the readiness of the American Navy to intervene following the requests 
of the two Governments. On the same day the Department of State issued a statement 
clarifying the legal basis upon which the US would provide its assistance. It reads as follows: 
"Any assistance which may be given in conformity with the president's announcement 
will be in response to a request which the respective Government concerned have 
every right in their sovereign capacity to make and which the United States in its 
sovereign capacity has a right to provide. It would be carried out within the national 
jurisdiction of the requesting Governments". 145 
Here again the traditional rule is upheld strongly, only established Government can benefit 
from assistance. 
2.3. The Pact of the League of Arab States 
This Pact which was concluded on May 10th, 1945 states in its Article 8 that: 
*Every member State of the League shall respect the form of Government obtaining 
in the other States of the league and shall recognise the form of Government 
obtaining as one of the rights of those States, and shall pledge itself not to take any 
144 Article 15 Of the original Charter became Article 18.721 UNTS, 1970, p. 328. 
145 Op. cit. * supra. n. 50, pp. 535. 
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action tending to change that form". 146 
This means implicitly that any intervention on the side of insurgents seeking to change the 
form of Government of member States is a clear violation of Article 8 of the Pact. 
However, assistance to keep the legal Government in power seems to be perfectly legal. 
Thus, the intervention of Egypt for many years on the side of the Republican Government 
in the civil war in Yemen, has never been labled as illegal by the league. 
2.4. Other Cases 
Many important multilateral agreements stress the principle of non-intervention, examples 
include: 
First, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia of February 24th, 1976 
between Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Its Article 2/3 
speaks of non-intervention in the internal affairs of one another. 147 The aim of the treaty 
was essentially to protect the political orders of the contracting parties against Communist 
insurgencies, and by consequence non-intervention does not apply to mutual assistance 
between the legal Governments, in combating any threat of Communist Revolts. 
Second, the Charter of the Islamic Conference includes among its principles (Article IT/ 13 
2-Respect for the right of self-determination and non -interference in the domestic affairs 
of member States). However, it seems that in the instance of the Afghan Civil War, the 
Conference was essentially hostile to the Soviet intervention, ' 48 because it denied the 
Afghan people their right to determine their destiny freely. In fact the Afghan insurgents 
received openly substantial amounts of assistance from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. 
Third, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in its Final Act on August 
Ist, 1975 under Part VI states that: 
"They [the Contracting Parties] will, Inter alla, refrain from direct or indirect 
assistance to terrorist activities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards 
the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State". 149 
Thus, there is a clear reference to the prohibition of any assistance to those seeking to 
overthrow violently the political regime of their States, and an absence of any reference to 
the legality of assistance of established Governments, however, it must be stressed that the 
Warsaw Pact and the NATO arrangements were created, among other things, to protect the 
political regimes of member States, and by consequence their primary object is to assist any 
Government which is threatened by violence and revolt. 
146 70 UNTS 1950, No. 241. p. 254. 
147 Op . cit., supra. chapter 1, n. 87, p. 298. 
148 For further detaits on the work of the Conference and especiatty on this resotution which was 
adopted by the Conference on the eve of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. See 26 Keesing's 1980, 
pp. 30241-42. 
14914 ILM, 1975, P. 1295. 
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The conclusion to be drawn from practice of States, is that the principle of non- 
intervention is declared as essential to any bilateral or multilateral understanding. Also, 
there is a general consensus that non- intervention in civil wars is a very important 
component of the principle. However, 'non-intervention in civil wars' applies essentially 
to insurgents, third States are explicitly prohibited from assisting such insurgents on 
whatever groud. On the other hand, there is some toleration of the legality of assistance to 
the legal Government, which means that the traditional rule is with us for some time, if not 
forever. 
This result in my view is not strange, since established Governments would like to keep 
the monopoly of receiving assistance and aid, for themselves and deny their opponents any 
such right. This is the logic of an international system which is based upon States and the 
traditional rule serves it well. 
Further, the fertile ground of revolution is the Third World, and the reality is that few 
Governments in this world, would survive any armed resistance to their rule, without 
external aid. This means that on the legal field, the traditional rule has no lack of 
supporters. 
C. Non-Interiention in the Context of Protocol 11 of 1977 
From the very start of the efforts to codify an instrument relating to internal conflicts. 
The question of intervention occupied a central position in all the discussions which took 
place. In fact foreign assistance has been seen as having the effect at least in some cases, 
of encouraging the internal conflict or even of creating it, and even the ICRC which is very 
reluctant to voice its opinion, admitted that its experience in the field has taught it that 
unless aid is humanitarian "it will always give a greater scope to the conflict and 
consequently increase the number of victims". 150 This proves that the question of 
intervention is not only a theoretical problem, in reality it has a direct impact on the 
application of humanitarian law. 
In this respect the majority experts of the ICRC were of the opinion that when assistance 
by third States to either party of the internal conflict takes the form of the dispatch of 
armed forces taking regular part in the hostilities, or when these forces are sufficiently 
large to modify the balance of the warring factions, in that case the nature of the conflict 
will be modified. The internal conflict becomes an international one, 151 with the 
consequence that all humanitarian rules would be applicable to the conflict. 
It must be noted here that the experts did not distinguish between assistance given to the 
legal Government or the insurgents, the two parties were treated alike, and it seems that is 
the reason why their opinion had no real impact on Government experts and later on the 
draft Protocol 11 submitted by the ICRC to the DCDHL. In fact, their opinion gave priority 
to humanitarian motives rather than to demands of sovereignty. 
At the CGEDHL (of 1972), some experts, especially from the Third World insisted on 
150 CGEDHL, (Geneva 24 May-12 June 1971: V. Protection of Victims of Non-Internationat Armed 




including a reference to the princiPle of non- intervention and sovereignty152 in the 
Preamble of the Draft Protocol IT. Also, it has been stressed that: 
"The prerequisite for the satisfactory implementation of Protocol Il should be the 
non- intervention of any State in the affairs of another". 153 
This, in fact, expresses the fear of Third World States that humanitarian law might be a 
vehicle for foreign intervention ' hence 
it was necessary to make it clear that all its 
application closely connected with a total adherence to the principle of non- intervention. 
It must be noted that the discussions did not touch directly on the question of the 
legitimacy of aid to established Government, although the recurrent insistence upon the 
right of the Government to build up its own political system and its right to defend that 
system in events of a conflict arising between the authority and insurgents, may implicitly 
include the right of that Government to ask for foreign help. 
The ICRC Draft Protocol 11 submitted to the DCDHL a provision (Article 4: Non- 
Intervention) which reads as gollows: 
"Nothing in the present Protocol shall be interpreted as affecting the sovereignty of 
States or as authorising third States to intervene in the armed conflict". 154 
It must be noted that at the very start of the DCDHL, some delegations especially from the 
Third World let it be known that their attitude to the Protocol 11 as a whole will depend on 
how foreign interference can be precluded by the Protocol. In that respect the Mexican 
representative stressed that his delegation: 
"... [C]onsidered it essential that Protocol 11 should safeguard the sovereign rights of States. In the past and even very recently the protection of actual or_Possible victims 
of internal conflict has been the pretext for external intervention. ' 5' ' 
Moreover, Abi-Saab, the Egyptian delegate expressed the feelings of the Third World States 
in these terms: 
"Several delegations from the Third World had expressed legitimate anxiety, however, 
about the possibility of Protocol 11 being used as a justification for intervention. In 
152 See the proposat submitted by the Experts of Indonesia and Pakistan concerning the Draft Preambte 
of Protocol 11, CE/COM 11/87, Vot. 2. CGEDHL (2nd Session Geneva 3 May-3 June 1973. Report on the Work 
of the Conference) Annexes, p. 50. 
153 Ibid, Vot, 1,, para. 230, p. 65. Moreover, some experts felt that 'the primary condition to be 
stressed for the applications of all provisions was the principle of sovereignty and non- 
intervention', (ibid, para. 2.539, p. 120). In other words, the application of humanitarian taw is 
completely dependent on the adherence to the principles of security and non-intervention. 
154 VoL. 1, ORDHL, p. 34. 
155 lbid, VoL. 8, CDDH/l/SR. 24, para. 14, p. 231. The Mexican representative then added: 
"Mis detegation's attitude to the Protocot as a whote woutc! depend on the extent to which 
Artictes 3 and 4 (cleating respectivety with the tegat status of the parties to the conftict 
nd non- intervention) prectuded the possibitity of externat intervention in the domestic 
ffairs of States on any ground whatsoever". 
Para. 15, p. 232. 
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a world in which threat as well as acts of intervention, military or otherwise, were 
common, it was important that those misgivings be taken into cons ideration. "I 56 
He then suggested that: 
"The Conference should try to meet that anxiety to a greater extent and should keep 
it in mind in drafting each of the Articles of Protocol 11". 157 
Thus, the Third World sees behind every humanitarian rule a possibility of intervention. 
This reaction is sometimes understandable, taking into account the history of those nations 
with the developed world. In this respect, during the discussions of Draft Article 4, two 
important amendments were advanced, both with the aim of reducing the possibility of 
interventions to none. The first was tabled by Nigeria and co-sponsored by Iraq and 
Venezuela and suggested the deletion of the words 'by other States', at the beginning of 
paragraph 2 of Article 2 as adopted by Working Group B. 158 The intention of the 
amendment was to make unlawful all interventions either by States or other organisations 
and bodies in the international conflict. 
This amendment was accepted, but on the clear understanding that it does not prohibit the 
UN from performing its functions in relations to the questions of the protection of human 
rights and in keeping peace and security, 159 once the internal conflict threatens 
international order. 
The second amendment to Article 4/2 was submitted by India. It suggested the inclusion 
of a third paragraph to Article 2 which reads as follows: 
"3. Despite the foregoing, any external interference in a non- international conflict 
as defined in Article I of the present Protocol, shall be considered a violation of the 
present Protocol, which will cease to apply till such time as external interference is 
removed". 160 
1561bid, CDDH/I/SR. 24, para. 28, p. 234. 
1571bid. 
158 Articte 4/2 as adopted on 4 and 5 March 1975 stiputates that: 
"Nothing in the present Protocol shall be invoked by other States as a justification for 
intervening, directly or indirectly for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the 
internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which that 
conflict occurs". 
10 ORDCHL. MDH/1/238/Rev., p. 99. 
159 See In this regard the comments made by Mr. Obradovic (Yugostavia), Chairman of Group 8, op. cit., 
supra. n. 155, CDDH/l/SR. 29, para. 50, p. 295 and especiatty the comments of the Itatlan detegate. The 
tatter stressed that: 
0... [He woutd] raise no objections to amendment MDH/l/239 with the proviso, however, that it 
couid not be interpreted as preventing the UN and its speciaLlsed agencies, or for that matter 
any other organisations dedicated to the protection of human rights since that was one of their 
basic tasks". 
Op. cit., supre. n. 155, MDH/I/SR 30, para. B. p. 301. 
160 4 ORDCHL, CDDH/l/240, P. 16. 
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The Indian delegate explained -that subversive activities might be financed, backed with 
equipment or even directed from abroad, hence, it is in his opinion very appropriate to 
State that it at any time external interference occurs Protocol 11 would cease to apply. Thus, 
the Indian amendment was envisaged as a sanction against the breach of the Article banning 
intervention. 
The amendment was not accepted, and was attacked by many delegations, that it would 
lead to a situation where the victims of internal conflicts would find no protection. Also, 
it has been argued that the adoption of the Indian amendment would weaken the application 
of Protocol 11, since everything would depend on the subjective assessment of the parties 
to the confliCt. 161 
The discussions, however, revealed that there is some consensus between States that even 
in cases of foreign interventions in internal wars, the basic humanitarian considerations 
contained in Protocol II will continue to have effect. This is a very encouraging result for 
the real victims of civil wars. 
Article 3/2 in the final version of Protocol 11 stipulates that: 
"Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening, directly 
or indirectly, for any reason whatever in the armed conflict or in the internal or 
external affairs of the high contracting party in the territory of which that conflict 
occurs". 162 
This is the first Article in the era of the Charter dealing specifically with the question of 
non -intervention, in the first international instrument dealing with application of 
humanitarian law in the said conflicts. The Article on the surface seems to prohibit 
intervention to both sides of the internal conflicts. 
The travaux prkparatolres show that Third World States especially concentrated their 
efforts on making sure that insurgents will find no legal ground for getting any assistance. 
Thus, it is clear any, 
(assistance 
to insurgents is a clear 't hat`ý violation of Article 3/2 of 
Protocol 11. 
On the other hand, Article 3 read together with Article I of the Protocol 11 (the latter 
defines the scope of the application of the Protocol II) will lead to the conclusion that 
established Governments, would easily find a legal justification for getting assistance from 
outside sources, simply by arguing that the conflict had not attained the character of a non- 
international conflict as defined by Article 1. However, whenever Protocol 11 is said to be 
applicable to the internal conflict, the room for manoevering by the legal Government to 
get foreign assistance is severely restricted, if not totally closed. 
161 See the comments of the Canadian deLegate, op. cit., supra. n. 155, CDDH/I/SR. 30, para. 6, p. 300. 
Moreover, the Austrian deLegate invoked another ground for rejecting the Indian amendment: 
U ... (61 ecause in at t conf I icts that had occurred over the tast two centuries, governments had 
atways stated that there was outside interference, the new paragraph 3 ... might serve as a 
pretext for faiture to appty Protocot 11, since it was difficutt to estabtish whether or not 
there had been outside interference". 
Op. cit., supra. n. 155, MDH/l/SR. 30, parb. 9, p. 301. 
162 Op. cit., supra. n. 63, p. 619. 
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D. The ICJ Decision in Nicaragua Case and Its Impact on Intervention in Civil Wars 
The decision in this case is very important, since it addresses a couple of very important 
questions concerning especially questions relating to the use of force, such as intervention 
and self-defence. 
Before embarking on analysing the judgement and its impact especially on the law 
governing intervention in civil strife, it is important to say that the present Court had in 
Corfu Channel Case condemned intervention as contrary to international law. It stressed 
that: 
"The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of 
a policy of force, such as has in the past, given use to most serious abuses and as 
cannot, whatever be the present defect of international organisation find a place in 
international law". 163 
In this respect, Brownlie comments 'the value of the pronouncement is decreased by its 
generality and ambiguity, its character as obiter dictum, and absence of any reference to 
the provisions of the Charter'. 164 Despite these misgivings, the statement is important since 
it is the first explicit condemnation of intervention in the history of international Courts. 165 
In the Nicaragua Case, the Court addressed many important facts of the question of 
intervention, and clarified the legal position especially concerning intervention in civil wars. 
However, it is important to analyse the content of the judgement concerning all questions 
relating to intervention, because they are closely connected with each other. 
1. The Status of Intervention In General International Law 
In the above case, the Court stressed first that there is in customary international law a 
principle of non- intervention. It held: 
*... [T]hough examples of trespass against this principle (of non -intervention) are not infrequent the Court considers that it is part and parcel of customary law. "166 
This means frequent violation of the principle does not undermine its legitimacy and its 
claim to be an important principle of international law. 
The Court stressed the existence of the principle in the Charter despite the absence of its 
explicit stipulation, it explained that in this way 'it was never intended that the Charter 
should embody written confirmation of every essential principle of international law in 
force'. 167 Then, it added: 
163COrfu Channet Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), lCJ Reports, 1949. pp. 135-6. 
164 Browntie, op. cit., supra. chapter 1, n. 193, p. 289. 
165 However, it must be made clear that the PCIJ and later the 1CJ had upheld In many instances the 
principles of sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity, as cardinal principles 
of international taw, which for all, purposes imply a corresponding right of non-intervention. 
1660P. 
cit., supra. chapter 1, n. 70, para. 202, p. lD69. 
1671bid. 
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"The existence in the gpinioLi . uris of States of the principle of non-intervention is -L . 168 backed by established i_nd7ýbstantial practice. 
The Court invoked different resolutions of the UNGA relating to non-intervention, as 
revealing that opinio juris. the Court then, made a very important statement concerning the 
legal force of those resolutions, among them the Friendly Relations Declaration (Resolution 
2625 XXV). In this context, the Court held: 
"The effect of consent to the text of such resolutions cannot be understood as merely 
of 'reiteration or elucidation' of the treaty commitment undertaken in the Charter. 
On the contrary it may be understood as an acceptance of the validity of the rule or 
set of rules declared by the resolutions themselves". 169 
This means that the Court treated these UN resolutions as having a legal force by 
themselves, this is true especially to member States who expressed their consent to those 
resolutions, hence the Friendly Relations Declaration which was adopted by consensus must 
be treated as having an independent legal force, and not merely as an authoritative 
interpretation of the Charter. 
2. The Content of the Principle of Non -Intervention 
The Court states in general that: 
"The principle of non- intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to 
conduct its affairs without outside interference". 170 
Thus, non-intervention is seen as the other face of sovereignty, they are closely connected. 
The Court indicated that the principle includes among other things : 
*The principle forbids all States or group of States to intervene directly or indirectly 
in international or external affairs of other States ... a prohibited 
intervention must 
accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted by the 
principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely, one of these is the choice of a 
political economic social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign 
policy". 171 
What we notice here is that the Court did not insist on the 'dictatorial' character of 
intervention, which was advocated for a long time (especially by the Western Doctrine) as 
the real criteria for a prohibited interventions. This means at least implicitly, that all 
intervention which have the aim of interfering with the free exercise of all the components 
of the principle of sovereignty, are prohibited, whatever their character may be. 
The Court also treated the delicate question of 'humanitarian assistance', in its opinion to 
escape the condemnation as a form of intervention. This form of assistance must be given 
168 lbfd. 
169 [bid, para. 188, p. 1066. 
170 
lbfd, para. 202, p. 1069. 
171 lbid, para. 205, p. 1070. 
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'without discrimination of any kind,. This means that it must be given to all parties in the 
internal conflict, especially to those who need it most, who are under the control of both 
parties to the internal conflict. The Court emphasised the following: 
"in view of the Court if the provision of humanitarian assistance is to escape 
condemnation as an intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua, not only must 
it be limited to the purposes hallowed in the practice of the Red Cross namely "to 
prevent and alleviate human suffering' and 'protect life and health and to ensure 
respect for human sufferings' it must also above all be given without discrimination 
to all in need in Nicaragua not merely to the contras and their dependents". 
172 
This is a very important statement, since first humanitarian assistance may be used for 
political purposes by favouring a certain faction in the civil war, secondly even when it is 
given on purely humanitarian motives to one faction it will be inevitably interpreted by the 
other faction as an involvement in the internal strife. Thus, the criteria set by the Court are 
very valuable in assessing the legality of such kind of assistance, also when acted upon in 
practice, they will really mitigate the sufferings of the civilians on both sides. 
On the question of whether cessation of economic aid and reduction of 90% of sugar 
imports, which the US has decided against Nicaragua, constitute intervention in the internal 
affairs of the latter, the Court contended by pointing out that: 
"The Court has merely to say that it is unable to regard such actions on the economic 
plane as is h re complained of as a breach of the customary principle of non- 
intervention. "M 
It is clear her that the Court has abstained from evaluating the legality of the above 
mentioned acts under contemporary international law, especially under the ever growing 
numbers of the UN resolutions condemning economic intervention in its different forms. 
3. Assistance to Insurgents-its Legality under International Law 
The Court observed in the first place the frequency of foreign interventions on the side of 
the insurgents, who are fighting their own Governments. However, it did not include 
assistance given to forces fighting for self-determination in that category, in fact it states 
that: 
"... Vt was] not here concerned wilh the process of decolonisation. This questions is 
not in issue in the present case". 14 
This means that the Court excludes intervention on the side of the insurgents fighting for 
self-determination as understood in the practice of the UN from being as an example of the 
prohibited intervention. 
In his Dissenting Opinion, Judge Schwebel commented on the passage just cluoted by 
emphasising that: 
1721bid, 
para. 243, p. 1069. 
1731bid, 
para. 245, p. 1069. 
174 Jbid, para. 206, p. 1070. 
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*Yet the implication, or surely a possible implication, of the juxtaposition of the 
Court's statements is that the Court is of the view that there is or may be not a 
general but a particular right of intervention provided that it is in the furtherance 
of the 'process of decolonization, that is to say by these statements, the Court may 
be understood as inferentially endorsing an exception to the prohibition against 
interventions in favour of the legality of interventions in the promotion of the so- 
called "wars of liberation' or at ang rather, some such wars, while condemning 
intervention of another character. "' 
Obviously Judge Schwebel is not happy with these implications of the Court's statements, 
but there is no doubt they translate faithfully the legal developments which were taking 
place since at least the beginning of 1960s. 
However, apart from that, the Court considered that intervention on the side of the 
opposition whether directly or indirectly. with or without armed forces by third States who 
share the political and moral values of the insurgents, is not a right in international law: 
"... [F]or such a general right to come into existence would involve a fundamental 
modification of the customary principle of non-intervention". 176 
In other words, the traditional rule which prohibits any assistance to the insurgents is still 
seen by the Court as the governing rule. 
In fact, the Court found that even the intervening States on the side of opposition did not 
justify their actions by reference to a 'new right of intervention or a new exception to the 
principle of its prohibition'. ' 77 The US for instance justified its conduct against Nicaragua 
on the grounds of the domestic policies of the Government, its ideology, the level of its 
armaments and the direction of its foreign policy. In this regard, the Court noted that: 
* ... But these were statements of international policy, and not an assertion of rules of 
existing international law. "178 
After that, the Court stated the position of international law vis-i-vis assistance to 
insurgents in the following terms: 
"... the Court therefore finds that no such general rule of intervention in support of 
an opposition within another State exists in contemporary international law". 179 
The Court also stressed that acts which directly or indirectly involve the use of force and 
which constitute a breach of the customary principle of non-intervention, will also 
constitute a breach of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force in international 
relations. The implication is very clear assistance to insurgents in all forms can be 
considered as a breach of Article 2/4 of the Charter, with the further implication in that 
1751bld, 
para. 179. p. 1192. 
176 Ibid, para. 206, p. 1070. 
lT7 Ibid, para. 207, p. 1071. 
1 78 Ibid. 
179 Ibid, para. 209, p. 1071. 
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case the UN may intervene to stop such assistance under Chapter IIV of the UN Charter. 
Moreover, The Court emphasised also that insurgents are not in a position to request aid 
from outside States, it considered that the principle of non- intervention: 
"... [W]ould certainly lose its effectiveness as a principle of law if intervention were to be 
justified by a mere request for assistance made by an opposition group in another State". 180 
This means that the Court has pursued a status quo oriented approach, where the protection 
of sovereignty is the corner stone of international order. Social change and revolutions are 
not however, prohibited but they must be made without any help from outside. 
Thus, the Court turned a deaf ear to suggestions for opening the door for exceptions to 
the principle of non-intervention, in order to assist insurgents especially those who meet 
certain conditions (such as: effective control over a substantial part of the territory, wide- 
spread support from the population, organised military command, etc. ). 
4. Aid to Established Government 
The Court it seems has upheld the legality of assistance to the established Government, it 
stressed it in the followinfterms: 
* ... [I]ndeed it is difficult to see what would remain of the principle of non- intervention in international law, if intervention, which is already allowable at the 
request of the Government of the State, were also allowed at the request of the 
opposition". 181 
This is an express recognition of the right of the established Government to seek and 
receive aid from third States in the event of civil wars, even in the era of the Charter. 182 
Thus, the Court in effect confirmed the relevance of the traditional rule in our 
contemporary era. 
S. Self-Defence as an Answer to Intervention 
The US tried to justify its actions against Nicaragua (these actions include a substantial 
involvement on the side of the Contras who are fighting the established Government) on 
the ground of collective self-defence with EI-Salvador, which in its opinion was the object 
of a campaign of destabilisation by Nicaragua, which assisted heavily the insurgents who 
are fighting the Salvadorian Government. It is interesting to note that the US did not try 
to justify its actions on grounds of counter-intervention, which indicates they do not offer 
1801bid, 
para. 246, p. 1079. 
lallbid. 
182 The Court noted that international law does not prohibit intervention on the side of the 
established Goverment upon its request. It only does not accept intervention on the request of 
insurgents, since in its view intervention is accepted on the request of the two sides Of civil war. 
It held: 
"This wouLd permit any State to Intervene in the Internat. affairs of another State, whether 
at the request of the Government or at the request of its opposition such a situation does not 
in the court's view correspond to the present State of International, Law". 
Ibid. 
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a solid legal ground. 
Moore has in fact, advocated that 'collective self-defence' as an answer to substantial 
involvement by third parties on the side of the insurgents, who are fighting a friendly 
regime. He considered those efforts of destabilisation as 'a secret war' which Article 51 of 
the UN Charter applies to them. 183 In this context, the massive support and assistance to 
the insurgents in El-Salvador given by Nicaragua and Cuba constitutes in his opinion an 
'armed attack' in the meaning of the UN Charter's Articles 3 and 53 of the Rio Treaty, 
which justifies the use of force in the form of self-defence. 
He gave a new interpretation to the phrase 'armed attack' which in his opinion means 
neither armed nor "armed aggression is limited by any language such as 'direct' which could 
have been expected if the draftsmen had intended to exclude indirect attack. "184 
The main criteria of this 'secret war' is according to Moore, when it is: 
"... [Clonducted through assistance in organising Marxist-Leninist controlled 
insurgencies, the financing of such insurgencies, the provision and the shipment to 
them of arms and ammunition, training the insurgents; assistance in command and 
control, intelligence military and logistic activities, and extensive political support. 
085 
Furthermore, that war includes terrorist attacks and subversive activities preliminary to and 
supportive of all out covert attack. To him, those actions are a real danger to world order. 
They are a very clear violation of the vision and intentions of the founding fathers of the 
UN and OAS Charters. He then suggests that: 
"... [A]t the minimum, it must be understood that an attacked State and those acting 
on its behalf are entitled to a rijqht of effective defence to end the attack promptly 
and protect self- determi nation"ý 86 
In his view, State practice affords many examples which justifies his above assertion. 187 
Judge Schwebel in his Dissenting Opinion in the Nicaragua Case, has developed an 
argument which does not differ substantially from Moore's view, 188 he concentrated on 
proving that the US actions in supporting the countries 
' 
in Nicaragua were necessary and 
proportionate acts of self-defence, in response to Nicaraguan support to Salvadorian rebels. 
The Court, however, refuted such a stand. It held: 
183me 
maintains in this respect: 
"The right of individual and cottective setf-defence embodied in Artfcte 51 of the 
Charter to appty to secret indirect armed attack as wett as to open invasion". 





186 Ibid, p. 117. 
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me cites the examples of the Us who considered the substanclat assistance to Insurgents in Greece 
in 1947 by Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia as an armed attack. Similarly, France regarded assistance 
to Algerian rebels from the Tunisian base of Sakiet-Sfdi-. Youssef as an act Justifying self-defence. 
188 
For a critical position vis-h-vis Moore's stand, see J. P. Rowtes: Setf-Defence and the Charter- 
A Reply to Professdr Moore. 80 AJIL, 1986. pp. 568-583. 
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"... [T]he Court does not believe that the concept of 'armed attack' includes not only 
acts by armed bands where such acts occur on a significant scale but also assistance 
to rebels in the form of provisions of weapons or logistical or other support". 189 
In the opinion of the Court then, the expression of 'armed attack' in Article 51 of the 
Charter does not include assistance to insurgents. It considered that such assistance may be 
regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention in the internal affairs of 
other States. 190 
Judge Schwebel, it must be stressed criticised bitterly the Court's stand (on the question 
of whether aid to irregular's may be tantamount to armed attack) he believed that the 
Court's interpretation of the expression 'armed attack' departs from accepted and desirable 
law. 191 He maintained that the judgement of the Court will not contribute to the progressive 
development of international law, because it"failed to take into account the realities of the 
use of force in international relations. 
Moreover, Judge Schwebel made it clear that the Court has sided with Third World 
position on the above subject, that position was stated in the thirteen powers draft 
submitted during the discussions on the definition of aggression. 192 Judge Schwebel stressed 
that he agrees with Stone who thought that the Third World proposals were at odds with the 
Charter and general international law. However, I think that despite these criticisms the 
judgement of the Court in that respect, is well-founded, it is in line with the letter and 
spirit of the Charter, since any enlargement of the scope of 'armed attack' will not serve the 
purpose of the Charter in keeping peace and security in the world. 
Also, even if we agree with Moore and Judge Schwebel that substantial assistance to the 
insurgents may constitute an armed attack, the important question, is who is entitled to 
determine that the assistance has reached a level where it can be considered as substantial, 
and what are the elements or criteria of substantial assistance. 
It is to be noted that the Court has rejected the claim of collective self-defence on 
another ground in the following terms: 
"... [Namely] there is no rule of customary international law permitting another State 
to exercise the right of collective self-defence on the basis of its own assessment of 
the situation-where collective self-defence is invoked, it is to be expected that the 
State for whose benefit this right is used will have declared itself to be the victim of 
'890p. 
cit., supra. n. 166, para. 195, p. 1068. 
1901bid. 
1911bid, 
para. 155, p. 1182. 
192 The Thirteen Powers Draft on the definition of aggression, submitted by Third WorLd States, 
specificaLty stated: 
"When a State is a victim in Its own territory of subversive and/or terrorist acts by 
Irregutar, votunteer or armed bards organised or supported by another State, It may take alt 
reasonabte and adequate steps to safeguard its existence and its institutions, without having 
recourse to the right of individuat or cottective setf-defence against the other State under 
Articte 51 of the Charter". 
ibid, para. 162, p. 1187. 
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an armed attack. " 193 
Those elements in fact were absent, since EI. Salvador did not declare itself to be an object 
of an armed attack and did not request the US to intervene in collective self-defence. 
6. Evaluation of the Decision of the ICJ 
The US representative to the UN commented on the ICJ decision in the Nicaragua Case in 
a meeting of the UNSC on July 29th, 1986 by making it clear that: 
"We [the US] believe the Court has fundamentally misperceived the situation in 
Central America. It is simply wrong on many of its facts, and the Court's conception 
of the relevant international law is seriously flawed in important aspects. " 194 
This is the US official position. Moore went so far as to suggest that 'the decision itself, is 
a tragedy for world order and for hopes to strengthen international adjudication'. 195 The 
focus of the attack is the ICJ explanation of the important questions of the use of force, 
intervention and armed attack and the relevant legal standards. 
In my view the Court's judgement is a very important contribution to the development 
of a world ruled by law. 196 It attempted to restrict and not enlarge the spectrum of the 
situation in which the use of force and intervention are allowed. The vital question of 
assistance to rebels, on which scholarly controversy has raged for a very long time, has been 
settled in a very clear way, and if especially strong States adhere to the ICJ standards, the 
interventionary activity would be significantly curtailed in a very significant manner. 
1931bid, 
para. 195, p. 1068. 
194SCOR, 39th year, Special Supplement. 
195j. N. Moore: The Nicaragua Case and the Deterioration of World Order, 81 AJIL, 1987, P. 152. 
196For 
a sympathetic aprraiset of the ICPs decision, see R. Falk: The World Court's Achievement, 81 
AJIL, 1987, p. 112-116, and T. Farer: Drawing the Line, 81 AJIL, 1987, p. 112-116. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
DEFINITION AND DELIMITATION OF THE SCOPE OF CIVIL WARS 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to reveal the extent to which the concepts of sovereignty and 
non-intervention, have influenced attempts to define civil wars. States, in general, are 
reluctant to accept limitations on their 'sovereign power' to qualify the nature of the 
conflicts which may take place in their territories. The argument of non- intervention, will 
be used to deny the capacity of any third party to determine the existence of such conflicts 
in their territory, and the argument of sovereignty will be used to defend their freedom 
of action, in such cases of extreme crisis. 
In situations of upheveals, States want to retain their full sovereignty, in order to combat 
their internal enemies, without any fear that the latter may claim any special legal status. 
In my view, States have always resisted the creation of international norms concerning the 
conduct of civil wars, because such an exercise will inevitably result, in their view, in the 
opening of the door to intervention by other States in their internal affairs, and in 
consequences affect their sovereignty. 
In my opinion, it is the influence of these two concepts (sovereignty and non- 
intervention) which made international law very slow in responding to the problems raised 
by internal conflicts. States will not easily accept restrictions to their power to deal with 
those who are under municipal law and have committed the most heinous of crimes, namely 
high treason. 
2. The Importance of Defining Civil Wars 
The most important reason is that the application of humanitarian rules will depend 
essentially upon the characterization of the conflict. Higgins correctly pointed out that: 
"... [T]he identification of a major conflict as either civil or international war is 
essential to the correct application of the relevant legal norms"'. 
This means that in the absence of such identification, the violent situation will be governed 
by national law, which is very harsh towards rebels and their supporters, it means also that 
even humanitarian organizations such as the ICRC will have great difficulty, if not face 
total prohibition in getting any assistance to the population in need, since any attempt on 
their part will be deemed by the established Government, as an intervention in their 
internal affairs. 
Another important reason for the definition of civil wars, is that since the elevation of 
wars of national liberation to the status of international wars by virtue of Article 1/4 of 
the first Protocol of 1977 (This category has been the main form of civil war in the sixties 
and seventies) we are left now with the real cases of civil wars, which occur inside 
I 
R. Higgins: Internal War and International Law, in C. E. Black and R. A. Falk (eds. ): The Future of 
the international Legal Order. Vot. 3: Conflict management. PUP, Princeton, 1971, p. 85. 
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independent States, which have realised their right to self-determination. 
These States are mainly in the third world, and because of the frequency of outside 
interventions on the side of their internal enemies, the question of definition or in other 
words the matter of the existence of an internal conflict within their borders, has acquired 
an enormous importance. Those States combat their internal opponents, among other things, 
by denying the existence of a situation which has the characteristics of a civil war. 
Thus, in practice, States label their opponents, as terrorists, thieves, mercenaries, 
saboteurs, etc., which means that they do not consider them as other than common law 
criminals. 
In other hand, Nicaragua labels the 'contras' as 'Somozan MercenarieS, 2. Further, in a 
letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua to George Shultz, the US Secretary 
of State, it is stated that: 
"The announcement made yesterday by the terrorist forces organized, financed and 
directed by the United States of America, through the CIA, that the Port of Corinto 
had been mined, etc. "3 . 
According to Nicaragua, then, those elements have no status and can receive no protection 
of humanitarian law; because among other things, they are implicitly the agents of a foreign 
power set to destroy the State. 
Similarly, in a statement by the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan in response to an earlier 
announcement by the US President Reagan concerning the proclamation of an 'Afghan 
Day', it is stated that: 
"The pronouncement of the President of the United States of America on this score have nothing new about them, yet it is surprising to see as to how a great demagogic 
and deceitful effort is made by Reagan to cover the crimes of a handful of 
executioners and ! Zrants, masquerading as 'Mujahiddin' and the 'fighters for the 
cause of freedom" . 
It is clear from these statements that the task of applying humanitarian law to internal 
conflicts, and especially the task of defining them, is by no means an easy exercise. 
States may very well cling to their sovereignty, by denying the existence of a civil war, 
and by characterising any outside attempt to uphold such existence as an indesirable 
intervention in their internal affairs. 
3. Definition of Civil War: Some Terminological Considerations 
A host of words are used to denote the violent events which take place within a State and 
are of a serious nature. Among them civil war, internal war, civil strife, and the most recent 
notion, "Armed Conflict of a non- international character'. These all have something in 
common. They are internal as opposed to international events, they are violent as opposed 
2 
UNSCOR, 39th year, (Supptement for Jan, Feb and March 1984), UN. New York, 1986, UN Doc. S/16343, 
p. 87. 
3 
lbid, UN Doc S/16395 dated March 7th, 1984, p. 86. 
41bid, UN Doc S/16445, p-120. 
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to peaceful. 
However, civil war is the classical word for the violent struggles within a State which 
involve the systematic use of armed force and divide the nation deeply. It is (civil war) 
the most used word in the literature of international law, it is used as the title of one of the 
first and original books on the subject by Rougier (Guerres civiles, 1903), and also by some 
recent works on the subject such as Castren (Civil War, 1965), Falk (International Law of 
Civil War, 1972) and Moore (Law and Civil War in the Modern World, 1974). Moreover, 
some recent articles still use this term such as is the case of Cassess (La guerre civile et le 
droit international, 1986). 
Similarly, some Governments use the same term in official documents. Thus, in a 
communiquk dated March 26th, 1984, the Government of Nicaragua stated that: 
"... [F]urthermore the civil war in the fraternal nation of El Salvador... "5. 
In the era of the UN Charter, the term 'war' has been out of fashion it has been replaced 
by the term 'armed conflict' the reason being essentially, to end all the legal and practical 
controversies concerning the question of the existence of a 'state of war' which plagued the 
League of Nations. However, this change has been made essentially in relation to 
international conflicts. 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 have in fact, extended this change to internal conflict 
as well, common Article 3 speaks of "armed conflicts of a non- international character'. The 
word has since been used frequently, by the UNGA and by the UN Secretary-General, and 
numerous resolutions used the term especially those adopted in connection with the subject 
of human rights in armed conflicts. Finally, Protocol 11 of 1977 used the same term, indeed 
it designated the subject matter of the whole Protocol. 
However, the word civil war will be used together with the term 'Armed conflict of non- 
international character'. Since the latter, has been interpreted, especially in Protocol 11 of 
1977 to mean the same thing as 'civil war' in classical international law, as I will try to show 
in the coming sections. 
After these preliminary remarks, it seems to me that in order to cover the subject of this 
chapter, it is necessary to deal first, the various distinctions between civil wars and other 
forms of violence which occur within States. 
Secondly, the legality of civil wars in international law. Thirdly, the definition of civil 
wars under customary international law. Moreover, the views of classical writers and the 
influence of the concepts of recognition of insurgency and belligerency on the definition 
of civil wars will also be dealt with. Fourthly, the definition of non- international armed 
conflicts in the context of Common Article 3 will be examined. Finally, the definition of 
non- international armed conflicts under Protocol 11 will be assessed. 
SECTION 1: Distinctions between Civil Wars and other Forms of Violence which Occur 
within the State 
The distinction between civil wars or non-international armed conflicts and other forms of 
5 Ibid. UN Doc S/16440, p. 117. 
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collective violence against the established Government, which may break out inside a given 
State, such as rebellion, insurrection, riots and internal tensions, is very important, since 
humanitarian rules may apply only in situations of civil wars, that is in situations which 
attain a certain degree of intensity, duration and organisation. Lesser forms of violence are 
covered by the national law of the country. 
However, the distinctions are by no means easy to make, especially at the beginning of 
the violent events, since it is in the interests of the established Government to leave the 
situation ambiguous, in order to claim their full sovereign right to suppress the violence by 
all means at its disposal, without any international legal restraints. 
Nevertheless, some writers have tried to make such distinctions. Thus, Rougier after 
observing that: 
"Une grande confusion rýgne dans la terminologie employ6e pour ddsigner les degr6s 
de trouble moindres que la guerre civile; les mots dmeute, insurrection, soulývement, 
rebellion, s6dition sont constamment employ6s comme synonymes"6. 
He then tried to clarify the matter by dividing these different kinds of troubles, according 
to their gravity and importance, in the following fashion: 
"Au premier degr6: tmeute ou insurrection, au 2ýme degr6: souMvement ou rebellion, 
au 36me degrd: guerre civile". 
According to him, insurrections are characterized by their localization, usually they do not 
extend beyond a small region of the national territory, they are of very short duration, 
however, they may become civil wars, if they spread to the whole territory and be 
prolonged. Essentially they are crimes under municipal law, as they are not recognized by 
international law. 
Rougier defines Tebellion by stating that: 
"D'une manitre g6ndrale, on peut dire qu'il ya rebellion lorsqu'une partie de la 
nation est dans un dtat permanent de r6sistance et de r6volte envers le souverain et 
qu'elle mpifeste son hostilit6 par des prises d'armes. des violences Mg6res et des 
dmeutes". 
He then adds that: 
"Trop faible encore pour se poser rdsolument en adversaire et en rival du 
gouvernement assez fort pour lui faire tete, la partie insurg6e essaye d'agir par 
menace et intimidation"8. 
Riots and rebellions may lack organization, and develop to mere acts of looting and 
disorder. They always fall under the authority of the local law. 
6Rougier, 





Vattel distinguishes between five different kinds of disorders, which may disrupt the State 
and force the sovereign to use armed forces. They are: (i) popular tumult; (ii) sedition, (iii) 
insurrection; (iv) rebellion; and (v) civil wars. The classification is made according to the 
seriousness of the disorder. 
(i) Popular tumult is: 
"... [A] disorderly gathering of people who refuse to listen to the voice of their 
superiors whether they be disaffected towards their superiors themselves or merely 
towards certain private individuals". 9 
It seems that this form of disorder is very easy to contain, hence it does not pose any real 
difficulty to the authorities, the sovereign is not directly challenged, local law exclusively 
governs the situation. Vattel then adds that: 
"... If the anger of the people is directed particularly against the magistrates or other 
officers invested with public authority, and if it is carried so far as to result in 
positive disobedience or acts of violence, the movement is called sedition"10. 
(ii) Sedition may develop into insurrection which is more serious when 'the evil extends 
and wins over the majority of the citizens in a town or province, and gains strength that 
the sovereign is no longer obeyed"'. 
(iii) Insurrection according to Vattel is essentially a local phenomenon, in other words it 
is strong but it is based in a specific region of the country as opposed to the country as a 
whole. 
(iv) Rebellion on the other hand 'only applied to an uprising against the lawful authority, 
which is lacking in any semblance of justice'12. Thus, it. is 'the injustice of the legal 
government' criteria which distinguishes rebellion, implying that the uprising is serious and 
is not confined to a particular region of the country. 
(v) Finally, rebellion may develop into full civil war, when the rebels become sufficiently 
strong to make a stand against him [the Sovereign] and force him to make formal war upon 
them'13. According to Vattel then, only civil war, as we will show in the coming sections, 
can draw the attention of international law, because in fact, it resembles international wars 
between States. 
Implicitly then, all other forms rest exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the 
State, sovereignty overrides any other considerations. Padelford maintains that there is 
something in common between revolt, insurrection. rebellion, revolution and civil wars. 
They are essentially different forms of the same thing "opposition to and an endeavour to 
9 E. de Vattet: The Law of Nations or Principles of Natural Law. 'Vot. 3, translated by C. G. Fenwick, 
Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1916, p. 336. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid, p. 338. 
13 Ibid. 
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bring about an alteration of the institutions or policies of an established government"14. He 
then distinguishes between three important degrees of disorders: (i) insurrection, (ii) 
rebellion and (iii) civil wars. 
(i) Insurrection or revolt "... is usually confined to a small portion of a country, is of a 
relatively short duration, and is supported by a minimum degree of organization". 
' 5 In this 
case, the legal Government will resort to its armed forces to quell the revolt, police action 
cannot cope with the situation. 
(ii) He then adds that: 
"An uprising may be said to be rebellion or revolution when the opposition embraces 
a large part of the country, forms a responsible government assuming the functions 
and powers of such over the territory controlled, and places disciplined and organized 
troops in the field against the forces of the established government"16. 
This definition in practice, makes no difference between rebellion and civil war, since 
rebellion has been defined as a very serious event, involving a real organization of the 
insurgents, with a real occupation of a part of the territory of the State. 
However. the classical statement on this subject is contained in the famous Lieber Code, 
issued during the American Civil War. Its Article 149 states that 
"Insurrection is the rising of people against their government, or a portion of it, or 
against one or more of its laws or against an officer or officers of the government. 
It may be confined to a mere resistence, or it may have greater ends in view m17 - 
This definition, it seems, concentrates on the targets against which the uprising takes place, 
rather than the means by which the Government fights against such uprising. There is no 
precision on the duration of the disorder, and no mention of the local character of the 
revolt. Moreover, there is no mention of the relevance of international law to the situation. 
Article 151 defines rebellion as follows: 
*The term 'rebellion' is applied to an insurrection of large extent, and is usually a war 
between the legitimate government of a country and portions of provinces of the 
same who seek to throw off their allegiance to it and set up a government of their 
ow "18 . 
Rebellion, it seems is seen as having a definite aim, it is the setting up of a new 
Government, in a particular region or regions of the old united country, which indicates 
that the term is employed essentially to designate a war of secession. Again, there is no 
indication that international law, has any relevance to the situation. 
It seems that there is sufficient evidence to the fact that, firstly, insurrections and 
14 N. J. Padetford: International, Law and the Spanish ClvR War, 31 AJIL, 1937, p. 227. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 




rebellions as forms of internal violence against the Government in power, are always seen 
as less violent than civil wars. Thus, in the case of Pan American Airwavs v. Aetna Casualty 
and Surety ComiDanv Case (1973), Judge Franbel stated, in connection with all risk 
exemption clauses in an insurance policy, that: 
"... As the all risk argument develops, it becomes apparent that reliance here is 
essentially upon the concept of 'insurrection' a somewhat less august (more embryonic 
smaller scale) attack upon a Government that 'rebellion', and a less momentous and 
organized conflict than a 'civil war'. 19 
Implicitly then, insurrections and rebellions are left within the domestic jurisdiction of the 
State, the Government can use whatever means to suppress them, this leads directly to the 
second observation, to the effect that third States have no right to intervene in those 
situations even by protest. 
In this context, in a note from the US Secretary of State, Stimson to the US Consul at 
Nogales in Mexico on April 4th, 1929, at the time of an armed rebellion against the legal 
Government of Mexico, it is stated: 
"The ... [US State] Department does not perceive a legal basis upon which to found 
representations against bombardment of Empalme by the forces of the recognized 
Mexican government as part of its military campaign, thus far highly successful, to 
crush out a rebellion against the authority of that government. Nor is this government 
in a position to substitute its judgement for that of the regularly constituted Mexican 
authorities as to the wisdom, propriety, or effectiveness of legitimate military 
measures and gperations undertaken by the regular Mexican forces to crush such 
rebellion, etc. "". 
This statement shows clearly that in cases of rebellions, States accept the duty of non- 
intervention and acknowledge the full right of the established Government to take all 
measures necessary to halt and quell the disorder. 
The conclusion is that there is no unanimity in stating different criteria which distinguish 
different kinds of disorder which occur within the State. However, the common 
denominator between insurrections, riots and rebellions and so forth, is that they are 
generally considered to be within the domain of exclusive jurisdiction of the State, and thus 
sovereignty and non-intervention are dominant to the exclusion of any international 
concern. 
The Government in power is free to deal with the situation in accordance with its local 
laws, which consider violent disorders as crimes against the security of the State, hence 
harshly punishable. In this area, sovereignty and non -intervention weigh against the 
interests of humanity. 
It must be noted that even in the era of the UN Charter, that is in contemporary 
international law as witnessed by common Article 3 and the Protocol 11, disorders which do 
not attain the threshold of "non- international armed conflict' are within the domestic 
jurisdiction of the State. 
19 Pan American World Airways v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Cow4mny, (Decision), 12 ILM, 1973, p. 1466. 
20 Whiteman, op. cit., supra. chapter 1. n. 8, VoL. 1, (1963), pp. 930-31. 
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These disorders, are officially called'internal disturbances and tensions'. Thus, Article 1/2 
of the Protocol 11 explicitly states: 
"This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions such 
as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of similar nature, as not 
being armed conflicts". 
This paragraph in fact, excludes those situations from the field of application of Protocol 
11, and also in my opinion from the field of application of Article 3 since the latter applies 
only to non-international armed conflict, which must attain some degree of intensity and 
duration and are more serious. The ICRC in its documentation submitted to the first session 
of the CGEDHL in 1971, has defined the two concepts of internal 'disturbances' and 
'tensions'. The former reads as follows: 
"... [I]nvolves situations in which there is no non- international armed conflicts as such, 
but there exists a confrontation within the country, which is characterized by a 
certain seriousness or duration and which involves acts of violence. These latter can 
assume various forms, all the way from the spontaneous generation of acts of revolt 
to the struggle between more or less organized groups and the authorities in power. 
In these situations which do not necessarily degenerate into open struggle, the 
authorities in power 4Zall upon extensive police forces, or even armed forces, to 
restore internal order"11. 
However, internal tensions are defined as: 
"... [S]ituat ions of internal disorder-and even more, those of civil war-often lead to 
the arrest of large numbers of persons because of their acts or their political attitudes, 
this phenomenon is likewise found in situations which are not marked by acts of 
violence, but which reflect internal tensions of a political, racial or other nature. This 
evolution is also due to the fact that the established Governments and their police 
dispose of such powerful means of repression, that an armed insurrection is often 
practically impossible. This may give rise to situations of internal tensions which 
are characterized by the fact that the Governmental authorities keep full control of 
the events and undertake the massive internment of persons they may consider 
dangerous to their security.. 22. 
Thus, it seems that in internal disturbances, acts of violence take place. which leads the 
Government to use force to maintain order, whereas in internal tensions there is no resort 
to violence by the opponent of the regime. However, because of serious tensions force is 
used as a preventive measure to maintain law and order. The use of force in these situations 
takes the form of. 
" ... [L]arge scale arrests-a 
large number of political prisoners. The probable existence 
of ill-treatment or inhuman conditions of detention; the suspension of fundamental 
judicial guarantees, either as part of the promulgations 3f a state of emergency or 
.3 simply as a matter of fact; allegations of disappearances 
21 CGEDHL, (Geneva 24 May- 12 June, 1971, Documentation submitted by the ICRC: V. Protection Of Non- 
International Conflicts), 1971, p. 79. 
221bld, 
p. 89. 
23Y. Sandoz, C. Swinarski and B. Zimmerman (eds. ): Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 
19T7 to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12th, 1949. ICRC, Martintis Nijhoff, Geneva, 1987, para 4476, 
p. 1355. 
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Meron seems to include internal disturbances and tensions in one single concept, namely 
'internal strife' which in his opinion may arise: 
"When a government does not recognize a situation involving collective violence to 
be internal armed conflict but nevertheless resorts to extraordinary measures such as 
emergency regulations, martial law or state of emergency, or when a state enacts 
legislation which permits such measures without categ? rizing them as such, an 4 internal strife situation may be frequently be implicated 
However, whatever name is given to such situations, one thing is certain, they are not at 
present within the field of application of humanitarian law. 
This has not prevented ICRC from acting on an ad hoc basis, indeed Pictet notes in this 
respect that: 
"Au cours des trente derni6res arindes, le CICR aW autoris6 A visiter et assister plus 
de 300,000 ddtenus politiques, dans plus de 80 pays. On le voit, c'est devenu l'une de 
ses activit6s majeures. Dans la moitid des cas, environ, on se trouvait en pr6sence de 
troubles int6rieures et, dans les autres, de tensions politiques sans troubles int6rieures 
et, clans les autres, de tensions politiques sans troubles caract6risees "25 . 
This indicated that the absence of a clear legal basis, has not prevented the ICRC from 
saving lives and reducing instances of inhuman treatment. 
However, despite this optimism, Pictet recognizes that : 
"Une action du CICR en faveur des d6tenus politiques slimpose done sur le plan 
humanitaire, mais elle est d6licate et rencontre souvent bien des obstacles, n6s des 
exigences de la souverainet6 dtaticlue, de la soret6 publique et du principe de non- 6 ingdrence dans les affaires int6rieures des nations" 6. 
Thus, sovereignty and non-intervention may very well be used to justify the denial of any 
humanitarian action in favour of the victims of such situations. Indeed there is nothing 
which can prevent States from denying the ICRC access to places of detention. 
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that situations of internal disturbances and tensions are 
not cases of 'no man's land' where international law has no relevance. Human rights 
instruments can play a very useful role, since they contain a hard core of non-derogable 
rights and prohibitions, which must be adhered to in all circumstances including times of 
emergencies. 
in this way, the right to life, prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment, the right to 
fair trial are mentioned as non-degorable Tights in universal and regional human Tights 
instruments. In these situations, the sovereignty of the State is limited by human rights law 
rather than humanitarian law. 
It must be also stated that the ICRC and some international lawyers (especially Meron) 
24 T. Meron: Human Rights in Internal Strife: Their International Protection. Cambridge Grotius Pub. 
Ltd., 1987, p. 103. 
25 J. Pictet: Une institution unique de son genre: te Comit6 Internationat de is Croix-Rouge. Institut 
Henry-Dunant, Gen6ve, ed. A. P6done, Paris, 1985, p. 93. 
261bid, p. 91. 
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have inaugurated a new approach to deal with the situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions. It is reported that the intention of the new approach: 
0 ... [I]s not to create a new 
body of law specific to these situations (internal 
disturbances and tensions) but rather to recall a number of existing fundamental rules 
drawn from written law, customary law and general legal principles, rules which will 
thereby be better applied in situations of internal disturbances and tensions and 
which cannot be violated without offending the universal conscience of mankind". 
27 
28 
In accordance with the spirit of this approach, Grasser proposed a code of conduct , 
likewise Meron suggested a Draft Model Declaration on internal strife29. Both texts 
proposed that certain rules must absolutely be respected. They are: 
"The right to life, the inherent dignity of the human being, the forbidding of murder, 
torture and other degrading forms of treatment, the taking of hostages, 
disappearances of persons, acts of terrorism and collective punishment, recourse to 
force out of proportion with the objectives sought, human treatment of persons 
deprived of their freedom, the granting of fundamental legal guarantees, the rights 
of the Shild, protection of the wounded and sick and the search for missing 0 0 persons" 0. 
The general conclusion of this section is that in customary law the concepts of insurrections 
and rebellions were widely used to describe situations of internal disorders, which are 
exclusively within the reserved domain of national jurisdiction, hence international law has 
no relevance, indeed even civil wars before the recognition of belligerency are purely 
internal matters. Fenwick stressed rightly that: 
"It is well established that civil wars, in the sense of struggles by different factions 
to obtain control of the Government of the same territorial area, belong within the 
class of domestic questions which are outside the control of international law "31 - 
This means to me that in traditional international law, all disorders which take place within 
a State whatever their intensity and duration and whatever their characterization, they are 
prima facie within the domestic jurisdiction of the State, until the recognition of the 
belligerency has been granted. 
in contemporary international law, non- international conflicts within the meaning of 
either Article 3 or Protocol 11, have been regulated by international humanitarian law. 
Internal disturbances and tensions, which presumably include the old concepts of 
insurrection and rebellion, are still outside the ambit of humanitarian law, but actions of 
the ICRC, and the influence of human rights, may mitigate their inhumanity, and States 
may have to adjust their sovereignty to these demands. 
27 Internal Disturbances and Tensions: A New Humanitarian Approach. IRRC, 1988,28th year, No. 262, 
p. 6. 
28H. P. Gasser: A Measure of Humanity in Internal Disturbances and Tensions: Proposal for a Code of 
Conduct. lbid, pp. 38-58. 
29T. Meron: Draft Model Declaration in International Strife. Ibid, pp. 59-76. 
301bid, p. 6. 
31C. G. Fenwick: Civil Wars Under the Control of International Law. 32 AJIL, 1938, p. 538. 
127 
SECTION 11: On the Legality of Civil Wars under International Law 
There is a general agreement that international law does not prohibit civil wars, Pinto 
observes that: 
"Illigale dans l'orde jUTidique inteTne, la gueTTe civile West pas interdite paT le dTOit 
inteTnational general"32. 
He then adds that: 
"Le gouvernement l6gal exerce librement sur son territoires les comp6tences 6tatiques, 
donc I"emploi de la force arm6e. Ses adversaires organisds ni. sont pas tenus, par une 
rýgle de droit international de lui en r6server le monopole" . 
Thus, resort to civil wars by a section of the population of the State cannot be considered 
as a breach of international law. 
Some writers inferred from the above stand, that international law in fact encourages 
recourse to civil wars. In this context, Padelford argued that: 
"International law predicts its existence upon a system of sovereign states each with 
exclusive jurisdiction over its own subjects within the national domain. Nevertheless, it takes cognizance of civil disturbances and accords them an equivocal position in its system. Uprisings that supremely unlawful in municipal law, being attacks upon 34 the personality of the State, are not at all unlawful according to international law" . 
He then adds: 
"On the contrary it [international law] favours them by advocating admission of insurgents rights at an early stage of hostilities, thereby exempting the rebels from the extreme rigors of their national law, and makes their position quasi-legal"35. 
Padelford interprets then the institution of the recognition of insurgency, as the evidence 
that international law encourages civil wars. 
I think that this suggestion goes too far, it is true that international law, does not prohibit 
civil wars. This being so, exactly because it sees them as internal affairs of the State to 
which international law has no relevance. To infer that international law encourages them, 
is an untenable suggestion, since it goes against the very principle of sovereignty, which is 
the main pillar on which international law is based. 
Concerning the claim that the institution of recognition of insurgency, as an indication 
that international law favours civil wars, it is my view that it is a very weak argument, 
since the institution itself is very vague on its contents and effects, also resort to it in 
practice is very rare, and in any event it is considered as obsolete at least after the era of 
the UN Charter. 
32 Pinto, op. cit., supra. chapter 2, n. 90, p. 477. 
33 Ibid. 
34 op. cit., supra. n. 14, p. 228. 
351bid. 
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Scelle on the other hand, maintains that not only international law but constitutional law 
as well, legitimizes recourse to civil war, he states: 
"D'une part le droit p6nal fait de la rebellion soit individuelle, soit collective et de 
la s6dition, des actes criminelles. D"autre part, ce meme droit constitutionel en 
validant, au moins partiellement les actes des gouvernements de fait, et le droit 
international en organisant la reconnaissance soit des insurgds bellig6rents, soit des 
gouvernements nouveaux semblent bien admettre la 16gitimit6 du recours A la force 
en vue de l'occupation des compitences gouvernementales, puisqu'ils font de cette 36 occupation un mode d'investiture au moins plausible de ces comp6tences" . 
According to him, it is impossible to prohibit insurrections Til ne garantit par des 
institutions super-dtatiques le libre jeux des constitutions et le respect de la souverainetd 
populaire 937 . In other words, only when respect for human rights 
is adhered to, can recourse 
to rebellion be prevented. 
In fact, Scelle argues that there is in every 'ordre juridique' a norm which authorizes 
resistence against tyranny. He writes: 
"Nous pensons qu'elle existe parmi celles qui sont fondamentales sans avoir besoin 38 d"etre formuldes. Elle est postul6e par 1'existence meme de tout ordre juridique" . 
It seems to me that this argument is not valid, since there is no actual local law which 
permits the overthrow of the established Government by force, also there is no evidence 
that even international instruments of human rights contemplate such a course. It is against 
the logic of State sovereignty. 
On the other hand, the argument of Scelle that 'recognition of belligerency' is an 
indication of encouragement by international law to civil war, seems to be incorrect, since 
the institution relates primarily to the application of the laws of war to the situation of civil 
wars, which have been recognized as attaining the level of belligerency. It only indirectly 
gives some very limited legal status to the insurgents, the institution also has been of rare 
occurrence. 
However, there is, in my view, clear evidence that international law although does not 
prohibit civil wars, it nevertheless does not encourage them. This is due to the fact that 
international law essentially favours the status quo, not change, within States. The insistence 
that States are absolutely prohibited from giving aid and assistance to insurgents is a part 
of the answer. 
Rougier in fact maintains that: 
"... [A] son d6but la guerre vile est toujours ill6gale, merne quand elle parait bien 
motivde et 16gitime en fait 9 
He then gave the legal rational behind such an assertion. He writes: 
36G. Scette: La guerre civiLe Espagnote et te droit de gens. 45 RGDIP, 1938, p. 267. 
37 lbid, p. 270. 
381bid, 
p. 267. 
39 Op. cft., supra. n. 6, p. 25. 
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"Non seulement elle West pas 1'exercise dun droit, mais elle viole les droits de I'Etat 
attaqu6, auquel les insurg6s 6taient unis soit individuellement, soit collectivement par 
un lien d'alldgiance, une promesse de respect et d'obeissance"40. 
Rougier then arrives at an opposite conclusion from that of Scelle. In fact, he denies the 
existence of a right to revolt, and implicitly thinks that civil war is forbidden because it 
violates the rights of States. 
Pinto maintains that: 
"Si le droit international ne condamne pas la guerre civile, il ne 1'encourage pas 
I'autorit6 exclusive du gouvernement 16gal- qui maintaint lordre public sur le 
territoire nationale doit etre respect6e par les Etats tiers". 41 
It seems to me that this is a correct statement since it goes with the logic of sovereignty and 
non- intervention. This logic in fact, stands against any pretended claim that international 
law supports and encourages the ousting of established Governments by the use of force. 
The UN Charter, although not prohibiting civil wars, gives no evidence that it encourages 
them. Shaw rightly observes: 
"The United Nations Charter neither confirms nor denies a right of rebellion. It is 
neutral"42. 
In my view, the UN practice largely supports this contention. Thus, whenever States facing 
civil wars contend that third States were behind their troubles, the typical reaction of the 
UN is to insist on non- interference, however, without pronouncing any view as to the 
legitimacy of such conflicts. Also States accused of such interferences always deny such 
allegations, which implicitly means that they accept that international law and the UN 
Charter do not encourage civil wars. 
In this context, in 1958, Lebanon brought a complaint before the UNSC in respect of the 
intervention of the United Arab Republic in its civil war. The latter rejected categorically 
any such intervention. The USSR during the discussion considered that: 
"The settlement of questions regarding the Lebanese Government was the inalienable 
right of the Lebanese people and so no other Government had any right to 
intervene "43 
Implicitly then, international law has no relevance in these conflicts. The UNSC, however, 
decided to dispatch an observer group to 'ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of 
personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese borderS, 44 which means 
that the Council supports the contention that civil wars must not be encouraged, because 
40 Ibid. 
41 op. cit., supra. n. 32, pp. 479-80. 
42 op. cit., supra. chapter 1, n. 148, p. 555. 
43 UNY, 1958, p. 37. 
44 Ibid, p. 37. 
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they will eventually endanger peace and security which the UN seeks to guard. 
The UNGA on its third Emergency session devoted to the situation in Lebanon, adopted 
unanimously a resolution which states: 
" 1. Welcomes [the UNGA] the renewed assurances given by the Arab States to observe 
the provisions of Article 8 of the part of the League of Arab States that each member 
State shall respect the systems of Government established in other member States and 
regards them as exclusive concerns of these States, and that each shall pledge to "45 abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of Government. 
Implicitly the UN does not see any role for itself in such situations. Thus, change or status 
quo, the situation must remain within the exclusive competence of the State. 
Similarly, in the case of the invasion of Cuba, in 1960, by counter revolutionaries, Cuba 
accused the US of aggression. The US representative in the UN stressed that: 
"If the Castro regime is overthrown, it will be overthrown by Cubans, not by the 
Americans"46 . 
This means that the US believes that the change of Government even by force is not a 
matter of concern to international law. In fact, the UNGA did not produce any view as to 
the matter of changing Governments by force, it adopted a resolution which merely notes 
that the UN members should take 'such peaceful actions as open to them to remove 
tensions'47. In other words, the main concern of the UN is to keep peace and security and 
not the promotion and encouragement of civil wars, which may very well endanger such 
peace. 
However, the practice of the organization establishes one very important exception; in 
regard to colonial situations and peoples under foreign domination and racist regimes. The 
UNGA especially- has established their Tight to rebel in order to exercise their right to self- 
determination, and also their right to receive external support. In this respect, the Friendly 
Relations Declaration 2625 (XXV) provides: 
"Every State has the duty to refrain from any forceable action which deprives people 
referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self- 
determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance 
to such forcible action, in the pursuit of the exercise of their right to self- 
determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance 
with the purposes as principles of the UN Charter "48 . 
In later resolutions adopted by the UNGA, the matter became very clear, armed struggle 
is mentioned explicitly as a means of achieving self-determination. Thus, Resolution 3070 
(XXVIII) stated that: 
"2. Also reaffirms the legitimacy of the peoples' struggle for liberation from colonial 
45 Ibid. 
46 Keesing's. 1961, p. 18155. 
471bid. 
48DIonovich (ed. ), op. cit., supra. chapter 1, n. 79, Vot. 13, p. 340. 
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and for' iF domination and alien subjugation by all available means, including armed 
struggleý 
Therefore, apart from these defined situations, the UN Charter does not in any way 
encourage civil wars. 
The conclusion is that international law in general, old and new, does not in any way 
encourage civil wars, although it does not prohibit them. It treats them as exclusive matters 
of domestic concern, any other course will not be favoured by States, it will be against their 
sovereignty. 
In my opinion, this is the best solution, since it is well known that international law does 
not favour any specific method of Government above another. This is confirmed by the 
insistence upon non -intervention. Any other course would open the way for open-ended 
policies of interventions, especially in our contemporary world, where two opposing 
ideologies are espoused by two powerful blocks and each favours a particular method of 
running society. In this context, any argument in favour of the claim that international law 
encourages civil wars, will in practice be in favour of the powerful not the weak. 
SECTION III: Definition of Civil Wars In Traditional International Law 
This section deals with the question of definition of civil wars in the pre-Conventional 
phase of 1949, in other words, the definitions of such conflicts in customary international 
law. The aim of this section is to find out how civil wars were defined in that period, and 
whether the concepts of sovereignty and non- intervention have played any role in that 
process. 
In my view, the customary attitude towards the question of definition can be sought for 
in two important sources. Firstly, in the opinions of classical international lawyers such as 
Grotius and especially Vattel. Their opinions, it must be conceded, have influenced 
subsequent developments in various fields of international law. 
Secondly, it seems that the institutions of recognition of insurgency and belligerency, were 
real attempts in customary international law to deal with the phenomenon of civil wars. 
The conditions of their applications, constitute important indices of the definition of civil 
wars in that law (customary international law). 
Moreover, the Lieber Code, even if it is an internal instrument, contains a definition of 
civil wars, and thus shed some light on what States understood by civil war. Furthermore, 
many domestic cases also refer to such definition. 
A. Classical Writers and the Definition of Civil Wars 
Under this heading, I will concentrate on two opinions of two important writers-of classical 
international, namely Grotius and Vattel. The reason for such a choice resides in the fact 
that their approaches to the question of civil wars differs widely. Grotius is more concerned 
with the rather philosophical question of whether the population has the right to rebel 
against their sovereign, rather than the question of actual definitions of such wars. 
49 Ibid, Vot. 14, p. 448. See also Resolution 3032 (XXVI), fbid, p. 353, also Resolution 3103, ! bid, 
P. 512. 
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On the other hand, Vattel is more positive, he addresses the issue of definition directly 
and he argued for the first time in the history of international law that whenever the 
elements of such definition are present in the internal conflict, the whole body of laws of 
war must be applied. 
1. Grotius's Opinion 
Grotius argued for the maintenance of the status quo, he is in principle against the right 
to rebel, since the advantages of the former are far better than the latter. He quotes with 
approval Favonius who 'used to say civil war is worse than evil'50 and also Cicero who 
'declared that peace on any terms between citizens seems more advantageous than civil 
war'51. This position of principle, prevented him from making a detailed study of the 
characteristics of civil wars, the difference between them and other forms of violence, 
which may take place within the borders of the State. Most important, he avoided the 
fundamental question of whether the laws of war apply to such conflicts. 
According to him, civil wars, which he labels as 'rebellion' are, as a general rule, not 
permitted by the law of nature. His reason is that: 
"By nature all men have the right of resisting in order to ward off injury, as we have 
said above, but as civil society was instituted in order to maintain public tranquillity 
the State forthwith acquires over us and our possessions a greater right to the extent 
necessary to accomplish this end"52. 
He then adds that: 
"The state therefore, in the interest of public peace and order can limit that common 
right of resistence-that such was the purpose of the state we cannot doubt since it 
could not in any other way achieve its end. If in fact, the right of resistence shogld 
remain without restraint there will no longer be a state but only a non-social hold " 3. 
Consequently, according to him, the State as a form of the organization of the society, is 
better than the State of nature, so in order to make the machine of the State work 
effectively the right of resistence must be taken away. It is clear that he has a Hobsian point 
of view of the situation in the primitive state of nature, where only the strong survives. 
As a result, it seems that he maintains that any pretended right of resistence, will result 
in a turbulent state of affairs, which nobody wishes to experience. Submission to the will 
of a tyrant is 'remedy against the dangers of lawlessness'. However, Grotius allowed the 
right of resistence in very restricted cases 54 . 
50 H. Grotius: De Jura Belli Ac Pacfs Libri Tres. J. Brown Scot (ed. ), Vot. 2, Clarendon Press Oxford, 





54 Grotius allowed resisting the sovereign in the following cases: 
A. The right to make war may be conceded against him who has the chief authority among free people. 
B. The right to make war may be conceded against a king who has abdicated the sovereign power. 
C. The right to make war may be conceded against a king who abdicates his kingdom, but only so far 
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The conclusion is that in general, Grotius seems to see resort to rebellion against the 
sovereign as unjust, obedience is better than revolution, the latter will weaken the sovereign 
power and leads to anarchy. To me, Grotius sees sovereignty as basically a good thing, since 
it brings peace and stability. 
2. Vattel's View 
Vattel's opinion is very interesting. He is the first classical writer who attempted a serious 
study of the phenomenon of civil wars. He explained what civil wars are, he also argued 
for the application of the laws and customs of war to such conflicts, in this he is innovative. 
He distinguishes between different forms of violence, which may take place in the State. 
He. in fact, reserves "civil war' for the most extreme form of such events. He writes: 
"Custom applies the name of civil war to every war between the members of the same 
political society, if the war is between a body of the citizens on one hand and the 55 sovereign with those loyal to him on the other" 
According to him, civil war is a contest between he, who holds power, and a body of 
citizens, or between two claimants to the same throne. He then develops the idea that civil 
wars are of such intensity that in fact they divide the nation into two distinct nations. He 
indicates that: 
"... [C]ivil war breaks the bonds of society and of government or at least suspends the force and effect of them; it gives rise within the nation to two independent parties 
who regard each other as enemies and acknowledge no common judge of necessity, 
therefore, these two parties must be regarded as forming thenceforth for a time at least, two separate bodies politically, two distinct nations. "56 
Implicitly then, the rift between the sovereign and his opponents must be very deep, that 
no reconciliation is possible. In these circumstances, then the conflict must be of a very 
high intensity and must not be confined to only a part of the country. The forces used must 
presumably be of near of equal strength. 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that Vattel did not pay any attention to the justice of 
cause of the civil war, he is concerned with the factual situation only. It is the latter which 
reveals whether civil war is present. The justice of the cause for which the people resort 
to rebellion is irrelevant. 
as to prevent the transfer. 
D. The right to make war may be concede against a king who has Lost his kingdom in consequence of a 
commissory taw. 
E. The right to make war may be conceded against a king who openly shows himself the enemy of the 
people. 
F. The right to make war may be conceded against a king who, possing only a part of the sovereign 
power, seeks to possess himself of the part that does not belong to him. 
G. The right to make war is conceded against a king In case liberty to offer resistence has in certain 
cases been reserved. 
H. Resistence by force may be used against a usurper by virtue of a right of war still continuing. 
1. Resistence by force may be used against a usurper of a mandate of one possessing power (ibid, 
pp. 156-161). 
55op. 
cit., supra. n. 9, p. 338. 
56 Ibid. 
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This position of principle in my opinion, constitutes the legal rational behind Vattel's 
revolutionary view that the laws and customs of war should be applied to civil war, 57 in 
other words it is the factual situation in a given country torn by civil war and not the 
justice of the context which determines the application of the laws of war. 
In fact, his non-interest in the notion of just war at the international level, has been 
extended to civil wars. Thus, practical problems needed a practical solutions and not 
philosophical conceptual izat ion. 
But, the important question is; how to reconcile Vattel's views on civil wars, with the 
concepts of sovereignty and non- intervention, both of which he supports. It seems to me 
that in Vattel's view sovereignty and non- intervention are the pillars of international law 
and international relations. However, the sovereign, in order to claim the benefit of such 
principles must be in control of situation within his State. 
Thus, whenever he loses such effective control, he can no longer prevent other States 
from aiding the insurgents. In fact, Vattel gave States the right to choose whether to 
intervene or not in a civil war, and also the right to decide which side will receive their 
help. In doing so, they are not infringing any rule of international law. In this way, 
sovereignty and non-intervention are intimately linked to effectivity and not to legitimacy. 
This advanced position, has implicitly gained certain success in customary international 
law, in my view the concept of recognition of belligerency attests to that effect. Since in 
order to apply the laws of war, the internal conflict must attain certain degree of intensity, 
duration and discipline, which in practice means that the nation has been divided into two 
separate States. This is not far from Vattel's view. 
Apart from this case, Vattel's views have never gained a wide acceptance in the practice 
of States. Thus, the proposal of the ICRC to apply all the provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 to internal conflicts, was not successful as I will show in the section 
dealing with common Article 3. Protocol II of 1977 also has not changed that attitude. 
B. Definition of Civil Wars and Recognition of Belligerency and Insurgency 
There is no international instrument which defines civil war. in customary international law. 
The only international instrument dealing with that subject (civil wars), the Havana Treaty 
of 1928 contains no definition. 
However, elements of such definition can be found in the Lieber Code, which is a 
national instrument, also in some cases brought before national courts, and especially in the 
concepts of recognition of insurgency and belligerency, which were in essence the legal 
response of customary international law, to different problems raised by civil wars such as 
intervention, international responsibility for damages to foreign persons and properties in 
such conflict, and also the question of application of the laws of war to internal conflicts. 
Before analyzing the definitions contained in those instruments, it is interesting to note 
that civil wars, which were the concern of customary international law, were those which 
occur in 'civilized nations'. 'Savage' and 'semi-savage peoples' were not recognized either 
as international belligerents (as States) or as belligerent in the meaning of the recognition 
57 Ibid. For a futL quotation, see infra chapter 4, n. 89 and accompanying comments. 
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of belligerency (that is as insurgents in a civil war). As a result, they were completely 
banned from benefitting from the laws and customs of war. 
In this context, in 1927 a Captain in the US Army observed that: 
"... [W]hen combatants and non-combatants are practically identical among a people, 
and savage or semi-savage peoples take advantage of this identity to effect ruses, 
surprises, and massacres on the 'regular' enemies, commanders must attack their 
problems in entirely different ways from those in which they proceed against western 
peoples"58 . 
In practice, this meant that there is no room for the application of the laws of war in such 
conflicts whatever their intensity, magnitude or duration, which means that no quarter is 
given even to children and women. Since the western armies have at their disposal 
superiority in fire power and military tactics, those wars were practically genocide. 
Similarly, a Colonel in the British Army wrote: 
*In small wars against uncivilized nations, the form of warfare to be adopted must 
tone with the shade of culture existing in the land, by which I mean that against 59 peoples possessing a low civilization, war must be more brutal in type" 
The British Manual of Military Law of 1914 states: 
"It must be emphasised that the rules of international law apply to warfare between 
civilized nations, where both parties understand them and one is prepared to carry 
them out. They do not apply in wars with uncivilized States and tribes, where their 
place is taken by the discretion of the commander and such rules of justice and humanity as recommended themselves in the particular circumstances of the case"60 . 
'Savages' were then seen as incapable of attaining the status of a lawful belligerent, wars 
with them were neither international nor civil wars. They were of a special nature, since 
military necessity overrode any concern for humanity. 
In my view, these past attitudes are responsible in a large part, for the present Third 
World lack of faith in and suspicion of European humanitarianism. They prefer to cling 
to their sovereignty rather than believe the European cry for humanity. 
Turning now to the definition of proper civil wars, those which take place in Europe and 
the Americas, I will begin with the Lieber Code, which is a national instrument, however, 
it reveals what an important State like the US understands to be civil war. 
1. The Lieber Code 
The code stipulates in its Article 150 that: 
"Civil war is war between two or more portions of a country or state, each contending 
for the mastery of the whole and each claiming to be the legitimate government. 
The term is also sometimes applied to war of rebellion when the rebellious provinces 
or portion of the State are contiguous to those containing the seat of government"61 . 
58G. L. Bridge-Cotby: How to Fight Savage Tribes. 21 AJIL. 1927, p. 279. 
59J. F. C. Futter. cited by Bridge-Coiby. Ibid, p. 280. 
60 Ibid. 
61Schindter 
and Toman (eds. ), op. c1t., supra. chapter 2, n. 63, p. 21. 
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This definition in fact, stresses the objectives of civil wars. They are either the taking of 
the political authority in the State, or secession. However, the definition does not define 
with precision the factual criteria of the conflict. Although, it must be admitted that the 
definition characterises the contest as 'war'. This implies that the confrontation must be of 
high intensity, as in the war between States. But, there is no indication on whether the 
laws of war apply in such conflicts. 
It must be noted that in 1862 (before the adoption of the Lieber Code) the US Supreme 
Court in the Prize Cases, had an opportunity to make an important statement concerning 
the meaning and scope of civil war. It stressed that the parties to 'war' are not exclusively 
independent states. It held: 
"... [I]t is not necessary to constitute war, that both parties should be acknowledged 
as independent nations or sovereign states o, 62 . 
Then it added: 
"A civil war is never solemnly declared; it becomes such by its accidents-the number, 
power, and organization of the persons who originate and carry it on. When the party in rebellion occupy in a hostile manner a certain portion of territory-, have declared 
their independence; have commenced hostilities against their former sovereign. The 
world acknowledges them as belligerents and the contest a war"63. 
In the opinion of the US Supreme Court, it seems that the actual existence of a civil war 
is a matter of fact, that is when the political bound is broken and the confrontation 
resembles war between States in its intensity duration, organization and occupation by the 
insurgents of a substantial party of the national territory, the civil war erupts. The influence 
of Vattel is very clear, the Court in fact, had quote him extensively. It is factual effectivity 
which makes the contest civil war. 
However, the Court noted that the insurgents: 
"... [C]Iaim to be in arms to establish their liberty and independence, in order to become a sovereign state, while the sovereign party treats them as insurgents and 
rebels who owe allegiance, and who should be punished with death for their 
treason "64 . 
In other words, even when the strong factual elements of the civil war are present, there 
is nothing to prevent the established Government from applying its penal laws against its 
opponents. Sovereignty even in such circumstances still plays a very important role by 
giving full backing to all the actions of the established Government. 
Similarly, when under Diab v. Attorney-General, the Israeli Supreme Court had an 
occasion to define civil war. It stated: 
"... We find that civil war is a war of the citizen against the State, or of citizen against 
citizen, for the purpose of obtaining power in the whole state or in part of it. The 
62 F. Deak (cottected and ed. by): American International, Law Cases 1783-1968. Vot. 17, Oceana Pub., 
Inc/Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1977, p. 382. 
631bid, 
pp. 382-3. 
64 lbid, p. 3a3. 
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emphasises is on the word 'citizen. That is to say, civil war always implies an armed 
struggle by a group of citizens against the established order or in order to obtain 
power over its own State, and not a war against another state trying to impose its will 
over the territory and the citizens of that state, that is to say, a foreign country. This 
is the legal meaning of the word, and it is also its nominal and natural meaning for 
the general public and for historians "65 . 
The Court emphasised that this definition is a summary of customary definitions of civil 
war found especially in the jurisprudence of the US courts. It must be noted that there is 
nothing in the definition which indicates, that civil wars are seen other than internal 
matters, the relevance of international law is not mentioned, sovereignty still holds the 
balance. 
2. The Recognition of Insurgency and Belligerency and their Impact on the Definition of 
Civil Wars 
Customary international law has as a matter of principle considered civil wars, as matters 
falling inside the domestic jurisdiction of the State. This stand is consistent with the basic 
aim of that law, namely respect for the sovereignty of the State and non- intervention in its 
internal affairs even when the Government in power is challenged by a portion of its 
population. However, in the 19th century, the situation began to change, civil wars could 
become of interest to international law, when the recognition of belligerency is granted. 
Thus, according to Zorgbib: 
"le message de Vattel semble au XlXeme si6cle, en voie de se couler dans le droit 
positif, il prend forme dans Vinstitution dite de la reconnaissance de belligdrence, 
c'est-ý-dire dans I'assimilation des insurg6s i des bellig6rents r6guliers par le 
gouvernement dtabli"66. 
The influence of Vattel is important in the emergence in positive law of the recognition of 
belligerency. Rougier supports this line of thinking, he stresses: 
"... [C]ette assimilation de la guerre civile A la guerre itrang6re, demand6e par Vattel, 
est ce que l'on nomme aujourd'hui la'reconnaiyance des insurg6s comme belligdrants' 
ou encore la reconnaissance de belligdrence"6 . 
It must be stressed that the institutions of insurgency and belligerency do not apply to every 
civil war, certain conditions of fact and law, must exist before their legal effects come into 
operation. This state of affairs, necessitates, in my view, a thorough identification of the 
criteria of civil wars to which those institutions apply. 
This process of definition and clarification, would in my opinion, reveal the kind of civil 
war to which States may concede certain of their sovereign privileges and accept certain 
limitations of their sovereignty. 
65 Diab v. Attorney General, Israeti Supreme Court sitting as Court of Criminat Appeats, Dec 2nd, 1952. 
Sir H. Lauterpacht (ed. ): ILR, 1952. Butterworth & Co., Ltd., London, 1957, p. 552. 
66Zorgbib, 
op. cit., supra. chapter 2, n. 66, p. 37. 
670P. 
cit., supra. n. 6, p. 196. 
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2.1. Recognition of Insurgency 
It seems that the status of recognition of insurgency, has less legal significance than the 
status of the recognition of belligerency in customary international law, it is in the words 
of Visscher 
"... [M]ore limited in its effects, and still more elusive in its criteria than the 
recognition of belligerency, it is adjusted to a situation of fact and modelled on the 
course of events "68 . 
However, there is a general support for the view that recognition of insurgency is 
necessitated by the existence of an internal conflict. Thus, the Assistant Legal Advisor to 
the US State Department, Mr. Yingling, stressed that: 
"... [S]uch recognition [of insurgeng] is an acknowledgement by a foreign State of the 
fact that a political revolt eXiStS. "6 
Also, the recognition of insurgency has often been the first official notice that third States 
have taken of the eventual possible success of the insurrection. 
The implication is that recognition of insurgency admits to the existence an insurgent 
forces which challenges the legal Government. They occupy a part of the territory, and 
exercise effective control over the persons and properties within that area, including foreign 
persons and properties, and have a quasi-political organization which may deal with foreign 
States. 
Moreover, whenever the recognition of insurgency has been granted by foreign States, the 
reasons behind such moves were essentially to regulate the political and economic 
intercourse with the insurgents, also such recognition signals that foreign States do not 
intend to treat the rebels as mere law breakers. Higgins stated rightly that: 
"The recognition of insurgency whether implied or express, is an indication that the 
recognizin q State regards the insurgents as legal contestants and not mere law breakers"7 . 
However, it seems that the internal conflict, in the eyes of the established Government, 
always remains an internal matter, even when the recognition of insurgency has been 
granted by foreign States. An eminent scholar on the subject, Padleford argued: 
"Admission of insurgency does not alter the legal status of the insurgents within their 
own states. They remain as previously, engaged in an unlawful attempt to overthrow 
the established government. "71 
68 Ch. De Visscher: Theory and Reality of International Law. Rev. ed. Translated from French by P. E. 
Corbett. PUP, Princeton, New Jersey, 1968, p. 245. 
69 Whiteman, op. cit., supra. chapter 1, n. 8, Vot. 2, (1963), p. 486. 
70 OP. cit., supra. n. 1, p. 88. 
71 N. J. Padetford: International andDfptomacy in the Spanish Civil War. MacMillan Co., NewYork, 1939, 
p. 196. 
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This means that the legal Government, can claim its full sovereignty in suppressing the 
insurgents, customary international law does not limit its sovereignty in any way. 
Lauterpacht remarks that: 
"... [W]ith regards to the acts of the insurgents on land when such acts do not cause 
injury to foreign States or their subjects but merely manifestations of a revolt against 
the constituted authority, outside States have no reason to express an opinion or to 
adopt an attitude". 72 
In other words, in cases of insurgency the Government is not obliged to respect the laws of 
war in its relation with the insurgents. They are mere criminals, who would be treated 
according to penal laws. 
In State practice, it is considered that the institution was used especially in the practice 
of the US vis-A-vis the Cuban revolt against Spanish rule in the late 19th Century. The US 
did not recognize the revolt as an international war, because of the lack of elements which 
are requisite to constitute such a war, however, it recognized the existence of an 
insurrectionary State of affairs to which the laws of neutrality must apply. 
On June 12th, 1895 a formal proclamation issued by the president, informed the American 
people that Cuba was: 
"The seat of serious civil disturbances accompanied by armed resistence to the 
authority of the established government of Spain a power with which the US are and desire to remain on terms of peace and amity"tý 
The Proclamation prohibited American citizens from taking part in those hostilities in 
whatever form. These pronouncements enabled American courts to acknowledge a 
difference between insurgency and belligerency. 
Thus, in the Three Friends Case, the US Supreme Court stated: 
"The distinction between recognition of belligerency and recognition of a condition 
of political revolt, between recognition of the existence of a war in a material sense 
and of war in a legal sense, is sharply illustrated by the case before us. For here the 
political department has not recognized the existence of a de facto belligerent power 
engaged in hostility with Spain, but has recognized the existence of insurrectionary 
warfare, etC. "74 . 
The implication is that it is the political interests of the recognizing State and not the reality 
of civil war, in the field, which play a major part in the determination of the existence of 
the status of insurgency. 
Also, it is apparent that international law does not place any legal obligations upon the 
recognizing States, it is left to such Government to decide freely what steps they can take 
in that situation, national interests are generally the basis upon which to decide such 
questions. 
720p. 
cit., supra. n. 69, p. 489. 
73 Op. cft., supra. n. 63, Vot. 20. Oceana Pub. Inc.. Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1978, p. 296. 
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The Spanish Civil War is another case where it is speculated that the recognition of 
insurgency took place, in fact Lauterpacht observes that: 
"The Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 is an instructive example of what may be regarded 
as recognition of insurgency"75. 
However, it seems to me that a better view is that the case must be seen as an example of 
recognition of de facto Governments rather than recognition of insurgency. The acts of the 
British Governments and the jurisprudence of British courts seems to support that view. 
In a letter to the Appeal Court (dated May 28th, 1938), the Foreign Office indicated the 
position of the British Government vis-i-vis the Franco Government in these terms: 
"His Majesty's Government recognizes that nationalist Government as a Government 
which at present exercises de facto administrative control over all the Basque 
provinces of Spain, etc. "76 . 
Thus, there is no mention of insurgency. Similarly, in the Arantzazu Mendl Case, the Court 
of Appeal concentrated on the issue of whether the recognized de facto Government must 
be treated as a Government of a sovereign State. The answer was positive77 and the House 
of Lords upheld its decision, recognition of insurgency was not stressed78. 
The main conclusions concerning the status of the recognition of insurgency are: 
1. It was not a well defined legal category, with the result that the conditions of its 
existence and its legal effects are not always very clear in customary practice. 
2. It seems that the granting of the recognition does not in any way challenge the legal 
Government, since the latter still enjoys the rights of its sovereignty, among them, its right 
to suppress its opponents by all its means, without outside interference. 
3. It is political considerations, rather than legal and ethical criteria which are taken into 
account in its granting. 
2.2. Recognition of Belligerency 
Recognition of belligerency, was the institution through which customary international law 
become relevant to violent events which take place inside the State, in that sense it may be 
said that it involves a limitation upon State sovereignty. 
Rougier pointed out in 1903 that: 
"Cest I'acte [of recognition of belligerency] le plus gros de cons6quences juridiques, 
qui donne A la guerre civile une portde internationale. Aussi peut-on dire que c'est 
par cette th6orie qu' a commencd I'dtude juridique des guerres civiles"79 . 
750p. 
cit.. supra. n. 69, p. 500. 
768ritfsh Institute Studies In International. and Comparative Law: British Internatfonat Law Cases. 
Vot. 2, Stevens & Sons, London, Oceana Pub., Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1965. p. 184. 
77 Arantzazu Mendi Case, Court of Appeat, Oct. 31st-Wov. Ist, 1938, Ibid, pp. 188-197. 
78 Government of the Repubtic of Spain v. SS "Arantzazu Mendim The Arantzazu Mendi, ibid, 198-204. 
79 Op. cit., supra. n. 6, pp. 373-4. 
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In fact, recognition of belligerency makes civil war a 'war' in the legal sense, in the sense 
that it is the same as recognition of a 'state of war' between States. 
What concerns me in this context, is the question of the conditions necessary for the 
recognition of belligerency since they throw some light on what is considered civil war in 
customary international law, and by consequence in what circumstances that law can be said 
to restrict the sovereignty of the State, in dealing with its internal problems. 
2.2.1. The Conditions for the Granting of Belligerency 
President Grant in his address to the US Congress in 1869 touched directly on the 
conditions which must be present in a civil war, in order to be a 'legal war' in the sense that 
it would be treated according to international law. He declared that: 
"... [T]he question of belligerency is one of fact, not to be decided by sympathies for 
or prejudices against either party. The relations between the parent state and the insurgents must amount, in fact, to war in the sense of international law. Fighting 
though fierce and protracted does not constitute war. There must be military forces 
acting in accordance with the rules and customs of war, flags of truce, cartels, 
exchange of prisoners etc., -and to justify a recognition of belligerency there must be above all, a de facto political organization of the insurgents sufficient in character 
and resources to constitute it, if left to itself, a state among nations capable of discharging the duties of a state, and or meeting the just responsibilities it may incur 
as such towards other powers in discharge of its normal duties"80 
Accordingly, the insurgents must have in fact, the characteristics of a real State, in order 
to be considered as belligerents. The conditions of the civil war must be very hight indeed, 
which means that only a very limited number of civil wars can qualify for such conditions. 
Many eminent scholars, in the 19th century have advocated that when certain conditions 
of fact exist in internal war, belligerency must be accorded. Thus, De Martens states: 
"... [U]n parti politique qui a pris les armes contre son gouvernement ligitime ... est reconnu comme bellig6rent s'il est rdgulier6ment organisd, s'il est independant de fait et s'il respecte les lois et usages de la guerre"81. 
Bluntschli82 is of the same view together with HaII83. 
BoCited by W. L. Watker: Recognition of BetLigerency and Grant of Bettigerent Rights. 23 Transactions 
of Grotfus Society, 1937. p. 188. 
81 F. de Martens: Tralti de drolt internatfonaL. Traduit du russe par A. 1.6o, tome 111, Paris, 
Librairie Marescq AW, 1887, p. 195. 
82M. BtuntschLi wrote: 
"La notion de bettig6rence, et par suite, itapptication du drolt clu gens, en opposition avec 
le drolt p6nat, au tieu de se restreindre A deux Etats 6trangers en guerre Pun avec t8autre. 
6tL' 6tenclue A une partle fnt6grante de ta poputation d'un Etat qui: : 
Est de fait, organiske coam force mititaire. 
b: Observe dans ta conduite des hostitit6s tes tois cle ta guerre. 
c. Croit de bonne fof tutter au tieu et ptace de tlEtat pour defendre son drolt pubticle 
opinion fmpartiate sur ta question de t'Alabama. I RDILC, 1870, p. 157. 
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In recent times, it is Lauterpacht who advocated such course, he maintains when certain 
conditions of fact exist recognition of belligerency must be accorded: These conditions are: 
1. There must exist within the State an armed conflict of a general character. 
2. The insurgents must occupy and administer a substantial portion of national territory. 
3. They must conduct the hostilities in accordance with the rules of war and through 
organized armed forces acting under a responsible authority. 
4. There must exist circumstances which make it necessary for outside States to define 
their attitude by means of the recognition of belligerency"84. He then adds: 
"... [R]ecognition of belligerency is in essence a declaration ascertaining the existence 
of these conditionS"85. 
This view in fact, is in accordance with Lauterpacht's general theoretical position vis-i- 
vis recognition, he thinks that recognition is a strictly legal institution, which must be 
declared whenever, the factual conditions as required by law are present. 
To me, these assertions are not wholly true, recognition in general and especially that of 
belligerency has never been a purely legal institution, political interests are the real factors 
behind its granting. 
In my view, there is a strong evidence to the fact that recognition of belligerency or its 
withholding, were animated by political rather than legal considerations. The logic of the 
system of international law, which is based on sovereign States favours such an approach. 
States want to keep their freedom of recognition, since it is in their view a political game 
rather than a legal act. 
In this respect, the insurgents in Chile in 189486, were not recognized as belligerents, 
despite the fact that they fulfilled the criteria laid down by Calvo and Bluntschli, also the 
US refused to recognize the insurgents in Columbia in 1885, Haiti in 1889 and Brazil in 
189387, likewise, Britain recognized the Greek insurgency in 1825 that is after full four 
83Matt 
stated: 
"As soon as. it is said, that a considerable population is arrayed in arms with the professed 
object of attaining political ends, it resembles a State too nearly for it to be possible to 
treat individuals belonging to such population as criminals, it would be inhuman for the enemy 
to execute his prisoners, it would be still more inhuman for foreign States to capture and hang 
the crews of warships as pirates, humanity demands that members of such communities be treated 
as belligerents, and if so there must be a point at which they have the right to demand what 
confessedly must be granted to them". 
W. E. Hatt: A Treatise on International Law. (Sir) A. P. Higgins, (ed. ), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1924, 
pp. 37-38. 
84H. Lauterpacht: Recognition in International Law. CUB, London, 1947, p. 176. 
851bid. 
86 Op. cit., supra. n. 6, p. 214. 
87See E. H. Riedel: Recognition of Belligerency: In Bernhardt (ed. ): Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. Instalment 4,1982, North Holland Pub. Co., p. 169. 
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years from the uprising, in which the insurgents fulfilled the condition of real insurgents8a. 
Similarly, the US recognized the belligerency of the insurgent forces in Canada on January 
5th, 1838, although they did not satisfy any real conditions of a real civil war. 
89 
Writing in 1895, Beale summarised the position of the US vis-i-vis recognition of 
belligerency as follows: 
"In the first place, we have not recognized belligerency prematurely ... We never 
recognized the belligerency of Greece, because the civil war in that country did not 
inconvenience us at all, or call for our interference. We recognized civil war in 
Canada when our own soil was invaded; and we recognized the belligerency of 
Spanish America, eight years after it was a fact, when our ocean commerce became 
involved in the contest, which was largely naval"90. 
This means that recognition of belligerency depended in the final analysis on subjective 
criteria, rather than legal considerations. 
Recognition of belligerency, is then always discritionary, the established Government 
especially is not legally obliged to grant such recognition and by the same token it is not 
bound to take into account any recognition granted by third States, the rebels can be treated 
as criminals. Thus, it is not the British Government recognition of the belligerency of the 
Southern States in the American civil war, which obliged the US Government to treat the 
insurgents as belligerents, but it was the recognition of the US Congress on July 4th, 1861 
of the existence of a state of war against the II States of the South, which had that effect 
91. 
This is, in my view, the natural consequence of State sovereignty as understood by 
international law in that era. Under the latter the State has overall jurisdiction over its 
territory and citizens, its relation to its citizens is an internal matter, in the absence of a 
clear legal obligation, no State can intervene and dictate the kind of treatment to be given 
to its citizens by their States. The concept of human rights was not yet born. 
To sum up, classical international law gave the full priority to the sovereignty of the State 
and non- intervention in its internal affairs, the rule is that when the basic units of that 
system (the States) are faced with internal upheavals, they have the full protection of the 
law to deal with the situation. 
In my view, this is implicit in the fact that even when the internal conflict is serious (in 
terms of its intensity, duration, effective control of a certain portion of the national 
territory, and the existence of a political organization of the insurgents), there is nothing 
which obliges the recognition of belligerency of the insurgents especially on the part of the 
established Government. 
On the other hand, it must be noted that the institution (of the recognition of 
belligerency) has to some extent clarified the criteria of civil wars to which international 
88 See J. H. Beate, Jr.: The Recognition of Cuban Beltigerency. 9 HLR, 1895-96, p. 412. 
89 lbid, p. 409-10. 
901bid, 
p. 416. 
9'See for a detalt discussion of this very point Zorgbib, op. cit., supra. n. 66, pp. 40-42. 
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law may become relevant, and consequently it has made civil war not a term of art, but in 
the words of De Lupis 'it could be possibly defined as the traditional type of conflict when 
92 insurgents have been 'recognized' as belligerent. 
In other words, recognition of belligerency has afforded the legal framework for the 
definition of civil wars in customary international law since it set out certain conditions, 
which States can take into account, if they want to acknowledge the belligerency of the 
insurgents. 
It seems to me that the notions of sovereignty and non intervention, were against the 
spirit of such an institution, mainly because it involves restrictions on the discretion of 
States to deal with their enemies and it may give some legitimacy to the struggle of their 
opponents. 
The institution (of recognition of belligerency) in my view has tried to bring the notion 
of objectivity into the realm of international law. But, in a decentralized system of 
international relations such an attempt was bound to conflict with the principles of 
sovereignty and no n- intervention, since objectivity cannot be applied without the existence 
of an objective central agency, which is above the States, and has the power to take binding 
decisions. 
In its absence (which is in itself a manifestation of the preference by States of sovereignty 
and non- intervention) the possibility that especially third States might be guided by political 
and economic considerations in their decision to grant recognition of belligerency rather 
than objective legal criteria remains open. This fact raises the possibility of the breach of 
sovereignty and interference in the internal affairs of States faced with civil wars. 
It is my view, that the notions of sovereignty and non -intervention, were in the first place 
responsible for the rare occurrence of recognition of belligerency in the practice of States 
in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, despite the frequency of civil wars, 
because the established Governments prefer to conduct their war in accordance with their 
discretion and not according to the laws of war, the latter will tie their hands in dealing 
with the insurgents and gives them legitimacy and signals that the established Government 
is not in control of the situation. 
Moreover, sovereignty and non -intervention were among the causes of the obsolescence 
of the recognition of belligerency. Thus, Cassese rightly states that such obsolescence is: 
"... [M]ainly due to the desire of the Government involved in civil commotions to wipe 
out rebellion as soon as possible, as well as to the interest of third States in either 
holding aloof or meddling de facto in the conflict without, however, going to the 
length of granting insurgents international legitimisation"93 . 
In other words, the obsolescence of the institution meant that States retained all their 
sovereign rights to quell the insurgents without any restrictions whatsoever, and third States 
wanted not to be seen as intervening in the internal affairs of States dealing with civil wars, 
921. D. de Lupis: The Law of War. CUB, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 9-38. 
93 A. Cassese: InternationaL Law in a Divided WorLd. CLarendon Press, Oxford, 1986. p. 281. 
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at least formally. 
SECTION IV: Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Definition 
of an Armed Conflict of a Non- International Character 
First of all, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 opens the way for a new 
terminology concerning internal conflicts, the term 'civil war' is not found in the actual 
text of the Article, instead a new term is used: 'An armed conflicts of a non-international 
character'. 
In my view, this change of terminology goes in line with the attitude adopted after the 
second world war, which consists of abandoning the term 'war' and its substitution by the 
term 'Armed Conflict' the latter being of a broader scope, and it avoids the fruitless 
discussions about the definition of war. 
However, in the context of internal conflicts, there is no evidence that this change of 
terminology has any legal significance94. Thus, in one of the reports drawn up during the 
Diplomatic Conference of 1949, it was stated that: 
"It was clear that this [Armed conflict not of an international character] referred to 
civil war and not to a mere not or disturbances caused by band itS"95. 
It must be stressed that Common Article 3 proved to be one of the most controversial 
subjects during the Diplomatic Conference of 1949,25 meetings of the Committee charged 
with its drafting were necessary, before agreement was reached. 
The reason for such difficulty lies in the fact that Article 3 was the first instance of an 
international regulation of internal wars in an international instrument. This fact meant that 
such effort may very well involve a restriction upon State sovereignty in one area, in which 
States customarily claimed to be the masters of the situation, namely civil wars, since even 
recognition of belligerency has been always seen as of a discretionary nature, which means 
that it was not a real threat to the sovereignty of the State. Article 3 provides in part that: 
"In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the high contracting parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, etc. " 
94 Thus, J. A. C. Gutteridge points out that: 
"An entirety new conception which has been introduced into the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is 
that the parties to each convention undertake certain obtigations in respect not of an 
internationat war but of 'a confLict not of an internationat character' occurfng in the 
territory of one of the high contracting parties which must mean a civil war". 
Thus, according to her, the change of terminology has not introduced any new legal dimension to 
internal war. (The Geneva Conventions of 1949.24 BYIL, 1949, p. 300. For a discussion on the concept 
of armed conflict, see K. J. Partch: Armed Conflict, in Bernhardt (ed. ), op. cit.. supra. n. 87, 
Instalment 3,1982, pp. 25-28. 
95 Report drawn up by the Joint Committee and presented to the Plenary Assembly, Final Records of the 
Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. 2, Section B, Federal Political Dept. 2950 Berne, p. 129. 
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The text of the Article then did not define what is meant by 'Armed conflict not of an 
international character' and did not indicate what is the authority competent to determine 
the existence of such a conflict. This section tries to elucidate the meaning of an armed 
conflict not of an international character, through a thorough study of the travaux 
pr6paratolres of the Diplomatic conference of 1949. It tries to expose fully the role of 
sovereignty and non-intervention, in influencing the question of the delimitation of the 
scope of Article 3. 
Recourse to subsequent practice, will show in which actual situations of internal disorders 
Article 3 had been seen by States as relevant, and whether sovereignty and non- intervention 
have played any role in that process. 
A. Travaux Prkparatolres and Definition of Armed Conflict not of an International 
Character, the Role of Sovereignty of Non-Intervention In that Process 
The traumatic effects of the second world war signalled the urgent need to revise the 
Geneva Conventions. In the context of internal conflicts, the absence of any regulation of 
those conflicts, coupled with the atrocities of the Spanish civil war and the movement 
towards the protection of human rights within the UN. All these factors have led the ICRC, 
to include a common Article in its proposed Geneva Conventions, which were submitted 
to the Diplomatic Conference of 1949. Common draft Article 2/4 stipulates: 
"In all cases of armed conflict not of an international character which may occur in 
the territory of one or more of the high contracting parties, each of the parties to 
the conflict shall be bound to implement the provisions of the present convention, 
subject to the adverse party likewise acting in obedience thereto"96. 
This draft article was approved at the 17th Conference of the ICRC. The Article in fact 
does not precisley define the kinds of internal conflict to which it is supposed to apply, in 
other words no definition is provided, and in the same time it envisages the application In 
toto of the draft conventions to internal conflicts, however, on the basis of reciprocity. 
This stand of the ICRC seemed to be ahead of its times, it in fact ignored that States are 
still very sensitive to any efforts at limiting their sovereign rights to deal with the situation 
of internal conflicts without any international interference. 
The first discussions, which were of a general character revealed that a considerable 
divergence of opinion exist between States. Three main positions can be detected from 
those primary discussions. The first group was composed of Socialist States Norway, 
Denmark and Mexico. These States favoured the ICRC approach, in regulating internal 
conflicts and extending all the provisions of the Convents to such conflict. 
The USSR led the attack, by rejecting the UK claim that the regulation of civil wars is 
outside the scope of international law, its representative Stated at the very first meeting of 
the joint committee that: 
"The UK delegation has alluded that colonial and civil wars were not regulated by 
96 
lbid, p. 120. 
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international law, and therefore that decisions in this respect would be out of place 
in the text of the conventions. This theory was not convincing since although the 
jurists themselves were divided on this point, some were of the view that civil war 
was regulated by international law. Since the creation of the United Nations, this 
question seemed settled. Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations provided that 
member States must ensure peace and world security. They would therefore not be 
indifferent to the cessation of hostilities, no matter the character or localization of 
the conflict. Colonial and civil wars therefore come within the purview of 
international law". 97 
Implicitly then, at least to this delegation, the developments which took place after the 
adoption of the UN Charter have made civil wars a matter of international concern, hence 
the regulation cannot be considered as an infringement of State sovereignty or an 
intervention in the internal affairs of the State faced with such conflicts. 
Hungary went even further, it regrets the inclusion of the idea of reciprocity" in the 
ICRC draft Article 2/4. This means that Hungary would like to see established 
Governments bound to apply the conventions without waiting the insurgents to do so. 
Mexico specifically stressed that humanitarian considerations should be placed above the 
rights of States", in other words, it advocates that humanitarian considerations should limit 
the sovereignty of the State. 
In my view, this position reflects the influence of the emerging idea of human rights, 
protection of human beings must not be seen as a breach of the sovereignty of the State 
or an intervention in its internal affairs. 
It seems to me that this group of States, was of the opinion that the omission of any 
definition of internal conflict in the context of draft Article 2/4 was a wise decision by the 
ICRC. This was in the interest of a wider application of the humanitarian rules to a wide 
range of internal conflicts, any mention of some factual or formal conditions as to the 
nature of the armed conflict would in practice give the established Government an 
opportunity to deny the application of the conventions simply by denying the existence of 
such conditions'00. This group of States was in the minority. 
971bid, 
p. 14. 
98Thus, the Hungarian detegate maintained that: 
U... Me was of the opinion that the essentiat aim of the conference was to extend the ffeLd 
of action of the Convention as much as possibte for the protection of the victims of confticts. 
He regretted that the StockhoLm Conference restricted the scope of the text submitted by the 
ICRC by inctuding the idea of reciprocity. He did not think there was any justification for 
the fear expressed by certain previous speakers that the convent might operate as an inducement 
Incitement to take up arms". 
lbid, p. 11. 
991bid. 
100 That was the impLication of the statement of Romania and Norway. The former stressed that: 
"Humanitarian considerations shouLd prevent the conference from introducing restrictions in 
the text, the whoLe object of which was to extend the protection of the conventions to the 
greatest possibie number of persons. m 
(lbid). The tatter put It in this way: 
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However, the important thing is that they basically saw no contradiction between 
sovereignty and international regulation. They seem to insist indirectly that the development 
in the field of human rights have placed some restrictions upon the discretion of States in 
dealing with their own citizens. 
To some authors the position of the Socialist countries, especially the USSR, which 
advocates the application of the whole body of Geneva Conventions to internal conflicts, 
is motivated by political designs rather than humanitarian concerns, Cassese argued that: 
"Ce West pas un hasard si le d6ldgu6 Sovidtique parlait toujours de, 'guerres civiles' 
et'guerres coloniales', entendant clairement par ces dernkres une cat6gorie de guerres 
civiles. Si on pense a la vision politique de l'Union Sovidtique, ý la fin des ann6es 
quarante (quand la guerre froide 6tait dans sa phase la plus aigud) il semblait dvident 
qu'une, grande protection et donc la Idgitimation internationale de ceux Qui 
combattent lors des guerres civiles et de guerres coloniales dtaient dans la ligne des 
programmes et des intentions politiques de l'Union Sovi6tique: celle ci visait A 
favoriser le, plus possible le d6mant Ilement des empires coloniaux comme la 
d6stabilisation des pays occidentaux"'O'. 
Despite this, it appears the Soviets who generaly cling to a very rigid conception of 
sovereignty and non- intervention are nevertheless, ready to admit the relevance of 
international regulation to internal conflict. 
The second position was championed in fact by only one country; Burma, a Third World 
country at the time experiencing civil war. To that State, any regulation of internal conflict 
by an international instrument was a flagrant violation of State sovereignty and an 
intervention in its internal affairs in the guise of humanitarianism. 
Burma accordingly opposed the inclusion in the Geneva Convention of any article 
concerning civil war. It argued that from its own experience it knew of foreign intervention 
its representative General Oung stressed that: 
"... [T]he proposed convention should not give legal status to insurgents who sought 
by undem cratic methods to overthrow a legally constituted Government by force I 
of . armsnlO?. 
In other words, no matter how serious, the internal conflict must be left entirely within the 
sovereignty of the State. In fact the Burmese Delegation was not only opposed to the ICRC's 
Draft Article 2/4 (for which it submitted an amendment for its deletion) but was against 
the inclusion in the Geneva Conventions of any reference to internal armed conflict in 
whatever form. In its view any such inclusion would be an encouragement to rebellions and 
"When belligerency was recognized in an internal conflict serious legal consequences were 
entailed but It was to be hoped that the conference would agree that purely humanitarian rules 
should be applied In armed conflicts independently of any recognition of belligerency". (Mid). 
In other words, absence of defunct is better for the cause of applying humanitarian rules. 
101 A. Cassese: La querre civite et te droit Internationat. 90 RGDIP, 1986, p. 564. 
102op. 
cit.. supra. n. 95. p. 15. 
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uprisings against the established Governments, hence a flagrant violation of the '... high 
principles laid down by the United Nations Organization" 
03. The reference here is 
implicitly to the principles of sovereignty and non- intervention. 
This Delegation clung to a very rigid concept of sovereignty which admits of no 
restriction, especially when it touches the relationship between the State and its own 
citizens. 
The third position was espoused by the majority of the States present at the Conference, 
most western States were supporters of this position, the USA, Britain, France, Canada, 
Australia, Spain among others. 
These States supported the principle that international regulation of internal conflicts was 
needed. However, they were opposed to the phraseology of the ICRC draft Article 2/4; the 
latter in their view would in practice lead to the unqualified application of the conventions 
to any form of disorder within the State, it would cover all forms of rebellion, insurrection, 
anarchy and brigandage. They claimed that the application of the conventions might give 
the insurgents some kind of legal status despite the express stipulation to the contrary in the 
instrument. ' 04 
The French delegate, in fact has expressed the theoretical basis by which the attempts to 
regulating internal conflicts must be guided, he stressed: 
"... [I)t was impossible to carry the protection of the individuals to the point of 
sacrificing the rights of States"105 
In other words, respect for the sovereignty of the State must be placed before humanitarian 
considerations. The American Delegate seems to express in concrete terms what the French 
delegate had in mind when he stated: 
"Every Government had a right to put dn rebellion within its borders and to 
punish the insurgents with its penal laws"' 
These attempts to protect individuals might well jeopardise the legitimate concern of the 
State, to keep law and order within its borders. 
It seems to me that this important group of States, have not attempted to characterise the 
international regulation of internal wars as an intervention in the internal affairs of States, 
they accepted in fact the relevance of international law to such conflicts. However, they 
insisted that such international regulation must proceed from the premise of placing 
sovereignty over humanitarian concerns. 
Faced with this initial objection and varying opinions, the Conference referred Article 
2/4 to a small committee (the special committee of the joint committee). The latter 
1031bid, 
p. 15. 
1041bid, p. 330. 
1051bid, pp. 101-102. 
1061bid, p. 17. 
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produced a number of amendments and proposals. They revealed that only one amendment 
proposed the deletion of Article 2/4 and also only one proposal for the retention of that 
Article as it was drafted by the ICRC. However, all other amendments stressed that if the 
conventions are to be applied to internal conflicts, the latter must have the characteristics 
of an internal war. 
In other words, the majority of amendments exposed directly the question of definition 
of internal conflicts. This means that States accept limitation of their sovereignty (in this 
context by applying humanitarian law) only when the conditions of internal conflicts are 
made fully clear. The legitimate interests of established Governments must be wholly 
protected. 
The different proposals before the Committee reveal, it seems a general pre-occupation 
by the majority of States, to include formal or factual criteria which must be met before 
the application of the conventions. 
Thus, the French thought that the insurgents must be '... organized military forces 
belonging to a responsible authority capable of respecting, or enforcing respect for the 
Convention in a given territory' 107 * This means that the Conventions would apply only 
Jn 
cases in which the insurgents have the characteristics of a real State. However, the Spanish 
proposal was less stringent, the Conventions within view would apply only when the 
established Government is obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces against the 
insurgents who are organized military and possess a portion of the national territorylos. 
For the US, the Geneva Conventions can apply in two situations. First, when the parent 
Government itself recognizes the belligerency of the insurgents, in this situation then the 
established Government accepts voluntarily to limit its sovereignty, by extending the 
application of the Convention to its opponents. 
In the absence of such recognition, the second eventuality arises, in this case according 
to the USA certain factual elements must be met by the insurgents in order to be recognized 
as belligerent and qualify for the application of the Conventions; 
These conditions are: 
1. The insurgents must have an organization purporting to have the characteristics of a 
State. 
2. The insurgent civil authority must exercise de facto authority over persons within a 
determined territory. 
3. The rebel armed force must act under the direction of an organized civil authority and 
be prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war. 
4. The insurgent civil authorities must agree to be bound by the provisions of the 
109 Conventions 
In the US view in the presence of those conditions, third States may recognize the 
1071bid, p. 10. and p. 121. 
108 lbid, p. 11. ard p. 121. 
1091bid, 
p. 12. and p. 121. 
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belligerent status of the insurgents whether or not such recognitions was accorded by the 
parent Governmentilo. 
The curious fact is that there is in reality no difference between those conditions 
advocated by the USA in 1949 and the conditions of the recognition of belligerency 
mentioned in the message of President Grant to the American Congress in 1879, which 
indicates that despite this considerable lapse of time, and the developments which took 
place after it, a country like the USA still clings to a very rigid idea of State sovereignty, 
since the latter cannot be limited easily. Canada proposed first the deletion of Draft 
Article 2/4, having failed in that attempt, it proposed a rigid test for the application of the 
Conventions to internal conflicts. It stated: 
"... [B]efore saying that a civil war was of the kind in which the Conventions should 
be applied, the test should be recognition of belligerency of the rebels by the lawful 
Government"Ili. 
This Canadian position is more stringent than that of the US. it will simply lead to the non- 
application of the conventions in many internal conflicts, since established Governments 
rarely acknowledge that their enemies are more than breakers of the local law, any other 
course of action, would give their enemies some legal status and may restrict their attempts 
to crush their opponents quickly. 
Australia, on the other hand, thought that for the internal armed conflict would quality 
for the application of the proposed Geneva Conventions as a whole, that conflict must 
satisfy certain formal and factual criteria. Thus, the conflict must be 'a full scale war, and 
when there was an organized form of Government which effectively controlled definite 
portions of the national territory and inhabitants there in"12. These are the factual 
conditions, and they are by no means easy to obtain. In addition Australia stressed that some 
formal criteria must be present in order to apply the conventions. 
1. The de Jure Government had recognized the insurgents as belligerents; or 
2. The de Jure Government had claimed for itself the right of belligerent; and 
3. The de jure Government had accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for 
the purpose only of the present conventions. 
4. That the dispute had been admitted to the agenda of the UNSC or of the UNGA of the 
113 UN, as a threat to international peace, beach of the peace of an act of aggression 
Thus, in three situations, the power of the established Government to determine the 
existence of an internal conflict is affirmed at least implicitly. However, the fourth criteria 
is interesting, here the initiative to determine the existence of the internal conflict is taken 









"The latter's [the fourth criteria] departure from the traditional discretionary nature 
of recognition and its move towards a quasi -collective legitimization of the 
qualitative nature of internal conflict would escape, as a matter of procedure, the 114 
great power veto" 
The Greek representative was more specific, he suggested the return to the notion of 
recognition of belligerency as a standard for the application of the Conventions to internal 
conflicts, but he proposed that the majority of the UNSC should be competent for the 
purpose of determining the presence of the conditions of such recognition. 
115 
This is a new approach to belligerency, since it takes into account the new development 
which took place after the second world war, especially the creation of the UN, it will be 
a good progress in international law, if serious internal conflicts are treated by the UN. Falk 
rightly notes in this respect that: 
"Belligerent status, if objectively determined by the community would enable 
supranational actors t? have a technique to justify treatment of serious internal wars 
as international war". 16 
In that case then rebellions and internal disorders would remain within the domestic 
jurisdiction of the State, whereas serious challenges may very well be internationalized in 
the sense that humanitarian law would be applicable to them if the international community 
may decide so. 
The problem with this approach is that traditions of sovereignty, and the ideological rift 
between the two great powers would stand as a barrier against any attempt at centralising 
the decisions about the existence of internal conflicts. 117 
This explains in part why the Greek proposal did not gain any support. The Soviet 
delegate in fact emphasised that the mission of the UNSC is to find a peaceful solution to 
conflicts which threatened the world security and not to determine the existence of such 
conflict and recognizing the status of belligerency to its parties. 118 
These initial amendments and proposals produced by the special committee of the joint 
committee reveal clearly that the majority of States did not in principle oppose international 
regulation of internal conflicts, which must be seen as a welcome step in the direction of 
making international law relevant to serious violent crises which arise, not only between 
114 D. A. Eider: The Historical Background of Cormion Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.11 
Case W Res. JIL, 1979, p. 45. 
115 Op. cit., supra. n. 95, p. 15. 
116 R. Fatk: Legal Order in a Violent World. PUP. Princeton, 1968, p. 122. 
117 In this respect, Falk rightly argues that: 
N... ETIraditions of sovereignty and the spLit associated with the coid war are formidabte 
obstactes to this recommended centralisation of suprationat authority over serious internaL 
wars". 
lbid, p. 122-23. 
118 Op. cit.. supra. n. 95, p. 14. 
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States, but also to those occurring within States. 
However, the majority emphasized that definition of internal conflicts is necessary, since 
the non-definition attitude adopted by the ICRC coupled with the extension of application 
of the whole Conventions to such conflict, would not be in the interests of the established 
Government since their power to deal with violent upheavals would be jeopardised because 
any insurgent group, however small, and insignificant can claim the benefits of the 
Convention hence creating legal and political embarrassment for the Government. 
Thus, through the device of definition, the majority of States raised the thresholds of 
internal conflict. They appealed to factual and formal criteria found in the customary 
institution of recognition of belligerency, and in the majority of cases left it to the 
established Government to determine the existence of internal conflicts. The rational behind 
such attempts is very clear. It is to protect the sovereignty of the State and to close any door 
to unwanted intervention in their internal affairs. 
The proposals and amendments produced by the special committee of the joint committee 
made clear that the majority of States were not in a position to accept draft Article 2/4 of 
the ICRC as it stands. Thus, the later discussions in the joint committee, led to the rejection 
of the draft Article 2/4 by 10 votes to I with I abstention. The main reason behind such 
rejection as it appears from the above mentioned Statements and amendments is that draft 
Article 2/4 was too wide in scope, which means that it covered situations which States 
considered as matters within their domestic jurisdiction. 
This rejection led to the appointment of a working group on May II th, 1949 with the 
mission of drafting a new Article dealing with internal conflict taking into consideration 
the views and amendments made by States on the ICRC proposal. It was composed of 5 
States (US, France, Norway, Australia and Switzerland) on the May, 1949, a new draft was 
produced, it states: 
"(I) In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the hight Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to implement the provisions of the present convention, provided: (a) that the de jure Government has recognized the status of belligerency of the 
adverse party without restrictions or for the sole purposes of the application of the 
present or 
(b) that the adverse party presents the characteristics of a State, in particular, that it 
possesses an organized military force, that it is under the direction of an organized 
civil authority which exercises de facto Governmental functions over the population 
or a determinate portion of the national territory, and that it has the means of 
enforcing the Convention and of complying with the laws and customs of war; 
application of the Convention in these circumstances shall in no way depend upon 
the legal status of the parties to the conflict. 
(c) This obligation presupposes, furthermore, in all circumstances, that the adverse 
party declares itself bound by the present Convention and as is the de jure 
Government, by the laws and customs of war (and that it complies with the above 
conditions in actual fact). 
(11). The provisions relating to the protecting powers shall, however, not be 
applicable, except in the instance of special agreement between the parties to the 
conflict. An impartial humanitarian body such as the international committee of the 
Red Cross, may offer to the parties to the conflict to undertake the duties conferred 
by the present Convention on the protecting powers. 
(M) In the case of armed conflicts which do not fulfil the conditions as determined 
above, by means of special agreements, all or part of the provisions of the present 
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Convention, or, on all circumstances, to act in accordance with the underlying 
humanitarian principles of the present convention. 
(IV) In all circumstances stipulated in the forgoing provisions, total or partial 
application of th?, present Convention shall not affect the legal status of the parties 
to the conflict. "' 9 
This draft in fact combines the factual and formal criteria included in the French, 
Australian and the American amendments referred to above. The general tone of the draft 
is plainly in favour of the rights of the State rather than humanitarian considerations, since 
the thresholds of the internal conflict are set very high and in practice very few conflicts 
would satisfy the stringent conditions contained in that draft. 
Moreover, there is nothing in the text of the draft, which indicates that the discretionary 
power, of the established Government to determine the existence of the internal conflict 
is limited in any way, even when the high factual criteria are present. This is a further 
example of favouring the rights of States. 
However, despite the stringent conditions contained in the draft of the working group, 
some important delegations were not pleased with it. Thus, France expressed its inability 
to accept the application of the whole Conventions to internal conflicts, especially the 
impossibility of such application in the case of the civilian Convention. Britain on the other 
hand was not happy with the mention of 'belligerency' since the latter 'implied rights 
exceeding the scope of the Conventions'. 120 Others were against the expression 'possessing 
the characteristics of State' which they feared, might be interpreted that the rebels have 
some legal status. 121 
The objections, led the joint committee to ask the same working group (on the May 25th, 
1949) to submit another draft. This was done, the new draft Article dropped any language 
which might suggest that the insurgents possess any legal status. Also a new provision was 
included specifically for the application of the civilian Convention in internal conflicts. 
Thus, recognition of belligerency does not suffice to apply the convention, it will be applied 






12 'Thus, Italy proposed "to delete the terms $present the characteristics of State' which gives the 
impression that the rebels already constitute a subject In international taw". Ibid. 
122The Secord Draft of the first working group in fact, included a new Article 2 (a) for the Civilian 
Convention. It provides: 
Oln case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one 
of the high contracting parties, the parties to the conflict should endeavour to bring into 
force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the provisions of the present convention, 
and in atL circumstances shaLL act in accordance with the underlying humanitarian principles 
of the present convention". 
lbid, p. 125. 
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In practice, then we may very well faced with a situation in which the established 
Government may recognize the belligerent status of their opponents (so that the wounded 
and sick and captured combatants would be treated in accordance with the laws of war) and 
can still refuse to enter into special agreement for the protection of the civilians. 
This situation underlines the fact that Governments would not like to be seen as losing 
the control over their own civilian population since that would hurt their claim, that they 
are (established Governments) the sole representative of the State. 
Apart from the changes mentioned above, the second draft does not differ much from 
the first draft. The two drafts followed the method of limiting the cases of conflicts of 
non- international to which the conventions would apply. This has been done by adopting 
definitions which contain very rigid criteria, which would in practice exclude any internal 
conflict which would not attain the gravity and seriousness of an international war. 
It seems that the approach which was followed by the working group in its two drafts was 
not accepted by the majority of States. The main reason for that is, in my opinion, that 
States feared that the application of the convention In toto would give their opponents 
certain legal status, that being so, despite the fact that the two drafts expressly stressed that 
the application of the conventions would not give any legal status to insurgentS. 123 
During the discussion of the second draft, the French Delegation hinted at another 
approach in the drafting of the Article concerned with internal conflicts. Instead of limiting 
the cases of internal conflicts, to which the conventions would apply In toto, it was 
proposed to restrict the provisions of the conventions, which would apply in such cases. The 
immediate effect of such an approach would have been the abandoning of the attempts at 
defining internal conflicts, and rather concentrating on the substantive humanitarian rules 
which may apply in those conflicts. 
Thus, the French delegation introduced the new approach by wishing that: 
"... [T]he humanitarian rules contained in the preamble of the civilians convention to be applied also to war of non- international character, such a preamble should be 
added to the three other conventions, and contain also a definition of judicial 
guarantees in penal matters". 124 
This led to the appointment of a second working group, with the mission of drafting a new 
Article dealing with internal wars. This group adopted a method which was in line with the 
French proposal. 
1231n this context, the French detegate attacked the method foltowed by the first working group. He 
stated: 
0... Mignatory Governments who were confronted with an insurgent movement would be In a 
dilemma: either they would never apply the clauses of the convention, or they would implicitly 
recognize that the adverse party had a character which was tantamount to that of State". 




The new draft Article125 produced by the second working group did not define non- 
international conflicts. However, it contained the humanitarian rules to be respected in such 
situations. Thus, only basic humanitarian rules would apply and not the whole convention. 
This draft was subjected to various criticisms. The most important criticisms were made 
by the Soviet Union and Burma. The former thought that the obvious outcome of the 
approach of the second working group would be that a large number of important 
provisions concerning the protection of war victims will not be put into operation, 
126 the 
Russian Delegation then proposed a series of proposals, with the object of widening the 
range of humanitarian rules applicable to each category of the victims of internal wars (the 
wounded, POW's and civilians), however, no attempt was made at defining non- 
international conflicts. 
Burma on the other hand, criticised the non-definition of "armed conflicts of a non- 
international character' this phrase in its view may 'include banditing, uprisings, disorders, 
rebellion and civil war'127. Its delegate tried to convince the Conference that any inclusion 
of any Article in whatever form dealing with internal conflict is very dangerous. He stated: 
"... [S]o the only help that the Article will give, if you adopt it, will be to those who 
desire loot, pillage political power by undemocratic means, or those foreign ideologies 
seeking their own advancement by inciting the population of another country. If you 
agree that this will be the result, we are sure you will not adopt this Article, 
especially if you will realize that no Government of an independent country, can, or 
will ever, be inhuman or cruel in its actions towards its own nationals. If you will 
adopt it you will not only be embarrassing the de jure Government, but you will also 
125The ArticLe adopted by the second working group stipulates that: 
"Paragraph I. In the case of armed conf tict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the high contracting parties, each party of the conflict shatt be bound 
to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, and those placed hors combat by sickness, 
wounds, captivity or any other cause, shatt be treated humanly in all, circumstances and without 
any discrimination. To this end, the following acts are and shatt remain prohibited with 
respect to the above mentioned persons: 
(a) Violence to life and person in particular murder of all kinds, mutf tation, cruet treatment 
and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humanity and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgments 
pronounced by a regutaratory constituted court affording at I the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized parties. 
(2) The wounded and sick shalt be collected and cared for. 
(3) No adverse discrimination shall, be practised on the basis of differences of race, coLour, 
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth. 
Paragraph 2. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the ICRC may offer its services to the 
parties to the conflict. 
Paragraph 3. The parties to the conf Lict should further endeavour to bring into force by means 
of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present convent. 
Paragraph 4. The application of the preceding provisions shatt not affect the Legal status of 
the parties to the conflict". 






seriously endanger its sovereignty as you will be taking away from it its own legal 
machi I nery 
to maintain the security of its population and the prosperity of its 
State" . 
Neither of the two extreme views, was adopted, in fact the Russian proposals were defeated 
by the joint committee by 9 votes to 1. 
With some minor modifications, the essentials of the draft proposed by the second working 
group adopted first by the joint committee and later by the conference as Article 3. The 
Article as adopted contains no definition of 'armed conflict of a non- international 
character'. However, in my view, the travaux p0paratolres, reveal clearly that the majority 
view holds that the term does not apply to every kind of internal disorder, only conflicts 
which reveal certain gravity and intensity could be included. 
In this respect, in the 19th Plenary Meeting July 29th, 1949 which adopted the future 
Article 3, the Delegate of Venezuela stressed: 
"... [W]e must be quite certain of what is meant by 'armed conflict of a non 
international character'. There is no doubt that this does not apply to the exploits of 
bandits or the riots of any kind but to civil wars, a sociological phenomenon of 
political history which often in essence is a form of class struggle". 29 
The representative of Switzerland, who was one of the sponsors of the actual Article 3, 
argued in response to the Burmese delegate who sees any inclusion of rules dealing with 
internal conflicts as an encouragement of insurgency. He stated: 
"The Burmese delegate is afraid that the Article 2A [which became Article 3 in the 
final draft] might be invoked against the legitimate Government, in cases of 
individual outbreaks of banditism or organized movement of the kind, but I do not 
consider that this apprehension is well founded. These provisions are applicable in 
the event of an armed conflict, in other words, an armed conflict must actually be 
going on but outbursts of individual banditism, or even movement of the kind, 
complicated or aggravated by the existence of a conspiracy, do not really constitute 
an armed conflict in the proper sense of the terms. Nor does a mere riot constitute 
an armed conflict. An armed conflict as understood in this provision, implies some form of organization among the parties to the conflict. Such organization will, of 
course generally be found on the Government side; but there must also be some 
degree of organization among the insurgents". 130 
It seems to me that this interpretation is interesting, since it reveals the intentions of the 
sponsors of Article 3. It shows clearly that 'an armed conflict not of an international 
character' has some kind of definition. The threshold of the conflict are not very high, in 
other words such conflicts do not have to resemble international conflicts, however, riots 
and internal tensions are excluded they remain in the domestic jurisdiction of the State. 
The other main conclusion to be drawn from the travaux pr6paratolres are in my opinion 
the following: 
128 lbid, p. 329. 




1. There was a wide acceptance that international law is relevant to internal crisis in 
certain specific cases. To me this is in fact a result of the influence of the humanitarian 
spirit which arose after the second world war. States came to terms with the idea that their 
treatment of their citizens has to be guided by certain fundamental principles. Human 
rights ensured the protection of human beings during peace times in general, humanitarian 
law would have the same effect during times of armed conflicts either internal or 
international. No State (except Burma) has in fact attempted to characterise such 
international regulation as an intervention in the internal affairs of the State or as a breach 
of sovereignty. 
2. However, the majority of States (mostly colonial States, US, Canada, Greece and 
Burma) were concerned about the effects of such regulations on their sovereign rights to 
keep law and order within their own borders. 
Those States sought to limit incursions into their domestic jurisdiction, by advocating first 
strict definitions of internal conflicts. In fact, these definitions contained such high and 
serious criteria, that in practice very few cases would qualify. Thus, the technique of 
definition was used at that stage for a very specific reason, and that is the protection of the 
sovereignty of State. 
Later in the conference, however, the tone has changed, States concentrated on limiting 
the humanitarian rules applicable to such conflicts. This would enable them to keep more 
discretion and liberty in the crushing of their opponents and would reduce the chances of 
the insurgents of obtaining legal status. 
It must be stressed that there is no direct indication in the travaux prkparatolres which 
suggests that by adopting the second method (of restricting the rules applicable in the 
internal conflicts) the States which tried to define the internal armed conflicts have 
abandoned their earlier definitions, and have opted for a more liberal interpretation. 
Although for more humanitarian spirit, it seems that the Statement made by Switzerland 
(quoted above) must be taken to express the feeling of the majority of States. 
3. Moreover, in my opinion, States wanted to limit incursions into their sovereignty, by 
rejecting the competence of any UN organ body to determine the existence of internal 
conflict. Which means implicitly that they wanted to remain the sole authority competent 
to make such a determination. The argument that when certain objective criteria exist, the 
State is obliged to apply Article 3 finds no real support in travaux pr6paratolres. Also, it 
seems to me that in a world still dominated by sovereignty and in the absence of a central 
agency above the States any talk of objectivity is out of place. 
However, what is needed in my view, is that the established Governments should act in 
good faith in their determination of the existence of an armed conflict. To me, it would be 
absurd for instance, to demand that the insurgents must occupy a substantial part of the 
national territory in a very effective way, in order to apply Article 3 since in guerilla 
warfare, which is the dominant method of warfare in our present world, that requirement 
would never be fulfilled. 
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B. Subsequent Practice and Situations to which Common Article 3 Applies 
In this context, Row writes: 
" ... [I]n practice Article 3 has been of little direct significance, simply because it attempts to control the manner in which a State treats its own citizens in 
circumstances where the Government concerned may be fighting for its very 
existence. In addition, a State may take the view that any trouble that it is having 
with armed groups intent on bringing down the Government is really only criminal 
and that its laws are adequate to stamp out that activity". 131 
In other words, the reason for the lack of interest of Government in the application of 
Article 3, is that it may restrict its discretion in dealing with its opponent and also it may 
give them some legal status. 
Many international lawyers interested in humanitarian law hold similar views132 suc as 
De Lupis who notes that: 
"In spite of the modest ambitions of common Article 3 states have still attempted to 
evade the application of this Article, clairnipy, that a conflict did not fall within its 
ambit but constituted a mere police action". '-" 
This means that the absence of definition of internal conflict, coupled with the absence of 
any mechanism for the determination of such internal conflict have resulted in practice in 
limiting the role of Article 3 in actual civil wars situations, and this gave precedence to the 
claims of established Governments. In this way, France, the UK and Portugal refused to 
acknowledge the application of Article 3 to their colonies, they acted under the presumption 
that established Governments have the right to put down uprisings, by all means required 
by the situation. The example of France is flagrant, it refused in the first years of the 
Algerian war to recognize that the conflict falls within Article 3, even when more than 
400,000 soldiers were used against the insurgents. 
Baxter attributes this state of affairs to: 
"... [T]he deceptively simple expression 'armed conflict not of an international 
character' has not proven easy to apply to the multiplicity of circumstances under 
which violence may break out in a state". 134 
However, despite the above misgivings, State practice shows that in certain cases, the 
Article has been recognized to apply either explicitly or implicitly. In this context, Forsythe 
established a chart on the initial relevance of Article 3 to the situation of violence during 
the period from 1949 to 1975, three categories emerge from his study: 
1. In the first category, the belligerents signed Ad hoc agreements in which all the four 
131 P. Rowe: Defence: The Legat lffptfcatfc>ns. Brassey's Defence Pub., 1987, p. 142. 
132 Thus, Bond notes that $States have generalty ignored It EArticle 311. J. E. Bond: The Rutes of Riot: 
Internal, Conf I, Icts and the Law of War. PUP, Princeton, 1974, p. 58. 
133 Co. cit., supra. n. 92, p. 169. 
134 R. R. Baxter: Jus in Betio Interno: The Present and the Future Law, in Moore (ed. ), op. cit., supra. 
chapter 2, n. 4, p. 521. 
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Geneva Conventions or their basic principles were applicable to their internal conflicts. 
Examples of this are: The Congo in 1960-4, The Yemen in 1963-67 and Nigeria in 1967- 
70. 
2. In the second category, explicit acceptance of the applicability of Article 3 either by 
Government officials or by a non -Governmental party (the insurgents). The former include: 
Guatemala in 1954, The US (Vietnam) in 1964, The Dominican Republic in 1965, Uruguay 
in 1972 and Chile in 1973. 
The latter (the recognition by the insurgents) comprise the cases of Algeria in 1956, 
Lebanon in 1958, Cuba in 1959 and Yemen in 1962. 
3. In the third category, Forsythe lists possible situations for the application of Common 
Article 3, not acknowledged by Governments but in which the ICRC visited detainees. He 
cites several examples such as Algeria (France) in 1955, Cyprus (UK) in 1955-58, Hungary 
in 1956, Malaysia in 1956, Kenya (UK) in 1956-59, South Vietnam in 1957-66, Rhodesia 
(UK) from 1959 till independence, Laos in 1961-72, Indonesia in 1966-69, Aden (UK) in 
1966-67, Bolivia in 1971, Guinea-Bissau (Portugal) in 1971-74, Mozambique in 1971-74, 
Burundi in 1972, and Angola (Portugal) in 1973-75. In addition, he also refers to instances 
where the ICRC still visits detainees as illustrated by the cases of Ethiopia since 1974- 
present, Lebanon since 1975-present, Northern Ireland (UK) since 1971-present, and 
Philippines since 1972-present. 135 
The conclusion to be drawn from this survey, is that in the overwhelming majority of 
cases, States do not feel obliged to declare themselves bound by Article 3. this would tie 
their hands in finishing off the insurgents at the earliest possible moment. However, if 
the conflict intensifies and prolongs for a long time, States to save their faces accept the 
ICRC humanitarian initiatives, without committing themselves openly. But, it has to be 
made clear that States can accept the offer of the ICRC, but refuse to acknowledge the 
application of Article 3, in other words, they can still deny the existence of an armed 
conflict of a non-international character. Thus, the UK accepted the visits of the ICRC to 
the 'H' block prison in Northern Ireland, on the clear understanding that such permission 
did not imply that the UK Government recognize the application of Article 3 to the 
situations in that region. 136 This explains in part why the ICRC is present at the moment 
in nearly every internal conflict. In this way, in 1990 it still is present in Afghanistan, 
Angola, Burma, Burundi, Chad, Chile, Colombia, East Timor, EI-Salvador, Ethiopia, 
Kampuchia, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Philippines, Sri-Lanka, Sudan, 
Surinam, and Uganda. 137 
Clearly, the majority of these States have never issued declarations in which they 
135 D. P. Forsythe: Legat Management of Internat War: The 1977 Protocot on Non-Internationat Armed 
ConfLfcts. 72 AJIL, 1978, pp. 275-276. 
1360P. 
cit., supra. n. 131, p. 142. 
137See 
the fottowing issues of the IRRC: 
March/Aprit 1989,29th Year, No. 269, pp. 147-152. 
May/June 1989,29th Year, No. 270, pp. 229-235. 
Sept/Oct 1989,29th Year, No. 272, pp. 474-479. 
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recognized the applicability of Article 3 to their conflicts. They maintain that such an act 
would inevitably carry with it the implication that the insurgents have some legal status, 
thus weakening their claim to be the masters of situations and the holders of legitimacy. 
1. The ICRC and the Definition of an Armed Conflict not of an International Character 
and the Question of Determining the Existence of such a Conflict 
The Official Commentaries of ICRC on the Geneva Conventions of 1949, seem to be guided 
by two principles, first the conflict to which Article 3 is to apply must satisfy some 
conditions of fact and that despite the absence of definition in the text of the Article. It is 
stressed that: 
"It must be recognized that the conflict referred to in Article 3 are armed conflicts, 
with armed forces on either side engaged in hostilities-conflicts in short, which are 
in many respects similar to an international war but take place within the confines U8 of a single country" 
The ICRC in the same commentaries suggested some criteria which can be useful in 
distinguishing "a genuine armed conflict from a mere act of banditry or an organized and 
short lived insurrection". 139 They are as follows: 
"I. That the party in revolt against the de jure government possesses an organized 
military force, an authority responsible for its acts acting within a determined 
territory and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the 
conventions. 
2. That the legal government is obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces 
against insurgents organized as military and in possession of a part of the national 
territory. 
3. (a) That the de jure government has recognised the insurgents as belligerents; or 
(b) That it has claimed for itself the rights of a belligerent; or 
(c) That it has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for the purposes 
only of the present convention; or 
(d) That the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the UNSC or the UNGA of 
the UN as being a threat to international peace, a' breach of peace or an act of 
aggression. 
4. (a) That the insurgents have an organization purporting to have the characteristics 
of a state 
(b) That the insurgents civil authority exercises de facto authority over persons 
within a determinate territory 
(c) That the armed forces act under the direction of the organized civil authority and 
are prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war 
(d) That the insurgents civil authority agrees to be bound by the provisions of the 
C1 *140 onvention. 
These criteria in fact are a summary of the proposed definitions which some States 
advanced during the discussions of Article 3 in the Diplomatic Conference of 1949. 
1380P. 
cit., supra. n. 114, p. 53. 
139 J. Pictet (ed. ): Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary. VoL. 1, Geneva Conventions for 
the Ametioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Fietd, Geneva, ICRC, 




However, the second principle contained in the ICRC Commentaries, is that 'the Article 
should be applied as widely as possible'141 meaning that the conditions cited above are not 
necessarily indispensable, since in its view no Government may in practice claim even in 
cases of mere disturbances that it is not bound by the purely humanitarian rules contained 
in Article 3. Thus, in its view the matter is not clear cut. It wanted to satisfy two 
opposing demands, a demand for respect for the sovereignty of State on one hand and the 
demand of more humanity in all internal confliq whatever their intensity. Later on, it 
seems that the ICRC adopted an approach which favours the demands of humanity as 
opposed to claims of sovereignty and non -intervention. 
In its report to the CGEDHL (1971), the ICRC stressed that: 
"To be sure, Article 3, de lege lata, does not contain a definition of the non- international armed conflict. But although the article fails to specify the concept of 
snon- international armed conflict', it is none the less true that the authorities involved 
would not be in a position to interpret it erroneously, and that, when the conditions 
of such aKe-conflict are realized the humanitarian standards of Article 3 must apply. 
In addition, certain elements of the existing text can be singled out: a non- international armed conflict exist in the case of hostilities engaging armed forces 
within the same State. Thus Article 3 leave a broad power of appraisal to the parties 
to the conflict, but nevertheless does not give them the power of sovereign decisions 
as the application of its provisions". 142 
In fact, the ICRC here confirms what a Commission of its Experts on Humanitarian 
Assistance of Victims of Internal Conflicts has arrived to in 1962. "' 
Thus, armed conflicts not of an international character, are not supposed to have the same 
characteristics of an international war, only moderate criteria can exist, such as a minimum 
of organization, existence of armed hostilitiesagainst the established Government, also a 
collective character of the conflict. 144 
The ICRC stressed the objective character of those conditions, and thus tried to restrict 
the discretion of the established Governments in the matter of the determination of the 
existence of an internal conflict, which eventually leads to the limitation of their 
sovereignty in that domain. 
Despite the obvious humanitarian intent behind such an approach, the fact remains that 
States rarely acknowledge the existence of internal conflict even when the existence of 
those 'objective conditions' is in no doubt. 
1411bid, 
p. 50. 
142CGEDHL (Geneva 24 May-12 June, 1971), V. Protection of Victims of Non-Internatfonat Armed 
Confticts, pp. 36-37. 
143That Commission in fact, stressed that: 
"La determination de Pexistence d'un teL conf Lit interne r6pond A des conditions objectives. 
Ette ne peut r4sutter de Pappr6cfation dfscretionnaire des Etats parties aux conventionslo. 
Op. cit., supra. n. 32, p. 525. See also Ibid, p. 44-45. 
144Atso, 
other considerations may be taken into consideration such as "ta dur6e du conf tIct, te nombre 
at Pencadrement des groupes rebels, teur Installation ou teur action sur une partle du territoire, 
te degr6 dI ins6curit6, tes moyens mis en oeuvre par te gouvernement t6gat pour rktabLir II ordre, etc. " 
Ibid, p. 526. 
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Ethiopia is a flagrant example today, after 30 years of conflict in Eritrea, and 14 years 
in Tigre provinces, where two well armed insurgent groups conduct a war of secession, 
and despite the deployment of nearly 180,000 soldiers in Eritrea and 40,000 in Tigre and 
despite the undeniable popular support for the insurgents in those two regions, 
145 there is 
no indication whatsoever that the Government is ready to accept the application of Article 
3. 
Thus, there is a real doubt that States can adhere to a theory of objectivity in matters 
which they see as vital to their survival, in fact ideological and political interests and the 
decentralised nature of the international system, would militate against such an approach. 
The UN practice, in my view, supports indirectly the above contention, since the 
organization dealt with only a few cases of internal conflict, and only rarely referred 
directly to Article 3. Also, most of these cases concerned wars of national liberation 
movements (especially in Africa)146 and above all the UN dealt with internal conflicts 
which threatened international peace and security, however, even in those cases, the 
established Government in bringing the matter before the UN never claims the existence 
of an internal conflict but always complains of foreign intervention. 
In this context, when Guatemala in the summer of 1954 was in the midst of a civil war, 
its foreign Minister announced on June 2nd, 1954 that it (the Government) had uncovered 
"a wide internal conspiracy directed from 'outside, and which was planned by' military 
technicians separated from the army of another country". 147 Guatemala later brought a 
complaint (before the UNSC) of aggression invasion and intervention in its internal affairs. 
The UNSC unanimously adopted a resolution calling: 
"... [F]or immediate termination of any action likely to cause bloodshed and requests 
for all members of the United Nations to abstain in the spirit of the United Nations 148 Charter from giving assistance to any such action" 
145The Daity Tetegraph. June 2rd, 1988, p. 9. 
146 Thus, in Resotution 2395 will), the UNGA: 
"12. Calls upon the Goverment of Portugal, in view of the arvied conflict prevailing in the 
territories and the inhuman treatment of prisoners, to ensure the application to that situation 
of the Geneva Convention Retatfve to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949". 
Djonovich, (ed. ), op. cit., supra. chapter 1, n. 79, Vot. 12, p. 172. See atso Resotutfon 2649 and 
especiatty Resotution 2674 (XXV) Respect for Human Rights in Internat Confticts, Para 3,4 and 5 in 
lbid, Vot. 13,1970-1971, pp. 289-292. See atso Resotution 2918 (XVII) Question of Territories under 
Portuguese Adiminstration, in particutar para. 3/b which states: 
"The just treatment of the freedom fighters of Angota, Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde and 
Mozambique captured during the struggte for freedom as prisoners in accordance with the 
prfncfptes of the Geneva Convention Retative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 
12th, 1949, and in accordance with the Geneva Convention Retative to the Protection of Civitlan 
Persons in Time of War, of August 12th, 1949". 
Ibld, (1972-1974), p. 321. 
147Keesing's, 1954, p. 13678. 
148 9 UNY, 1954, p. 99. 
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This means that the UNSC abstained from declaring the existence of an internal conflict, 
it concentrates rather on its main mission which is keeping peace and security in the world. 
It must be conceded that recently (in the 1980s) with the idea of combatting widespread 
violation of human rights, the UN through its UNCHR, the Sub-Commission of Non- 
Discrimination and Minorities and the UNGA, have stressed the importance of the 
application of the rules of Article 3 as a means of elimination of those violations and by this 
they indirectly took it as their mission to indicate the existence of an internal conflict of 
a non -international character. 
The case of El-Salvador is typical, The UNGA did not hesitate to proclaim the 
applicability of Article 3 to the situation which prevails in the country. In this respect, 
Resolution 36/155 of December 16th, 1981 in its 4th paragraph stipulates that: 
"The United Nations General Assembly draws the attention of all parties concerned 
to the fact that the rules of international law, as contained in Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 are applicable to armed conflicts not of an international 
character and requests the parties involved to apply a minimum standard of 
protection to the affected persons". 149 
The most interesting in this sphere, is that EI-Salvador, although it rejected the resolution 
because in its opinion: 
overstepped the humanitarian sphere and included highly political 
considerations which fell exclusively under internal jurisdiction". ' 50 
It did not specifically question the competence of the UNGA to characterise its internal 
conflict as being governed by Article 3. In fact, the UNGA made it, from 1981, a custom 
in adopting resolutions calling for the applications of Article 3 to the conflict. 151 
In my view, this is a very important development, it signals that the international 
community, even in the atmosphere of a decentralised world system, can act in matters 
which are very sensitive to States, such as the determination of the existence of an internal 
conflict, and this can restrict the discretion of established Governments in that sphere. 
The idea of human rights serves as a vehicle for such enterprise since it is accepted as 
valid limitation on State sovereignty. This concern for the protection of human rights, 
which is a recognized mission of the UN, may very well include in some circumstances the 
application of humanitarian rules of Article 3, and by consequence, Governments have to 
accept that verdict. 
However, the main weakness of the UN activity in this field is that its actions are very 
selective, many internal conflicts are simply ignored, politics and super power rivalry play 




15 'Thus, Resolution 37/185 (Dec. 17th, 1982) referred in its para 2 to the application of Article 3. 
36 UNY, 1982. p. 1127 and Resolution 38/101 (Dec. 16th, 1983) referred also to Article 3 in its para 
3.37 UNY, 1983, p. 889. 
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a major part in this failure. 
The general conclusion from State practice, is that in the over whelming majority of 
cases, States still cling to a very rigid concept of sovereignty in the matter of definition and 
determination of the existence of internal conflicts. The idea of objectivity, seems to be 
perceived by those States, as non-existent or in the best of circumstances, it is only their 
decisions which are objective. 
However, a very slow process is beginning to emerge, whereby the recognized mission 
of the UN to look after the protection of human rights is exploited by the organization to 
declare in some instances the application of Article 3. This confirms in my view that human 
rights as limitation of State sovereignty have an important role to play in the context of 
internal conflicts. 
2. The Doctrine and their Interpretation of the Situations to which Article 3 Applies 
The doctrine is divided on their interpretation of the situations to which Article 3 of the 
Geneva Convention applies. Their readings of the legislative and the subsequent practice 
of States differ. In my opinion, three main tendencies may be detected. 
The first view is advocated by Bond. He writes: 
"... [S]tates are bound to observe only those rules to which they agree, and they have 
usually resisted even minimal efforts to tie their hands in dealing with domestic 
enemies. All this may suggest that the delegates considered an armed conflict not of 
an international character a civil war by any other name and voted in favour of 
applying a limited number of principles to a limited range of conflicts. " 152 
According to this opinion, then Article 3 is very restricted in scope, it implies that the 
Article is not in any way broader than the traditional concept of belligerency, sovereignty 
and its demands it seems are behind such interpretations, since established Governments 
will not consider any uprising as internal conflict to which Article 3 is applicable. This 
would tie their hands in dealing with opponents. 
Schindler and Higgins advocate a milder position, the former after studying the practice 
of the ICRC in internal conflicts, 153 maintains that armed conflicts within the meaning of 
Article 3 are to be differentiated from internal disturbances and tensions. The latter remains 
under the exclusive control of the established Government, he stresses that the armed 
conflict in the context of Article 3: 
"... [M]ust show certain similarities to a war without fulfilling all conditions necessary 
152 Op. cit., supra. n. 132, pp. 56-57. 
153 He writes: 
"The practice of the ICRC has set up the foLtowing criteria to cletimit non-internationaL 
confticts from internat disturbances: In the first ptace, the hostftities are meant to be of 
: coLlective character, that is they have to be carried out not onLy by singLe groups. In 
ddition the insurgents have to exhibit a minimum amount of organization. Their armed forces 
shoutd be under a responsibie command and be capabLe of meeting humanitarian requirements". 
D. SchindLer: The Different Types of Armed Confticts According to the Geneva Conventions and the two 
Protocots. RCADI, 1979/111, p. 147. 
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154 for the recognition of insurgency" . 
According to this view, then, armed conflicts within the meaning of Article 3, are of a 
lower intensity than the traditional concept of civil war and recognition of belligerency. 
In fact, Schindler thinks that Article 3, is a clear progress in comparson to the old 
classical international law, and especially the traditional institution of recognition of 
belligerency, and then states that: 
"... [T]he provisions of Article 3 differ in three ways from the traditional rules on civil 
wars and recognition of belligerency. First, they are to be applied automatically in 
case of an armed non- international conflict no recognition is necessary. Not even 
reciprocity in the application of these provisions is required. 
Secondly, Article 3 sets lower requirements to the intensity of an armed conflict as 
would be necessary for the recognition of the insurgents. Neither is it necessary that 
the insurgents exercise control over a part of the state territory nor must they embody 
attributes of a government. 
Thirdly and finally, in case of a non -international conflict according to Article 3, not 
all the laws of war are applicable - Article 3 contains only an absolute minimum of duties for the opposing party"155. 
It seems to me that in practice the differences stated by Schindler, are relative, since as it 
has been shown above, some internal conflicts, which have taken place in the last 30 years 
would fulfil at least in part some of the conditions of the application of the status of 
recognition of belligerency, but States claimed that the Article is not applicable (Algeria at 
least as from 1956). The question of the automatic application of Article 3, is very 
problematic, States do not accept easily to waive their discretion in that important matter, 
practice shows this clearly. 
Higgins's opinion does not differ much from Schindler's view. She writes: 
"... [Tlhe Article is binding on both parties, and is not subject to reciprocity. It does 
not itself define an 'armed conflict not of an international character, but given its humanitarian purposes, it would seem to be applicable to major insurgency and 
probably also to rebellion as well as to civil war". 156 
The third view goes very far, it advocates the application of Article 3 even to internal 
disturbances and tensions. The main argument used, is that since the rules of Article 3 are 
very limited in number and humanitarian in spirit, they should be applied to all ranges of 
tensions which occur within the State, the main advocate of such an approach is Pictet, he 
asked: 
"... [W]hat Government would dare to claim before the world in a case of civil 
disturbances which could justly be described as mere acts of banditry that Article 3 
not being applicable, it was entitled to leave the wounded uncared for, to inflict 
1541bid. 
155 lbfd, p. 146. 
156 Op. cft., 'supra. n. l. p. 91. 
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torture and mutilations and to take hostages". 157 
Despite the humanitarian spirit involved in such a statement, the fact remains that the 
legislative history and even the subsequent practice concerning Article 3. makes it clear that 
Article 3 does not apply to situations of riots and civil disturbances. 
The three opinions in my view are, in fact, different answers to the central question of 
the relation between humanity and sovereignty in the context of internal conflicts. The first 
view stressed the priority of sovereignty over humanity, the second view tries to reconcile 
the two principles, whereas the third view gives an absolute priority to the demands of 
humanity over the claim of sovereignty. 
To me, the absence of a clear definition of the expression 'armed conflicts of a non- 
international character' in the text of the Article itself, and the absence of any indication 
of who can determine the existence of such a conflict, have in practice led in large part to 
the weakening of Article 3. Such absence of definition is itself a manifestation of the strong 
position of sovereignty and non -intervention in international relations. 
SECTION V: Definition of Armed Conflicts of a Non-International Character In Protocol 
II of 1977 
The ambiguity of the situations to which common Article 3 applies, the absence of 
specific rules concerning the protection of civilians, the need for effective restrictions on 
means and methods of combat, the tragic experiences of the Vietnam War, Nigerian and 
Bangladesh civil wars, the efforts of the ICRC and its calls for more humanity in internal 
conflicts, and the influence of the idea of human rights, which stressed the sacrosanct 
obligation of every State to protect the fundamental rights of the-individual and groups 
of individuals. These different elements have played different roles, 
'in revealing 
the need 
for a new international instrument which will develop Article 3. 
In this section, I will concentrate on analyzing the definition contained in Article I of 
Protocol Il of 1977, the criteria involved in that definition, the relation of Article I of the 
Protocol to common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and finally the evaluation of 
Article I of Protocol 11. 
A. Definition: The Criteria 
Article 1, is the corner stone of the whole Protocol II, it has been termed as 'the keystone 
of the instrument'158 or "... I'article premier du Protocole en est reallement la pierre 
angulaire'. 159 The Article in fact, defines the scope of the application of the Protocol, and 
by implication restricts the sovereignty of the State in all cases covered by that Article. In 
157 Op. cit., supra. n. 139, p. 50. 
iss Op. cft., supra. n. 23, p. 1348. 
15 9R. Abt-Saab: Droft humanitafre et conftits Internes. Institut Henry-Dunant, Ed. A. Pddone, Paris, 
1986. p. 149. 
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this respect, Romania expressed the view that it : 
"... [Alattached considerable importance to the field of application of draft Protocol 
11, since the sovereignty of the State was involved". 160 
In fact, this view was shared by many States, especially Third World countries, they 
emphasised the close relationship between the protection of their sovereignty and the need 
to restrict the field of application of Protocol 11.161 
The ICRC draft Article 1, submitted to the Diplomatic Conference of 1974-1977, defines 
the non- international armed conflict as follows: 
*Article 1. Material field of application 
1. The present Protocol shall apply to all armed conflicts not covered by Article 2, 
common to the Geneva Conventions of August 1949, taking place between arae-a 
forces or other organized armed groups under responsible command. 
2. The present Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions, Inter alia riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a 
similar nature. 
3. The foregoing provisions do not modify the conditions governing Article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions of August 12 1949". 162 
The definition here is very broad indeed, only two factual criteria are necessary to make 
the internal disorders 'armed conflict not of an international character'. First, the contest 
should be between armed forces and other organized armed forces. Secondly, the organized 
armed groups should be under a responsible command. 
It must be noted that in accordance with the first criteria only contests between 
Government forces and insurgents armed groups are 'armed conflicts', which means that 
when the established Government is not a party to such conflict, Protocol Il is not relevant. 
Thus, situations of civil wars like those which took place in Angola in 1975, and currently 
in Lebanon are not covered by the Protocol's Article 1, although there is no doubt that 
Article 3 is applicable. 
The ICRCs representative at the Diplomatic Conference explained on February 14th, 
1975 the rational behind their approach to draft Article I in these terms: 
"The ICRC had had the difficult task of determining the field of application of draft 
Protocol 11, it had chosen a broad field to cover all non- international armed conflicts, 
and for that purpose had endeavoured to specify the characteristics of a non- 
international armed conflict by means of objective criteria so the Protocol could be 
applied when those criteria were met and not be made subject to other 
considerations". 163 
160 8 ORDCHL, MDH/I/SR. 23, para. 33. p. 221. 
161 Thus, Mexico argued that it "attached the greatest importance to scope and field of application 
of the draft Protocol concerned with the victims of internal armed conflicts It considered it 
essential that the Protocol should safeguard the sovereign rights of States". Ibid, MDH/I/SR. 24 
para. 14, p. 231. 
162 Ibid, Vot. 1, p. 33. 
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The ICRC's object is clear, first, it made the definition broad in order to cover a wide 
range of conflicts, secondly, it excluded, at least implicitly, the competence of the 
established Government in determining the existence of such conflicts. The aim is to make 
the Protocol apply automatically, once the two objective criteria are present in the conflict, 
and thus, surpassing the claims of sovereignty and non- intervention by Governments facing 
such challenges. 
It must be stressed that draft Article 1, was one of the most discussed provisions of the 
ICRC's draft Protocol II, many amendments and proposals were introduced in connection 
with it, a working group was created to find a suitable definition. That group had to create 
a sub-group, which had to meet six times in order to reach an agreement. 164 This difficulty 
of reaching an agreement, arises from the fact that the Article touches directly on the 
sovereignty of the State, and its ability to control events inside its borders without any 
interference. 
The legislative history of draft Article 1, reveals that States held two different opinions 
concerning the field of application of the Protocol. The first view was held by Socialist 
States (except Romania) and some moderate western States, like Norway, Sweden, Italy, 
Switzerland and New Zealand. This group was largely happy with the ICRC's draft Article. 
However, some States of this group were against the introduction of two kinds of internal 
armed conflicts (those covered by Article I of the Protocol and those covered by Article 3) 
they advocated a single category of those conflicts. 
East Germany submitted an amendment which gave an identical definition to the two 
kinds of internal conflicts, only two criteria have to be present in order for the Protocol 11 
to apply. The armed conflicts must: (i) take place between armed forces or organized armed 
165 groups; and (ii) under responsible command. 
Thus, East Germany, adopted in fact the criteria of the ICRC's definition and simply 
extended it to Article 3. However, Norway submitted an amendment which simply states: 
"The present Protocol shall apply in situations referred to in Article 3 common to 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of the war victims". 166 
In my view, this amendment despite its humanitarian intent, is unrealistic since it brought 
back the imperfections of Article 3 to the Protocol 11 such as the absence of definition. 
164 10 ORDCHL, MDH/l/238/Rev I., p. 93-94. 
M5 
East Germany in fact, submitted the fottowing amendment: 
"Redraft paragraph I as follows: 
1. the present ProtocoL which specifies and supplements Article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions of August 12th, 1949, shalt apply to all armed conf Licts which in conforming with 
common Article 3 have not an international character and take place between armed forces or 
organized armed groups under responsible command". 
4 ORDCHL, CDDH/l/88, P. 8. 
166 
Ibid. p. 9. 
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As to the East German position, which can be safely said to represent the socialist States 
view, 167 it seems to me that its real aim was to restrict the field of application of Protocol 
11, so that it would not be applicable to their possible internal problems, which can usually 
be tackled by police action. Also it was especially directed to prevent any possibility of 
intervention in the internal affairs of States. 168 
Socialist States, later in the Conference, and after it became clear that wars of national 
liberation movements are to be considered as international armed conflicts, tacitly supported 
Third World countries, in playing down the importance of Protocol II. 
The second group of States which included Third World countries and many other States, 
was generally critical of the ICRC's draft Article 1, to them the definition contained in the 
article, was broad and thus it will open the way for outside intervention, and would tie the 
hands of the established Government in crushing violent disorders inside the country. 
Argentina expressed the feeling of the majority when its delegate stated: 
"... [H]is delegation appreciated that draft Protocol Il had been based on the idea of 
the protection of humanity. It was however, unrealistic in some respects, certain 
articles and particularly Article 1, to some extent infringed the jurisdiction of the 
State. "119 
To this delegation, in order for the sovereign States to accept such an instrument (Protocol 
11), the approach must be 'realistic', realistic in the context of draft Article 1, meant that 
the Article must be in line with the requirements of States interests. In other words, its 
definition must be strengthened, it must contain strong criteria which only limited cases of 
internal wars can satisfy, and by consequence leave a considerable margin of manoeuvre to 
the established Government. 
In fact, many States which belonged to this group submitted amendments, which contain 
their understanding of what constitutes an 'armed conflict not of an international 
character'. 170 Indonesia in fact, considered that Protocol 11 dealt with matters coming within 
the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign State, hence a cautious and practical view is needed 
in order iP-give due respect for the principle of sovereignty and integrity of States. It 
suggested that to attain that aim, Article I should take into account the following criteria: 
167 * See for further details on the socialist position: J. Toman: La conception sovi6tique du conf Lit 
arm6 non- international, in St. Trechsel and Y. Hangartner, (eds. ): VoLkerrecht im Dienste Des Menschen 
Festschrif FOr Hans Haug. Haupt, Bern/Stuttgart, 1986, pp. 309-335 (especially 327-331). See also J. 
Toman: The Socialist Countries and the Laws of War in: Modern Wars: The Humanitarian Challenge. A 
Report for the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues. Zed Books Ltd London to 
New Jersey, 1986, pp. 164-165. 
168 In fact, the East German detegate at the Conference stated in defence of his country's amendment 
that: 
"The introduction of new categories and difficutt distinctions was not caLcuLated to strengthen 
the deveLopment of internationat humanitarian Law, instead, it might encourage interference 
in the internat, affairs". 
OP- Cit.. supra. n. 160, MDH/I/SR. 22, para. 27, p. 207. 
169 lbid, CDDH/l/SR. 23. para. 9, p. 216. 
170 OP- cit., supra. n. 165, pp. 6-9. Pakistan MDH/1/26, p. 6; Irdonesia MDH/l/32, p. 7; BraziL 
CDDH/1/79, p. 83. 
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1. It should apply to regular armed forces under responsible command which took up 
arms against the legitimate Government, or to armed conflicts taking place between regular 
armed forces and organized armed groups. 
2. The armed forces or organized groups hostile to the legitimate Government must 
exercise continuous and effective control over a substantial or non-negligible part of the 
territory of the high contracting party. 
3. The armed conflict must reach a certain degree of intensity and continue for a 
prolonged period. 171 
These are very hard factual criteria, no insurgent movement which took arms against 
established Government since the second world war, can satisfy them, thus, the occupation 
of 'a substantial part of the State territory' criteria in fact can never be satisfied, in 
conditions of guerilla warfare, also the subjective elements of duration and intensity, may 
very well be abused by the established Government. 
Brazil also introduced other very stringent criteria in its amendment to draft Article 1; 
first, the insurgents must act under a responsible and identifiable authority, secondly, they 
must clearly distinguish themselves from the civilian population and thirdly the insurgents 
must exert continuous and effective control over a non-negligible part of the territory. 172 
These in fact, are impossible criteria to satisfy by guerillas where camouflage among the 
civilian population, is the essence of their tactics, especially when they are engaged in 
actual combats. 
The Delegation of Vietnam, after emphasising the necessity of defining the concept of 
'non-international armed conflict' as precisely as possible, stressed that: 
"... [I]n order to justify the application of humanitarian law and reconcile it with the 
principles of non- intervention in the internal affairs, this delegation considered that 
the scope of Protocol 11 should be limited to situations of armed conflicts of a 
particularly serious nature". 173 
To this country which experienced a whole range of deadly conflicts, fear of intervention 
is the reason behind its attempt at raising the threshold of the internal conflict. 
Vietnam, in fact introduced a proposal, to include in the definition of armed conflicts 
of non- international character, two serious elements: 
1. Popular support for the cause of the insurgents and secondly the occupation of a 
considerable part of the territory by the insurgents. Vietnam explained the rational behind 
the first criteria, in these terms: 
"... ]T]he party in conflict with the lawful Government should at least be fighting for 
a just cause, in order to have that popular support, which was not a purely sub . ective 
factor but could be easily evaluated on the basis of actual demonstration". 1N 
171 lbid, p. 7. and supra. n. 160, MDH/I/SR. 22, para. 55, p. 212. 
1721bid, 
p. g. 
1730P. cit., supra. n. 160, CDDH/l/SR. 22, para. 55, p. 212. 
1741bid, MDH/I/SR. 22, para. 59, p. 213. 
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The necessity of the second criteria was explained in the following way: 
"... [T]he occupation of a considerable part of the national territory implied control 
of that portion of territory by the responsible command and was proof of the 
seriousness and high degree of intensity of the hostilities between the Government 
of a State on one hand, and one or more factions on the other". 175 
Vietnam in fact, tried to introduce the idea of just war, in the context of internal conflicts. 
The requirement of 'popular support' is very hard to prove, and it is always absent in the 
first period of the internal conflict. Moreover, the legal Government may use very harsh 
methods against the civilian population, in order to terrorise them and consequently 
suppress any explicit show of support for the insurgents. 
In my opinion, the criteria of just cause must be eliminated in the sphere of the 
application of humanitarian law, since what is just for the insurgents is obviously unjust 
for the Government, no Government on earth can admit that its opponents have a good 
reason to overthrow it by the use of force. 
Introducing such highly political and moral criteria in the definition of internal conflicts, 
would mean in practice that established Governments would be in the position to treat their 
enemies inhumanly, only by claiming they are not fighting for a just cause. The criteria of 
just cause in my opinion hides in effect a return to very rigid concept of sovereignty. 
As to the criteria of "occupation of considerable part of the country", it seems to me that 
even the Vietnamese conflict shows that despite the intensity and duration of the contest, 
the insurgents could not claim that at any time, they controlled a considerable part of the 
country, this assertion will go against the logic of guerilla warfare. 
However, Pakistan tried to appear as a moderate it introduced an amendment, which 
emphasised some factual and psychological elements. They are the following: 
A. The conflict must take place between the armed forces of the Government and 
organized armed forces 
B. The hostilities must be of some intensity and last for a reasonable period of time. 
C. The insurgents, must occupy a part of the territory. 
D. The insurgent armed forces must be represented by a 'responsible authority' and have 
the intention to apply the obligation contained in Article 3 and the Protocol. 
E. The established Government may recognize the existence of a conflict not of an 
international character before the above conditions are satisfied. 176 
What has been done in this amendment is that it tried to tone down some of the onerous 
conditions advanced by the hardliners, it in fact, dropped the adjectives of 'non-negligible' 
and 'considerable' which have been attached to the quality of the territory which must be 
occupied by the insurgents. Moreover, the hostilities must be of 'some intensity" and not 
high intensity, the duration has been said to be of 'a reasonable period of time' instead of 
175 Jbid, p. 213. 
1760P. 
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prolonged duration. Also, it opened the way for the established Government's discretion in 
determining the existence of the internal armed conflict. 
It must be noted that some Third World countries have let it be known that after the 
inclusion of wars of national liberation in Article I of the first Protocol. They saw no need 
at all in pressing for any international regulation, since any attempt to that would be an 
infringement of their sovereignty, and would open the door for foreign interference in their 
domestic affairs. They considered that internal laws are sufficient for dealing with such 
events. 177 
However, Article I was adopted by the conference in June 2nd, 1977, after lengthy 
discussions. 178 It must be noted that the Article was not the object of any revision in the 
simplified version of Protocol 11, which was presented by Pakistan in the very last days of 
the diplomatic conference, 179 and which led to acceptance of Protocol 11 by consensus 
ATticle I as adopted, Teads as follows: 
"I. This Protocol which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, without modifying its existing conditions of 
application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article I of 
the Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating 
to the protection of victims of international armed conflict (Protocol 1) and which 
take place in the territory of high contracting party between its armed forces and 
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which under responsible 
command exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry 
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol. 
2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, 
as not being armed conflicts". 180 
177The 
main spokesman of this stand was India. Thus, even after the vote on draft ArticLe 1, he 
stated: 
, 'my detegation betieves that the provisions of Protocot 11, witt onty mititate against the 
overeignty of States and will. interfere in their internaL affairs. The internal, taw and oLder Ituations are the sote concern of sovereign States and these probtems are to be deatt with 
according the domestic taws of the country". 
7 ORDCHL, CDDH/SR. 49, p. 81. 
1781n fact, the Chairman of working group B of Committee 1, which drafted Articte 1, stressed In the 
49 Ptenary Meeting in which the Articte was adopted that: 
11 Art icte I represented a very f rag He consensus reached on Ly after tengthy cons ide rations". 
lbid, CDDH/SR. 49, para. 38, p. 66. 
179 Pakistan at the last session of the Diptomatic Conference and after consuttations with Canada, 
Egypt and the ICRC, submf tted an amendment which amputated nearly the half the provisions of Protocol 
11 as adopted at the Committee level. The reasons advanced were: 
1. A majority of States (especially from the Third World) firmly held the view that the text (as 
adopted at the committee Level) entered into unnecessary details, rendering it not only cumbersome 
but difficult to understand and to apply in the peculiar circumstances of a non-InternationaL 
conflict. 
2. Consequently the provisions of the Protocol must be within the perceived capacity of those involved 
to apply them, and therefore, precise and simple and, 
3. Those provisions should not appear to affect the sovereignty of any State Party or the 
responsabRity of its Goverment to maintain taw and order and defeat national unity, nor be able to 
be invoked to justify any outside intervention. See ibid, MDH/SR. 49, para. iO-12, p. 61. 
180 Op. cit., supra. n. 61, p. 121 
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The article was adopted on a roll call vote, with 58 in favour, 5 against and 29 
abstentions. 181 The Indian delegate who voted against the Article, interpreted the result of 
the voting as follows: 
W ... [fludging 
by the voting pattern it is seen as many as 34 delegates-more than one 
third present in the conference-did not vote in favour of this Article, which is indeed 
the very basis of this Protocol. Clearly, 34 delegations have expressed their 
disapproval of this Protocol. 
Moreover, further analysis of the vote shows that all the delegations which did not 
vote in favour of Article I are from the developing world, with the exception of 
Norway". 182 
Columbia on the other hand expressed the feeling that Article 1: 
a ... [H]ad been adopted by a fragile majority, and that 
in the last resort and after much 
discussion it had been approved through sheer fatigue". 183 
it seems that only the consensus vote to the whole Protocol, which saved Article 1. This 
Article then is a compromise formula and as such it will be the subject of different 
interpretations. 
On the other hand, what we can note in Article I as adopted is a real shift towards the 
point of view of the group of States which put sovereignty and non- intervention before the 
requirements of humanity, in internal wars. Thus, there is a real emasculation of the criteria 
of the internal armed conflict, so as to make the application of the Protocol very limited in 
practice. 
In fact, the Article, as it is drafted, ignores implicitly demands of guerilla warfare, it is 
silent on the point of who determines the existence of the internal conflict, and it applies 
only to the contests in which the established Government is a party to, all these elements, 
in my opinion, are examples of the triumph of those who advocate more protection for State 
sovereignty. 
Thus, if the overwhelming majority of States during the conference, supported the need 
for a clear definition of armed conflicts not of an international character, in order to avoid 
the imperfections of Article 3 (which contains no definition). The travaux prkparatolres, 
in my opinion, clearly show that the majority of States used the device of definition as a 
real vehicle of strengthening their sovereignty, and preventing any intervention in their 
internal affairs, simply by making the criteria of internal conflict very difficult to obtain. 
It must be stressed that Third World States were the main driving force behind such a 
stand. The reason in my opinion, is not because they were inhuman. but for the simple fact 
that they see themselves as the main seat of internal conflicts, and they are suspicious and 
181 States which voted against the Article were: Argentina, Cameroon, Chile, India and Syria. Among 
the abstaining States were: Algeria, Angola, Brazil, Indonesia, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Sudan, Sri-Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda and Zaire. op. cit., supra. 
n. 177. CDDH/SR. 49, p. 70. 
182 lbid 
183 
lbid, p. 78. 
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fearful of any international regulation of their behaviour during times of such conflicts, 
since that regulation may be used to limit their discretion in putting down the rebellion, and 
may give those who want to intervene in their internal affairs, an acceptable legal basis. 
B. Analysis of the Criteria of Armed Conflicts of a Non -International Character Included 
In Article 1 of Protocol 11 
The criteria included in the definition of armed conflict not of an international character, 
in the text of Article I of the Protocol 11 are the following: 
1. The contest should be bewteen the armed forces of the State and dissident armed 
groups: This implies first; that the established Government must resort to the use of its 
armed forces in order to quell the rebellion, the use of police action suffice to render the 
Protocol inapplicable, the use of armed forces itself is a manifestation of the gravity of the 
situation. Secondly; only when the established Government is a party in the conflict does 
Protocol 11 apply. The ICRC official commentary to Protocol 11, states that: 
"... [T]his criteria illustrate the collective character of the confrontation, it can hardly 
consist of isolated individuals without co-ordination". 184 
2. The insurgents must be under responsible command. This means that the insurgents 
must have some kind of organization with a responsible leadership, which is capable of 
directing the operations in an effective way, and can ensure discipline within the fighting 
forces. The ICRC commentary, however, stresses that the existence of a responsible 
command '-does not necessarily mean that there is a hierachical system of military 
organization similar to that of regular armed forces'. 185 
3. Control of a part of the territory by the insurgents: To me this criteria in fact signals 
the triumph of the advocates of sovereignty, since they are aware of the fact, that it will 
never be fulfilled in the first period of the conflict, and even after that, the criteria is very 
difficult to ascertain in situations of guerilla warfare. 
Similarly, there is no precise and express indication as to what is the proportion of the 
territories which has to be controlled, and how this control is to be exercised. Bothe stresses 
that: 
" ... [T]he extent of the control must be only such 
'as to enable' the adverse part 'to 
carry out sustained and concerted military operations. Nor can the proportion of the 
territory over which control must be exercised be indicated precisely. It seemed 
preferable to determine the extension of such territory by indicating its function ('as 
to enable... ) instead of fixing that it should be a "considerable part'... in a 'non- 
negligible part'. " 186 
In my view, there is no reason why States could not use a contrary argument and demand 
1840p. 
cit., supra. n. 23, pars. 4460, p. 1351. 
1851bid. 
186 M. Bothe, K. J. Partsch and Watdemar, A. Sotf: New Rutes for Victims of Armed Confticts. Martimis 
Nfjhoff, The Hague/goston/London, 1982, pp. 627-28. 
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that the control must be of a non-negligible part of the territory, the possibility is there, 
and the fear for sovereignty may very well lead to such an interpretation. 187 
4. The insurgents must conduct sustained and concerted military operation. This criteria 
emphasises implicitly the elements of duration and intensity of the conflict, 188 and this will 
bring, in practice, subjective elements to bear upon the determination of the conflict. This 
is another loophole which may be used by the established Government to resurrect the 
application of the Protocol. 
5. The ability of the insurgents to implement the Protocol. This criterion is closely linked 
to the criteria listed above, in a way it is the existence of these criteria, which can indicate 
in part, that the insurgents can be capable of implementing the rules of Protocol 11. 
This criterion is in my view highly subjective, in practice, it may very well open another 
loopholes for the legal Government to avoid the application of Protocol 11. 
It must be stressed that even with the high criteria included in the definition of internal 
conflicts in Article 1. some Third World States still insist that: 
"... [T]he conditions in Article I Qý did not provide adequate safeguards 'for the 
protection of State sovereignty'". 1 
This in my view, explains in part the reticence of the majority of States and especially those 
who experience internal wars, to ratify the Protocol II. In fact, only 3 States who are 
engaged in such contests dared to ratify that Protocol on the 31st October 1989 (El- 
Salvador, Surinam and the Philippines). 190 
1871n fact, Indonesia advocated such a stand. Thus, even after the adoption of Article 1, it stressed 
that it wouLd like to see the last three tines (of Article 1/1) anpLified on the following lines: 
11... (EIxercise continues and effective control over a substantial non-negLigibLe part of its territory for such a prolonged period as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted 
military operations of a high intensity and to implement this Protocol". 
Op. cit., supra. n. 177, CDDH/SR. 49, para. 7% p. 71. 
18SThe ICRC Commentary Is opposite to such a contention it stressed that: 
"The criteria of duration and intensity were not retained as such in definition because they 
would have introduced a subjective element". 
He then adds that: 
"On the other hand, the criterion whether mititary operations are sustained and concerted, 
white imptying the etement of continuity and Intensity, couptes with an objective assessment 
of the situation". 
Op. cit.. supra. n. 23, para. 4469, p. 1353. 
189 Statement made by Indonesia after the vote on Articte I of the Protocot It. Op. cit., supra. n. 177, 
MDH/SR. 49, p. 71. 
1900n Oct., 31st, 1989,88 States were parties to Protocol. I and 78 were parties to ProtocOt I I. See: 
IRRC, 1989,29th year, No. 272, p. 490. The reason for such retuctance (in the ratification of ProtocoL 
11) seems to be in the words of Gasser: 
not so much a tack of enthusiam for one or other of the provisions of ProtocoL 11 
which appear wetL-batanced. These governinents seem to reject the very idea of creating 
Internationat ruLes reLating toevents considered tobe fnternaL affairs of sovereign states". 
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C. The Situations to which Article 1 of Protocol IT Applies 
The majority of the doctrine supports the contention that the conditions of Article I of the 
Protocol 11 are very high, they in fact introduce through a back door the classical concept 
of civil war and belligerency. 
In this respect, Herczegh a Hungarian international lawyer, stresses that: 
"Protocol 11, holds the traditional concept of civil war whose cardinal eigment is the 
virtual control over a part of the territory of the country in question'. Iyl 
Green supports such an interpretation, he states: 
"This definition is so framed as to require a level of military organization and 
sophistication that ensures its application only in the traditional type of civil war". 192 
Another writer maintained that: 
"Protocol 11 has in effect reStated the general rule of international law relating to the 
status of belligerency. Before a situation assumes such a status the conflict is to be 
considered as a purely domestic affair". 193 
In practice then, the Article will apply only to rare cases. This point has been pointed out 
clearly by Schindler who stated that: 
"... [T]he fact that Protocol 11 only covers conflicts of high intensity will mean that this 
Protocol will only be applied in relatively few cases. The Spanish civil war and the 
civil war in Nigeria were mentioned as examples at the Geneva Conference". 194 
Cassese also supports the same view. He states: 
"... [Protocol 11] ne rdgit pas Wimporte quelle guerre civile, mais seulement des guerres de longue durde et de grande intensit6. Le Protocol a donc la meme sphýre d'application que les normes couturnkres form6es pendant la guerre civile Espagnole". 195 
I think that the conditions laid down in Article I leave no doubt that the above statements 
Some Legal Issues Concerning Ratification of the 1977 Geneva Protocols, in M. A. Meyer, (ed. ): Armed 
Conflicts and the New Law: Aspects of the 1977 Geneva Protocols and the 1981 Weapons Convention. 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London, 1989, p. 97. 
191 G. Herczegh: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention on the Protection of the Victims of Non- 
International Armed Conflicts, in Gryorgy, Harazti, (ed. ): Questions of International Law. VoL. 2, 
Akadeemial Kiado Budapest 1981, p. 75. See also the same author: Development of International 
Humanitarian Law. Akademiai Kiado Budapest, 1984, p. 208. 
192 Cited by K. J. Keith: The Present State of International Humanitarian Law. 9 AYIL' 1985, p. 18. 
193 M. R. RweLamira: The Significance and Contribution of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of August 1949 in Swinarski (ed. ), op. cit., supra. chapter 1, n. 1, p. 234. 
194 Op. cit., supra. n. 153, p. 149. 
1950p. 
cit., supra. n. 101, p. 571. See also the same author: Respect of Humanitarian Worms in Non- 
International Armed Conflicts in Modern Wars: The Humanitarian Challenge. A Report for the Independent 
Commission on International Humanitarian Issues. Zed Brooks Ltd. London and New Jersey, 1986, p. 91. 
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are correct, and that the Protocol will apply only to internal wars, which have, to a large 
extent, the characteristics of international wars. This opinion is supported by the majority 
of States, which made explanation of their votes when Article I was adopted. 
Thus, Canada stressed that the conditions laid down in Article I 'could only exist in a 
civil war situation'. 196 Bindschindler, as the delegate of Switzerland, stressed that: 
"... [T]he text which had just been adopted, however, fell short of everyone's hopes 
since its scope was too narrow and it covered only cases of conventional civil war, 
which had become rare". 197 
Pictet on the other hand, as a representative of the ICRC in the conference argued: 
"... [T]hat draft Protocol 11 had been criticized as committing States too far, but its 
field of application had been so precisely limited that it could be only in clearly 
defined civil conflicts". 198 
These statements confirm in my view my contention that claims of sovereignty and non- 
intervention, have been used effectively, in limiting the cases of internal conflicts to be 
regulated by humanitarian law to the minimum. In fact, the conditions of Article 1, 
contradict the spirit of guerilla warfare, which is the main form of the overwhelming 
majority of internal wars which are going on at the moment. 
D. Who Can Determine the Existence of a Non -International Armed Conflict within the 
Meaning of Article 1 of Protocol 11 
The Article itself is silent on this important question. However, two diametrically opposed 
views have been advanced during the conference and even after the adoption of the 
Protocol. 
The first view advocates that Article I containing objective criteria, which need no 
special mechanism or authority for their determination. This view was held by ICRC and 
some western States. Thus, the ICRC delegate stressed at the very start of the discussions 
of draft Article I that: 
"... [I]t [the ICRC] had chosen a broad field to cover all non- international armed 
conflicts and for that purpose had endeavoured to specify the characteristics of a 
non-international armed conflict by means of objective criteria so that the Protocol 
could be applied when those criteria were met and not be made subject to other 
196 Op. cit., supra. n. 177, MDH/SR. 49, p. 77. 
197 Ibid. MDN/SR. 58, para. 194, p. 300. 
198 lbid, MDH/SR. 49, p. 60. However, it must be noted that a minority of States expressed the view that 
the conditions of Articte I resembte those of insurgency in traditionat internationat taw, rather then 
bettigerency. Thus, Ecuador took the view that: 
"Protocol 11 brings under humanitarian taw the terms Laid down by international Law for the 
recognition of insurgency". 
Op. cit., supra. n. 168. MDH/SR. 49, p. 79. In my opinion, such assertions have no real weight since 
the concept of Insurgency and its conditions is not very clear even in traditional taw and in the 
State practice at that point. 
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considerations". 199 
The implication is that the established Government has no power of determination of the 
existence of an internal conflicts in its borders. 
Some delegations also supported such a stand. Thus, the US delegates stressed that: 
"... [T]he conditions it [Article 1] laid down for application of the draft Protocol to 
internal conflicts were reasonably objective and could be applied without great 
difficulty". 200 
Belgium also stated the same point of view, it stressed that: 
"... [N]o provision introduced in the present text of Article I could constitute an 
arbitrary or subjective prerequisite enabling a high contracting party to evade the 
application of the Protocol". 201 
Egypt for its part thought that any attempt to introduce the right of the Government to 
determine the existence of an internal conflict, would mean the return to the concept of 
the recognition of belligerenCy. 202 
The ICRC, in its recent official commentary, advocates also the idea of the automatic 
application of Protocol II. It states clearly that: 
"... [T]he Protocol applies automatically as soon as the material conditions as defined 
in the Article are fulfilled. The aim of this system is the protection of the victims of 
armed conflict should not depend on an arbitrary decision of the authorities 
concerned". 203 
Bothe and others support the same view. They advocated that: 
"... [A]II the qualifications required in paragraph I are of an objective nature. There 
is no room for discretion on the part of the high contracting party in whose territory 
a conflict covered by the provisions of Article I occurs, to decide whether this 204 conflict fulfils the requirements and from which date". 
l 99 Op. cit., supra. n. 160, MDH/I/SR. 22, para. 12, p. 203. 
2001bid, MDH/l/SR. 29, para. 32, p. 292. 
201 lbid, p. 291. 
202The Egyptian detegate, Abi-Saab, In fact, stated that: 
"Amendments to Article I requiring the recognition by the established Government of the 
existence of a situation of an internal armed conflict, introduced a purely subjective and 
voluntary criterion; they revived the old-fashioned doctrine of recognition of belligerency. 
But, if there were a recognition of belligerency there would be no need for a Protocol 11 
because according to general international Law. the whole body of the Law of war would then 
apply including the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocol Im. 
lbid, MDH/l/SR. 24, para. 31, p. 235. 
2030p. 
cit., supra. n-23, para. 4459, p. 1351. 
204 op. cit.. supra. n. 186, p. 628. 
180 
Then, they added: 
"Independent of any position taken by the Government in power, the adverse party 
and the members of its forces, and the civilian population and all persons affected 
by the armed conflict are entitled to the protection provided in the ProtoCol, o. 205 
Many States especially from the Third World together with Romania were against the above 
view during the conference. Similarly, even after the adoption of Article I they stressed 
the inalienable right of the established Government to determine the existence of an 
internal conflict within its borders. The rational behind such claims, lies obviously in the 
arguments that any other course would compromise State sovereignty and inevitably 
constitute an intervention in the internal affairs of the State concerned. 
Romania in fact submitted in the first Diplomatic Conference (1974) an amendment, 
which proposed to add at the end of Article 1/1 the following: 
"In cases where the State, on whose territory the events are taking place recognizes 
the existence of the conflict, its character and its constituent elements. " 
W 
It seems that the proposal did not gain much support in working group B. Although one 
delegation at least, (Brazil) still insist on the spirit of the Romanian amendment. 207 
At the 1977 session of the Diplomatic Conference, and in the 49 Plenary Meeting in 
which Article I was adopted, Columbia tried to introduce an oral amendment to Article 1, 
which specifies that: 
"The determination of the con itions referred to above shall be a matter for the State 908 in which the conflict occurs". 
This amendment was withdrawn, but on explaining its vote (it abstained) Columbia made 
it clear that: 
"... [W]ithin the context of this Article [Article 11 the insertion of subjective elements 
gives rise to difficulties of interpretation, and my delegation believes that in the 
exercise of sovereignty resides the right to determine such situations the text 
approved does not contradict that in any way". 209 
2051bid. 
2060p. 
cit., supra. n. 165, p. 7. 
207 Thus, Brazit supported by some States request the sub-group of working group B, that the fottowing 
text be incorporated in Articte 1/1 after the words 11 ... Protocol. 1: recognizes as such by the High 
Contracting Party in whose territory the armed conftict is considered to exist... ". op. cit., supra. 
n. 164, CDDH/l/REV/1, pp. 93-94. 




Many States supported the Columbian position in the explanation of their votes for Article 
1.210 Chile for instance, stressed that the application of Protocol 11 was determined by 
criteria whose definition by third parties would constitute interference on the internal 
211 affairs of the State. 
Moreover, it must be stressed that States confronted by internal conflicts may resort to 
Article 3 of the second of the Protocol, (on non -intervention) to characterise any attempt 
by third parties to determine the existence of such conflicts, as intervention. 
I think that the whole argument is between those who cling to a very rigid concept of 
sovereignty, because they see themselves the main target of internal wars, and those who 
are inclined to see some limitation to State sovereignty to grant human beings some 
protection against the cruelty of internal conflicts. 
In my view, in practice, the objective character of the Criteria of Article 1, can be 
apparent, if the established Government acts in good faith in the fulfilment of its 
international obligations. in fact the argument of human rights, and the need for the 
protection of the victims of internal wars, militates in favour of limiting the State power 
in the issue of the determination of the existence of the internal conflict, since 
Governments faced with such conflicts, are always tempted to abuse their power, and thus 
deny protection to the victims in need. 
The experience of El-Salvador is a case in point, the Government is a party to the 
Protocol 11. However, until now there is no official recognition of the application of 
Protocol 11 to the conflict. Despite the fact that all the elements of Article 1, are objectively 
present. Thus, the insurgents apparently control 5 of the 14 provinces of the country, such 
control has enabled them to conduct sustained and concerted operations against the 
Government forces. The insurgents also have shown their ability to implement the 
humanitarian rules, by accepting the distribution of relief in the zones controlled by them, 
and by accepting the exchange of prisoners through the ICRC. 212 
This state of affairs, has led the international community through the UNCHR and 
especially the UNGA to declare the application of Protocol 11 to the situation in El- 
Salvador. 
21OThus, Tanzania stressed in the exptanation of its vote on Articie 1 (it abstained) that: 
"Our delegation would specifically not allow this determination to be made by a body that is not a 
representative of the State in which the conflict takes place". 
lbid, p. 84. 
211 Ibid, p. 75. It must be noted that Chile after joining in the adoption of Protocol 11 by consensus, 
stated that: 
"The Chilean delegation joined the consensus of the adoption of Protocol 11; as it explained 
when Article I was voted on, It did so on the understanding that the determination of the 
conditions for its application ties with no authority other than the State in whose territory 
the conflict takes place, for reasons of sovereignty and non intervention ... is. 
lbid, MDH/SR. 56, p. 232. 
212See Americas Watch Report: Protection of the Weak and Unarmed: the Dispute over Counting Human 
Rights Viotations in Et-Setvador. Fob. 1984, p. 37-38. 
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Thus, in Resolution 38/101 of December 16th, 1983, the UNGA drew the attention of 
the parties to the conflict that: 
"... The rules of international law, as contained in Article 3-and additional Protocol 
I and 11 thereto, are applicable to armed conflicts not of an international character, 
such as in EI-Salvador. etC". 213 
The case of EI-Salvador has in my opinion established that the legal Government will 
fortify its supposed right to the determination of the existence of an internal conflict, when 
it acts in an arbitrary way. 
Concern for human rights protection can be established as a legal bias for international 
community intervention to declare the application of Protocol 11, in certain cases of internal 
conflicts. To me this is the logical consequence of accepting human rights as a valid 
limitation on State sovereignty. 214 
E. The Relation of Article 3 to Protocol II 
In its draft Article I submitted to the Diplomatic Conference, the ICRC gave a broad 
definition to non-international armed conflicts, excluded situations of internal disturbances 
and tensions from the application of humanitarian law, and lastly paragraph 3 of the Article 
(1) stated that: 
"The forgoing provisions do not modify the conditions governing the application of 
Article 3 common to the Geneva Convention of August 12,1949". 
Thus, Protocol 11 sets out two kinds of non- international armed conflicts, on one hand those 
which must satisfy the conditions of Article I and on the other hand those covered by 
Article 3. 
The intention of the ICRC, was to keep the conditions of application of Article 3 
unchanged, in other words the ICRC wanted to keep an autonomous existence of Article 
3, in order that the rising of the thresholds of the definition of Article I does not react 
upon Article 3.215 
During the conference, four opinions concerning the position of Article 3 in the Protocol 
11 can be noticed: 
21337 UNY, 1983, p. 887. 
214 Cassese, however, advocates the estabtfshment of a lcomit6 de sages' which consists of prominent 
individuaLs of great prestige from the Third WorLd countries, which woutd have as a main function the 
determination of the existence of an internal, armed confLict in the meaning of ProtocoL 11. See A. 
Cassese: Respect of Humanitarian Norms in Non-Internationat ConfLict, In: Modern Wars: The 
Humanitarian Chattenge. A Report for the Independent Commission on International, Humanitarian Issues. 
Zed Brooks Ltd. London & New Jersey, 1986, pp. 96-97. 
215See the comments of the ICRC detegate in connection with this subject. op. cit., supra. n. 160, 
MDH/I/SR. 22, para. 16. p. 204. 
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1. Some States tried to drop any hint or reference to Article 3 in the text of Article 1, of 
the Protocol 11,216 the implication is that all internal conflicts, other than riots and internal 
disturbances and tensions, will be covered only by Protocol 11. This position in fact gives 
sovereignty priority over any humanitarian considerations. However, this view, it seems had 
not attracted States, since even hardliners concentrated on raising the thresholds of conflicts 
covered by Protocol 11, rather than eliminating Article 3. 
2. Some other States tried to establish the identity of the field of Application of Article 
3 and Protocol II, by extending the definition of armed conflicts covered by Protocol 11 to 
Article 3. This was the position of socialist States. These States wanted in fact to establish 
only one kind of internal conflict, the rational behind such a stand was advocated by East 
Germany, which stressed that the introduction of new categories and difficult distinctions: 
"... [W]as not calculated to strengthen the development of international humanitarian 
law. Instead, it might encourage interference in the internal affairs of States". 217 
It seems that the real motive behind the socialist stand was to exclude any possibility of 
applying Article 3 to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, which may constitute 
the main forms of internal disorder in those StateS218 and thus, protect State sovereignty. 
3. Norway, 219 however, tried to establish the identity of the field of application of 
Protocol 11 and Article 3, however, unlike socialist States, it did not attempt to give any 
definition to that unique kind of internal conflict. Clearly, the intention of Norway was to 
make the overwhelming majority of internal conflicts benefit from the application of 
Protocol 11 and thus restrict the discretion of States to a greater extent. 
4. However, the majority of States opted for the importance of keeping an independent 
scope of application for Article 3. This in fact was to compensate for the emasculation of 
the definition of conflicts covered by Protocol 11. 
Abi Saab (Egypt) during the Conference gave the rational behind such an approach in 
these terms: 
"It was a step in the right direction of gearing the scope of protection to the level of intensity of the conflict rather than to abstract legal categories such as internal and international armed conflicts. Such an approach by stages was more in conforming 
with the spirit and purpose of humanitarian law and with the multiple forms of 
contemporary armed conflicts, especially guerilla warfare and low intensity conflicts. For the same reason, it was essential to safeguard the indepSndent scope of 
application of Article 3 common to Geneva Conventions of 1949". 20 
216Romania 
advocated such course In fact, it submitted an amendment, proposing the deletion of 
paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the ICRC draft. Op. cit., supra. n. 165, CDDH/1.30 (March 12th, 1974), p. 7. 
Romania explained later that it considered para 3 of Article I as unnecessary. Op. cit., supra. n. 160, 
MDH/l/SR. 23, para. 34, p. 221. 
217 Op . cit., supra. n. 160, CDDH/I. SR. 22, para. 27, p. 207. 
218 For further details, see Toman, op. cit.. supra. n. 167, pp. 328-331. 
219 OP. cit., supra. n. 165, MDH/1/218 (17.2.1975), p. 9. 
220 op. cit., supra. n. 160, CDDH/I/SR. 24, pare. 30. pp. 234-235. 
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The implication then, is that humanitarian law will be served by keeping an independent 
scope of application for Article 3, since that Article would be applicable in situations which 
are not covered by Protocol 11. The actual text of Article I as it was adopted establishes the 
relationship between the Protocol and Article 3 in the following fashion: 
'This Protocol which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of 
application. etc*. 
The suggestion is that. when the Protocol applies, Article 3 applies automatically. However, 
when the thresholds of the Protocol definition are not present Article 3. will be applied only 
when the situation is not characterized as internal disturbances and tensions. 
It must be noted, that in the 49th plenary meeting, in which Article I as it stands now 
has been adopted. Cameroon submitted an oral amendment which would have reduced the 
significance of Article 3, it suggested that: 
".. 41]n his view (the delegate], the words 'without modifying its existing. conditions 
of application' in paragraph I were unnecessary and could be deleted. ""' 
It seems that the immediate implication of this amendment, would be the establishment 
through a back door of the similarity of the field of application of Protocol 11 and Article 
3. and thus indirectly extending the high thresholds of the definition of armed conflict in 
Protocol 11 to that of Article 3. This suggestion in fact, would kill the autonomy of Article 
3 and at the same time enlarge the number of internal conflicts, which can escape any 
international regulations. The proposal. however, was withdrawn. Mexico made a very 
interesting observation in connection with the Cameroonian amendment when it stressed 
that: 
"... Mhat Committee I had considered the phrase to be very important, in so much as it ensured that the applicatiQ of Article 3 common to Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
should not be jeopardized*. 'P2 
This observation. underlines the general feeling of States that there are two sorts of internal 
conflicts. to which humanitarian law contained in the Protocol 11 and in Article 3 can be 
applied. It also implies that the field of application of Article 3 is broader than that covered 
by Protocol 11.2Z3 
However. one writer has gone so far as to suggest that 
221 OP. cit., swo. n. 177. MON/lIS4.49. pers. 46, p. 67. 
2221bfd. 
2231n 
this context. the Syrian delegate expressed the view that "Article I was retrogressive when 
compared with the provisions of Article 30. This implies -m9 other things, that he sees Article 3 
as having a broader field of application. since It applies to conflicts which are of some tower intensity. Ibfd. pars 47. p. 67. 
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"... [N]either Protocol 11 nor Common Article 3 contain any criteria to determine their 224 exact relationship with each other". 
In my view, this suggestion is not wholly true, the legislative history of Protocol 11 affords 
some very important indication as to that relationship. 
Moreover, Egypt and Belgium referred specifically to that question in their explanation 
for their votes for the two Protocols. The former stated that: 
"Protocol 11 develops some aspects of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949, without completely covering its scope. Consequently Article 3 still represents 
the minimum protection for everything that is not covered, and better covered by this 
Protocoln. 225 
The latter explained that: 
"... [W]hile this Article (1) which develops and supplements common Article 3 does not 
cover all possible applications of Article 3, neither does it modify the conditions of 
applications ... in other words the entire philosophy of the provisions of common Article 3 whether explicitly reaffirmed or not, is included in the Protocol". 226 
No State has contradicted such an interpretation. 
Furthermore, the relationship between the Protocol 11 and Article 3, is based upon the 
autonomy of their respective fields of application. In case of the absence of the conditions 
of application of Protocol 11, in that situation only the minimum rules of Article 3 will 
apply. However, when the conditions of the application of Protocol Il are present, all the 
rules contained in Article 3 as developed in the Protocol II apply. The ICRC commentary 
and the doctrine confirms such interpretation. It states: 
"... [I]n circumstances where the conditions of application of the Protocol are met the Protocol and Common Article 3 will apply simultaneously, as the Protocol's field of 
application is included in the broader one of common Article 3. On the other hand, in a conflict where the level of strife is low, and which does not contain the characteristic features required by the Protocol, only Common Article 3 will 
apply". 227 
Abi Saab stresses the same point. He writes: 
"Le Protocole compl&te I'article 3 commun par rapport A un seul espace de conflits 
armds r6gis par ce dernier. Mais il Wexclut ni ne limit I'application de I'Article 3A 
ce meme type de conflij,, et c'est dans ce sens qu'il ne modifie nullement ces 
conditions d'application". 
2240p. 
cit., supra. n. 193, p. 234. 
2250p. 
cit., supra. n. 177, MDH/SR. 49, p. 76. 
2261bid. 
2270P. 
cit., supra. n. 23, para. 4457, p. 1351. 
228G. Abi Saab: Conftfts armds non-internationaux, in: Les dimensions internationates du droit 
humanitaire. Institut Henry Dunant, ed. A. P6done, UNESCO, 1986, p. 267. Atso S. Junod and Bothe Stated 
the same view. The former indicates that when Protocot 11 is appticabte due to the existence of its 
conditions, Articte 3 witt "retain an autonomous existence, its appticabitfty is neither restricted 
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This kind of interpretation, in my view, is consistent with the object and purpose of the 
Protocol 11. The latter in fact, stipulates that: 
"This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions and 
other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts". 
However, the question is whether Article 3 as opposed to Protocol 11 is applicable to such 
situations. One view stresses the application of Article 3 to such situations; only Protocol 
11 is precluded. In this respect, Bothe writes: 
"... [P]uisque le Protocole 11, ne modifie pas les conditions actuelles de Papplication de 
I'Article 3 common aux Conventions, la d6finition n6gative du conflit arm6 contenu 
au paragraphe 2 de I'Article I ne peut concerner que le Protocole 11 et non F2R9S 
I'Article 3. La question du champ d'application de I'Article reste done ouverte". 
In fact, Bothe is defending a position which has been advocated by West Germany, in its 
explanation of its vote for Article I of the Protocol. In this context, it stated that: 
"... The existing conditions of application of Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions are not modified. This is clearly expressed in Article 1, paragraph I of 
Protocol Il. It also applies to paragraph 2 of the same Article. Consequently the 
negative definition of the term 'Armed Conflict' in paragraph 2 applies only to 
Protocol II, not to Article 3 Common to Geneva Conventions. This is the 
understanding of the Federal Republic of Germany as to the interpretation of Article 
I of Protocol Il". 230 
Whatever the humanitarian motives behind such assertions, it is very doubtful whether the 
nor subjected to the scope of Protocol Ilm- junod: Additional Protocol 11, History and Scope, 33 AULR, 1983, p. 35. 
The Latter notes in this respect, that: 
11 ... It is the idea behind common Article 3 which is developed and supplemented, not the 
provisions of the Article itself. The field of application of Article I is different from that 
of Common Article 311. 
Op. cit., supra. n. 186, p. 623. 
229M. Bothe: Confl, its arm6s internes et droit international, hunanitaire, 82 RGDIP, 1978, p. 90. 
Simitarty, Gasser advocated such views. He stated: 
"'This minimum standard, of international humanitarian taw, contained in Article 3, largely 
corresponds to the body of guarantees f rom wh f ch Governments cannot derogate, even in emergency 
situations. These rules are binding in armed conflicts, including non-internationaL armed 
conflicts, and hence also logically in internal disturbances and tensions". 
Proposats for a Code of Conduct. IRRC, 1988, (28th year), No. 262, p. 45. 
230 Op. cit., supra. n. 177, CDDH/SR. 49, pp. 79-80. Itaty eartfer in the Diptomatic Conference (in 1975) 
seems to support such interpretation (advocated by West Germany) it stated: 
"The situations provided for in paragraph 2 did not fail within the scope of application of 
draft Prot ocot. 11 since that Protocol did not regard them as armed conft, I cts; though that wou Id 
clearly not exclude the possibility that some of them might come within the field of 
application of Common Article 311. 
Op. cit., supra. n. 160, MDH/l/SR. 29, para. 25, p. 290. 
187 
majority of States would support such a view, since it leads to the restriction, of State 
sovereignty to a large extent. 
In fact, it seems certain that socialist and Third World States do not support any extension 
of Article 3 to situations of internal disturbances and tensions. Thus, in its explanation of 
vote for Protocol I and 11, East Germany expressed the feeling of the majority when it 
stressed that: 
"Many countries have expressed their fears that Protocol Il might lead to an 
infringement of their sovereignty. Because of that fact it seems important to us that 
Article I of Protocol II unambiguously States that Protocol 11 as well as Article 3 
common to the Geneva Conventions do not apply to situations of internal 
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and 231 other acts of a similar nature". 
This interpretation is supported also by the ICRC Commentary, where it is stressed that 
internal disturbances and tensions are not within the field of application of humanitarian 
law and that the ICRC acts in that area only on an ad hoc basiS. 232 
This interpretation would in my view, satisfy the limits to which States are ready to 
accept limitations on their sovereignty. 
F. Evaluation of Article 1 of Protocol 11 
It is my opinion, that the high and serious threshold of application of Article 1, coupled 
with the absence of a definition of armed conflict regulated by Article 3 common to 
Geneva Conventions and the express provision that the Protocol does not apply to situations 
of internal disturbances and tensions will mean that in practice many internal conflicts, will 
not be covered by any rule of humanitarian law. 
Keith rightly stressed that the Protocol II cannot apply to situations of urban guerilla 
warfare, since it (the Protocol) requires some kind of territorial control. Moreover, it is very 
doubtful whether those situations can be regulated by Article 3.233 This is a concrete 
example of an armed conflict, which may very well find no protection by humanitarian law. 
Although, human rights as an accepted restriction of State sovereignty may still play a 
useful role in the protection of the fundamental human rights such as the right to life, 
2310P. 
cit., supra. n. 177, CDDH/SR. 56, p. 243. See atso J. Toman: The Sociatfst Countries and the Laws 
of Armed Conftict in: ModernWars: The Humanitarian Chattenge. A Report for the Independent Commission 
on Internationat Humanitarian Issues. Zed Books Ltd, 1986, p. 166. 
232 Op. cit., supra. n. 23, p. 1356. Simitarty, Meron seems to support this view: Draft ModeL Dectaration 
on Internat Strife. IRRC, 1988.28th year, No. 262, p. 60. Likewise, Bedlaouf takes the same stand, he 
state: 
"in its present, humanitarian taw does not provide a sound legal basis for the ICRC to 
intervene in such situations. frequent though may be involving all kinds of racial riots, 
violent strikes and social tensions". 
Humanitarian Law at a Time of Failing National and International Consensus in Modern Wars. The 
Humanitarian Challenge, a Report for the Independent Commission on Humanitarian Issues. Zed Books, 
London, 1986, p. 20. 
2330p. 
cit., supra. n. 192, p. 20. 
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prohibition of torture and the need for humanitarian treatment in those situations. 
Furthermore, I think that in practice, States faced with violent challenges to their 
authority, will have a very wide discretion to choose between the categories of armed 
conflicts contained in Article I of the Protocol. This may result in delays in the application 
of humanitarian rules. 
Similarly, it seems to me that, despite the argument that the development and codification 
of humanitarian law has not to be seen as an infringement of State sovereignty, or an 
234 intervention in its internal affairs, the majority of States especially from the Third World 
were not convinced. Consequently, even after the adoption of the two Protocols, many 
States in their explanation of their votes asserted that Protocol II touches on their 
sovereignty. 235 This will have in practice, a negative effect upon the application of that 
Protocol. In this way, Article 1, is very rigid in the sense that it did not take notice of the 
234 Thus, Pictet as a deLegate of the ICRC argued that: 
"Despite the misgivings of some delegations, the Protocols did not represent a danger to the 
Governments... nothing in the texts was prejudicial to national sovereignty". 
op. cit., supra. n. 177, CDDH/SR. 49, para. 4, p. 59. Similarly, the USSR delegate stressed that: 
11... Protocot 11 contained a number of ArticLes of great weight, while at the same time 
avoiding tanguage which couLd be interpreted as attempting to interfere inthe internat affairs 
of States". 
lbid, CDDH/SR. 58, para. 93, p. 297. 
235Thus, Mauritania stressed that: 
M ... (Ilit considers that Its provisions [Protocol III are essentially a matter of national 
sovereignty". 
Ibid, CDDH/SR. 58, p. 324. The Philippines made it cLear that: 
"... Ellt wouLd have abstained as wetL If a vote had been taken on ProtocoL 11, because it 
adheres strongLy to the principLe that it Is the sovereign right of every state to cleaL with 
rebel, movements within its territory in any manner it deems fit, and to appty its nationat taw 
according". 
lbid, MDH/SR. 56, p. 243. Turkey atso expressed the view that: 
"Protocol 11. even in its present form presents aspects which seem to conflict with the 
sovereign right of the State". lbfd, p. 249. 
Zaire noted that: 
"... [Hlowever good the intentions of Its authors might have been, the fact remained that 
several provisions of Protocol It encroached upon the rules of State's domestic Law and thereby 
dangerously compromised the sovereignty and territorial jurisdictions of those States". 
lbid, p. 219. Uganda enphasised atso that it has: 
0... kR]etuctantty joined the consensus on the adoption of Protocol It and, If the text of 
Protocol 11 had been put to the vote, our delegation would have abstained because some of its 
provisions infringe the sovereignty of States". 
Ibid, p. 251. Finatty, Iran dectared that: 
"The simptif fed text neverthetess contained some provisions that were tacking in ctarity and 
that might be interpreted as a threat to State sovereignty". 
lbid, CDDH/SR. 58, p. 309. 
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development of methods of warfare in internal conflicts. Guerilla tactics are the main 
method of the weak, and insurgents are always weak in matters of arms and equipment, 
intelligence and personnel. 
Established Governments faced with such methods, will be at ease in denying the 
application of Protocol 11, since the insurgents will hardly be able to assert control over a 
certain part of the territory. 
It has also been suggested that Article I contains objective conditions, their existence 
does not need any formal determination by any one, be it the established Government, the 
rebels or a third party. It is asserted that in practice many problems of interpretation 
concerning such 'objective conditions' will arise. This would not be in the interests of the 
victims of internal conflicts. In my opinion, the concept of sovereignty and non- 
intervention will play a major role in the raising of the Problems of interpretation. 
However, on the positive side, I think that the definition of non- international armed 
conflicts in Article 1, and its inclusion of Article 3 Common to Geneva Conventions can 
be interpreted as a positive step in the development of humanitarian law in internal 
conflicts, since the implication is that Common Article 3 halbeen given a definition which 
the text of the Article (3) had left out. 
Such a definition must be seen against the high threshold of application of Article 1, in 
other words Article 3 must be interpreted as containing a lower threshold of application 
compared to Article 1, which means in practice that many internal conflicts which do not 
satisfy the conditions of Article I may very well be covered by Article 3. 
Despite the limited number of humanitarian rules contained in Article 3, they ate to be 
observed by all States, hence they are now an established legal limitation upon State 
sovereignty. Also due to the very low number of States who challenged the reference to 
Common Article 3, in the text of Article I (in fact only Romania did so). It is suggested 
here, that the Article (3), must be seen as becoming a rule of Jus cogens in the meaning of 
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, which every State 
must observe in internal conflicts which satisfy at least two conditions. First, they are not 
internal disturbances and tensions within the meaning of Article 1/2 of the Protocol 11. 
Secondly, they do not satisfy the thresholds of application of Protocol Il laid down in 
Article 1/1 of the same Protocol. 
Moreover, on the positive side, it seems that Article I is a positive limitation of State 
sovereignty, since it codifies some conditions of the traditional concept of belligerency, 
in an obligatory international instrument. 
When the conditions of Article I exist in an internal conflict, the sovereignty of the State 
give way to the applications of a host of humanitarian rules, which are essentially of a 
human rights nature. This means that the movement for the application of human rights in 
peace time, has, as a limitation upon the sovereignty of State, found another extension to 
periods of violence and times of war. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PROTECTION OF THE VICTIMS OF INTERNAL WARS 
Introduction 
Civil wars are well known for their cruelty and inhumanity since sentiments run very high 
and the temptation to indulge in committing atrocities is very present. In this respect, 
Vitelius in the battle of Bepriar, exclaimed: 
"Le corps d'un ennerni mort sent toujours bon, surtout si c'est un compatriote". 1 
Similarly, General Sherman who committed many atrocities during the American civil war 
believed that 'the only possible way to end this unhappy and dreadful conflict is to make 
it terrible beyond endurance., 2 This means that the question of the protection of the victims 
of internal conflicts acquires a pressing importance, since lives of human beings are at 
stake. 
It must be indicated that the term 'victims of internal wars' will include the civilian 
population, the wounded and the sick and the captured combatants held prisoners. In 
general, it includes those who do not bear arms or those who are unable to continue the 
fight because of their injury, sickness or capture. 
My assertion in this chapter is that, even if States still use the argument of sovereignty 
and non-intervention to block or limit the regulation of their conduct towards their own 
citizens especially in times of emergency, nevertheless, they gradually began to accept some 
timid curtailment of their absolute rights especially in the context of the subject matter of 
this chapter. 
It is asserted that the concept of human rights has helped to a great extent the acceptance 
by States of some important humanitarian rules, concerning the protection of the victims 
of internal wars, first in common Article 3 and especially in the context of Protocol 11. 
In order to cover the subject of this chapter, the latter will be divided into 3 sections. 
First, the protection of the victims of internal conflicts in customary international law. 
Secondly, the protection of the victims of internal conflicts in Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Convention. Thirdly, the protection of the victims of internal conflicts in Protocol 
Il. 
Section 1: The Protection of the Victims of Internal Conflicts under Customary 
International Law 
In this section, my aim is to search for, first, the roots of the protection of victims of wars 
in general, secondly, to state what are the customary rules on the protection of victims in 
wars in general whatever the nature of the conflict, and lastly, to see whether those rules 
1 Cited by M. Veuthey: Les conftits arm6s de caract6re non-internationat et te droit humanitaire, in 
Cassese (ed. ): Current Probtems of Internationat Law. Giuffrb, Mitan, 1975, p. 181. 
2 Cited by F. Kalshoven: AppLicabiLity of Internationat Customary Law in Non-Internationat, Armed 
ConfLfct, ibid, p. 274. 
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of customary law apply in situations of civil wars. This will be done essentially by studying 
the State practice and throughout the whole section, the influence of the principle of 
sovereignty and non- intervention on these issues will be sought and elucidated. 
A. The Roots of the Protection of the Victims of War 
It is claimed by some writers that if rules relating to the conduct of hostilities find their 
roots in the usages and traditions of what is called chivalry. The roots of protection victims 
of war to be found in the writings of the publicists, 3 such as Grotius, Vattel, Montesquieu 
and Rousseau. 
However, before analysing the contributions of these writers and the State practice vis- 
A-vis victims of wars, especially in the 17th and 18th centuries, it is interesting to note that 
even if the roots of modern law of war in general, and that of the protection of the victims 
of war especially, are to be found in the writings and the State practice. 
Other civilizations, especially the Islamic one, which was in direct contact with the West, 
has developed a very coherent body of rules of warfare, wherein they stressed the 
importance of the protection of victims of wars. Thus, the rules on the protection of non- 
combatants in general, were to apply in wars between the Islamic States and other States and 
also in wars between Moslems that is in 'internal wars'. 
It is to be noted that the main reason for the interest of Islam in the laws of war and the 
protection of victims springs from the fact, that the 'Jihad' (the holy war) was a component 
part of the religion. It was a duty for the Islamic State and moslern individuals. This being 
so, its regulation was very important. 
The examples of good treatment of the victims of war can be found in the Islamic 
historY4 such as it is illustrated by the treatment of the Algerian Emir Abdelkader during 
his war against the French occupation (1830-1847). Prisoners were kept by him 
5 
and treated 
well and in many instances released upon the intervention of Catholic priests. 
However, it is interesting to note that the idea of non-combatancy and the humane 
treatment of those who lay down their arms because of injury or capture, have developed 
essentially in the context of Europe. Theoretically, it is the 17th and 18th centuries that 
witnessed the seeds of such developments. Those developments it seems were essentially a 
reaction against what was going on in practice, war was more or less total, no one escaped 
its horrors. 
One witness of that epoch, Sorel wrotes: 
38est, op. cit., supra. chapter 1, n. 1, pp-63-64. 
4 See in this respect, 14uhamed Tatlat At-Ghunalmi: A General Review of Humanitarian Law in Islam, in: 
First Egyptian Seminar on international Humanitarian Law. ICRC, Egyptian Society of International Law, 
Cairo, November 1982, pp. 43-93. See also General Samir Muhamed Fadet: Contemporary Developments in 
International Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflicts: A Comparison with Islamic Principles 
Cin Arabic), ibid. pp. 95-105. 
5 D. Borrer: Narrative of a Campaign against the Kabaites of Atgerfa with the Mission Of 14. SuChet to 
the Emir Abd-Etkader for an Exchange of Prisoners. Longman, Brown, Green & Longmans, London, 1848, 
pp. 274-321. 
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"... [La guerre] d6pouille I'homme du vernis d'emprint dont il se part; elle le met ý nu, 
ddcouvrir toutes ses infermitdes; Iftche tous ses vices, d6bride toutes ses passionS". 6 
He then observes that: 
"Les hommes du dix-huitiýme si6cle restent bruteaux et emport6s. La plupart 
dissertent 6galement sur Ilhumanit6, pour peut sont humains. La 'sensibilit6' est pure 
affaire de modes". 7 
He then describes how war was conducted in the 18th century as follows: 
"Le fait de la guerre tombe sur le pays occup6 et Ncrase. On proscrit les habitants 
rdput6s dangereux ou simplement suspects les autres prennent peur, et pour se 
soutraire au p6ril qui menace non-seulement leurs biens, mais leur personne, 
I'honneur de leurs fernmes et de leurs filles, its dmigrent. Alors, on met une taxe sur 
les absents, puis on d6molit les maisons de ceux qui ne le payent pas ". 8 
Thus, the population of the State against which war is declared are considered as 'enemy', 
their property can be taken. 
The war against the prince is a war against every individual in his realm, those 
indivuduals are therefore destined to suffer every disruption of family ties and every loss 
of property and honour. It is against this background, that publicists began to urge 
moderation and humanity in dealing with the victims of war. In this context, Grotius even 
if he regarded the population of the adversary as 'enemies', he nevertheless maintained that 
moderation must prevail. He approved Cicero who in his "first book to his officers, advises 
the sparing of those who have committed no acts of atrocity and cruelty in war and that 
wars undertaken to maintain honour should be conducted upon principles of moderation". 
9 
However, he did not rule out the possibility of killing the innocent, if, in the language 
of today, military necessity requires it. He writes that: 
*Though there may be circumstances in which absolute justice will condemn the 
sacrifice of lives in war, yet humanity will require that the greatest precaution should be used against involving the innocent in danger except in cases of extreme urgency 
and utility". 10 
We can see in this statement the seeds of the distinction between combatants and non- 
combatants, we can infer also that he sees that the hardships of war must be directed 
essentially against those who bear arms, innocents and their belongings should be protected 
from the horrors of war. " 
6A. Sorel: L'Europe at ta r6votution Francaise. lere. partie, Les moeurs potitiques at les traditions. 
Meme ed. Librarie Plon, Paris, 1897, p. 81 
7 Mid, p. 82. 
81bid, 
p. 83. 
9H. Grotius: The Rights of War and Peace, translated by A. C. Campbell. M. Walter Dunne (Pub. ), London 





However, in the context of the protection of prisoners of war he observed that: 
"It is the practice among Christian powers to detain prisoners of war, till their ransom 
be paid; the amount of which dspends upon the will of the conqueror unless it has 
been settled by express treaty. "' 
This means that on the question of POW's, Grotius was pragmatic, since it seems that he 
regards that paying a ransom is better than enslavement or outright killing. 
On the other hand, Vattel states his general principle in somewhat harsh words: 
"When the ruler of the state, the sovereign declares war upon another sovereign, it 
is understood that the whole nation is declaring war upon the other nation..: The two 
nations are therefore enemies and all the subjects of one nation are enemies of the 
subjects of the other". 13 
He also emphasized that: 
"All citizens are exposeýjto losses and it is his misfortune upon whom they fall. If in 
civil society we must risk our lives for the State, we may well risk our property "- 14 
However, this sweeping statement of the general principle on the effects of war is followed 
by excluding women, children, feeble old men, the sick, ecclesiastics, men of letters, 
husbandmen and generally those who are not armed. These categories which we may call 
them non-combatants if they offer no resistance 'the belligerent has no right to maltreat or 
15 otherwise offer violence to them much less put them to death'. 
Moreover, Vattel argued that if the Sovereign desires to keep his conscience clear, and 
fulfill the duties of humanity, he should keep in mind that the right to wage war upon his 
fellow-men, must be a matter of necessity and a remedy against a wrong done. He then 
stressed: 
"If he [the Sovereign] is impressed with that great truth he will not push the remedy 
beyond its just limits, and he will be careful not to make more severe or more 
disastrous to mankind than the care of his own safety, etc. " 16 
In other words, if the war between States is inevitable, its conduct must not be without any 
limits. This is the anti-thesis and theoretical foundation of the Declarations of St. 
Petersburg of 1868 and of Brussels of 1874, and indeed the whole movement of codification 
of the laws of war which has been undertaken in the 19th century. 
The impact of Rousseau and Montesquieu, to name but two, is considerable in the 
development of the concept of combatants and non-combatants and human treatment of the 
victims of war in general. In this context, Montesquieu stressed that: 
121bid, 
p. 347. 








"... [N]ations ought to do to one another in peace the most good and in the war the 
least evil". 17 
The implication is that war is not mutual destruction, and that massive inhuman treatment 
of enemy's subjects will not help future relations with that same enemy. 
Montesquieu, then outlined his basic theory concerning what nations ought to do to each 
other in war. He noted that: 
"It is false that killing in war is lawful, unless in case of absolute necessity". 18 
He gave priority to the standard of civilization, lives are to be protected unless military 
necessity intervenes. However, it is obvious that attacks against the innocent civilians, 
killing of helpless sick and wounded soldiers, refusing to give quarter, or inhuman 
treatment of those who laid down their arms, can never be justified by the claim of absolute 
military necessity. This is the likely implication of what Montesquieu advocates. 
He also stated in clear terms his position vis-A-vis prisoners of war, he was against their 
enslavement or killing, his reason was that: 
"... [W]ar gives no other right over prisoners than to disable them from doing further 
harm by securing their persons. All nations concur in detesting murdering of 
prisoners in cold blood". ' 
Once the soldier is hors-de-combat, he must be treated humanely, he is no longer a lawful 
object of attack or killing. These humanitarian views were, in fact, the real basis upon 
which the protection of the victims of war was to be built as we will see later. 
Rousseau is considered widely as the main architect of the theoretical foundation of thý 
laws of war, especially its aspect dealing with the protection of persons. He writes: 
"Cest le rapport des choses et non des hommes qui constitue la guerre, et Ntat de 
guerre ne pouvant naltre des simples relations personnelles, mais seulement des 
relations rdelles, la guerre privde oij I'homme a homme ne peut exister ni dans Ntat 
de nature, ou it n'y a point de propriW constante, ni dans Ntat social, oil tout est 
sous I'autorit6 des joiS". 20 
This observation shows that Rousseau believes that men are essentially good, by their 
nature. They are not directed to inflict pain on each other. This assumption has led him to 
pronounce his much quoted observation that: 
"... [L]a guerre West donc point une relation d'homme A homme, mais une relation 
d'Etat ý Etat, clans laquelle les particuliers ne sont ennernies quaccidentellement, non 
point comme des hommes, ni meme comme citoyens mais comme soldats, non-point 
17C. de Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws (1748), transtated by T. Nugent. Hafner Pub. Co., New 




20 J. J. Rousseau: Du contrat social. Une Introduction. E. Dreyfus-Brisac, Paris, 1896, pp. 22-23. 
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comme membres de la patrie, mais comme ses defensseUrSn. 21 
This important observation has since then become the classical introduction in any dealing 
with the subject of the laws of war, and especially the protection of its victims. The 
implication in this pronouncement is that the civilian population is protected against the 
evils of warfare, since war is essentially the business of the soldiers in the field of combat. 
Rousseau also stressed that: 
"... [L]a fin de la guerre ttant la destruction de I'Etat ennemi, on a le droit Wen tuer 
les ddfensseurs tant qui'ils ont les armes i la main; mais aussitot qu'ils les posent et 
rendent, cessant d'etre ennemis ou instruments de 1'ennemi, ils redevienment 
simplement hommes, et l'on n"a plus de droit sur leur vie ". 22 
This observation laid the ground for the protection of the prisoners of war who were in the 
past the object of brutal treatment. Thus, when they laid down their arms because of 
capture or injury, they are no longer enemy soldiers. They revert to their ordinary human 
nature. 
The maxims of Rousseau have exercised a deep influence upon writers of international 
law, and also upon the State practice in the form of later codification. As a result, the 
predominance of the liberal political theory with its insistence upon the individual and his 
private property as the foundation of the whole political and economic life produced the 
essential distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Consequently, it gave much 
more protection to the individual and his property, and also protection to the soldiers once 
he became a mere human being. 
In this context, a writer observed in 1912 that: 
*The civilised view of war is that it is an affair of Governments acting through and 
against officially organised forces, and that the peaceful private citizens of both 
countries should be as little disturbed as possible ... it is more and more recognised that only the regular armed forces should fight, that only Government property should 
be captured and that the private citizen should suffer only through increased taxation. 
Naval prize is an exception but it is recognised as such and its scope is more and 
more limited by international conventions. "23 
This passage shows clearly the influence of Montesquieu and especially Rousseau on legal 
writings in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. 
However, Best took a radical interpretation of Rousseau. According to him, Rousseau's 
maxim was a good piece of propaganda but, it was doubly defective and disadvantageous 
when adopted and announced as a guide to practice. What Rousseau actually said in Best's 
view is that: 
"... [W]ars were between 'states' not 'peoples' therefore (if you swallow this) people(s) 
were not objects of military operations. But people(s) nevertheless got hurt, often 
very badly. How else could that be explained by a Rousseauite, except as some sort 
of unavoidable accident or incidental feature of war, more or less beyond your own 
211bid, 
p. 24. 
221bid, p. 25. 
23 H. T. Kingsbury: Capture after Capitutation: A Juristic Anachronism. 6 AJIL, 1912, P. 657. 
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control and responsibility". 
24 
In accordance with this line of argument, Best concludes by stressing that: 
"Thus a huge realm of civilian wartime experience was, so to speak, lifted beyond the 
primary range of judicial scrutiny and placed in a second category of things that just 25 happened in war". 
Then, Best cited the practice to prove his point, he concentrated on the French Revolution. 
Thus, General Deflers, who was the commander of the Army of Pyrenees Orientales, 
answered the Spanish General Ricardos, who demanded that combatants must be clearly 
distinguished from non-combatant by saying: 
"... [L]a force g6n6rale de la R6publique se compose du peuple entier, tous les Frangais 
sont des soldats". 26 
Moreover, the French Decree on Levke en Nlasse (August 23rd, 1793) proclaimed that: 
"Young men shall go to battle; married men shall forge arms and transport provisions, 
women shall make tents and clothing and shall serve in hospitals, children shall turn 
old linen into lint; the aged shall betake themselves to public places in order to arouse 
the couray of the warriors and preach hatred of kings and the unity of the 
Republic". 7 
However, despite such misgivings, Rousseau's influence upon the later development of the 
laws of war cannot be denied. Thus, the Declaration of St. Petersburg of December II th, 
1868 stipulated that: 
"The progress of civilisation should have the effect of alleviating as much as possible 
the calamities of war; that the only object which states endeavour to accomplish 
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy". 28 
In order to achieve this end (weakening of military forces of the enemy), it is sufficient to 
disable the greatest possible number of enemy men and by implication this declaration goes 
in the 'Rousseauite' tradition of limiting the war to the field of combat, thus preserving the 
civilian population of the horrors of war. Wars are not regarded as a vengeance, they are 
regulated so that at least, those who are not members of the armed forces must be spared 
in their lives and property. 
The Brussels Conference of 1874 stated in its final protocol that: 
"... [I]t had been unanimously declared that the progress of civilisation should have the 
effect of alleviating as far as possible the calamities of war and that the only 
legitimate object which states should have in view during war is to weaken the enemy 
240p. cft., supra. n. 3, p. 58. 
251bid. 
261bid, p. 336. 
271bid, 
p. 59 
28Schindler and Taman, op. cft., supra. chapter 2. n. 63, p. 96. 
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without inflicting upon him unnecessary sufferingS". 
29 
Then the same declaration adds that: 
"... [W]ar being thus regulated would involve less sufferings, would be less liable to 
those aggravations produced by uncertainty, unforeseen events and the passions 
excited by the struggle, it would tend more surely to that which should be its final 
object; the re-establishment of ood relations and a more solid and lasting peace 4 
between the belligerent states". 
The implication of these pronouncements is that the object of the regulation of warfare is 
to limit its horrors. Victims of war are the prime beneficiaries from that regulation. It is to 
be observed that the declaration puts into practice Montesquieu's view, concerning the final 
object of war. 
The project of the International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, 
adopted at the Brussels Conference of 1874 which was signed but never ratified, contains 
extensive references to the protection of the victims of warfare such as Article 38 which 
provides for the protection of family honour, rights and the lives and property of persons, 
their religious convictions and property. 31 
Thus, it seems that States began to feel that civilians must be protected. Sovereignty has, 
then, actually been limited, since military necessity which is the name of sovereignty during 
the war, cannot be invoked to destroy the lives and property of persons when no real 
military advantage can be gained. 
Article 23 of the same Declaration, after establishing that POW are in the power of the 
enemy Government rather than of the individuals or units who captured them, stressed that 
they must be treated humanely and according to Article 26 they must not be compelled to 
participate in the operation of war. 
The Oxford Manual on the Laws of war on land published in September 9th, 1880, 
provides as a general principle in Article I that: 
"The state of war does not admit of acts of violence, save between the armed forces 
of belligerent stateS". 32 
Article 7 forbids the maltreatment of the non combatant population. Article 10 stresses that 
the wounded and the sick should be brought in and cared for, without any discrimination. 
The interest of the Manual, which has been drawn by the most distinguished authors of 
international law, lies in its stress upon that "it 'the manual' has contented itself with stating 









practicable". 33 This statement appears in its Prdface. The phrase 'accepted ideas of our time' 
includes in my opinion the whole intellectual production of the later Enlightenment 
concerning war in general. Among this of course, stands the work of Montesquieu and 
Rousseau. 
The conclusion to be drawn is that the theoretical basis of customary international law 
concerning the protection of the victims of war is to be found in writings of Grotius, 
Vattel, Montesquieu and Rousseau; none of them saw sovereignty as going in the direction 
of allowing atrocities against the victims of war. 
B. Customary Rules Concerning the Protection of the Victims of War In General 
In rejecting the claim that Germany was not bound by The Hague Convention of 1907 
because of the general participation clause contained in that Convention, the Nuremberg 
Tribunal stated that: 
"... [B]y 1939 these rules [The Hague rules] laid down in the conventions, were 
recognized by all civilized nations and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws 
and customs of war which are referred to in Article 6(b) of the Charter". 
34 
In other words, the rules contained in those instruments are considered as customary rules. 
However, those instruments do not contain any express rules on the protection of civilians, 
but many references can be interpreted as containing the fundamental distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants. Thus, Article 46 of the Fourth Convention of 1907 
provides for the protection of family honour, rights and lives of persons, respect for their 
religious convictions and prctices, and private property. Articles 22,23,25,26 and 28 of 
the same Convention contains also indirect references to the protection of civilians. 
Nevertheless, if the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is easily deduced 
from the Hague Conventions and regulations, it is difficult to find specific rules on the 
protection of civilians. The codification of such specific rules was not made until the end 
of the Second World War. 
However, it must be indicated that the customary distincýtion between combatants and 
non-combatants has come under heavy pressure. Thus, the whole economic structure which 
contribute to the efforts of war is regarded as a legitimate target. 
Moreover, the advent of aerial warfare especially, has been regarded as making the 
concept of total war a reality. In this context, Spaight writes: 
"War is now a totalitarian affair, affecting all the individuals of a nation, and there 
are no 'non -combatants' today, for all contribute in some way to the national effort. 
The coming of the bombing aircraft has increased the difficulty of differentiating 
between the soldier and the civilian". 35 
However, it seems that the advent of total war has led, if not to the killing of the traditional 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants, to the division of the civilians to 
331bid, 
p. 36. 
34 L. Friedman: The Law of War. VoL. 2, Random House, New York, 1972, p. 961. 
35J. M. Spaight: Non-Combatants and Air Attack. 9 Air Law Review, 1938, p. 372. 
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different categories. 
Thus, in general, civilians involved in the military and economic efforts of war were 
considered in the opinion of some as a lawful. object of attack. In this context, Rolland 
stressed that: 
"... [S]euls sont ill6gitimes et condamnables les bombardements aeriens de nature, 6tant 
donn6es les circumstances dans lesquelles its sont opdr6s, IA atteindre principalement 
ou exclusivement la population civile ne coopdrant pas a la production du material 
militaire". 36 
Nevertheless, the prevailing view still holds that the distinction between combatants and 
non-combatants must continue. The argument that 'total war' has suspended it, or even 
abrogated many important rules of customary international law was not accepted, indeed 
37 the spirit of the whole judgment of Nuremberg goes in that direction. 
The conclusion is that customary international law does not contain a wholly developed 
system of protection of the civilian population. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the 
general distinction between combatants and non-combatants is well entrenched in that law. 
Many references in The Hague Conventions can be interpreted as establishing some essential 
guarantees for the protection of civilians, especially the rule that civilians must never be 
an object of attack. 
With regard to the POW's, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 regulate their status 
(Articles 4 to 20 of the IV Convention of 1907 respecting the laws and customs of war on 
land). Thus, Article 4 of the IV Hague Convention makes the general principle that they 
must be treated humanely. Article 7 obliges the State into whose hands the POW's have 
fallen to treat them as regards food, lodging and clothing on the same footing as the troops 
of the Government who captured them. 
In the Nuremberg War Trials, the defense lawyers of the Nazis accused of maltreatment 
and killing of Soviet POW"s tried to justify the German atrocities on the grounds that the 
Soviet Union was not a party to the Geneva Convention of 1929 dealing with POW. The 
tribunal then had an occasion to make clear the position of POW"s in customary 
international law. In fact, it supported the Soviet protest of September 15th, 1941 to 
Germany against the regulations for the treatment of Soviet POW's signed by the German 
General Reinecke on September 8th, 1941. The protest stated: 
"The Geneva Convention for the treatment of prisoners of war is not binding in the 
relationship between Germany and the USSR. Therefore only the principles of 
general international law apply. Since the 18th century these gradually have been 
established along the lines that war captivity is neither revenge nor punishment but 
solely protective custody, the only purpose of which is to prevent the POW from 
further participation in the war. This principle was developed in accordance with the 
36 L. Rottard: Les pratiques de ta guerre aerlenne dans le conftit de 1914 et te droit des gens. 
(Extrait de la RGDIP), Ed. A. PI-done, Paris, 1916, p. 70. 
37 In this context, Lauterpacht affirmed: 
0 ... These probtems raised 
by air warfare cannot be deemed to have affected the vaLidity of the 
generat principte of immunity of non-combatants from direct attack". 
H. Lauterpacht, (ed. ): InternationaL Law: A Treatise. Vot. 2,7th ed., LOngmans, Greene & Co.. London, 
New York L Toronto, 1952, p. 525. 
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view by V armes that it is contrary to military tradition to kill or injure helpless 3 people". 
The Tribunal considered that this Soviet protest 'correctly stated the legal position'. 39 
As to the sick and wounded, they were the first to receive international Protection in 
international codification efforts. The movement was initiated by the famous Swiss national, 
Henry Dunant. Thus, in 1863 at a conference in which 16 States were present, a resolution 
was adopted. In its preamble, the States present expressed their desire : 
"... [O]f coming to the aid of the wounded should the military services prove 
inadequate". 40 
The conference resolved then that each country shall have a committee whose duty of war 
would be to assist the army medical services by every means at its disposal. The conference 
also recommended that in time of war the belligerents shall proclaim the neutrality of 
ambulances and military hospitals and that official medical personnel, voluntary medical 
personnel and the inhabitants who aid in the relief of the wounded must be recognized. 
From that Resolution began the whole history of the Red Cross movement. Thus, the first 
international Convention on the Condition of the Wounded was adopted on August 22nd, 
1864. It made the undertakings of the first Resolution of 1863 obligatory. Article 6 of that 
Convention poses, in fact, the fundamental humanitarian rule concerning the wounded and 
the sick: 
"Wounded or siýk combatants, to whatever nation they may belong, shall be collected 
and cared for". 1 
The convention went so far as to encourage inhabitants to care for the wounded and sick. 42 
That convention (of 1864) has been revised by an Additional Protocol of October 20th, 
1868 which essentially extended its benefits to naval forces. Then, it was replaced by the 
Convention of 1906. The latter being replaced by the Convention of 1929 and finally the 
Geneva Convention (the first) of 1949 replaced that of 1929. It seems that these conventions 
are viewed by all as reflecting now the customary rules on the subject since their 
application over the last 100 years had achieved, in the words of Solf 'a remarkable measure 
380P. 
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42Article 5 of the Convention stfputates: 
"Inhabitants of the country who bring help to the wounded shall be respected and shati, remain 
free. Generals of the belligerent powers shall make it clear it is their duty to notify the 
Inhabitants of the appeal made to their humanity and of the neutrality which human conduct will 
confer. 
In the presence of any wounded combatants receiving shelter in a house shall ensure its 
protection. An Inhabitant who has given shelter to the wounded Shall be exempted from bitletfng 
ard from a portion of such war contributions as may be levied,,. 
Ibid. 
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of success. 43 
The conclusion is that customary international law contained some general principles and 
even some specific rules for the protection applicable of POW's and of the wounded and 
sick which are only applicable in inter-States wars. This situation can be explained in my 
view, by two reasons. The first, is that humanitarian ideas exercised important influence 
toward restricting the horrors of war, in relation to these helpless categories of the victims. 
Secondly and more importantly, because such humanitarian protection is in the interest of 
States. Pragmatism led the latter to look for better treatment of their soldiers who fall into 
the enemy's hands in exchange for doing the same to those enemy soldiers who fall into 
their hands. 
However, as concerning the civilians, the matter is a little different. There were no 
specific rules for their protection although the essential distinction between combatants and 
non-combatants is there. The lack of precise regulations even in inter-State wars can be 
explained in my view, on the basis that States do not welcome any international regulation 
of their behaviour towards their citizens. This is a matter of domestic jurisdiction and 
sovereignty. They allowed some protection of their citizens only when some parts of their 
territory fell under occupation. 
C. Customary Rules on the Protection of the Victims of War and Internal Conflicts 
It must be stressed that the above developments concerning the protection of the victims 
of wars have been conceived only to apply to inter-States and not intra-States conflicts. 
Humanitarian rules were to apply only to those who are giving their lives to preserve and 
defend the territorial and political sovereignty of the State. Thus, at first glance, it is very 
difficult to imagine that States will give any humanitarian protection to those whose 
declared aim is to overthrow them. The interplay of the notions of sovereignty and non- 
intervention will not help the cause of the rebels. The crime of high treason, as a natural 
product of the concept of sovereignty, has been developed to deal with the rebels. 
Harsh treatment always awaits those who attempt to fight the State, from within or 
outside. State practice shows that since the 12th Century, internal conflicts and those who 
44 fomented them, received attention in treaty practice. Thus, in a Treaty of September 1177 
between King Henry 11 and King Louis of France, it was agreed, among other things, that 
both sides undertook to banish, on request, each other's enemies from their dominions. 
Another treaty 12 years later, between King Richard I and King Philip of France again 
45 provided for the extradition of each other's malefactors. 
However, in customary law, the laws of war can be applied only when the recognition 
of belligerency takes place, especially when that recognition emanates from the established 
Government itself. The problem, as we have seen earlier in Chapter 111, is that in practice, 
43 W. A. SoLf: Development of the Protection of the Wounded and sick and Shipwrecked under the Protocols 
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in Swinarski (ed. ), op. cit., supra. chapter 1, n. 1, p. 236. 
44 G. Schwa rienberger: International. Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals. VoL. 2, The 
Law of Armed Conflicts. Stevens, London, 1968, p. 713. 
45 Cited by G. Schwarzenberger: The Frontiers of International Law. Stevens, London, 1962, p. 111. 
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States experiencing civil wars do not easily recognise or accept the belligerency of their 
enemies. Sovereignty gives them the right to deal with their citizens at their discretion, 
especially those who take up arms against their authority. Other States, by the same token, 
have no right to demand any better treatment for those rebels. 
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention, it seems, is not accepted in State practice, 
especially in times of internal conflict. In the very rare cases of recognition of belligerency, 
States acknowledged that recognition, mainly because the conflict has attained a very high 
degree of intensity that it resembles, in fact, an international war. 
1. The State Practice In Cases of Civil Wars In which Recognition of Belligerency has 
Taken Place 
It must be noted that in the actual cases of recognition of belligerency in State practice, the 
established Government stress that the recognition is given due to humanitarian motives, 
in order to dismiss their opponent's claim to a legal status. 
Thus, in the American Civil War, Articles 153 and 154 of the Lieber Code are revealing. 
The former States, in substance, that the extension of humanitarian rules to the rebels does 
not confer on them any legal status, they remain rebels and only victory in the field settles 
the future relations between the warring parties. The latter Article (154) made it clear that 
the application of the customs and usages of warfare in the field between the Government 
forces and the rebels does not prevent the former from trying the leaders of the rebellion 
on a charge of high treason. 
All this can be explained, in my view, by the fact that the established Government, even 
when it recognizes the belligerency of its enemies, it does not feel that it has done so 
because of a legal obligation, but only because of humanitarian motives. 
States do not wish to weaken their sovereignty by recognizing that another party can share 
their monopoly of representation over the territory and its inhabitants. In this context, 
Article 152 explicitly states that: 
"When humanity induces the adoption of the rules of regular war toward rebels 
whether the adoption is partial or whole, it does in no way whatever imply a partial 
or complete acknowledgement of their Government, if they have set up one, or of 
them as an independent and sovereign power. Neutrals have no right to make the 
adoption of the rules of war by the assailed Government toward rebels the ground 
of their own acknowledgement of the revolted people as an independent power H. 46 
This Article spells out the limits of the recognition of belligerency in regard to the 
application of the laws of war. Sovereignty and non-intervention are not suspended on the 
recognition of belligerency, which means among other things, that other States cannot use 
that recognition as a pretext for demanding the application of the norms of the laws of war 
to the conflict. 
However, it seems that in practice once the recognition of belligerency has been granted, 
Governments usually respect the laws of war, especially the rules relating to the protection 
of the victims of war. Fear of reprisals and the idea of reciprocity ensure that, in general, 
460P. 
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those rules are respected. 
1.1. The American Civil War 
In this war, the institution of recognition of belligerency as a concept had reached its fullest 
requirements (since basically nothing had been added in future similar conflicts), affords 
in fact, a good example of how the laws of war have been applied in civil wars. The Lieber 
Code covers, in effect, a very large part of the laws of war, and it seems as Wright correctly 
observed: 
"... [T]he standards set ý. y the Code seem to have been generally observed by both sides 
during the civil war". " 
The Code recognizes the distinction between combatants and non-combatants (Article 155). 
However, since the concept of belligerent occupation cannot be applied in civil war, mainly 
because it is in contradiction with the territorial unity of the State which the established 
Government is set to guarantee and because also any recognition of belligerent occupation 
would mean that the insurgents have legal status. Hence, special regulation must then 
determine the relation of the legal Government with, especially its 'own citizens' who are 
in the zone controlled by the insurgents. This raises, in effect, the question of the treatment 
of the civilian population in civil wars. 
The Lieber Code stresses in its Article 155 the following: 
"The military commander of the legitimate Government, or war of rebellion, distinguishes between the loyal citizens in the revolted portion of the country and the disloyal citizens. The disloyal citizens may be further classified into those citizens know to sympathize with the rebellion without positively aiding it, and those who, 
without taking up arms, give 4ý ositive aid and comfort to the rebellious enemy without bodily forced thereto". 
ATti cle 156 then envisages the kind Of treatment of each category of those citizens. Thus, 
loyal citizens must be protected from the TigOUTs and horrors of war while disloyal citizens 
must bear all the hardships and deprivations of war, the military commander has to throw 
all the burden of war on them. 
Thus, the civilian population, at least its "disloyal" portion are to suffer greatly. This is 
the logic of sovereignty, the State protects only those who obey its power and authority. 
Those who disobey must not expect any mercy. 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the Lieber Code did not incorporate the idea of 
the levke en masse. This means that it does not exist in civil wars, since any resistance 
against the approaching army of the established Government, will be considered as high 
treason, death being the penalty. In fact, Article 157 of the Lieber Code makes it plain that: 
"Armed or unarmed resistance by citizens of the United States against the lawful 
movement of their troops is levying war against the United States and is therefore 
470. Wrf ght: The knerican Cf Ai War. fn Fatk (ed. ). op. cf t., supra. chapter 2, n. 8, p. 56. 
48 Op. eft., supra. n. 28, p. 22. 
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treason". 49 
As to POW's, the Lieber Code establishes that category and stresses that POW is not 
subjected to any punishment, the status of POW's were recognised in fact, by both sides to 
the conflict. 
In practice, it seems that even if generally the laws of war were adhered to. nevertheless 
many instances of cruelty were present. The civilian population was the main target of such 
violations of the laws of war. In this respect, General Sherman wrote to the Mayor of 
Atlanta, when the latter city was under siege by the Federal forces: 
"War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it and those who brought war into our country 
deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand 
in making this war and I know I will make more sacrifices today than any of you 
to secure peace. If the United States submits to a division now, it will not stop but 50 will go on until we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war". 
General Sherman was generally very harsh in the treatment the civilians and their 
belongings. During the siege of Atlanta, he wrote to General Hood, the Confederate 
Commander of Atlanta that: 
"Atlanta is no place for families or non -combatants". 
51 
The General replied : 
"And now sir, permit me to say that the unprecedented measure you propose 
transcends, in studied and ingenious cruelty, all acts ever before brought to my 
attention in the dark history of war. In the name of God and humanity, I protest, believing that you will find you are ex yelling from their homes and firesides the 
wives and children of a brave people". 5 
As to POW's, on both sides of the conflict, nearly 30,000 men died out of some two 
hundred thousand. In the north, from cold weather and disease and in the south from 
inadequate food and epidemics. 53 
1.2. The Boer War 
In this conflict, the insurgents resorted to the methods of guerrilla warfare which meant 
that they used the countryside as their main logistic and intelligence source. This led the 
British to resort to the questionable policy of establishing concentration camps which were 
first used by the Spaniards during the Cuban insurrection in order to isolate the insurgents 
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The policy was inaugurated by a memorandum of December 21 st, 1900 signed by General 
Lord Kitchener. It stated: 
"The General, Commander in Chief, desires that all possible means be taken to stop 
the present guerrilla warfare of the various means for the accomplishment of this 
object, one which has been strongly recommended and has lately been successfully 
tried on a small-scale is the removal of all men, women and children and natives 
from the districts which the enemy's band particularly OCCUpy". 54 
Inside these concentration camps, a policy of discrimination in the treatment of the civilian 
population was instituted. Families of neutrals and insurgents who had surrendered were 
to be afforded better treatment than families whose fathers, husbands and sons were in the 
opposing force. The policy of establishing concentration camps was justified by the British 
on the ground of humanity (example: the protection of the occupants of lonely farms) and 
also for inducing the insurgents to surrender. 
In practice, the picture was different. The camps witnessed a very high rate of mortality 
due to the lack of sanitation, medicine and doctors. The harsh treatment of the families of 
the insurgents did not encourage the latter to surrender, on the contrary, their numbers 
increased. It is also to be mentioned that General Lord Kitchener, by means of his 
instructions of January 24th, 1901, ordered his commanders in the field to clear the 
countryside systematically of supplies, horses, cattle, crops, transport vehicles and non- 
combatant families. He directed that supplies and crops if not used were to be burnt; 
55 bakeries and mills were to be destroyed. 
This policy led to a growing opposition in Britain. In Parliament, Lloyd George asked: 
"Why make war against women and children? It was the men that were their 
enemies so . 
56 
Then he added: 
"... [B]y every rulgf civilized war, we were bound to treat women and children as 
non -combatants". 
The implication is clear, rules of war must be adhered to even in cases of civil war. The 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants is the golden rule of these 'rules of 
civilized war'. Thus, humanity demanded the full protection of, women and children, 
pragmatism also demanded the same since: 
"... [B]rave men will forget injuries to themselves much more readily than they will 
insults, indignation and wrongs to their women and children. "58 
54 E. Childers (ed. ): The Times History of the War in South Africa. VoL. 4, Sampson Law, Martson, 
London 1907, p. 86. 
55 T. Pakenham: The Boer War. Wiedenfetd & Nicotson, London 1979, p. 162. 




The policy of concentration camps was later abandoned, however, not on moral ground or 
legal principle but it seems simply because it was too expensive in financial terms since it 
was estimated that the Boer war, apart from the Napoleonic wars, was the most expensive 
war in the British history. 
On the other hand, it seems that the treatment of the sick and wounded was in general 
humane. In this respect, when the famous siege of Ladysmith was imposed by the 
insurgents, from October 1899 to the end of February 1900, the Boers allowed the 
establishment of a neutral camp some four miles from the town where the wounded and 
59 non-combatants could be protected and cared for. 
Despagnet in fact, described the attitude of the Boers vis-i-vis prisoners and wounded 
soldiers in the following fashion: 
'Aussi les t6moignages abondent-ils pour prouver que pleins d'humanitd pour les 
prisoniers, les malades ou les bless6s tomb6s en leur pouvoir, ils ont souvent poussd 
les igards envers eux jusqu'a la bont6 et meme jusqu'i la d6licatesse. On peut croire 
d'ailleurs, qu'ils avaient le souci de s"assurer compktement le beau r6le aux yeux des 
puissances neutres dont ils ne cessaient pas de r6clamer Vintervention". 60 
The conclusion to be drawn from the American Civil War and the Boer War, as examples 
of civil wars, in which the recognition of belligerency has been granted, is that such 
recognition brings into operation the body of the laws of war, as if the war is between 
States. This concession, on the part of the established Government is directed especially by 
pragmatic motives, in order to save the life and mitigate the suffering of its captured and 
wounded soldiers. 
It appears, that the first beneficiaries from the application of the laws of war are 
especially the soldiers of the two sides since, whenever they become hors de combat, either 
by capture or injury, they will benefit from the status of POW's, they are not criminals. 
However, it seems that the civilian population and especially those who are labelled as 
'disloyal' citizens, were in general treated with harshness and severity. Their essential 
objects of livelihood were considered as military targets. They were (the civilians) 
sometimes interned in camps. This is due among other things to the absence of specific legal 
rules as to the treatment of civilians in case of customary law itself. 
2. The State Practice In Cases where the Recognition of Belligerency has not Taken Place 
It appears that customary international law, recognized only a certain minimum standard 
of protection of individuals in civil wars, only when they are foreigners. However, the 
59 C0100et Mapteton, who was the principat medicaL Off Icer of Ladysmith hospitat, wrote In this regard: 
"I have seen some of the Boers, as I am in charge of the hospital out there. I have several 
times met the Boers under the f tag of truce to discuss sundry matters. Those I have seen have 
all been very pleasant fellows indeed and very friendly. They have behaved extremely well to 
Our wounded prisoners, attending them and giving them everything they had themselves. All our wounded speak highly of the kindness they have received at their hands". 
D. Judd: The Boer war. Hart-Davfs McGibbon, London, 1977, p. 89. 
60F. DesPagnet: La guerre sud-afrfcalne au point de vue du droit international. Ed. A. P6done, Paris, 1902, P-126. 
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citizens of the country, either in peace or war times were only under the protection of their 
own local laws. 
Thus, in the absence of the recognition of belligerency, international law affords no 
protection whatsoever to the victims of internal wars. In other words, sovereignty gained 
the upper hand, it is more important than caring for those who arose in arms against their 
sovereign. The era of human rights was not yet born. 
In this context, Wilson writing in 1907 summed up the British practice with its colonies 
in this way: 
"The English law and practice maintaining that insurrection in a dependent 
community'is waging war against the Queen' and this act may involve the annexation 
of the revolted territory". 61 
Accordingly, the uprising in Manipur in 1891 was treated as a crime, to which criminal law 
extended, thereby justifying the execution of the revolt leaders as criminals. 
State practice in civil wars, where the recognition of belligerency was absent, shows that 
cruelty was the order of the day and that there is little evidence that other States considered 
their behaviour as illegal. 
2.1. The Greek War of Independence 
In this case, Turkey refused to recognize any status to the rebels, instead considered them 
as mere bandits to whom the most cruelty must be applied. Siotis notes in this regard that: 
"... [T]oute dtude de la rdvolution Gr6que ne peut que nous amener A la constatation 
que pendant le d6roulement des hostilit6s les cruautds les plus atroces furent commises 
de part et d'autre et que tout souci d'humaniser le conflit 6tait compktement absent 
des intentions des responsables de la conduite de la guerre". 62 
In this respect, a Turkish Commander (Ibrahim Pasha, Pasha of the Peloponnese) declared 
in 1825: 
"I am determined to put them down [the rebels] .... everything shall be destroyed and "63 the inhabitants in the mountains must perish whether of cold or hunger. 
This means that he clearly did not distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, the 
war is conducted against all Greeks. 
However, the insurgents also behaved in the same fashion. Thus, when they captured 
Tripolitsa, the principal inland town of the Peloponnese in October 1821. First hand reports 
established that: 
".. [W]omen and children were frequently tortured before they were murdered, after 
the Greeks had been in possession of the city for forty-eight hours, they deliberately 
collected together about two thousand persons of every age and sex but principally 
61G. G. Witson: Insurgency and InternationaL Maritime Law. 1 AJIL. 1907, p. 52. 
62 J. Sictis: Le droit de to guerre et tes confLits ermds de Caractere non-internationa(. LGDJ, Paris, 
1958, p. 71. 
63 Cited by C. M. Woodhouse: The Greek War of independence. Hutchinson, London, 1952, p. 112. 
208 
women and children and led them to a ravine in the nearest mountain, there they 
were all murdered. The writer saw heaps of unburied bones bleached by the winter 
"64 rains and summer suns in passing this spot two years after the catastrophe. 
This means in fact, that the rebels in reprisal against the authorities resorted to genocidal 
tactics. 
Thus, in order to secure the unity of the Empire, hence its sovereignty over Greece, 
human lives and sufferings were not considered worthy of any regard. Law was totally 
absent and the dictates of barbarity prevailed. The racial and religious hatred between the 
two communities seems to play a major role in the actions mentioned above. 
2.2. The Wars of Independence in Latin America 
In the wars of independence which swept Latin America in the beginning of the 19th 
century, the institution of belligerency has not yet been developed. This meant, among other 
things, that there were no legal restrains on the conduct of States vis-&-vis their 'disloyal' 
subjects, who took up arms to fight their sovereign. In fact, there is abundant evidence that 
the Spaniards were very cruel towards the insurgents and even to the civilian population. 
In a letter by Jose de Martin, one of the famous Generals of the Revolution to his British 
friend, the Earl of Fife on December 9th, 1817, wrote: 
"What emotions of grief, my dear friend, must excite in your breast the destiny of 
these delightful regions! It would seem as if the Spaniards were bent upon making 
a desert of them, such is the war which they wage. Neither age nor sex is spared 
"65 from the sword and the block. They have laid in ashes a vast number of places. 
He then added: 
"In short, speaking without any prepositions, they appear to be brutes rather than 
beings imbued with reason. I can verify this charge by the conduct of the Spanish 
captain himself who held the supreme command in this province [Chili]. A few days 
previous to my entrance, he threatened in the public papers to inflict upon me not 
the sort of death which is adapted to military men, but the gallows, as if I had been 
a highwayman". 66 
By implication then, the Spanish despite the widespread and organized revolt, still consider 
that there is no room for any rules of the laws of war, therefore the insurgents, the civilians 
and their essential objects of livelihood were all lawful targets of war. 
On the other hand, it seems that the insurgents were largely restrained in their actions, in 
this respect Jose de San Martin emphasised in the same letter mentioned above: 
... I might have retaliated, instead of which he [the Captain, Commander of Chili] as 
well as one hundred and fifty officers, in common with upwards of three thousand 
men that were taken prisoner have been treated with all the consideration dictated 
641bld, 
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67 by our enlightened age". 
This statement in fact, makes it clear that some leaders of the insurgents at least, have 
embraced the ideas of Rousseau and Montesquieu. They understood very well that POW's 
are not criminals. They must be treated in accordance with the dictates of humanity. 
On the other hand, it seems that the insurgents were not ready to accept this unequal 
position for long. They signalled that they could and would resort to reprisals. In this 
context, Jose de San Martin made clear to his British friend that: 
"Your Lordship will exclaim that this is fighting on very unequal terms. Indeed, the 
period of so much generosity is drawing to a close. If they continue the infamous 
system of warfare which all along they have been pursuing, your Lordship may rest 
assured that to m_y great sorrow, I shall find myself under the dire necessity of 
sacrificing them". ' 
Despite the apparent readiness of the insurgents to apply some minimum rules of custom 
and usages of warfare, the Spanish conduct led them to behave in some instances in the 
same manner, especially in relation to captured Government soldiers. In fact, in a letter 
dated April II th, 1818 from San Martin, the General summed up the Spanish conduct of 
war in a very clear fashion thus: 
"No one is ignorant of the conduct pursued by the Spaniards with respect to their 
colonies, and of the kind of warfare they have adopted for subjugating them. It was 
reserved to the age of liberality, mental improvement and philanthropy to witness 
the horrors committed by the Spaniards in peaceful America, horrors which humanity 
5ýg shudders 
to contemplate and which are inflicted upon us Americans for havin 
"6 incurred the crime of asserting the rights of the general will of her inhabitants . 
The strange thing is that no Government has condemned the Spanish conduct vis-i-vis its 
colonies. Thus, Britain which was the leading great power in that period had no special 
reason, it seems to desire the independence of the Spanish colonies. In fact, it (Britain) had 
tried for a while to mediate between the insurgents and Spain in order to keep them under 
Spanish rule. The main interest of Britain was to keep its trade with South America, by 
protecting its shipping fleet from seizure, either by the Spaniards or the insurgents. 
The question of the recognition of the independence of Latin America Republics was 
decided by taking into consideration only those interests; there was no protest from Britain 
that Spain was violating certain customary rules of war, the assumption is Britain might 
have thought that any protest is a violation of Spanish sovereignty. 
2.3. Other Cases 
In other cases of civil war, where the recognition of belligerency was not granted, the 
evidence suggests that cruelty was the order of the day, no restraints seem to be observed 
especially by the established Governments. They used their full freedom of discretion in 
671bid, p. 557. 
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crushing their enemies. Thus, during insurrection in Cuba of 1869, General Balmacida, the 
Commander in Chief of the Government forces, made killings, assassinations and arson the 
rules of his fight against the insurgents. He, in fact, signed a Proclamation in which it was 
expressly stated: 
"Toute m. Ale ag6 de plus 15 qui sera rencontr6 hors de sa derneure pourra etre fusilld. 
Toute maison, habitde ou inhabit6e, sur la quelle le drapeau blance ne flottera pas 
pourra d re brul6e, les fernmes pourront etre transport6es de force & Jiguani oit i 
Bayano". 
ýýO 
These draconian measures, made the distinction between combatants and non-combatants 
obsolete, since the war is mainly waged against civilians. Actually, it was in this war that 
the use of concentration camps was first resorted to. 
In the War of the Commune of Paris, Marx wrote: 
"The Commune knew that its opponents cared nothin for the lives of the people of 
Paris, but cared much for their own Paris buildings". 
ý' 
In this bloody war, shooting prisoners, especially by the established Government, was 
common practice. The Communards took hostages in the hope of protecting their captured 
soldiers. However, the continuing shooting of the prisoners by the Government led the 
insurgents to act in the same way. 
In the Russian civil war, it was also the prisoners who suffered most, especially at the 
hands of the 'Whites', i. e. the insurgents. Thus, when White Officers were asked about the 
fate of captured Government soldiers, their usual answer was: 
"... [W]e kill all of them that are communists. Jews and commissaries stood no chance, 
of course, but it was somewhat difficult to ascertain which of the others were 
communists. The system generally followed was this. From among the prisoners, a 
man who looked like a Bolshevik was led aside, accused with great violence of being 
a notorious communist but afterwards promised that his life would be spared if he 
gave the names of all those among his companions whom he knew to belong to the Bolshevik party. This ingenious scheme which was tried on more than one victim in 
each part, ý of prisoners generally resulted in a number of Red soldiers being 
"2 executed. 
Thus, the insurgents acted without any mercy, hatred was the order of the day. 
In the Spanish Civil War, it was estimated that the total number of those killed on both 
sides, including military and civilians casualties, was approximately 1,200,000 of whom 
450,000 soldiers and 750,000 civilians. 73 It seems that the war was conducted in a way 
which ignores all restraints. Maurras stated, in this respect: 
*L'anarchie Espagnole comme l'anarchie Russe exprime avec clarit6 un recul 
70ROugler, 
op. cit., supra. chapter 2, n. 62, pp. 240-41. 
71K. Marx: The Civil, War in France. Martin Lawrence Ltd., London, 1933, p. 59. 
72W. P. Coates & ZeLdak Coates: Armed intervention in Russia 1918-1922. Victor Goltanz Ltd., London, 
1935, p. 209. 
73 Keesing's, 1937-1940, ApHL 19-20,1939, pp. 35-36. 
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incontestable de tout ce qui a distingu6 I'hornme de I'animal". 74 
The terror method was resorted to especially by the insurgents, in order to neutralise the 
masses, which sympathized either actively or passively with the Republicans. Conclusive 
evidence of the deliberate and systematic nature of Franco's terror, was provided by a 
document found on Manual Canacha, a rebel officer, who was taken prisoner. It was a copy 
of a circular addressed to the high officers in the insurgents army; it stressed the following: 
"One of the most important tasks, if victory is to be assured is the undermining of 
the morale of the enemy troops. The army has neither sufficient troops nor sufficient 
arms to resist; nevertheless the following instructions must be rigidly observed: 
1. In order to safeguard the provinces occupied, it is essential to instal a certain 
salutary terror into the population. When the troops occupy a place, the local 
authorities must first be taught a lesson in respect; if they have escaped, a similar 
procedure must be adopted towards the members of their families. In every case the 
methods resorted to must be of a clearly spectacular and impressive character and 
must indicate clearly that the leaders of the troops ge determined to proceed with 
like severety against anyone who offers resistance". 
The document also indicated in clear terms that: 
N. Every town along the enemy's line of retreat and all the areas behind the enemy lines are to be considered as battle zones. In this connection, no differentiation must be observed between the places harbouring enemy troops and those not doing so. The 
panic experienced by the civilian population along the enemy's line of retreat is a factor of the utmost importance in contributing towards the demoralisation of the 
enemy troops. The experience of the last world war shows that accidental destruc on 
of enemy hospitals and ambulances has a highly demoralising effect on troops. 
96 
The Circular also noted that after the entry into Madrid of the rebel forces, and in any 
event of any opposition on the part of the populace: 
"The streets should be put under fire without any further parleying. In view of the fact that large numbers of women are fighting on the enemy side, there should be no distinction of sex in such cases. The more ruthless we are the more quickly shall we 
quell hostile opposition among the population, the more quickly will the restoration 
of Spain be effected". 77 
It is clear, therefore, that the rebels, behaved in such a way that no distinction whatsoever 
between combatants and non-combatants must exist. Total war is the only way to success. 
Terror, in fact, was not employed to defeat the Republicans, but to destroy them 
completely. The German press hailed the practice: 
"The principle of modern Nationalism 'no opp ent but shall be destroyed' is 
thoroughly carried out ... 
just as here in Germany 
74 Ch. Maurras: Vers t'Espagne cle Franco. Ed. clu Livre moderne, Paris 1943, p. 74. 




78 lbid, p. 83. 
212 
It must be stressed that rebel leaders publicly acknowledged that no political opponent 
should be spared. All have to die in order to win the war effectively. Thus, the famous 
broadcaster and Commander of the second division of the rebel army, General de Llano, 
talked openly on the radio of that intention. On July 23rd, 1936, he stated: 
"Our brave legionnaires and the regulars have shown the red cowards what it means 
to be a man. And incidentally the wives of the Reds too. These communist and 
anarchist women, after all have made themselves fair game by their doctrine of free 
love". 79 
In another broadcast, on August 19th, 1936, he insisted that: 
"Eighty percent of the families of Andalusia are already in Mourning. And we shall 
not hesitate, either to adopt even more rigorous measures to assure OUT ultimate 
Victory. We shall go on to the bitter end and continue our good work until not a 
single marxist is left in Spain". 80 
When Seville was occupied by the rebels this policy was put into practice; in one day more 
than 9000 workers were slaughtered. 81 
Killing of prisoners and the taking of hostages was resorted to on both sides. In this 
context, a Red militiaman told Maurras that: 
dtait difficile, sinon impossible de faire des prisoniers ceux qui nous avaient 
mitraill6s et que nous venions de prendre les armes A la main avaient W condamn6s 
A mort. Le flagrant ddlit ne n6cessitait pas les formalit6s d'un proc6s". 82 
The Government, however, used to judge those accused of sedition in regular courts, but, 
later in the war the practice changed "men were taken from their houses, hustled into cars 
" 83 and thrown out and shot by the roadside . The rebels proclaimed publicly that they 
resorted to the taking of hostages. In this respect, General de Llano stated in August 18th, 
1936: 
"I have to inform you that I have in my power as hostages a large number of the 
relatives of the Madrid criminals who are answerable with their lives for our friends 
in the capital". 84 
The Spanish Civil War shows that the conflict was conducted in an atrocious inhumane 
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especially to apply their methods of terror. One explanation of such a state of affairs lies 
in the fact that the rebels wished to destroy and put to an end all the 19th century spirit 
which was: 
"... [L]iberal, decadent, masonic, materialist and Frenchified and to return to 
impregnate ourselves with the spirit of the sixteenth century, imperial, heroic, proud, 
Castilian spiritual mythical and chivalrous". 85 
One sign of this attitude was not only the change of street names but especially on the 
methods of war. By the return to the sixteenth century methods. In fact, a memorandum 
drawn up by the governing body of Madrid faculty of law in 1936, specifically supports 
that contention. It is stated: 
"... [C]ivil wars that divide families and breed hatred have always been prosecuted in 
a particularly ruthless manner; the crimes that are being committed by the insurgents 
at the moment, however, surpass anything that has hitherto been known in the way 
of organized savagery. The spirit that inspires these retrograde hordes is that of the 
Carlist wars, the spirit that existed under the fanatical and intolerant regime of 
Ferdinand VIL Once more the Red caps of the 'Requetes' have risen up from the 
blood drenched Spanish soil- once more bishops and priests play their part in 
dastardly guerrilla warfare". 'o 
In the Spanish Civil War, no recognition of belligerency took place which meant in the first 
place, as we have seen, that no legal standards were adhered to in the area of protection of 
the victims of war, by both parties and especially the insurgents who behaved like an 
invading army in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. All the legal and moral standards 
of the enlightenment were forgotten. 
It must be stressed on the other hand, that foreign intervention, especially on the side of 
the insurgents, was decisive in their victory. in fact, it helped them to apply their ultra- 
modern tactics of terror in a perfect way, by bombarding, attacking and destroying civilians 
and civilian objects essential for their livelihood. 
2.4. Conclusions as to State Practice In Customary International Law In Cases where the 
Recognition of Belligerency has not Taken Place 
The main conclusion to be drawn from State practice, in customary international law, is that 
the, ideology of the State and sovereignty gained the upper hand. That law had no place for 
the protection of those who take arms against their sovereign. Protection was reserved for 
entities (States) rather than individuals, the latter were mere objects, in the sense that they 
have no rights directly enjoyable under the law (international law), their relation with their 
State is the business of the State alone. The idea that the individual has a legitimate right 
to be protected on his life and property, on the international plane, irrespective of his 
nationality had to wait until the birth of the concept of human rights. 
On the level of humanitarian law, this meant that States accepted the protection of 
victims of war only in their mutual wars. The ideology of State and sovereignty required 
85H. Thomas: The Spanish Civil War. Hamfsh Hamilton, 3rd ed.. London, 1977, p. 509. 
86 Op. cit., supra. n. 75, p. 85. 
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that stand; those who fight for their sovereign must be protected when they fall into enemy 
hands. Thus, the enlightenment's production in the field of humanitarianism were exploited 
for the benefit of those who obey the State and not for those who challenge its authority. 
Thus, in the absence of the recognition of belligerency it seems that the parties behaved 
as though no restraints existed. This meant that the defenceless civilian population 
particularly was fair game between the two parties, the struggle for power seems to 
overshadow any other consideration. 
It is also to be observed that foreign assistance, especially to insurgents, led the rebels, 
as the Russian and particularly the Spanish case show, to adopt strategies of total warfare 
with its inevitable horrendous consequences to civilians and civilian objects. 
On the other hand, the Spanish Civil War shows the rebels had an organized and 
disciplined armed forces, unlike the Government forces who were essentially militia units 
which: 
"... [W]ith a few exceptions had no staff of officers they would trust to lead P em into 
the field and were for the most part ignorant of the organization of war". 
Even with that advantage, the insurgents seem to have acted on the premise that, in order 
to conduct an effective war, civilians must be attacked. They used their organizational skills 
in that direction. The reason would seem to be that they wanted to exterminate any leftist 
opposition, so when they came to power, their authority would never be challenged. 
D. Can the Laws of War Apply in Situations of Civil Wars then the Recognition of 
Belligerency Is Absent 
It must be indicated that on the level of doctrine, some writers have insisted that even when 
the recognition of belligerency is absent, the laws of war and especially those of its rules 
relating to the protection of the victims of war must be applied. Their justification, 
however, differs. It was Vattel, who was the first international lawyer to try to argue for 
the extension of the laws of war to internal conflicts. He maintained that civil war gives rise 
to two independent parties within the Nation who must be considered as forming two 
political bodies, in other words, as two separate States. 88 
The implication is that in order to be considered like a war between States, the civil war 
must have the real characteristics of those wars (between States) in intensity and magnitude. 
He then argued that once the situation had attained the level described above: 
"It is perfectly clear that the established laws of war, those principles of humanity, 
forbearance, truthfulness and honour which we have earlier laid down should be 
observed on both sides in a civil war. The same reasons which make those laws of 
obligation between State and State render them equally necessary and even more so 
in the unfortunate event when two determined parties struggle for the Possession of 
their common fatherland". 89 
87 B. Bottoten: The Spanish Revolution. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hitt, 1979, pp. 249- 
250. 
88 For the fuLl citation, see VatteL, op. cit., supra. chapter 3. n. 56, p. 338. 
$91bid. 
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Thus, it seems that pragmatism, among other things, has led Vattel to this conclusion, since 
cruelty and maltreatment will result in cutting all bonds between the warring factions and 
hence makes the chances of a speedy peace very remote. The spirit of vengeance will grow 
and reconciliation will be very hard to achieve. 
In other words, political wisdom and also humanity, demand that either in internal or 
international wars, the maxims and dictates of humanity must be respected in the conduct 
of the war. However, it seems that Vattel's view and advice has not been acted upon in the 
overwhelming majority of cases of civil wars which took place at that time and afterwards. 
States choose to stick to the freedom of discretion in dealing with their enemies, which 
sovereignty affords them. 
In the modern era, some international lawyers, continue to stress, that there is a minimum 
standard which emerges from the customary law of war which must be respected, in all 
conflicts, irrespective of their nature or formal characterization. McDougal and Florentino 
argued that: 
"... [B]ecause the law of war is designed for the benefit of all mankind and not merely 
of certain belligerents, most observers agree further that this most basic policy of 
minimum unnecessary destruction of values applies to all forms of hostilities, irrespective of the characterization of the resort to violence as lawful or unlawful, 
of the formal character of one or the other participants as an intra-state rebel group 
or unrecognised Government or an international organization, of the intensity of the 
violence and its extension in time and space and of recognition or non-recognition 
of the existence of a technical state of war". 90 
However, the main criticism of this approach, in my opinion, is that it is built on the 
assumption that the laws of war are designed for the benefit of all mankind, which is not 
true. Laws of war were designed for those who fight only for the State, in traditional 
international law. The reason of State sovereignty and its protection favoured that only 
when the recognition of belligerency takes place can those laws be extended to internal 
conflicts, in all other cases of civil wars, sovereignty takes precedence. 
On the other hand, Kalshoven has also tried to indicate that customary rules of warfare 
aPply to civil wars. According to him: 
"It would be very strange indeed if completely different codes of conduct or 
standards of civilization would apply according as the conflict would have to be 
classified as an international or non - inte rnational. "91 
He then went on to suggest that: 
"Notwithstanding this sharp difference [between civil and international wars] in legal 
regimes as they appear from the written instruments, it would be astonishing indeed 
to find that the underlying custom I, codes of conduct applicable in the two situations 
really have nothing in common. "9 
90 N-S. McDougat and P. Ftorentino: Principtes of the Law of War. 67 YLJ, 1958, pp. 827-828. 
91 OP- Cit., supra. n. 2, p. 272. 
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He supported his contention by noting first that the Lieber code was written for a civil war 
situation, despite all its contents being drawn from the rules which apply between States, 
and secondly by concentrating on some general pronouncements, made by Britain in the 
first Peace Conference in The Hague in 1899, and some pronouncements by the US 
concerning the Protocol of 1925 Concerning the Use of Gas. 93 Lastly Cassese indicated that: 
"As to customary international law very few rules concerning inter-State wars have 
evolved in such a way as to also cover internal conflicts. Mption can be made of 
some general norms concerning the protection of civilians W. 
9 
He then cites these rules which are: The rule prohibiting attacks upon civilian population, 
the principle whereby military objectives only be can attacked, and the rule providing that 
reasonable care must be taken in attacking military objectives so that through carelessness 
95 a civilian population in the neighbourhood is not bombed. 
However, it seems to me, and despite the manifest humanitarian motives behind the 
statements and opinions made above, it is very difficult to suggest, and especially difficult 
to prove that States which were involved in civil wars in which no recognition of 
belligerency had taken place, behaved or considered themselves as restricted in their actions 
vis-A-vis their opponents, by any legal standards, or some general rules of customary 
international law. 
A strict approach, in fact, suggests that in customary international law the laws of war 
apply only in cases of the recognition of belligerency. Demands of sovereignty and non- 
intervention, in the absence of such recognition, repulse any claim to treat the insurgents 
according to the customary rules of warfare. Hence the claims of sovereignty and non- 
intervention overrode the claims of humanity and moderation in these circumstances. 
Furthermore, there is no practice which suggests that States have acted in any way which 
indicates that they had accepted that there were some legal constraints on their actions by 
virtue of customary international law. On the contrary, there is evidence to suggest the 
opposite, in the sense that established Governments saw themselves as free from any legal 
restraints in their actions against their opponents. Thus, when in 1912 the ICRC 
93 Thus, when discussing the prohibition of dum dum buttets, the main objections came from Britain. 
Its representative maintained that the buttets had been found to constitute an indispensabte means 
of stopping the attack of the indigenous enemy (in the British Indies). Katshoven suggested that: 
... ECItearty the retevance of experiences gained in the fnternat mititary actions In the 
Indies for the debate on prohibition of the use of certain buttets in an International, war was 
never doubted by this representative". 
lbid, p. 275. See atso the view of the US concerning the 1925 Protocot on the Prohibition of the Use 
of Gas, is that the protocoL cannot be used to prohibit the use of gas by the police. Kalshoven 
comments that: 
"The distinction made here by the USA is between use in war and use for potice purposes, not 
between internaL or internationat confLicts". 
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Conference, an US motion was proposed for the possibility for Red Cross societies to extend 
their assistance and relief to the wounded and sick and generally to all non-combatants in 
situations of civil war, 96 to the warring factions. Despite the plain humanitarian sense of 
this proposition, it was rejected out of hand by the Russian delegate, General Yermolov, 
who insisted that: 
"I consider, in addition that the Red Cross societies should have no duty towards 
insurgents or bands of revolutionaries whom the laws of my country regarded as 
criminals". 97 
Schl6gel observed that: 
"This statement met with such general aýý 
mere exchange of views on the subject". 
proval that it was not possible to have a 
This plainly means that there is no feeling whatsoever that States are bound by any rules 
in dealing with their opponents. 
Again it seems to me that in the absence of the recognition of belligerency, civil wars 
functioned largely beyond international legal rules, and even when some instances of respect 
of some rules of war can be traced in a few cases of civil wars, usually the motive was 
humanitarian or more precisely mere pragmatism, but never under the sense of legal 
obligation. 
Thus, in the Spanish Civil War which witnessed many acts of cruelty and inhumanity as 
we have seen above. Nevertheless, it witnessed some instances of apparent compliance with 
the basic rules of war, such as the treatment on both sides of each other's captives as POW's, 
but this practice has never been acted upon as emanating from legal obligations since many 
flagrant violations of the rights of the POW had occurred on a large scale. 
Despite the claim of the Republicans that they would treat POW's in accordance with 
their military code, and the claims of the Nationalists that they will respect the laws of war: 
"It was reported that the Republicans still execute POW's, who were members of fascist organizations or of the civil guard. Prisoners who could convince their 
Republican captors that they had been forced to fight for the Nationalists against 
their will were enrolled in the Republican Army". 99 
96 The American motion suggested in fact that: 
116. Such Red Cross societies of other countries extending their assistance in time of such 
disturbances shalt confine their aid strictly to the care and nursing of the sick and wounded, 
as provided In the Geneva Conventions and in The Hague Conventions for the adaptation to naval 
war of the principles of the Geneva Convention, or to relieving the suffering of non- 
combatants, inhabitants of the country and such societies shall render such aid and assistance 
with the utmost impartiality as between the opposing factions, etc. " 




99 A. Van Wyaen Thomas arxi A. J. Thomas Jr.: The Civit War fn Spafn, fn Fatk (ed. ), op. cft ch pter 2, n. 8, p. 125. .. 
a 
218 
Nationalists also, as we have seen, practised outright execution of captured Republican 
soldiers. 
Thus, it appears that the parties to the civil war, did see themselves as free from any legal 
bounds when dealing with their enemies. Their local law prevailed over any other 
consideration, and that law is always severe towards all those who challenge the authority 
and legitimacy of the established order. 
The conclusion is that in the absence of the recognition of belligerency, there is no 
evidence that States feel that they are bound by any other rules, other than the dictates of 
sovereignty, even the general principles of the laws of war, such as the protection of 
combatants, human treatment of POW's and the caring for the sick and wounded can hardly 
be said to be applicable to civil wars without the consent of the established Government. 
This is a sad state of affairs but it reflects what the international community believes to 
be right, since the logic of absolute sovereignty demands it. This State of affairs also 
reflects that in a decentralised world when no common ethics are shared by its components 
the claims of sovereignty and non- intervention will be held by the State to be the most 
important thing to care about. 
However, the tragic fact is that when recognition of belligerency is not in use any longer 
and in the absence of customary rules applicable to internal wars, the only rule which 
regulates the conduct of the State towards its citizens is sovereignty, absolute sovereignty. 
This situation coupled with the tragic events of the Spanish civil war and World War 11, 
clearly demonstrated, in general, the need for some kind of international regulation to 
render such conflicts more humane. The advent of the UN with its emphasises on human 
rights has also accentuated that need for regulation. All these elements have led to the first 
international attempt at regulation in the form of common Article 3, which will be the 
subject of the next section. 
Section IT: The Protection of the Victims of War In Article 3 of the Geneva Convention 
The non-recourse of States to the recognition of belligerency which was the only door 
through which the rules of warfare may apply to civil wars. The horrors of the Spanish 
Civil War especially highlighted the terrible sufferings of the civilian population. These 
elements coupled with the humanitarian spirit that arose after the Second World War, as a 
reaction to the terrible crimes committed by the Nazis against the civilians, the POW's and 
even against a section of the German population itself, and which were exposed fully by 
the judgments of the Tokyo and Nuremberg tribunals. 
Moreover, the inclusion of the concept of human rights in the UN Charter and especially 
the efforts of the ICRC to induce States to agree to some kind of regulation of internal 
conflicts. All these factors have in different degrees influenced States to try to regulate 
internal conflict. 
However, it must be noted that although, States reluctantly accepted the principle of 
regulation of internal conflicts in the context of an international instrument, they tried (at 
least the majority) to reduce its significance by several means. One was to Minimise the 
kind of substantive rules that are to be applied, in line with the requirements of the 
protection of their sovereignty from major incursion. This occurred in the Diplomatic 
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Conference of 1949 and again in the subsequent application of that Article. 
A. The Travaux Pr6paratolres of the Diplomatic Conference of 1949 and the Protection 
of the Victims of Internal Wars 
The need for adequate humanitarian protection of the victims of internal wars had been 
expressed especially in the ICRC conferences long before 1949, i. e., as beginning from 1921 
(at the Xth Conference), the Conference adopted Resolution XIV, 100 which was wholly 
concerned with the question of relief in the circumstances of civil wars. At the XVIth 
Conference in London, a very important Resolution (XIV)101 dealt with the role and 
activity of the Red Cross in times of civil war. The Conference by that resolution requested 
the ICRC and the national Red Cross societies to endeavour to obtain the application of the 
'humanitarian principles' contained in the 1929 Geneva Convention and the Xth Hague 
Convention of 1907 relating to the Treatment of the Wounded and the Sick, the POW and 
the Protection and Safety of Medical Personnel. The Resolution also demanded the 
protection and respect of life and liberty of non-combatants, especially children. 
This Resolution, it must be noted, was adopted when the Spanish Civil War was raging 
with all its cruelties, hence, it shows clearly the progress made in the public opinion, in the 
sense that sovereignty and non- intervention cannot bar the protection of human beings even 
in internal conflicts. 
On the other hand, it seems to me that the Conference of 1938 laid the first step toward 
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. The Second World War prevented the holding of the 
Diplomatic Conference that was to revise the Geneva Convention of 1929. However, after 
the war, the atmosphere was appropriate for a new effort for the revision and development 
of humanitarian law in general. Three conferences102 took place between 1946 and 1948 and 
produced the famous Article 2/4, which became, after a heated and prolonged discussion 
at the Diplomatic Conference of 1949, the Common Article 3. 
The general view of these conferences was that the conventions which should be adopted 
must apply to internal as well as international conflicts. The Diplomatic Conference of 1949 
shows that the hopes of the ICRC, were ahead of their time. They neglected the fact that 
States, both old and new, still hold to their sovereignty and to non- intervention in their 
internal affairs. Hence, Draft Article 2/4, which in general envisaged the application of the 
whole Convention to civil wars, was quickly the object of a vigorous attack. Sovereignty 
was the essential element of the argument. Rosemary Abi-Saab rightly observed that: 
"Les thýses en presence tournent autour d'un point essentiel, celui du principe de la 
souverainet6 de I'Etat. L'attitude adopt6e A Ngard de ce point fondamental 
d6terminera I'attitude aussi bien quant au champ d'application des Conventions et de 
la d6finition du conflit arm6 de caract6re non-international que quand aux modalit6s 
100 For the text of the Resolution (XIV), see CGEDHL (Geneva 24 May-12 June 1971, V. Protection of 
Victims of Non- International Conflicts Submitted by the ICRC), Geneva, January 1971, Annex VI, p. 013. 
lollbid, Amex VII, pp. 15-16. 
102 These conferences were: (1) Pretiminary Conference of the Nationat Societies of the Red Cross, 
1946. (if) Conference of Goverment Experts 1947; and (Iff) The XVII Internationat Conference of the Red Cross (StockhoLm 1948). 
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d'application et au contenu de la riglementation proposie". 103 
The discussions at the Diplomatic Conference revealed to a large extent the correctness of 
that observation. Thus, in the first meeting of the Joint Committee on April 26th, 1949, the 
French delegate noted concerning Draft Article 2/4 that: 
"The Conference at Stockholm had been mainly concerned with the protection of the 
individual but it was also necessary not to lose sight of the rights of the States". 104 
He, in fact, stressed that it was inconceivable to carry the protection of the individuals to 
the point of sacrificing the rights of States. Moreover, the French delegate, with the 
blessing of the majority of the delegates present in Geneva, implicitly placed the rights of 
States before human rights in the context of internal conflicts. This means that when 
individuals rise in arms against their own Governments, they should expect that the rights 
of their Government override their individual rights as human beings. 
However, it seems important to see how each category of the victims of internal conflicts 
has been treated by the Conference. This will show how the principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention have been used to limit the extension of humanitarian rules to those 
victims. 
1. The POW 
The Greek delegate led the opposition to the proposal of the ICRC to extend the POW status 
to captured insurgents. His view, in fact, reflects what a State which has just finished a 
drama of a civil war thinks about the fate of its captured enemies. He stressed that: 
"The adoption of the text as at present [Draft Article 2/4] would entail the application 
to the latter 'The rebels' of the provisions of Articles 74 and 100 of the POW Convention. The rebels could not, therefore, be charged with crimes against common law committed before their arrest and they would be automatically granted a pardon 
at the end of the disturbances. Furthermore, they could claim the protection of a 
protecting power. The possibility of such protection might incite political opponents 
to take up arms against a legitimate Government". 105 
Captured insurgents then, were singled out as the category which needs no international 
protection, States it seems were not prepared to treat insurgents as a legitimate and bona 
fide belligerents. The US delegate, in fact, stressed that: 
"... [E]very Government had a right to put down rebellion within its borders and to 
punish the insurgents in accordance with its penal laws ". 106 
Other delegations suggested that the need for humane treatment for captured insurgents did 
103R. Abi-Saab, op. cit., op. cit., supra. chapter 3, n. 159, p. 54. 
104 Final Records of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva, 1949, Vot. 2, Section B, Federal Political 
Dept., Bern, 1950, p. 10. 
105 Ibid, p. 11. 
106 lbid, p. 12. 
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not entail the application of the POW status, to them local penal law can guarantee such 
humane treatment in a very effective way. 107 
Burma in fact, went even further. Its representative, General Oung stressed that: 
"The proposed Convention should not give legal status to insurgents who sought by 
undemocratic methods to overthrow a legally constituted Government by force of 
arms". 108 
In other words, only the deletion of any reference to civil wars would satisfy the 
requirements of sovereignty. The argument of sovereignty, at least implicity, was used to 
deny any legal status or any international regulation of the most hated category of the 
victims of internal wars. 
2. The Civilian Population 
The British delegate led the attack against the Civilian Convention by pointing out that: 
"Careful consideration of the provisions of the Convention concerning civilians, in 
particular, left little room for doubt that their application to civil wars would strike 
at the root of national sovereignty and endanger national security". 109 - 
The problem is that the Civilian Convention was essentially based on the concepts of 
nationality and occupation. These concepts are really strange in the case of civil wars, since 
the civilian population holds the nationality of one State in the whole territory, even in that 
portion which is under the control of the insurgents. Thus, the established Government is 
not expected to apply different sets of laws to its nationals. 
Moreover, occupation by the insurgents of certain portions of territory. even if effective, 
can hardly be admitted by the established Government as analogous to occupation by a 
foreign power, since the question of the applicable law will raise fundamental difficulties 
and serious problems in connection with the concept of sovereignty of which the established 
Government claims to be the sole holder. 
The Canadian delegate expressed the difficulties described above in this manner: 
"The introduction of the fourth paragraph into Article 2 seemed even more impossible in the case of the civilian convention. Here the persons protected were 
essentially enemy nationals residing in the country. It would be inconceivable to 
suggest that even in a large-scale civil war supporters of the rebels could justify 
demands from the lawful Government that they be treated as protected persons under 
the civilian convention, although they were not living in the part of the country 
controlled by the rebels. No lawful Government would be able to quell a rebellion 
under these circumstances". ' 10 
It appears then that the status of the captured insurgents and the civilians, as the main 
107 lbid, P. 13. 
108 Mid, p. 15. 
109 lbid, p. 10. 
110 lbid, P. 13. 
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victims of internal wars were not considered worthy of complete protection (at least at the 
beginning of the discussion of Draft Article 2/4). In my view, the reason of the concept of 
sovereignty is still seen by a large number of States to exclude the protection of those 
individuals who take up arms against their lawful Government or those individuals among 
the civilian population who support them. 
Individuals who do not obey the lawful Government cannot expect any better protection 
than that provided in the laws promulgated by the Government which they are fighting. 
Paradoxically, the Nuremburg judgment did not influence the attitude of States on the 
particular point of the 'protection of the civilians'. Its effect (of the judgment) is obvious 
in the Fourth Geneva Convention as a whole. However, that convention was to be applied 
only in the context of international wars. Sovereignty it seems was stronger than the 
humanitarian spirit of the Nuremburg judgment in the context of civil wars. 
The preliminary opposition described above to the Draft Article 2/4 submitted by the 
ICRC, opened the way for the establishment of two working groups, with the express 
mission of drafting a new common draft Article 2/4, which would satisfy the majority of 
States present at the Conference. 
In Chapter III, I dealt with the work of these two groups in relation to the question of 
the definition of civil wars. Here I will concentrate on their contribution, if any, to the 
protection of the victims of internal wars. 
3. The First Working Group and Its Work 
In its first new Draft (Article 2/4), the working group (the first) accepted the idea of the 
application of the whole convention to civil wars on two important conditions. First, it 
raised, as we have seen in Chapter 111, the thresholds of the definition of civil wars, so they 
will in effect resemble international wars. Secondly, the institution of the protecting power 
will not operate automatically, only special agreements between the belligerent parties will 
bring it into operation. Thus, according to this version, the victims of internal wars will 
enjoy the same treatment accorded in the case of international conflicts. 
However, many delegations were not satisfied with that solution, among them being the 
French delegate. Although, he was in support of the extension of the humanitarian 
principles of the convention to internal conflicts, he felt that: 
"It was impossible to extend all the clauses of the convention to internal confligls. 
This impossibility was particularly obvious in the case of the civilian convention". "' 
He was strongly supported by the British' 12 and the Burmese delegates who were unable to 
accept the proposition of the working group. 113 On the other hand, the Soviet Union 
expressed the view of the minority when its representative stated that the proposed draft 






not of an international character". 114 
In the light of these divergent positions, the same working group was directed to draw 
up a new Draft Article 2/4. The second Draft distinguished between two kinds of non- 
international armed conflicts to which different rules would apply. The first kind resembles 
international wars, in this case, the Conventions on POW and the Sick and Wounded would 
be applicable on the strict condition of reciprocity. 
In cases of internal conflicts, which do not attain the intensity of the first kind, the 
conventions or part of them can be applied only through special agreements failing the 
conclusion of such agreements. The belligerents are directed to conform to the humanitarian 
principles of those conventions. 
Concerning the civilian conventions, the second Draft contained a completely new 
article, 115 according to which the convention or part would be applicable only through 
special agreements whatever the intensity of the war. 
Thus, in effect, even in cases of major civil wars, civilians would not have effective 
protection, States wanted to have a free hand to deal with their subjects and punish severely 
those who help or try to help the 'traitors' who took up arms against their legitimate 
Government. 
However, the new Draft of the first working party was not accepted. Many delegations 
submitted amendments. The most important were those tabled by Britain and France. 
Britain in effect, demanded that even in the case of a major civil war, the provisions of the 
conventions would apply only after six months from the beginning of the conflict. 
The British proposal was very dangerous from a humanitarian point of view, since as the 
experience of civil wars shows the cruelty and brutality are always present in the first 
period of the conflict. The effect of the British amendment was to give a free hand to the 
Government to finish off the insurgents in six months by whatever rileans, since at the end 
of that period the Government would be obliged to apply the conventions. Thus, the 
Government will be in a race against time, emdeavouring to end the conflict before the 
deadline. 
The French delegation supported by many other delegations, attacked the second Draft 
of the first working group on the grounds that it contained dangerous elements. It 
considered that: 
"... [S]ignatory Governments who were confronted with an insurgent movement would 
be in a dilemma; either they would never apply the clauses of the conventions or they 
would implicitly recognise that the adverse party had a character which was 
1141bid, 
p. 48. 
115 This second Draft drawn up by the first working party contains a speciat Draft Articte (new Articte 
2A) which stipulates that: 
uln the case of armed conflict not of an international character, occurring on the territory 
of one of the high contracting parties, the parties to the conflict should endeavour to bring 
Into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the provisions of the present 
convention, in all circumstances shatt act in accordance with the underlying humanitarian 
principles of the convention". 
Jbid, p. 125. 
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tantamount to that of a State". 116 
Therefore, to that delegation any attempt to apply the conventions to internal conflicts will 
give a legal status to the rebels, hence, it touches indirectly on the sovereignty of the State 
and its freedom of action. 
Similarly, the USSR was unable to accept the working party's second Draft, but for 
different reasons. In its view, the Draft was too restrictive, it considered that at the 
outbreak of an internal conflict, the application of the convention should be automatic. 
Special agreements might be taken into consideration in the course of the conflict but, the 
USSR added, it would not be acceptable to leave persons who require protection without 
defence. 117 However, the USSR was in the minority and it seems that the voice of 
sovereignty won the day. 
4. The Work of the Second Working Group 
After the failure of the first working group to satisfy the majority, a second working group 
was appointed with the mission of drawing up another Draft Article (Article 2/4). The 
working group chose a new approach. There is no room for the application of the whole 
convention to internal conflicts, only some fundamental humanitarian rules would be 
applicable. 
The French delegate chaired the group and introduced the new Draft by stating that: 
"It offered in all cases and circumstances the chief advantage of permitting the 
automatic implementation of concrete and precise provisions which were the essence 
of humanitarian rules to be observed in cases of armed conflicts not of an international character". 118 
In fact, these 'concrete and precise provisions, were some general and fundamental 
principles of humanitarian law which in practice, need more precision and elaboration if 
they are to have any effect at all in the protection of victims of internal wars. 
The US delegate criticised the second working group's approach, because it did not oblige 
the contracting States to apply the whole conventions in certain serious cases of internal 
wars-119 Furthermore, he thought that the new Draft Article 2/4 had simply prohibited 
some acts of violence, which in fact had been forbidden by other international instruments 
and would serve no useful purpose in practice. 120 It appears that the US delegate was 
referring to the Genocide Convention and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Norway raised a very important question concerning the fate of captured insurgents. It 
pointed out that: 
116 Ibid, p. 78. 
117 Ibid, p. 79. 




"... [A]ccording to the proposal under discussion, a Government with the intention of 
executing combatant insurgents or of taking them as hostages instead of capturing 
them would be at liberty to do So". 
121 
No precise answer was given to this question. However, an important delegation (the US) 
was quick to point out that the de jure Government should treat insurgents as regular 
combatants. 122 The same delegation went even further. It stressed that the law of combat 
has to be applied even in internal conflicts. It stressed that: 
"Combatants should also be entitled to some protection. The use of poison or gas, for 
instance, was prohibited by international law but international law only applied to 
wars ýetween states and the prohibition should also be extended to cover civil 
wars. " 23 
This proposition is very interesting since Article 3, as adopted, does not contain any express 
reference to the regulations of methods and means of warfare. To this important State (the 
US), the means of injuring the enemy are not unlimited even in cases of civil wars. 
At the 37th meeting of the Special Committee, the USSR introduced a proposal which in 
the opinion of that delegation was a compromise between all drafts and observations made 
during the discussions on Draft Article 2/4. It conceded that it was impossible in the light 
of the discussions which took place to apply all the provisions of the Conventions in a 
conflict of a non -international character. Its proposal selected some fundamental 
humanitarian principles which would apply to each category of the victims of internal 
conflicts (civilians, POWs and the sick and wounded). Inhuman treatment and other cruel 
acts and discriminations are prohibited in the case of all these categories of victims. 
It seems to me, that despite the humanitarian flavour of the Soviet proposal it does reflect 
the Soviet political stand which encouraged national revolution against colonialism. 
However, the Soviet proposals were quickly attacked by the French and even by the Italians. 
They concentrated their attack particularly, on the proposal extending the term POW to 
captured insurgents, which would impair the sovereignty of the Government and its 
freedom of action. 124 In my opinion, only on the ground of arguments for sovereignty can 
we understand the failure of attempts of giving POW status to insurgents. 
The Soviet proposal which is in effect milder than the ICRC's Draft Article 2/4, was 
rejected in the Special Committee by 9 votes to I (July 8th, 1949). This is a revealing case, 
States were not ready to commit themselves in any manner concerning the treatment of 
rebels and of the civilian population. To them, this would impair their sovereignty and 






124 Throughout the conference the French delegate defended the 'rights of States' against the rights 
of individuals and pointed out in connection with the Soviet proposal on Powls that all rules 
governing the regime for treatment of POWs could not be applied In civil wars because the protecting 
powers conferred by the Mandate would impair the sovereignty of the Government. The same points hold 
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intervention in their internal affairs. 
At the end, it must be indicated that the second working group Draft, after being 
amended slightly by the Special Committee was adopted by the conference in its plenary 
session by 34 in favour, 28 against and I abstention, that Draft became the well-known 
common Article 3. 
The voting showed clearly that Article 3 was adopted by a slim majority which indicates 
that an important number of States were not happy with it, since it made vulnerable their 
exclusive jurisdiction over events which occur in their territories. 
5. Conclusions to be Drawn from the Travaux Prkparatolres 
1. From the start of the Conference. the majority of States felt that any general extension 
of the Geneva Convention to all the victims of internal wars would not be acceptable 
whatever the magnitude and intensity of the conflict, the reason being that the sovereignty 
of the State would be impaired. However, Schl6gel attributed such failure to the following: 
"The little legal protection from which the victims of civil war benefited was the 
logical outcome of the impossibility for Governments to agree on what should be 
demanded of the rebel party for it to have recognition of equal rights under the 
Geneva Conventions". 12.5 
2. The majority of States resisted all attempts to give captured insurgents POW status. 
Established Governments closed the door to any international regulation in that domain in 
the name of preserving their discretion. 
3. Because civilians hold the nationality of their State and are thus bound by the duty of 
allegiance, they were not regarded as eligible for extensive international protection as in the 
case of international war. Sovereignty closed the door to real protection. 
4. However, there was a general consensus that the sick and wounded should be treated 
with humanity. No detailed provisions were made for the effective application of the 
principle that those victims (the sick and wounded) should be 'collected and cared for' 
which, in practice, brought many problems. 
5. There was no detailed discussions concerning the actual principles included in Article 
3, which in practice, led to different interpretations of the concepts involved. For example, 
the concept of 'human treatment' which is a central principle in the context of Article 3, 
has not been defined in any precise form. 
B. Analysis of the Actual Contents of Common Article 3 
Article 3 signals, in my view, the rapprochement between humanitarian law and human 
rights, since human rights apply in peace time and most of them will be suspended in times 
of emergencies. The remaining few rights after the suspension will be protected by 
humanitarian law. Those rights that are protected, represent the point of meeting between 
human rights and humanitarian law. 
On the other hand, it must noted that before the adoption of the Geneva Convention of 
1949, two events in particular, contributed to the eventual meeting between human rights 
1250P. 
cit.. op. cit., supra. n. 96. p. 129. 
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and humanitarian law. 
First, the UN Charte r mentions human rights as one of the purposes of the organization 
(Article 1/3). The UN Secretary-General, in one of his reports in the late 1960s, made the 
argument that the human rights disposition of the UN Charter did not distinguish between 
periods of peace and war, between military and civilian personnel. He wrote: 
"... [L]a terminologie de la Charte s'applique dans sa g4n6ralit6 aux civils aussi bien 
qu'aux militaires, elle englobe les personnes vivant sous la juridiction de leurs propres 
autoritis nationales et les personnes vivant dans les territoires OCCUpiS*. 126 
This interpretation of the dispositions of the UN Charter extends implicitly the application 
of the regime of human rights to internal conflicts, since apparently there is no distinction 
between different kinds of conflicts in the application of human rights. 
Secondly, it must be remembered that in 1948, the first international instrument of 
human rights was adopted (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). That Declaration, 
in effect, contains no derogation clause in times of emergencies. This may be interpreted 
that all human rights must be respected at all times or at least some of them: such as the 
right to life, prohibition of torture and the right to a fair trial. Although, participants 
present at Geneva in 1949 were military men, diplomats and those who in general, defend 
the rights of States, nevertheless, they had to take into account what happened in Paris in 
1948. In this context, Quentin-Baxter wrote: 
"The proof of this lay in the new Article 3 common to all four Conventions, 
providing ?,. simple Code of Human Conduct in conflicts not of an international 
" 27 character . 
It seems to me, that there are three views regarding the question of what kind of rules are 
included in Common Article 3. 
1. The First View 
This view holds that Article 3 does not bring anything new, its guarantees are stipulated in 
general in all civilized States' laws. In this connection, Pictet maintains that Article 3 
imposes only- 
"... [A] few essential rules which the Government in fact respects daily under its own 
laws, even when dealing with common criminaIS". 128 
Similarly. Siotis argued: 
"... [L]es principes hurnanitaires, qui sont A la base des r6gles dont I'application est 
prdvue, Wont nullement besoin d'explication et constituent des 616ments essentiels de 
126UN Doc A/7720, pars 23, cited by Heyrowitz: Le droit de is querre et tes droits de Phomme, 88 
RDPSPFE, 1972, pp. 1080-81. 
127R. Quentin- Baxter: Human Rights and Humani tar i an Law: Conftuence or Conftict, 9 AY I L, 1985, p. 101. 
128Cited by Bond, op. cit., supra. chapter 3. n. 132, p. 57. 
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toute morale humaniste, rationaliste ou religieuse". 
129 
He then added that: 
"... [N]ous avons M des rýgles de droit intern jonal dont I'application ne peut en 
ancune mankre nuire au maintain de I'ordre"Iý 
In his view, the rules of Article 3 do not constitute any derogation from the State's 
sovereignty. 
In my opinion, this approach ignores that Article 3 was not easily accepted by the 
majority of States present at Geneva. Because States mainly considered that it touches upon 
their freedom of action and their right to maintain law and order within their borders. 
Moreover, even if we concede that the rules included in the Article are already found in 
the Codes of Conduct of civilized States, their (the rules) inclusion in an international 
agreement was not easy, since it brings with it, in their opinion, the prospect of 
intervention in their internal affairs. 
Other viewpoints differ in their interpretation of the fundamental notion of 
'humanitarian treatment'. This principle, as it is known, is a fundamental principle of 
human Tights, and of the laws of war. 
This divergence of interpretation led to different conclusions as to the rules embodied in 
Article 3. Thus, when the notion of 'human treatment' is interpreted as a human right 
principle, it is said to mean respect for the right to life and prohibition of torture and the 
right to fair trial. 
To me, the right to life in this Context, must include the means of survival, it is not a 
negative right in the sense that the State must abstain from doing certain things. It is also 
a positive right in the sense that the State must provide, or allow other humanitarian 
agencies such as the ICRC to provide, essentials namely food, shelter and medical supplies. 
However, it must be indicated that Article 3 does not prohibit capital punishment 
therefore, the right to life for captured insurgents does not include protection from the 
death penalty. In such circumstances, the notion of 'human treatment' must be interpreted 
as excluding summary execution. A fair judgment is a necessary element of human 
treatment in the case of the worst treated victims of internal wars (captured insurgents). 
This brings us to the conclusion that the human rights approach in the interpretation of 
Article 3 leads to indicate that all these rights to life, prohibition of torture and fair trial 
are now cardinal elements of the human rights system and thus, they constitute a 
fundamental limitation upon the State's sovereignty. 
No State can claim that it will not respect them, and it has no right to characterise as an 
intervention in its internal affairs any attempt by the international community to state its 
views on the subject, or demand respect for those rights. The emergency situation has no 
relevance in this respect. Such approach affords the benefit that the instruments of human 
rights may be used to protect the civilians and even the combatants in times of emergency. 
129 Op. cit., supra. n. 62, p. 212. 
1301bid. 
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2. The Second View 
Another view concerning the contents of Article 3, hold that the article must be seen as an 
attempt to state aresumd' of the essential principles of 'Geneva Law, which deals with the 
protection of the victims of war. They stress that the principle of humane treatment and 
other principles included in Article 3 such as 'the taking of hostages' and 'caring for the 
wounded and sick' must be seen and interpreted within the perspectives of the law of the 
Geneva tradition and not that of human rights. However, they admit that the influence of 
human rights appears at least in two instances in Article 3: 'The prohibition of outrages 
upon personnel dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment" and of non- 
discrimination. 
In this context, Wilhelm observed that: 
"Quand au contenu des garanties fondamentales de I'Article 3, on peut dire en un mot 
qu'elles correspondent au syst6me des Conventions de Geneva de 1949, c'est_i-dire 
qu'elles proftent les bless6s et les malades aussi que les personnes combattant ou non 
qui sont tombdes ou se trouvent au pouvoir de I'adversaire ". 131 
According to him, the central notion of 'humane treatment' comes directly from the 
tradition of the law of Geneva and to some extent The Hague. it can be found in the 
Geneva Convention of 1929 and in what is called 'Martens Clause' in the Preamble of the 
IV Hague Convention of 1907. 
He also stresses that other rules included in Article 3 can be found in the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949. The prohibition of taking hostages is stipulated in Article 34 of the 
IV Geneva Convention, collecting and caring for the sick and wounded in Article 40 of the 
132 first Convention and so on. 
It seems to me, that although this kind of argument is not without solid foundation, the 
human rights approach may afford the benefit that States will be at odds in denying the 
application of certain fundamental rules of human rights in situations of internal conflicts. 
Because in demanding respect for those fundamental rules, third States cannot be seen as 
making an intervention in the internal affairs of the State concerned, as their position, 
cannot in any way, be interpreted as giving rebels any legal status or giving the conflict any 
characterisation. 
However, to interpret Article 3 in the light of the tradition of Geneva Conventions, may 
be considered by an established Government engaged in an internal conflict, as an attempt 
of giving the rebels some kind of legal status and also as a way of inducing that 
Government to accept that the conflict is an internal one, to which certain rules must be 
applied. 
3. Third View 
This view goes very far and tries, in my opinion, to interpret the clause of "humane 
treatment" in the light of the law of war stricto sensu. In this connection many principles 




and rules of Jus In bello are inferred from that principle, i. e. 'the principle of humane 
treatment'. 
Thus, the fundamental rule of the laws of war, namely'the protection of non-combatants, 
is deduced, and from that rule many other rules were inferred such as the prohibition of 
bombardment of open towns and villages, the distinction between lawful and unlawful 
targets of attack and even the nature of weapons which may be used. The principle of 
military necessity is introduced. All military acts must be decided in the light of the 
necessities of the situation. In other words, the idea of humane treatment and the general 
object of Article 3, has been interpreted as prohibiting total war in civil wars. 
An example of this exercise is what has been done by Bond, Pinto, O'Brian and others. 
Pinto interpreted the prohibition of violence to life and murder of all kinds, mentioned in 
Article 3 (A), as prohibiting bombardment, indiscriminate aerial attacks and also all means 
of combat which cause unnecessary sufferings. 133 
Bond, after observing that the idea that the laws of war should govern internal conflicts, 
argued that the use of biological and chemical weapons, resort to strategic bombings, 
committing of reprisals, relocation of the civilian population, defoliation of farm and forest 
lands and destruction food stores and the claim to treat captured insurgents as common 
criminals or traitors rather than POW's. To all these important issues, he maintains that 
although, Article 3 does not prohibit them specifically, he stressed that a broad 
interpretation, especially of the principle of humane treatment, would render most of the 
acts listed above as illegal because most of those actions would affect non-combatants, 
hence they would in one way or another violate the obligations to treat them humanely. 
O'Brian does not base himself on a broad interpretation of Article 3 in order to introduce 
the application of certain rules of Jus In bello, in internal conflicts. Rather, he seems to 
argue from what experience shows. In this context, he writes: 
* ... [I]n a serious contemporary revolutionary war both sides are likely to resort to means proscribed or limited by jus In bello, rules prohibiting the use of disproportionate or indiscriminate firepower against heavily civilian targets and banning measures of population control which exceeds the standards set for belligerent occupations". 134 
He then adds: 
"... [A]dmittedly no international convention has accepted these standards as binding 
on belligerents in civil war but, as will be argued, these limits should be the basis for 
evaluating the treatment of civilians in such conflicts. "135 
However, it seems to me that O'Brian argument does not find real support in practice. The 
Vietnam war is a case in point. In this context, Falk was right when he wrote: 
"... [F]or a number of reasons it is equally complicated to apply the laws of war to the 
conduct of a large-scale counter- insurgency war. The virtually inevitable illegality 
133 See Pinto, op. cit., supra, chapter 2, n. 90, p. 533. 
134 W. V. O'Brian: The Jus in Betio In Revotutfonary War Law. IS VJIL, 1978, p. 204. 
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of insurgents methods and tactics tends to vindicate recourse to effective responses. 
Governments generally maintain the Tight to request external help to defeat such 
internal armed struggles. In addition, counter-insurgency weaponry and tactics are 
a somewhat recent development. International law is generally a orded a very 
limited sphere of applicability in relation to a largely internal war". 
"6 
Then, he arrived at a different conclusion concerning the applicability of certain rules of 
jus In bello in internal conflicts. 
It seems to me, however, that the views of those who support the broad interpretation of 
Article 3, in order to include some fundamental rules of Jus In bello, face in practice, some 
legal and political obstacles which States may resort to. First of all, according to the law of 
treaties, the aim of any interpretation is to elucidate the intentions of the parties. 
Consequently, it is very hard to prove that the parties to the Geneva Conventions envisaged 
such broad interpretation. No words, no preparatory work and in a way no subsequent 
practice concerning Article 3, supports such contention. The only legal device for the 
acceptance of such broad interpretation is the conclusion of special agreements between the 
parties. 
In my view, Baxter, appears to be correct when he stressed that: 
"... [T]he obligations of Article 3 are cast in such general terms and leaves so many 
things unsaid that they cannot, even under the best of circumstances, be an adequate 
guide to the conduct of belligerents in civil strife". 137 
4. Conclusion 
It seems that the fundamental defect of Article 3 is as Schl6gel argues "... lies in the lack of 
balance between the principle in heading I and the enumeration as examples of particular 
violations under sub-headings (a) to (d)". 138 The same idea was expressed by Veuthey, who 
observed that: 
"I'Article 3 concrdtise le general principe 'le traitement humain" non par une 
description du traitement A accorder mais d'une manjýre n6gative en inumdrant ce 
qui est incompatible avec un tel traitement humain". 139 
Therefore, what is absent from Article 3 in my view is a positive formulation of the idea 
of 'humane treatment' which can include amongst other things, some fundamental economic 
and social rights, such as the supply of food to those in need in situations of internal strife 
and their right to receive such supplies through independent channels. Moreover, the 
prohibition of any kind of forced labour, the right to receive medical care for the sick and 
wounded and the duty of the medical staff and the civilian population as a whole to give 
the necessary assistance are not mentioned in Article 3. 
136See P. D. Trooboff: Law and Responsibitity. Univ. of North Carotine Press, Chapet Hitt, 1975, p. 51. 
137R. Baxter: Jus In Betto Interno: The Present and Future Law, in Moore (ed. ), op. cit., supra. 
chapter 2, n. 43. pp. 528-9 
138 Op. cit., supra. n. 96, p. 133. 
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C. Subsequent Practice Concerning Article 3 
To what extent has Common Article 3 in practice protected the victims of internal wars? 
This is a very important question since it shows us how far States are ready to honour their 
obligations and especially how they interpret their obligations contained in the Article, and 
finally how the two principles of sovereignty and non -intervention were sometimes used 
to limit these obligations. 
In this respect, I will deal with three points: (i) The State practice in actual civil wars; (ii) 
the UN and the protection of the victims of internal wars and, finally, (iii) the judgment 
of the ICJ in the Nicaraeua Case and Article 3. 
1. The State Practice In Actual Civil Wars 
This reveals beyond any doubt that the protection of victims of such conflicts is not wholly 
satisfactory. Thus, the civilians, the POW's, were not effectively protected and even the sick 
and wounded were not afforded the real conditions of protection since Article 3 does not 
protect the persons who may afford assistance to persons in need e. g. the medical staff. 
This practice, as will be seen, reveals many instances of those attempting to give 
assistance to the sick and wounded being considered as committing a crime punishable in 
law. In order to cover this point, I will deal with the fate of the civilians, captured 
insurgents and finally the sick and wounded, in actual civil wars. 
1.1. The Civilian Population 
In a civil war more than an international conflict, civilians are in general intimately 
involved in the contest. Victory will be on the side of those who can muster the support of 
the population. In this context, Mao Tse-Tung stressed that: 
"The people may be likened to water. the troops to fish who inhabit it". 140 
They 'the civilians' are the source of food, shelter, intelligence and care for the wounded 
and sick. Because of that, the civilians have sometimes become military targets themselves 
especially in the eyes of the established Government. They are the victims of terrorist acts, 
bombardment, displacement, etc. Their property too, which is an essential element of their 
survival, is at the mercy of the two sides of the conflict. 
It appears that the practice revealed that the use of the guerrilla method of warfare has 
led Governments fighting in such situations to act as if the general distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants which is implicit in Article 3 is non-existent, they behave 
in a total warlike manner. The guerrilla method of warfare seems to negate the application 
of any humanitarian rules. The cases which I will deal with point in that direction. 
1.1.1. In Vietnam 
140 Cited by J. B. Ketty and G. A. Pettetner: Legat Controt of Poputations in Subversive Warfare. 5 VJIL, 
1965-6, p. 174. - 
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In Vietnam both the US and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam acknowledged the 
application of the Geneva Conventions to the conflict. 14 1 The NLF gave the assurance that 
it did not consider the Conventions applicable to the conflict, it did, however, assure the 
ICRC that POW's would be treated humanely. 
The field manual (April 1964) of the US forces stressed that when the US forces are 
involved in fighting the insurgents, they will apply the rules contained in Article 3 and will 
encourage their local allies to do likewise. In fact, the manual in its point D stipulated that: 
"Civilians taking no part in the hostilities are entitled to the protection in Article 3 
above. The US forces coming into contact with the civilian population will apply 
these provisions, will -insurgency forces to likewise , 
ye the insurgents and counter 
apply the provisions. " 4 
However, the reality was otherwise. The civilians were the main victims of the war since 
in order to destroy the insurgents, they must first be separated from the civilians. This was 
basically, an impossible task as only political means could achieve that result, military 
means could only lead to disaster. 
The Americans and their allies relied on their military superiority to achieve victory. 
They resorted to saturation bombing, use of anti-personnel weapons, air and artillery 
bombardment of small villages which resulted in heavy casualties among the civilians. A 
total war policy was admitted even by the American administration itself. In this context, 
John McNaughton, then the US Assistant-Secretary of Defence, was able to state: 
"We seem to be proceeding on the assumption that the way to eradicate the Viet Cong is to destroy all the village structures, defoliale all the jungles and then cover the 
entire surface of south Vietnam with asphalt". 143 
The US and their allies have, in fact, resorted to many tactics that resulted in making the 
civilians the first target of the war. Special forces composed of Cambodians, tribesmen, 
Chinese and Vietnamese were used by the CIA, these were indiscriminately violent. The 
CIA also hired people to disguise themselves as Viet Cong and discredit communists by 
141 The US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, wrote to the JCRC on 10th August, 1965 stating that: 
NThe United States has always abided by the humanitarian principles enunciated in the Geneva 
Convention and will continue to do so. In regard to the hostilities in Vietnam, the US 
Government is applying the provisions of the Geneva Convention and we expect other parties to 
the conflict to do likewise. " 
Likewise, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Repubtic of Vietnam, Dr. Tran Van Do, sent a simitar 
tatter to the ICRC in which he stated that: 
"The Goverment of the Repubtic Is futty prepared to respect the provisions of the Geneva 
Convention and to contribution activety to the efforts of the ICRC to ensure their 
apptfcation". 
Cited by L. Petrowski: Law and the Conduct of the Vietnam War, in Fatk, (ed. ). op. cit., supra. 
chapter 2, n. 8, p. 483. 
142 Cited by Ketty and PetLetner, op. cit., supra. n. 140, pp. 185-86. 
143 Cited by T. Farrar: The Laws of War 25 Years after Nureffberg. IC, 1971, No. 583, p. 28. 
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committing atrocities against the civilians. 144 
Farrer summarised the attitude of the higher echelons of the American administration as 
follows: 
"In the eyes of President J. F. Kennedy-the high priest of counter - insu rgency- and 
certain of his advisors, Vietnam was the doctrine's acid test. His successor observed 
that the tough and cocky guerrillas were still swimming in their life-preserving 
human sea. More subtle means failed and President L. B. Johnson turned to blunter 
weapons. No one apparently bothered to tell him about the laws of war". 145 
In other words, no legal constraints were respected, total war with its inevitable lack of 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants, was accepted both as a policy and a 
practice. 
Falk describes the war in Indochina as follows: 
"... [The war in Indochina] was the first modern instance in which the environment 
has been selected as a 'military target' appropriate for comprehensive and systematic 
distinction ". 146 
In practice, such a policy will hit the civilians hard, rather than anyone else, since it is 
directed at drying up the sea of civilians, so that the insurgents will die immediately. 
Falk notes in this respect, that. 
"This drying up process is translated militarily into making the countryside unfit for 
civilian habitation. To turn Indochina into a sea of fire and compel peasants to flee 
their ancestral homes was embodied in a series of war policies including 'free-fire 
zones'; 'search and destroy' operations and various efforts to move villages forcibly into secure areas W. 147 
The result is that the war tends toward genocide with respect to the people and ecocide with 
respect to environment. The US Department of Defense has, in fact, estimated that between 
1965 and 1968 annual expenditure on chemicals rose from $10 million dollars to $70 
million. 148 
It would seem that the destruction of people and environment has been considered by 
officers in the field as a matter of military necessity. Petrowski states that: 
"In some officers eyes, it would be considered a matter of 'military necessity' to burn 
down an entire village to kill one sniper". 149 
This causes civilians to be caught in the middle, they were used as a means of fighting 
insurgents. 
144S. Metman. (Director of Research): In the Name of America: The Conduct of War in Vietnam by the 
Armed Forces of the United States as Shown by Pubtished Reports. 1968, pp. 92-94. 
145 Op. cit., supra. n. 143, p. 25. 
146 R. FaLk: The Vietnam War and InternatfonaL Law, VoLume IV, PUP, prfnceton, 1976, p. 287. 
147 Ibid. 
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In this country, the British used between 275,000 and 395,000 soldiers in order to defeat 
8,000 to 10,000 communist guerrillasl5o and it seems that much of the weight of the terror 
fell on the Chinese citizens from whom the guerrillas tried to gain support. 
Thompson, a very well-known expert on counter-insurgency tactics, explained the means 
by which the Government fought the communist insurgents in the following fashion: 
"Some very tough laws were enacted in Malaya. One enabled the Government to seize 
and deport all Chinese found in a declared bad area. Another allowed the 
Government to impose a collective fine on all the inhabitants of an area where the 
people were unco-operative. On the other hand, laws imposing strict curfews, a 
mandatory death penalty for carrying arms, life imprisonment for providing supplies 
or other support to terrorists restricted residen e or detention for suspected terrorist 
supporters and so on were effectively used". 151 
With these measures, no room was left for the freedom of civilians, their lives and deaths 
were virtually left at the discretionary power of the established Government. it is also clear 
that the main characteristics of the above listed crimes, is that they were broadly stipulated, 
in order to make any act or movement of the civilians suspected. The accused always had 
to explain the suspicious conditions of their acts which meant that the action of the 
Government forces could easily degenerate into a wholesale restriction of the fundamental 
rights of the citizens. 
1.1.3. Algeria 
The official Algerian figure of those who died for the cause of independence 'The martyrs' 
is one and a half million. It is estimated that the majority of those who died were civilians 
since the highest figure mentioned by the FLN for its forces during the war was 130,000. 
However, after the war, 250,000 claimed to have been fighters for the FLN. 152 
The estimated figures on the French side were 20,000 military personnel and 25,000 
civilians. It appears to me that the French, especially from 1956, had resorted to a policy 
of total war. Every Muslim Algerian was considered as a political sympathiser of the FLN, 
if not an actual member. In this context, the Report of the French Commission "de 
sauvegarde des droits et libertds individuels' established by the Government of Guy Mollet 
cited the General Director of the National Security as saying that: 
"la police Algdrienne comme la gendarmerie. se livraient sur les inculpds suspects ou 
simple pr6venus & des m6thodes d'investigation relevant beaucoup plus de la Gestapo 
que dune police d6mocratique". 153 
'50F. E. Armbruster. R. D. Gastil, H. Kahn, W. Pfaff and E. Stillman: Can We Win In Vietnam?. F. A. 
Paeget, Pub., New York/Washington/London. 1968, p. 113. 
151 R. Thompson: Defeating the Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya. Chatto & Windus, London, 
1966, p. 53. 
15 2 A. Frateigh: The Algerian Revolution as a Case Study In International Law, in Falk (ed. ), op. cit., 
supra. chapter 2. n. 8, p. 192. 
153Cited by Siotis, op. cit., supre. n. 62, p. 214. 
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The same report quotes a high ranking official as saying that: 
"Ies m6thodes brutales d'interrogation-violence, s6vice ou torture ont une efficacitd 
nettement supdrieure aux procddds autorisds par les rdglements". 154 
Teguia stresses that the majority of those who died during the war were not armed 
combatants. They were, in fact, defenceless; women, children and the old. He then gives 
some examples of the methods and pictures of the repression practised by the French army. 
He writes: 
"Des agglom&rations rurales totalement effacdes de la carte par des bombardement au 
napalm, une multitude de charniers, de fosses communes, dont certaines restent 
inconnues de nos jours, des exdcutions sommaires innombrables, des d6placements 
de population par millions, des prisons et des camps de concentration bondds, la loi 
faisant forictionner fr6quement la guillotine, des r6gions enti6res vid6es de toute vie 
humaine et sournises A un bombardement incessant pour 1'entrainement des artilleurs, 
des aviateurs oii Ncrasement des 'rebelles", ont marqu6 les sept ans et quart de 
guerre". 155 
Scherer describes the methods used by the French army in the famous 'la Bataille d'Alger' 
in these terms: 
"... [L]a r6pression atteint un degr6 de brutalit6 rarement surpass6 dans I'histoire de 
I'arm6e Franqaise. Des unit6s d'61ite sont gangren6es par le racisme, i force de'casser 
du bougnoule' et cherchant un exutoire A leur besoin de violence dans des m6thodes fascistes". 156 
Lebjaoui, a nationalist leader, quotes some examples used by the French, as revealed by 
published reports of some French officers and soldiers: 
"Ddbut mai (1956), pr6s de Batna A la suite d'une embuscade oil deux soldats trouvant la mort, quinze suspects sont interrogds, torturds, quatorze sont fusill6s sur les quinze. Vallde de la sommam: trois suspects arr&6s, enterrds jusqu'au cou, apr6s avoir eux- 
memes creus6 leur trou, en plein soleil. Une gamelle d'eau est placde A cinquante 
centimWes de leurs 16vres. Ils sont laissds aussi deux jours environ. N'ayant pas 
parl&, deux sont abattus. Le troisi6me parle, mais abattu aprW. ' 57 
Torture in fact, became nearly an official policy. Thus, the famous 56me Bureau which 
specialised in extracting information from suspects, was a body whose main function was 
torture and inhumane treatment. A leaked ICRC report was published by Le Monde (dated 
January 5th, 1960) which the Government unsuccessfully tried to seize. The report revealed 
that torture and inhumane treatment were systematically used, in fact, many prisoners died 
from lack of medical attention and conditions of internment were disastrous. 
1541bid, 
pp. 214-5. 
155M.. Teguia: L'Alg6rie en querre. OPU, Atger, p. 321. See stso pp. 320-523. 
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However, the FLN also used terror against civilians. The justification was that they were 
convicted by revolutionary courts for their acts in collaborating with the enemy. It is 
estimated that the Muslim Algerians were the hardest hit. The tactics of the urban guerrilla 
used by the FLN in the big cities such as Algiers, Constantine and Oran resulted in the 
killing of innocent civilians by the French. In the famous 'la Bataille d'Alger' in 1957, the 
158 FLN estimated that 6000 persons were killed in the town. 
However, Siotis writing in 1958 observed that the use of terrorist tactics by the FLN 
against the collaborators of the French had declined because in his view: 
"... [D]ýs le moment oii l'organization politique et militaire de l'insurrection prit des 
formes plus pouss6es et que ses responsables acceptýrent I'application des dispositi ? ns 
des contentions de Gen6ve, le nombre et I'ampleur de tels attentats a diminu6". 1 9 
He then notes: 
"ll West pas impossible que cette diminution soit due A d'autres causes, mais nous 
somme de I'avis que I'acceptation des lois de la guerre accompagn6e par une tactique 
militaire beaucoup plus conforme aux usages de la guerre, constitue une preuve de 
la maturitd politique indispensable A toute mise en oeuvre des dispositions des 
conven ions". 160 
The explanation is also that the fight for the hearts and minds of the population both in 
Algeria and especially, in France were of the utmost importance in the strategy of the FLN. 
In the legal field, throughout the conflict the French position either in the application of 
Article 3 or the entire Conventions of Geneva, was unclear. Thus, in 1954, the French 
argued that the matter was a mere police action, which meant that there is no room for the 
application of Article 3. However, in 1955, the French PM, Mr. Faure, noted in the 
Assernbl6e Nationale that Article 3 is applicable to the situation. This acknowledgement had 
never been published in the Journal Officiel de la R6publique Frangaise. 161 
On the other hand, in 1956, Mr. Guy Mollet, the then French PM recognized that the 
conflict was no longer a matter of penal law but had attained the level of an armed conflict 
of a non -international character. Thus, the communlqu6 of 'la Presidence du Conseil' of 
June 23rd, 1956 relative to the mission of the ICRC in Algeria, stated the following: 
"En conformit6 avec I'Article 3 des Conventions de Gen6ve relatives aux cas de 
conflits armds ne presentent pas un caracWe international et surgissant sur le 
territoire de l'un des parties contractantes, le Comit6 International de la Croix-Rouge 
a offert ses services au gouvernement Frangais. Le gouvernement I'a autoris6 A 
envoyer en Algdrie une mission en vue de visiter les camps d'hdbergement et 
l'iloignement dans lesquels ont W rassamblds les intern6s administratifs et 
d'entreprendre des visites des lieus de d6tention oii se trouvent les personnes 
poursuivies a la suite des 6venements". 162 
158 Op. cit.. supra. n. 155, p. 336. 
159C)P. 
cit., supra. n. 62, p. 213. 
160 Ibid. 
161Cf ted by T. Farrer: International Armed Conflict. 71 CLR, 1971, p. 53. 
162Cfted by Sfotfs, op. cit., supra. n. 62, p. 211. 
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Despite these pronouncements, the French never admitted in a clear cut way that the war 
was either civil or an international one. Therefore, on July 25th, 1960, when the war was 
at its height and resembled an international war, the French Government rejected the 
capacity of the GPRA set up by the FLN in 1958 (which has been recognised by many 
foreign States), to adhere to the Geneva Conventions in the following terms: 
"The French Government recalls that the self-styled 'Provisional Government of the 
Algerian Republic' set up on foreign territory by the leaders of the rebellion in the 
French Department of Algeria, cannot on any grounds, claim the capacity of 'state' 
or that of 'power' consequently. It does not possess the re? uisite competence to 
'adhere' to the said conventions, according to the text itself". 63 
The French Government raised the question of legitimacy of the representativity of the 
insurgents and the question of sovereignty over Algeria to reject the capacity of the 
insurgents to adhere to the conventions and, by implication, its refusal to apply the 
humanitarian standards set in those conventions to this conflict even when France was 
attempting to enter into negotiation with the GPRA. 
1.1.4. Nigeria 
In Nigeria, the civilians especially in the Biafran side, were cruelly treated; bombings and 
starvation were used extensively, coupled with a lack of food and medicines. Genocide was 
a reality. Shepherd wrote: 
"A question must be posed whether there is uncontrollable genocidal movement in the 
Nigerian army. Evidence of indiscriminate killing of non-combatants is 
incontrovertible". 164 
O'Brian also wrote that the killing of the lbos in Benin and mid-western regions 'leaves no 
doubt that the war is being waged in a genocidal Spirit'. 165 The insurgent's Leader, Lt. Col. 
Ojukwu, in fact, repeatedly made allegations of genocide. 166 
This situation led the Federal Government on September 6th, 1968 to invite the 
Governments of Britain, Canada, Poland and Sweden, the UN Secretary-General and the 
OAU each to send a representative to Nigeria to observe the Federal Army's operation in 
the areas affected by the conflict. 
In their first consolidated report, the observers found that the Federal Government was 
following its declared policies of protecting the lbo people and lbo property in Federal held 
areas. They insisted that they had neither seen nor heard evidence that the Federal Army 
was practising a policy of genocide against the lbo people and they then concluded that the 
term 'genocide" was unwarranted. 167 
163 Cited by Fraleigh, op. cit., supra. n. 152, p. 195. 
164Cited by Z. Cervenka: The Nigerian War 1967-1970: History of the War, Selected Bibliography and 
Documents. Bernard & Graefe Vertag fUr Wehrwesen, Frankfurt am Main, 1971, p. 88. 
165 Ibid, p. 88. 
166 Ibid, pp. 87-88. 
167 Ibid, p. 89. 
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However, on the controversial ciuestion of bombing of civilians, the observers made clear 
that 'it was impossible to receive proof that allegations are false'168 which means that the 
allegations that indiscriminate bombings against the civilian population were true. 
It must be noted that at the beginning of the conflict, the head of the military 
Government and Commander- in-Chie f of the armed forces issued instructions to the 
Nigerian army, air force and navy in which he insisted that: 
"... [N]o mercy will be shown to the rebel clique and their collaborators anywhere. The 
task of the Federal military Government is to save the country from disintegration 
and uncontrolled bloodshed". 169 
In other words, in the name of preserving the territorial integrity which is a central 
component of sovereignty, everything is justified in order to eliminate the insurgents and 
their collaborators, the latter being civilians. The result of such policy was well known over 
2 million people died, most of them civilians. 
On the other hand, it must be made clear that on the legal side, the Federal Government, 
because of its insistence on the unity of Nigeria and its sovereignty had never acknowledged 
officially the applicability of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention to the situation. However, 
many implicit acts can be interpreted that the Federal Government considered very 
important parts of the Geneva Convention as applicable. Thus, the Nigerian Foreign 
Minister referred to Article 23 of the Civilian Convention in order to allow the ICRC free 
passage. 
The Federal Government also issued a code of conduct to its forces which indicated 
among other things: 
"The aim of the war is to keep Nigeria and Nigerians together. To ensure this noble 
task, maximum and sincere efforts will be made to preserve as many lives as 
possible". 170 
It then made clear to Federal forces: 
"... [Y]ou will not repeat not bomb any non-military targets. Any gathering of the 
civilian population will be avoided. Military targets will not normally be towns. You 
will end vour to maintain a maximum restrain on your activities over the rebel 
forces". ';? 
However, in practice, Biafran towns, ports and villages were the primary targets of attack 
which inevitably resulted in huge civilian casualties as Stated above. 172 
Examples of genocide are not rare in this respect. The New York Review (dated 
168 Ibid, p. 91. 
169 Ibid, p. 58. 
170 Ibid, p. 91. 
171 Ibid. 
172For 
an accurate account of the atrocities, see F. Forsyth: The Biafra Story. Penguin Books, 1969, 
pp. 208-221; J. de St. Jarre: The Nigerian civil War. Hodder & Stoughton, 1972, pp. 203-253; and C. 
Odumegwu Ojukwu: Biafra. Perennial Library, Harper & Row Publishers, 1969, Vot. 1, pp. 318-325. 
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December 21st, 1967) noted: 
"In some areas outside the east which were temporarily held by Biafran forces, as at 
Benin and the midwestern region, Ibos were killed by local people with at least the 
acquiescence of the Federal forces. About 1,000 Ibo civilians perished at Benin in this 
way . 
Moreover, it was reported in The Washington Morning Post (dated September 27th, 
1968)that: 
"The greatest single massacre occurred in the Ibo town of Asaba where 700 Ibo males 
were lined up and shot". 
Ojukwu, the Leader of the insurgents, repeatedly accused the Federal Government of 
carrying out a policy of genocide against the Ibo people. 173 This means, in fact, that the 
Code of Conduct of the Federal army had not been respected in practice, it was a 
propaganda tool for the Federal Government and it was the civilians who paid the price. 
1.1.5. Yemen 
The civil war in the Yemen broke out in September 1962 and ended formally in 1969, 
fought between the Republicans supported by the Egyptians and the Royalists supported 
by the Saudis. 174 The war was long, costly and bitterly divisive. Egypt sent a 60,000 strong 
army 175 to help the new republic and Saudi Arabia offered money and refuge to the 
royalists. The Yemen war, in my view, was the Vietnam of the Arabs. The hatred between 
the two factions and their supporters was intense. 
The royalists resorted to guerrilla methods and the republicans relied on their superiority 
in the air. The use of bombardment resulted inevitably in the loss of civilian lives. 
176 
1731n his speech of January 27th, 1968 Ojukwu stated: 
"Gowon conspired with his Northern Nigerians to massacre more than 3,000 Eastern Nigerians in 
May, 1966. This Is genocide. 
Gowon murdered his supreme commander, stole his mantle of office and proceeded to direct the 
extermination of army officers and men of Eastern Nigerian origin. This is genocide. 
Gowon plotted and carried out the wholesale massacre throughout Nigeria of persons of eastern 
origin in September 1966, killing more than 30,000 defencetess men, women and children. This 
is genocide. 
Gowon, in 1966, organised the pillage and destruction of properties belonging to Eastern 
Nigerians in Northern Nigeria. This is genocide. 
Gowon's genocidal acts precipitated the mass exodus of millions of Eastern Nigerians resident 
in different parts of Nigeria, abandoning aLL their properties, businesses and means of 
livelihood. This is genocide. Gowon refused to compensate Eastern Nigerians who had Lost all 
their property as a result of his activity. This is genocide. 
Gowon permitted the wanton destruction of properties, Looting and rape throughout those areas 
of Biafra overrun by his troops. This is genocide. 
Gowon ordered the forcible transfer of Biafran children from their homes in Ofafra to Nigeria. 
This is genocide. 
For all these acts, Gowon stands condemned for genocide-a crime condemned by the civilized 
world under international law, a crime against humanity, a crime against God". 
lbid, p. 241. 
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Numerous reports alleged that the Egyptians used poison gas against royalists and dissident 
republican villages. 177 
It must noted that in January 1963, the contending parties agreed 'to respect' the 
principles of the Geneva Conventions'. Boals suggests that: 
"These pledges appear to go beyond acceptance of the provisions of Article 3 and 
supports a more far-reaching interpretation of the obligations of the parties with 
respect to the laws of war than might otherwise be the case in an internal conflict". 1 (8 
However, the practice of the warring factions in the field diverged from what was 
proclaimed. This situation led Boals to concede that. 
"... [I]nternational law was extremely ineffective in regulating the conduct of the 
parties in the Yemen internal war and hostilities went forward largely without 
refereng to applicable standards of conduct embodied in existing or evolving 
State". 19 
It seems to me that foreign intervention was a factor which accentuated the suffering of the 
civilian population and made the war more cruel. As Stookey stressed that: 
"Yemen, in effect, again had two regimes under respective sponsorship of rivals for 
influence in the Arab world". 180 
It was those foreign powers who introduced sophisticated arms capable of mass destruction, 
which had previously been unknown and prohibitively expensive in the under developed 
and tribal Yemen. 
1.2. Captured Combatants 
As we have seen, during the Geneva Conference in 1949, States have rejected conferring 
the status of POW on captured insurgents since this will mean, among other things, that they 
have to : 
"... [R]epeal their treason laws and confer on their domestic enemies a licence to kill, 
maim or kidnap security personnel and destroy security installations subject ? nly to 
honourable detention as POW's until the conclusion of the internal ýonflict". 81 
In the eyes of established Governments, the extension of the POW status to captured 
insurgents, would encourage rebellion and insurrection since the personal risks of those who 
1771bid 
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rebel are greatly diminished. Therefore, even when insurgents carry out their operation in 
conformity with the laws of war, they are not immune from prosecution upon capture. 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, in fact, does not take away the right of the 
established Government to prosecute its enemies according to its own laws, it only forbids 
summary executions without trial. 
Hence, the law in the words of Myrowitz: 
" ... [G]ives the Government in power a very strong protection, establishing for their benefit, a discrimination whose most striking expression consists of the fact that the 182 law of civil war ignores the status of the prisoner of war" 
The practice, however. shows that in some cases of large-scale civil wars, Governments and 
especially insurgents, try at lease on a de facto basis to grant the status of POW's to their 
respective captured combatants. 
A typical case is Nigeria, where the Federal Government extended on a de facto basis, 
a treatment similar to that of POW's to captured Biafran soldiers. They were not prosecuted 
for the sole act of taking arms against the legal Government. 
The Military Code of conduct for the Nigerian army issued by the Federal Government 
in July 1967, suggests that in all their actions against the rebels, the Federal army has to 
observe the rules contained in the Geneva Conventions and on the more specific question 
of POW's. The Code stipulates that: 
"Soldiers who surrender will not be killed. They are disarmed and treated as POW's. They are entitled in all, cir umstances to humane treatment and respect for their 
person and their honour . 
If 
However, since only 'surrendered soldiers' can be treated as POW's, the number of those 
who can enjoy it would be insignificant due to the hatred between the two warring factions. 
It must be pointed out that the situation in Nigeria was bad for the captured combatants. 
In his interim Report of January 17th, 1969, the representative of the UN Secretary- 
General in Nigeria expressed his concern for the POW's. He stressed that: 
"... [R]elatively few prisoners had been taken in the course of the war". 184 
He then described their treatment as follows: 
"The care and custody of the POW once they had been moved away from the 
divisional areas was assigned to the civil prison authorities and consequently POW 
were subjected to much the same regime as common law offenders and civilian 
detainees. The limited prison facilities resulted in extreme overcrowding and the 
available medical services were inadequate. Prisoners also lacked opportunities for 
exercise and spent too little time in the open". 185 
182 H. Myrowitz: The Law of War in Vietnam, in Falk (ed. ), op. cit., supra. chapter 2, n. 8, P. 521. 
183Cited by A. Rosas: The LegaL Status of POW's. SuomaLafnen Tiedeakatemfa, Helsinki, 1976, P. 197. 
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Moreover, Biafra had never indicated its views on the applicability of the Geneva 
Convention to the war, either In toto or only Article 3. However, in relation to POW's, 
Rosas argues that: 
"... [I]n view of her general position on the legal nature of the conflict, it may be 
assumed that Biafra acknowledged, as a minimum, the applicability of the customary 
law relating to POW's". 186 
It seems to me, that the practice in general indicates that when the conflict intensifies and 
the insurgents became capable of sustaining a prolonged war, the situation will lead the 
established Government to treat captured insurgents as POW's at least, on a de facto basis, 
in the hope that the insurgents will reciprocate, therefore protecting Government soldiers. 
At the same time, the Government would play down any legal significance of such moves 
by insisting that only humanitarian norms are behind its actions. On the other hand, and as 
a general rule, insurgents frequently seem willing to grant POW status to captured 
Government soldiers, despite their scarce resources. The political and legal significance of 
such moves are clear. They made the insurgent organizations appear respectable and capable 
of assuming obligations like Governments. 
Guerrilla organizations even liberate captured soldiers when unable to maintain them. In 
this context, Che Guevara stated the policy of the Cuban insurrection as follows: 
"What can never be done is to keep prisoners unless a secure base of operations 
invulnerable to the enemy has been established. Otherwise prisoners will become a 
dangerous menace to the security of the inhabitants of the regions or to the guerrilla 
band itself because of the information he can give upon rejoining his army. If he has 
not been a notorious criminal, he should be set free after receiving a lecture". 187 
1.2.1. Algeria 
The FLN in Algeria insisted throughout the conflict that it had conferred POW status on 
French soldiers. The FLN also issued a detailed procedure to be followed by its forces in 
cases of capture of French soldiers, 188 and in its 10 commandments of the Arm6e de 
Libdration Nationale (ALN), the military wing of the FLN, the combatants were instructed 
to 'se conformer aux principes de l'Islam et aux lois internationales dans la destruction des 
forces ennemies'. 189 It is well known that according to Islam, the captives must be treated 
well and in a good manner. 190 A well-known military Commander wrote in the FLN 
newspaper "El Moudjahid": 
l 86 Op. cit., supra. n. 183, p. 196. 
187 E. Che Guevara: Guerrilta Warfare. Penguin books, p. 49. 
IB8 Op. cit., supra. n. 152, p. 196. 
189 Cited by M. Veuthey: Guerri I la at drolt human! tafre. Henry Durrant Institute, Genbve, 1976, p. 202. 
190 In this respect, see: M. Khaddurf (translation and Introduction): The Islamic Law: Shaybani's 
Siyar. The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland 1966, pp. 75-138 and Sheikh Abdut-Aziz Khayyat: 
International Humanitarian Law and Islamic Law. First Arabic Middle East Seminar on International 
Humanitarian Law, Amman, 5-13 April 1981, Report presented by the ICRC and the Jordanian National Red 
Crescent Society, 1981, pp. 131-32. 
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OVALN s'est tOujours efforcde de traiter le plus humainement possible les prisonners 
Frangais. Nos Moudjahidines vont jusqu'a sacrifier leur maigre confort au profit des 
soldats captur6s". 191 
However. the French Government refused for a very long to grant POW status to the 
captured rebels, they were treated as common criminals and they were often sentenced to 
death for terrorist activities. 192 Torture and various forms of inhumane treatment of 
captured insurgents and suspects were systematically resorted to. In this context, 
Hutchinson wrote that: 
"... [P]unishment, often in the form of physical torture was meted out to guilty and 
innocent alike in contrast to the more discriminating and subtle violence of the 
FLN". 193 
In fact, numerous cases of alleged beatings, torture and starvation of prisoners in order to 
extort "confessions' had been cited in the French press and even in the debates of the 
French Assemblde Nationale. 194 
On the other hand, it must be pointed out that the continued policy of France in 
executing the captured insurgents led the FLN to declare on April 30th, 1958 that the 
insurgents would 'respect the laws of war only if the enemy does the same, 195 and that a 
French soldier would be shot for every rebel guillotined. Thus, the FLN resorted to the 
execution of French soldiers on at least two occasions (in May 1958, two POW's) and in 
August 1960. It must be noted, however, that the FLN tried to justify these executions not 
as reprisals but rather as punishments meted out by special courts of the Liberation Army 
for alleged war crimes committed against the civilian population such as torture, rape and 
murder. 196 
In general, it seems that the FLN has tried very hard to comply with the details of the 
third convention despite the harsh conditions of guerrilla warfare, which made it very 
difficult to organize and maintain POW camps. The FLN sent lists of POW's captured by 
its units; prisoners received parcels from their families; were able to send letters and tape 
recordings and in one instance, at least the ICRC was able to visit captured French soldiers. 
This occurred in 1957. The FLN also handed over to the ICRC on January II th, 1958, four 
French soldiers. 197 
In the later years of the war, France began to change its attitude toward the problem of 
1910p. cit.. supra. n. 189, p. 202. 
192 In this respect, see 10 Keesing's, 1955-1956, p. 14432A, and particularly, Y. Saadi: La bataitte 
d'Atger., Vot. 1 (Llembrasement). ENAL. Alger, 1984, pp. 229-245. 
193M. C. Hutchison: Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962. Hoover Institute Press, 
Stanford Univ, Stanford, California, 1978, p. 128. 
194 il Keesing's, 1957-1958, p. 16556. 
195 Ibid. 
1960p. 
cit., supra. n. 183, p. 147 and also M. Bedlaoui: The Algerian Revolution and the Law. Brussels 
1961, p. 215. 
197 Keesingis, op. cit., supra. n. 194, p. 16556. 
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captured rebels. They (the French) allowed the ICRC to visit camps and prisons on at least 
10 occasions. Thus, on January 13th, 1959, some important measures of amnesty and 
clemency for Algerian captives were announced. It was decided that: 
1. All persons condemned to death would have their sentences commuted to life 
imprisonment (179 persons were to benefit from this measure). 
2. Seven thousand suspects would be released from the internment camps in Algeria. 
3. Sentences on all Algerian rebels, other than those on whom the death sentence had been 
passed or those serving terms of less than three months, would be reduced by one-tenth. 
4. Rebels serving sentences of three months or those who had been wounded in military 
operations, would be immediately released, etc. '98 
On January 19th, 1959, it was announced in Algeria that 7,188 suspects had been released 
from internment camps in application of the amnesty. 199 These measures it must be stressed, 
were essentially taken to mark the beginning of General de Gaulle's seven year presidential 
office. They were politically motivated and they did not in any way amount to a recognition 
of the POW status since captured insurgents were still considered criminals. However, a 
partial recognition of the status of FLN POW's came indirectly, and under strict conditions, 
in 1959 in a memorandum to the French Minister of Justice. In this context, a member of 
General Massu's staff declared that: 
"Rebels captured with guns in their hands, guiltless of any crimes before joining a 
rebel group are not prosecuted but are interned in military camps. They are treated 
as members of an enemy army ". 200 
In practice, this means that insurgents in order to benefit from such treatment, the captured 
insurgents must satisfy the conditions of Article IV/2 (a) of the third Geneva 
Convention. 201 The implication is that the irregular forces of the FLN, members of the 
OCFLN who work among the population and do not bear arms or carry weapons, would still 
be treated as terrorists. 
The Algerian case suggests that even the elementary humanitarian rules of Common 
Article 3, were not respected especially in the first period of the conflict. Summary 
19812 Keesing's, 1959-1960, p. 16628. 
1991bid. 
2000P. cit., supra. n. 161. p. 54. 
201 Articte IV/2 (a) provides, inter atia, that: 
112. Members of other mi lit ia and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized 
resistance movement, belonging to a party to the conflict and operating in or outside their 
own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militia or volunteer 
corps, including such organized resistance movement, fulfil the following conditions: 
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
(c) That of carrying arms openly; 
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the taws and customs of war. 
Friedman, op. cit., supra. chapter 3, n. 17. pp. 590-591. 
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executions in the field, torture and inhumane treatment were used systematically. 
202 in this 
context, a close confidant of General de Gaulle who worked in Algeria from 1958 until 
1962 wrote: 
"Quand, dans une situation comme I"Algdrie, la justice, si je peux dire, 16gale, ne peut 
plus faire entiýrement face a sa tAche, qu'elle est encombr6e et que son n6cessilre 
formalisme laisse impunis des crimes certains, il se forme une justice parallOe". 03 
He then added that: 
"On n'envoie plus les gens devant les tribunaux on les interne, ou, si le cas est grave, 
ils sont cens6s avoir W abattus en cherchant i s'enfuir. Et comme la lenteur de la 
justice affaiblit beaucoup 1'exemplarit6 de la repression, on cherche par d'autres 
moyens A rendre celle-ci terrifiante: Mabitude s'6tait prise ainsi, a une ipoque 
d'exposer sur la place des villages les cadavres des terroristes abbatus. Sinistres 
pratiques, dont on peut penser que, plut6t que d'inspirer la crainte elle attisait les 
haines". 204 
It must be noted that even when France recognised the limited protection from prosecution 
for a limited number of FLN soldiers only a small number of captured insurgents had 
benefitted from it. Thus, at the close of conflict, they were only 3600 persons. On the other 
hand, no formal acknowledgement of POW status was declared by the French Government, 
the latter tried to make sure that no legal status was given to the FLN. 
However, it seems that the FLN in general was willing, despite their limited resources, 
to apply the whole third Geneva Convention, especially from 1958, the year of 
establishment of the GPRA. Of course, the benefits from such a course of action were 
evident, since in practice, it is the French who held a large number of FLN soldiers and 
sympathizers; also from a legal and political viewpoint, it enhanced the cause of the FLN. 
1.2.2. Vietnam 
In Vietnam, the most significant factor is the enormous divergence between what the 
Government issued as standards of behaviour towards captured enemy soldiers and the 
atrocities committed by the army in the field. 
Thus, the Republic of Vietnam armed forces guide book for handling combat captives 
stated that: 
"Viet Cong have been warned by their commanders that once we capture them, we 
will kill them. Therefore, captured VC's are 'wise' to seek a quiet death rather than 
be tortured ... We must make them realise that they 
have been subjected to false VC 
propaganda by handling them in a good manner . . 
205 
202See in this respect: D. Amrane: Llextention de la tutte armL&e pendant lea premi6res ann6es cle ta 
guerre de Lib6ration nationate, in: Le retentissement de ta R*votution ALg6rier'ne. Cotloque 
fnternationaL d'Atger (24-28 Nov. 1984), ENAL. Aiger, 1985, pp. 90-108. See aLso H. Greer: A Scattering 
of Dust. Hutchinson of London, 1962, pp. 150-181. 
203 B. Tricot: Les sentlers de La paix: Atg6rie 1958-1962. PLon, Parts, 1972, p. 85. 
2D41bid. 
205 Cited by R. Mitter (ed. ): The Law of war. Lexington Books, Lexington & London, and D. C. Heath 
Co., 1975, p. 167. 
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Moreover, in a wallet-size plastic card which was written in Vietnamese and was given to 
the Republic's army, it stated that: 
"When a communist rebel prisoner is captured he will be treated humanely by you 
although he is not recognized as a POW in accordance with the meaning normally 
used internationally ... do not seek revenge under any reason 
0.206 
In substance, the South Vietnamese, who collected a great number of prisoners, were not 
prepared to grant POW status to their captives. However, they indicated they would 
implicitly conform to Article 3 since the captured are to be treated humanely. Furthermore, 
the evidence suggests that the standards of humane treatment were not adhered to by the 
South Vietnamese Government. Thus, the Viet Cong captives were executed in the field, 
or tortured to death, 207 revenge was the norm. 
The issue of treatment of detainees was raised with regard to the Provincial Interrogation 
Centers. These centers were built by American funding, (44 centers were built) and were 
run by the Vietnamese special police who specialised in interrogating VC suspects. They 
were advised directly by the CIA. The Vietnamese police, as Guenter Lewy remarked that: 
"... [W]as not a highly professional organization and the South Vie namese generally 
were reputed to have a low regard for human life and suffering". 
108 
However, it seems that the inhuman practices of the South Vietnamese army towards 
captured Viet Cong insurgents, which were largely reported by the mass media, have led 
the US staff advisers and comman personnel to persuade their Vietnamese allies to change 
their politics and practices. The Americans stressed to their allies that they had overlooked 
the value of trying to gain military intelligence from their captives. 209 It must also be noted 
that the Americans would greatly benefit from that change of policy since American 
prisoners in the hands of the insurgents would not be the object of reprisals and it would 
give them a favourable international propaganda. 
Nevertheless, the practice of the US forces per se toward captured Viet Cong soldiers, 
reveals two distinct periods. In the first period, Viet Cong soldiers captured by US forces 
were simply turned over to the South Vietnamese in the field, the latter resorted to acts of 
2061bid. 
207 The evidence is abundant. The Christian Science Monitor of Feb. 5th, 1967 reported that: 
"There have been news reports and pictures of rough treatment of prisoners by the South 
Vietnamese mititary units in the ffetd. There atso have been substantfat accounts of on-the- 
spot executions of prisoners. Torture of prisoners in the fietd has not been uncommonso. 
208 G. Lewy: America in Vietnam. OUP, New York, 1978, p. 285. 
2091n this context, Lewy wrote that: 
"Most American advisers, it appears tried to get across the proposition that the use of force 
was not productive of retlabte inteltigence and even though the South Vietnamese were not 
aLways receptive to this advice, there is reason to think on the whoLe, American InfLuence 
hetped somewhat to mitigate the crueLtfes to be encountered In any civf L war". 
lbid, p. 288. 
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summary execution and maltreatment. This led to accusations of the US that it had violated 
Article 12 of the third Geneva Convention, 210 and as result, captured North Vietnamese and 
Viet Cong fighters were sent to American divisional headquarters and kept by the 
Americans. They would then be transferred to the South Vietnamese only when a new 
POW's compound was made ready. 
The US Commander in Chief in Vietnam stressed that: 
"These prisoners are not being mistreated. They are handled in accordance with the 211 Geneva Convention". 
Moreover, every American soldier was issued with an instruction card for the treatment of 
prisoners. It is directed that prisoners were to be handled 'firmly, promptly, but 
humanely'. 212 Furthermore, 'mistreatment of any captive is a criminal offence', 213 and lastly 
it is stressed in the same card that 'whether civilians or combat captives' they are to be 
214 protected against 'violence, insults, curiosity and reprisals of any kind' . 
It must also be noted that the US tried very hard to encourage the North Vietnamese and 
the Viet Cong to treat its captured soldiers as POW's by indicating that it will act 
reciprocally. In this context, Directive 20-5 of September 21st, 1966 (as amended on 
December 16th, 1966), the US Military Command in Vietnam (MACV) indicated that in 
addition to the persons qualifying under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, the 
protection of the latter Convention was to be extended to: 
"I. Persons who are captured while actually engaging in combat or a belligerent act 
other than an act of terrorism, sabotage or spying against the Republic of Vietnam 
or the United States and other free world military assistance force. 2. Any captive member of the North Vietnamese armed forces or of the Viet Cong, 
whether captured in combat or not, except a terrorist, saboteur or Spy". 215 
21OArticle 12 of the Third Geneva Convention stfputates that: 
"POW's are in the hands of the enemy power, but not of the individuals or mf titary unf ts who 
have captured them. Irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist, the 
detaining power is responsible for the treatment given to them. 
POW's may onty be transferred by the detaining power to a power which is a party to the 
convention and after the detaining power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability 
of such transferee power to apply the convention. When POW's are transferred under such 
circumstances, responsibility for the application of the convention rests on the power 
accepting them white they are in their custody. 
Nevertheless, If that power falls to carry out the provisions of the convention in any 
important aspect. the power to whom the POW's were transferred shatt, upon being notified by 
the protecting power. take effective measures to correct the situation or shatt request the 
return of the POW's. Such requests must be complied with". 
Friedman, op. cit., supra. n. 201, p. 594. 
2110ted by H. S. Levie: Mattreatment of POW's in Vietnam, in Fatk (ed. ): The Vietnam War and 
Internationat Law. Vot. 2, PUP, Princeton, New Jersey, 1969, p. 378. 
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Similarly, in a reply to a letter from the ICRC concerning the application of the Geneva 
Convention of 1949 to the hostilities in Vietnam, the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk 
wrote that: 
"Among the particular measures being taken to implement the convention at the 
present time, the United States Government is developing plans to assist the 
Government of the Republic of Vietnam to expand and improve facilities and 
procedures to process and care for an increased number of captives taken in combat. 
The two Governments are also increasing programs of instruction for personnel in 
the details of the provisions of the Convention". 16 
However, despite this official policy, information existed, and it is well - documented, as to 
the atrocities of American troops in the field where the policy of 'body count' was 
followed. 217 
As to the insurgents (the NLF) their policy was at first Stated in general terms. It stated 
that: 
"The NLF applies a lenient policy toward military men and members of the enemy 
administration as well as toward captured foreigners, including Americans". 218 
The NLF explained that policy on the ground that the majority of the military men in the 
southern army were workers, peasants and labourers who came from the poorer strata and 
who have been induced or forced to enlist. 
This policy was, in fact, confirmed by a letter from 90 men captured in June 1962, they 
wrote: 
"We have been well treated by the revolutionary soldiers. They appeared before us 
with a smile, full of clemency and humanitarianism ... we, victors and vanquished, have been living together with fraternity and full affection". 219 
In its programme of 1967, the NLF made its Policy towards enemy prisoners clearer, 
'captured officers and soldiers of the puppet army will enjoy humane treatment and 
leniency 
... captured US and satellite troops will receive the same treatment as captured 
220 puppet troops'. 
The NLF also delivered to every captured American soldier a declaration in English 
which explained their policy toward them. The Declaration stated specifically. 
"I. POW's are not maltreated or insulted. 
2. POW's shall receive sufficient food, receive care when they are ill or wounded. 
3. They have occasion to understand that the liberation forces are not 'rebels' but 
organized and disciplined patriots struggling for peace, independence and democracy, 
for friendship with all peoples of the world including the American people, for a free 
and happy life without the U. S. monopolists and their valets in South Vietnam. 
216 Ibid, p. 245. 
217 See atso supra. n. 141, pp. 512-13, supra. n. 10, p. 172 and supra. n. 208, pp. 50-73. 
218D. Pike: Viet Cong. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., London, 1966, p. 259. 
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"221 4. They shall be liberated . 
Besides, it seems that primitive prisons were maintained by the NLF. They were small and 
transient, their favourite place was the jungle which was an ideal place for hiding. 222 it 
appears that US servicemen were treated humanely. However, the South Vietnamese were 
subjected to some indignity. Treatment of prisoners were in general subject to their co- 
operation and participation in the seminars organized by the political officers in the camps. 
They were in practice, courses of political indoctrination. 
The NLF, it must be noted, has resorted in some instances to the killing of American 
prisoners. 223 The killings were specifically justified as reprisals against the execution of the 
Viet Cong soldiers by the US forces. 224 The US considered these reprisals as murder and 
violations of the third Geneva Convention. 225 
On the other hand, it must be made clear that throughout the conflict the NLF has never 
committed itself to be bound by the obligations contained in the third Geneva Convention, 
Rosas thinks that 'the NLF committed itself to certain humanitarian principles, presumably 
akin to customary international law,. 226 
The conclusion is that in Vietnam, the internal elements of the struggle played a 
significant role in the conduct of the principal parties of the struggle, (the NLF and the 
Government of South Vietnam) towards captured soldiers of both sides. The hatred and 
cruelty that accompanied internal conflicts was obvious in the conduct of the South 
Vietnamese despite official statements made under US pressure. 
However, the insurgents, for obvious political and propagandist reasons, abstained from 
massive inhumane treatment of the South Vietnamese prisoners. Instead they resorted to 
political indoctrination in the hope of giving the newly captured prisoners a new outlook 
on Communism. 
1.3. The Wounded and Sick 
Article 3 states simply that the sick and wounded shall be cared for. In fact, it repeats in 
general, the customary principle codified in the 1864 Geneva Convention. Article (3) 
contains no further explanation on how, what and who should give that protection. In 
221C)P. 
cit., supra. n. 218, p. 267. 
222For 
a det af Led description of the camps and daf Iy Life in them, see MiLLer, op. cit., supra. n. 205, 
pp. 172-174. 
2230p. 
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2240p. 
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225The Director of the office of News in the US State Department stressed on Sept. 27th, 1965 that: 
"These murders not only violate the sense of decency of all civilized men but are also In 
direct violation of the prisoners' provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention by whichthe Viet 
Cong masters, that is the Government of Hanoi, is bound. Article 13 of the Geneva Convention 
expressly prohibits reprisals against prisoners". 
Op. cit., supre. n. 205, p. 333. 
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particular, there is no protection of those who try to give assistance to the sick and 
wounded. 
The ICRC in its report submitted to the CGEDHL in 1972, summed up the practice vis- 
i-vis this section of victims of international wars as follows: 
"Improper knowledge of the rules of humanity combined with partisan quarrels, too 
often interfere with the free exercise of the medical profession in internal conflicts. 
It endangers the lives of doctors and nurses and hampers the availability of 
medicaments and dressings. In the long run it is jhe wounded and sick who suffer, 
while they should be kept out of the fighting". 22 
It must be stressed that in practice, it was the insurgents who suffered most since the 
established Government had resorted to banning sale to them of certain medicaments. It was 
a crime to aid wounded and sick insurgents. Moreover, generally speaking the Government 
had at its disposal hospitals to care for its wounded personnel. 
Che Guevara stressed that the insurgents must treat wounded enemies with care and 
respect 'unless his former life had made him liable to the death penalty in which case he 
will be treated in accordance with his desserts'. 228 
1.3.1 In Vietnam 
Miller surnmarised the situation as follows: 
"It appears that concern for collection and protection of the wounded and sick was 
among the few principles of the Geneva Convention honoured in spirit, if not the 229 letter, of the law". 
To him, mistreatment of the wounded combatants was not a major characteristic of the 
Vietnam war, the explanation given is that: 
"... [B]oth Vietnamese and US cultural values and. 3poublished policies 
debate compassion for the wounded and sick of any nationality". 2 0 
Therefore, US personnel were instructed not to refuse medical aid. 23 1 However, atrocities 
were not absent from time to time. 232 
2270P. 
cit. # supra. n. 100, p. 53. 
2280p. 
cit., supra. n. 187, p. 49 
2290P. 
cit., supra. n. 205, p. 194. 
2301bid. 
2310P. 
cit., supra. n. 141, p. 512. 
2321t 
appears that: 
"... CUInlike Amer I can casualties, who were taken direct ty by he I, I copter to large hospit a Is with 
full surgical facilities, it was the practice to Interrogate wounded Viet Cong and North 
Vietnamese soldiers before evacuation while providing first aid for one badly hit Viet Cong. 
I was told by a senior officer, 'We just need to keep him alive for a few minutes so we can 
question him, after that he can die, it does not matter'. On another occasion, an intelligence 
officer, objected to my giving morphine to a wounded prisoner, saying II think they talk better 
when they are in a Little pain". 
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It should also be pointed out that aerial bombardment resulted inevitably and in many 
instances, in big numbers of civilian wounded and sick who were not collected and cared 
for; coupled with the inadequacy and lack of medicaments this resulted in many wounded 
and sick being left to die. 
1.3.2. In Algeria 
France in fact tried from the beginning of the conflict to establish a 'blocus sanitaire' 
against the insurgents. From 1955, the French Government forbade the sale of certain 
medicaments which were used to treat injuries. Chemists were ordered not to deliver 
medicines or surgical instruments without medical prescriptions. The identity of buyers and 
their addresses had to be taken. Doctors too, who assisted an Algerian whose injuries were 
suspect had to take all necessary information i. e. name, address, names of those who 
accompanied him, failing to do so would result in prosecution. Thus, an Algerian doctor 
(B. M. Zemliri) was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment for having assisted a wounded 
insurgent. 233 
Hence, assistance to injured insurgents and the banning of the free sale of medicine 
which were necessary for any effective protection of the wounded may be used as an 
element of the whole strategy of war against the insurgents. Veuthey went even further 
when he suggested that 'on ne cherche qu'& blesser plut6t qu'a tuer, dans le but de 
234 surcharger la troupe et les services sanitaires adverses'. 
It must be noted that it is the insurgents who were the hardest hit by this practice since 
they lacked hospitals, medicines and trained medical personnel. In one instance, Fidel 
Castro in July 1958 released without any conditions 253 wounded regular soldiers; the main 
reason being that the insurgents were not in a position to care for them because of lack of 
medicines. 235 
The practice shows that in many instances collaboration between the insurgents, the 
established Government and the ICRC in respect of the wounded and sick was possible. No 
party used such attitudes to infer some legal status for the insurgents, indeed in these 
circumstances it is the humanitarian ideals which play the leading role. 236 On the other 
hand, it appears that in some instances, the ICRC medical teams, material and vehicles 
that were used to assist the wounded and sick were the object of attack (especially in the 
Lebanon). 
However, in general it seems that the ICRC was able, despite these problems, to do a 
Cited by Veuthey, op. cit.. supra. n. 189, p. 181. The Evening Standard in Washington of June 30th, 1965 
reported that: 
"It is a hard fact of war in South Vietnam that hospitats become a target for both sides. 
Vietnamese troops rate the destruction of Viet Cong hospitaLs probabLy higher than anything 
short of kiLting Viet Cong troops. 
2330p. 
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superb job in this area (the protection of the wounded and the sick). In its worldwide report 
of 1986 the ICRC stressed that: 
"The tasks of the ICRC Medical Division have diversified to keep pace with the 
changing nature of warfare since the end of the Second World War. In addition to 
meeting the priority need for medicines and medical supplies to treat the wounded, 
a global approach was adopted to the health problems affectinzlhe victims such as 
epidemics, inadequate hygiene conditions and poor nutrition". "" 
It seems to me, that since all cultures of the world encourage compassion for the sick and 
wounded, it is difficult, especially morally, to use claims of sovereignty and non- 
intervention to bar the necessary assistance to such victims. Any such attempts must be 
condemned as being against the very basis of the idea of humanity. 
Even if Article 3 does not expressly protect those persons involved in assisting and caring 
for the sick and wounded, it would be morally wrong to build an argument on such absence 
of protection (of medical personnel) in that Article, in order to try those persons as having 
committed a crime against the State. This explains in part why in Protocol 11, the situation 
of the wounded and the sick had been improved dramatically. Claims of sovereignty and 
non- intervention in this instance, go against the idea of humanity itself. 
2. The UN Practice and the Protection of the Victims of Internal Wars 
The work of the UN has been based upon the extension of human rights standards to all 
kinds of armed conflicts. However, it must be noted that the interest of the UN in civil 
wars was primarily a reaction to what was happening in colonial wars especially in Africa. 
Thus, it is primarily politics that brought the attention of the UN to this field. 
The first rendez-vous between the UN, the Jus In bello in armed conflicts and human 
rights took place in Tehran in 1968 on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights. Resolution XXIII of May 12th, 1968 stipulated in substance 
that those who struggled against colonial and racist regimes should, upon capture, be treated 
humanely and "if detained should be treated as POW's or political prisoners under 
international law,. 238 In the same Resolution, it was recognised that the Geneva Convention 
of 1949 was not sufficiently broad in scope to cover all armed conflicts. 
However, from that date the UNGA took it as a custom to recommend each year the 
application of humanitarian principles, human rights and fundamental rules of the law of 
war to 'all armed conflict' which could be interpreted as including not only internal 
conflicts in colonial territories, but also internal conflicts in the strictest sense which 
occurred in territories of an independent State. The title of these resolutions 'Respect of 
Human Rights in Armed Conflicts' is revealing. Human rights are to be enjoyed by 
individuals and groups, in order that these rights can effectively be protected, not only 
humane treatment is necessary, but some limitations on the methods of means of warfare 
became necessary as well. If these means do not distinguish between combatants and non- 
2371bid, 
p. 4. 
238 Final Act of the international Conference on Human Rights 1968, Chap. 3. Res. XXIII, May 12th, 
1968. 
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combatants, the protection of the individual and groups becomes meaningless. 
Respect for human rights, such as the right to life, which is included both in Article 3 
and Human Rights Instruments, would be useless if certain legal restraints on the use of 
certain methods of war are not imposed. As we have previously seen in this section, the 
issue is very important in the context of internal wars, since Article 3 does not specifically 
impose any restraints on the means and methods of war. The UN, through its resolutions, 
has stressed the necessary link between all these elements in 'all conflicts'. 
In this context, the UNGA, despite the controversy around the legal force of its 
resolutions, has led to the further limitations of the State sovereignty in the sense that means 
and methods of its war against enemies of the State are not wholly free of limitations, at 
least theoretically. Resolution 2674 (XXV) of December 9th, 1970 was adopted by 77 in 
favour, 2 against (Portugal and Brazil) and 36 abstentions. It stipulated that: 
"3. Considers [the UNGA] the principles of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and Geneva 
Convention of 1949 should be strictly observed by all States. That States violating 
these International Instruments should be condemned and held responsible to the 
world community". 239 
The same Resolution in its 5th paragraph considers that air bombardment of civilians and 
the use of gas and all analogous liquids, materials, devices and bacteriological weapons 
constitute a flagrant violation of The Hague Convention of 1907, the Geneva Protocol of 
1925 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949. This meant that all inhuman means of war 
should be prohibited. 
Although the Resolution speaks about obligations between States and not intra-States, 
there is no question that an effective protection of human beings in times of internal 
conflicts is not possible without respect of the prohibitions of some methods and means of 
warfare. This interpretation is somehow confirmed by UNGA Resolution 2677 (XXV) of 
December 12th, 1970 that was adopted by a majority of III in favour to 0 against and 4 
abstentions. After the proclamation in the Preamble of the continuing value of existing 
humanitarian rules to armed conflicts, it is stipulated in paragraph I that: 
"... [The UNGA] ... calls upon all parties to any armed conflict to observe the rules laid down in the Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other humanitarian rules applicable in armed 
conflicts and invites those States who had not yet done so to adhere to those 
instrumentS". 240 
No doubt an interpretation in good faith and in accordance with the object and the purpose 
of the resolution (that is the protection of human rights in all conflicts) would extend the 
application of the rules laid down in the instruments cited in the Resolution on internal 
conflicts, since human rights protect individuals and groups, whatever their nationality and 
without any discrimination. 
23924 UNY, 1970, p. 539. 
240 Mid, p. 541. 
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In Resolution 2853 (XXVI) of December 20th, 1971, after establishing the relationship 
between the terrible suffering that armed conflict continue to inflict upon combatants and 
civilians, through the use of cruel means and methods of warfare and through inadequate 
restraints in defining military objectives. It stressed that the UNGA: 
"... [C]alls upon all parties to any armed conflict to observe the rules laid down in The 
Hague regulations of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Protocol of 1925 ... etC. "241 
In the Resolution 3103 (XXVIII) of December 12th, 1973,242 an important segment of 
internal conflicts that is the colonial wars and wars against racist regimes and alien 
domination, were elevated to the status of international wars in the sense of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions. This means that a very significant portion of victims of internal wars 
would get a better protection than that provided for in Article 3. 
In a series of resolutions, the UNGA tackled the question of the protection of different 
kinds of victims of war in all armed conflicts. Thus, in Resolution 2676 of December 9th, 
1970, (paragraph 5), the UNGA: 
"... [U]rges that combatants in all armed conflicts not covered by Article 4 of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 be accorded the saml humane treatment defined in the 
principles of international law applied to pOW". 2 3 
Although, it is the right of combatants in colonial wars which are solicited here, a correct 
interpretation cannot preclude the application of the said resolution to all combatants who 
do not satisfy the conditions of Article 4 of the Geneva Convention of 1949. 
Another noted resolution in the field was designed explicitly for the protection of 
civilians. Resolution 2675 (XXV) of December 9th, 1970 was adopted without any negative 
vote (109 in favour 0 against and 8 abstentions) which indicate that there is a general 
consensus among States that this group of victims of war need more protection. The 
Resolution contained the basic principles for the protection of the civilian population in 
armed conflicts. There is no insistence upon the kind of conflict which leads to the 
conclusion that the Resolution covers all internal wars. 
The Resolution contains 8 principleS244 which are of great importance in any real 
24125 UNY, 1971, p. 428. 
242ResoLution 3103 (XVIII) was adopted by a majority of 83 in favour, 13 against (among them: the US, 
the UK and France). In paragraph 3, it is stipuLated that: 
"The armed conflict involving the struggle of peoples against colonial and alien domination 
and racist regimes are to be regarded as International conflicts". 
27 UNY, 1973, p. 553. 
2430p. 
cit., supra. n. 239, p. 540. 
244 The eight principtes mentioned in the Resotution are: 
1. Fundamental human rights, as accepted in international taw and laid down in International 
instruments continue to apply fully in situations of armed conflicts. 
2. In the conduct of military operations during armed conflicts, a distinction must be at all 
times between persons actively taking part in hostilities and civilian population. 
3. The conduct of military operations every effort should be made to spare the civilian 
population from the ravages of war and all necessary precautions should be taken to avoid 
injury, toss or damage to civilian population. 
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protection of civilians. Among these principles, stress is laid down that fundamental human 
rights as found in international instruments continue to apply fully in situations of armed 
conflicts. Hence the close link between human rights and humanitarian law is established. 
Moreover, the resolution maintained and stressed the customary distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants. The latter are not an object of attack, they are to be 
spared from all ravages of war. Furthermore, in Resolution 3318 (XXIX) of December 14th, 
1974 which was adopted without any negative vote (110 in favour, 0 against and 14 
abstentions) methods and means of war which inflict damage on civilians including women 
and children are prohibited. The following acts are banned: 
A. Attacks and bombings, inflicting incalculable suffering against civilians. 
B. The use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in the course of military operations. 
The reason being that they inflict heavy losses on civilian population including defenceless 
women and children. 
245 C. All forms of repression and cruel treatment of women and children. 
The huge majorities for the adoption of these resolutions attest, in my opinion, to the 
growing concern and acceptance of States that protection of the victims of war, especially 
civilians, is vital whatever the character of the war. This has become an issue of 
international concern and has been taken away from the domestic jurisdiction of States. In 
other words, the defence of sovereignty and non- intervention can no longer be used to bar 
the demands of the international community that the civilians must be protected in any 
given situation of war either internal or international. 
It seems to me, however, that the serious developments which took place in the UNGA 
did not seriously influence Protocol 11. The reason is mainly political, since all developments 
in the UNGA were made under the influence of Third World countries, with their eye on 
colonial wars. 
In the Diplomatic Conference those same States fought very hard for the inclusion of 
wars of national liberation under Protocol 1; once a positive outcome was obtained. these 
States in general were not ready to continue the same efforts for civil wars because they 
were generally the threatre for such conflicts. Any far ranging extension of the laws of war 
to such conflict would only bring foreign intervention and would weaken their monopoly 
of sovereignty. 
4. Civilian population as such should not be the object of military operations. 
5. Dwellings and other installations that are used only by civilian population should not be 
the object of military operations. 
6. Places or areas designed for the sole protection of civilians, such as hospitals, zones or 
similar refugees, should not be the object of military operations. 
7. Civilian population or individual members thereof, should not be the object of reprisals, 
forcible transfers or other assaults on their integrity. 
8. The provision of International relief to civilian population In conforinity with the 
humanitarian principles of the Charter of the UN, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The Declaration of Principles for international relief to the civilian population in disaster 
situations, as laid down In Resolution XXVI adopted by the 21st International Conference of 
the Red Cross shall apply in situations of armed conflicts and all parties to a conflict Should 
make every effort to facilitate this application. 
Op. cit., supra. n. 240, p. 543. 
245 28 UNY, 1974, p. 646. 
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On the other hand, it is necessary to point out that the UN practice in the form of its 
different resolutions, has in effect introduced the vitally important linkage between human 
rights and armed conflicts in all their diversity. Thus, it was stressed, either directly or 
indirectly, that respect of the fundamental rules of the law of war, is a necessary condition 
for the enjoyment of human rights in times of conflict. 
There are those, however, who view the UN approach with scepticism. They see in the 
UN endeavours an attempt to revise the laws of war through the bias of human rights. A 
typical opponent of such an approach is Meyrowitz, who maintains that: 
"Le confusionnisme West pas seulement un vice de la pens6e; il est Waste dans les 
cons6quences pratiques auxquelles il conduit, I'hdtdrog6neit6 du droit de la guerre et 
des droit de I'homme condamne l'id6e pronde de divers cot6s, et qui a trouv6 un 6cho 
aux Nations Unis, d'entrprendre par le bias des droit de I'homme la revision du droit 
de la guerre". 246 
Dinstein also goes in the same direction: 
"In any event international humanitarian law must not be confused with international 
human rights". 247 
To Dinstein many wartime human rights find their basis in The Hague law and not human 
rights (such as protection of private property). Humanitarian law also contains many 
provisions that apply directly to individuals. They are also human rights. It seems to me, 
however, that there is no doubt that the criticisms are valid in the context of international 
conflicts but not for internal conflicts. 
Thus, the efforts of the UN must be welcomed since respect for fundamental human 
rights, leads logically and necessarily, in some instances, to the imposition of certain 
restraints on methods and means of war. These restraints do not exist wholly in Article 3, 
only the idea of human rights as developed by the UNGA can fill t hat gap. 
The UN has done what the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has done in 
Latin America where many excesses and cruelties of civil wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador 
etc., were condemned as violations of human rights. 248 Thus, the UN, in my opinion has 
contributed to the creation of the idea that human rights are the essential substance of the 
rules of war. Therefore, States are obliged to respect the life and freedom of their citizens 
in the conduct of war by choosing the means and methods of their armed struggle carefully. 
This leads me to support what Meron who asserts that: 
"The idea of humanity has become the common denominator of human rights law and 
of humanitarian law". 249 
246 Op. cit., supra. n. 126, p. 1105. 
247Y 
. Dfnstein: Human-Rights in Armed Conf I icts 
in I nternat Iona t Human! tar I an Law, In T. Meron (ed. ): 
Human Rights and International Law: Legal Policy Issues. Vot. 2, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 346. 
248See N. Buergenthat: Human rights: The Inter-American System. Binder 3. Part 3, Cases and Decisions, 
Oceana Pub., Inc., Dobbs Ferry, New York 1987. p. 67. 
249Meron, 
op. cit., supra. chapter 3, n. 24, p. 14. 
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He concludes by stating: 
"The fact that these two systems of law [human rights and humanitarian law] have 
different historical and doctrinal origins and should not obscure the tremendous 
rapprochement between them which has already taken place". 
250 
No doubt the UN was a real force behind such rapprochement, in the context of civil wars, 
since Article 3 does not specifically contain any restraints on the methods and means of 
warfare, the contribution of the UN is very important. It established beyond any doubt that 
the extension of the concept of human rights, if acted upon in good faith by the 
belligerents, will lead to the imposition of restraints on methods and means of war. This will 
afford a real protection of all individuals and above all to the victims of internal conflicts. 
3. The ICJ and Article 3: the Nicaragua Case 
In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ had, for the first time, an occasion to deal with Article 3. 
However, it must be indicated that Nicaragua did not invoke that Article, presumably 
because it feared such a move would be construed that it regarded its war against the 
Contras as an 'Armed conflict not of an international character', such implication would 
force the Nicaraguan Government to abide by the rules contained in Common Article 3. 
Nicaragua blamed the Americans for the illegal acts of the Contras, since in its opinion, 
they (the Contras) were financed and directed by the US. In short, they were the creation 
of the US and the latter must be considered as the responsible party for the Contras' 
violations of humanitarian rules in general. 
However, the ICJ rejected the Nicaraguan logic. It held: 
"The Court does not consider that the assistance given by the United States to the Contras warrant the conclusion that these forces are subject to the U to such an I 
extent that any acts they have committed are imputable to that Statew. 2ýi 
It then added: 
"It [the Court] held the view that the Contras remain responsible for their acts and 
that the US is not responsible for the acts of the Contras but for its own S? nduct vis- 
A-vis Nicaragua, including conduct relating to the acts of the Contras". 2 
The Court then considered that the conflict as 'not of an international character' between 
the Contras and the Nicaraguan Government, 'the acts of the Contras toward the 
Nicaraguan Government are therefore governed by the law applicable to conflicts of that 
253 character'. In other words, it is Article 3 that governs the situation. However, the actions 
of the US in and against Nicaragua were considered to be of an international character. 
2501bid. 
25lCase Concerning Hititary and Paramititary Activities in Adjacent Nicaragua (Nicaragua ve United 
States of America), 25 ILK, 1986, para 110, p. 1047. 
2521bid, 
para 110, p. 1047. 
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The Court then made a very important pronouncement concerning the position of the 
rules contained in Article 3, in international law. It specifically stated: 
"Because the minimum rules applicable to international and non-international 
conflicts are identical, there is no need to address whether those actions must be 
looked at in the congt of the rules which operate for the one or for the other 
category of conflict". 4 
It then added: 
"The relevant principles are to be looked for in the provisions of Article 3 of each 
of the four Conventions of August 12,1949, the text of which, identical in each 255 Convention, expressly refers to conflicts not having an international character". 
The Court considered the fundamental rules governing internal conflicts as substantially the 
same as those applying to international conflicts; in other words it considered that the rules 
contained in Article 3 as the minimum standard that must always be respected whatever the 
nature of the conflict. 
The Court also stressed that: 
"Article 3 which is common to all four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
defined certain rules to be applied in the armed conflicts of a non-international 
character. There is no doubt that, in the event of international armed conflicts, these 
rules also constitute a minimum yardstick in addition to the more elaborate rules 
which are also to apply to international conflicts; and they are rules, in the Court's 
opinion, which reflect what the Court in 1949 called 'elementary considerations of humanity' (Corfu Channel Merits, ICJ Report, p. 22). "256 
Hence, the rules of Article 3 are characterized as 'elementary considerations of humanity'. 
The latter, it must be added, had been considered in the Corfu Channel case as obligatory 
257 in times of war and even in peace. 
The Court seems to imply, in my opinion, that the rules of Article 3 have become 
customary international law, or at least general principles of humanitarian law which must 
be adhered to independently of the Geneva Conventions. The view of the Court is 
therefore, in my opinion, of great importance since it also establishes beyond any doubt that 




2571n the Corfu Channet Case, the ICJ stated in fact. that: 
"The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authorities consisted in notifying, for the 
benefit of shipping in general, the existence of a minefietd in Albanian territorial waters 
and in warning the approaching British warships of the imminent danger to which the minef jeLd 
exposed them. Such obligations are based not on The Hague Convention of 1907, No. Vill, Which 
Is applicable in time of war, but on certain general and weLt-recognized principles, namely: 
elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war, the principle 
of the freedom of maritime communications; and every State's obligation riot to allow knowingly 
Its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other Statesel. 
The Corfu Charnet Case (United Kingdom v. Atabania) (14erftlL ICJ Reports 1949, p. 22. 
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Court) contributed to make the protection of the victims of internal conflicts an 
international issue. The established Government can no longer claim a monopoly in this 
area. 
However, it must be recognized that the Court's view concerning Article 3 has been the 
object of criticism by some judges and lawyers. Hence, Judge Jennings noted: 
"Even the Court's view that the common Article 3, laying down a 'minimum 
yardstick' (paragraph 218) for armed conflicts of a non-international character, are 
applicable as 'elementary considerations of humanity'; is not free from diffiCUlty". 
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The same view was expressed by Judge Ago in his Separate Opinion, he was: 
"... [M]ost reluctant to be persuaded that any broad identity exists between the Geneva 
Conventions and certain 'fundamental general principles of humanitarian law' which, 
according to the Court, were pre-existing in customary law to which the Conventions 
9merely gave expression aragraph 220] or of which they are at most' in some 
respects a development". 
A 
Meron also was sceptical about the Court's view, he wrote: 
"It is not certain that the rules of Article 3 and of those other provisions match each 
other perfectly, or that all of those humanitarian principles have necessarily attained 
the character of customary rules of international laW". 260 
In his view, elementary considerations of humanity have not attained the status of 
customary law and Article 3 was viewed in 1949 as making a "new step' in the development 
of humanitarian law. It has no antecedents in earlier Geneva Conventions and the State 
261 practice is not very clear. 
It seems to me, that the Court can find the State practice not only in concrete situations, 
where violations are frequent, as we saw above, but also in the'practice of international 
organizations, where representatives of States declare their readiness to respect humanitarian 
standards, also in different resolutions of the UNGA and since no State can voice its 
opposition to respect humanitarian principles contained in Article 3, this points to the 
existence of the element of opinto jurls of States. 
Thus, the Court may be said to have made the obligations contained in Article 3 erga 
omnes. This means that the plea of 'intervention in the internal affairs, has no relevance 
whatsoever, when humanitarian rules of Article 3 are violated by a given State'. 
D. Conclusions 
The conclusions concerning this section can be summarised as follows: 
1. From the theoretical point of view, Article 3 is the first international attempt to 
2580P. 
cit., supra. n. 251, p. 1285. 
2591bid, 
p. 1108. 
260T. Meron: The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law. 81 AJIL. 1987, p. 356. See atso the same author, 




regulate internal wars, in the context of an international treaty. Whatever its shortcomings 
and low impact in practice, it is a fundamental derogation from the State sovereignty. The 
Nicarsaua Case seems to imply, as we have seen above, that the rules of Article 3 have 
become a part of customary international law and thus confirmed as a real derogation on 
State sovereignty. 
One may even venture to suggest that the humanitarian rules of Article 3, constitute rules 
of jus cogens, in the sense of Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(1969). This assertion can be justified partly on the ground that there is no record of a State 
which adopted a policy of claiming publicly that it is not bound by the humanitarian rules 
contained in the Article. 
States can always claim that the conflict does not fall in the ambit of Common Article 3, 
but not that the rules contained in it are non-applicable. That is to say, no State can claim 
that torture, killing, inhumane treatment and summary executions are justified, and are a 
component part of its policy in dealing with insurgents. I think this is a part of the answer 
of why the ICJ has not found it difficult to consider the rules of Article 3 as customary 
rules, or at least general principles of humanitarian law. 
2. As to the content of the rules of Article 3, theoretically the influence of the emerging 
law of human rights is not wholly irrelevant. The law of New York has a very close 
relations with the law of Geneva, in the context of internal wars. Although, reading many 
of the rules of the law of war in Article 3, (such as the prohibition of bombardment of open 
towns and villages, selection of targets of attack and the prohibition of certain kinds of 
weapons), as some experts in humanitarian law did (even the ICRC), 262 can be implicitly 
opposed by a strict adherence to the rules of treaty interpretation (Articles 30 to 33 of the 
Vienna Convention). The UN was able to make that 'reading' by using the human rights 
approach, since respect for fundamental human Tights of persons, resulted automatically in 
restricting the discretion of States in adopting methods and means of their war against their 
opponents. 
3. It seems to me that the practice shows that the arguments of sovereignty and non- 
intervention were not used to justify violations of humanitarian rules contained in Article 
3. Thus, torture, inhumane treatment and massacres, were never justified on those two 
pleas. 
Therefore, when France was confronted with the publication of leaked ICRC reports 
(which revealed the brutal truth of the conduct of the French army in Algeria) in Le Monde 
(dated January 5th, 1960), the Government tried to prevent the spread of the revelations 
by stopping the distribution of the newspaper. However, when that failed, it tried to limit 
the damage by abolishing the Fifth Bureau which was responsible for carrying out the 
atrocities. 263 
262 ICRC, League of the Red Cross Societies in cottaboratfon with the Henry Dunant Institute: 
Internationat Red Cross Handbook. 12th ed., Geneva, Juty 1983, pp. 641-646. 
263 D. P. Forsythe: Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee of the Red Cross. The John 
Hopkins Univ Press, Baltimore and London, 1977, pp. 149-150. 
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The French Government never tried to justify its actions as necessary for the 
safeguarding of its sovereignty in Algeria. This leads to an important conclusion, namely 
that if Governments always use pleas of sovereignty and non -intervention, in the subject 
of characterisation of the conflict, as we saw in the third chapter, they are not willing to 
do the same when the matter concerns the substantive rules of Article 3. The reason seems 
to be that States morally and politically cannot justify either in international or internal 
conflicts, massacres, torture and inhumane treatment or their sovereign right to use every 
method at their disposal to win the war. 
4. The practice which is not always consistent, however, reveals that the insurgents were 
almost always the first to declare their readiness to extend more humanitarian treatment, 
to at least one section of the victims of internal wars, namely, captured combatants. Whereas 
the established Governments are always reluctant to do the same or, when they do, only on 
a de facto basis. 
In this area, I think the plea of sovereignty still wields strong influence, since any action 
of the established Government in this field may be interpreted as giving legal status to the 
insurgents. 
5. The practice also establishes, that loopholes exist in the substantive rules of Article 3. 
The generality of those rules and their vagueness, leaves to the belligerents, especially the 
established Government, a wide room for discretion. The case of the wounded and sick is 
a point where the only obligations is to care for them. This merely led Governments in 
practice to prohibit the sale of certain medicines and punishment of those who assisted the 
wounded and sick insurgents. 
Section III: The Protection of the Victims of Internal Wars Under Protocol 11 of 1977 
Introduction 
In its documentation submitted to the First CGEDHL (1971), the ICRC pointed out 
concerning the protection of the victims of internal wars: 
"Indeed, in the course of its practical activities, the ICRC had found that the number 
and scope of non-international conflicts made it immediately imperative to provide better Protection to all victims of hostilities. However, Article 3 had proved, it had 
been shown to have numerous loopholes, and this made it no longer possible to ensure 
"264 sufficient guarantees to the victims in question. 
This is the ICRC's rationale behind its efforts in providing more protection to the victims 
of internal wars. 
However, in practice the ICRC had at least since 1953 signalled the need for more 
protection of the victims of internal warS. 265 Moreover, the Teheran Conference of 1968 
signalled the beginning of the UN interest in the question of human rights in armed 
conflict. Thus, the UN added its voice to the need to update humanitarian law, in order to 
give better protection to all victims of all armed conflicts. The Teheran Conference in fact 
adopted the well known Resolution XXIII, in which it requested the UNGA to invite the 
264 Op. cit., supra. n. 100, p. T. 
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UN Secretary- General to study: 
"(a) Steps which could be taken to ensure the better application of existing 
humanitarian international conventions and rules in all armed conflicts; 
(b) The need for additional humanitarian international conventions or for possible 
revision of existing conventions to ensure the better protection of civilians, prisoners 
and combatants in all armed conflicts and the prohibition and limitation of the use 
"266 of certain methods and means of warfare. 
This led the UNGA at its 23rd session, to adopt Resolution 2444(XXIII) of December 19th, 
1968, in which it invited the UN Secretary- General, in consultation with the ICRC, to 
study the possible measures to ensure the better protection of all victims of all armed 
conflicts without any distinction. This led in effect to the efforts which resulted in the 
adoption of the two protocols. 
However, it must be stressed that many other factors have encouraged the movement for 
the better protection of the victims of war in general. The whole atmosphere of the 1960s 
(wars of national liberation, the adoption of the UN two covenants on human rights, and 
especially the atrocities and the sufferings of the Vietnamese war which were brought alive 
to the world through the media) have in different degrees led to the movement of 
development and reaffirmation of humanitarian law, which began in 1969, the date of the 
first Red Cross Expert Conference. 
In this section I will concentrate on the protection of the victims of internal wars, in the 
context of Protocol IT of 1977, in order to see whether new rules and new attitudes of States 
have changed from the rules and attitudes adopted in the conference of 1949. However, my 
main concern would be to bring out the influence of the concepts of sovereignty and non- 
intervention in speeding or retarding the rate of protection of the victims of internal wars. 
To do this, my essential method would be the extensive use of the travaux pr6paratolres 
of the Diplomatic Conference (1974-1977) and sometimes even the use of the discussions 
which took place in the Red Cross Experts Conferences and the CGEDHL. 
To me, this is the best area, where we can clearly see the working of the two concepts 
(sovereignty and non-intervention) in practice, because to my mind the Draft Protocol 11 
submitted by the ICRC to the Diplomatic Conference has in essence, and in many important 
issues, placed the dictates of humanity before the demands of sovereignty and non- 
intervention. This led States to the use of these concepts, either to modify or simply 
suppress many important rules for the protection of the victims of internal wars. 
However, recourse to the subsequent practice in cases of internal wars which are raging 
now would be undertaken to see whether what was adopted in Protocol 11 can find a place 
in practice. In other words, whether Protocol IT was an exercise which was far from reality. 
On the other hand, it must be stressed that it is only El Salvador which accepted the 
application of Protocol 11 to its internal conflict (at least in the opinion of the ICRQ. Thus, 
recourse to other cases like Nicaragua, Sri-Lanka, Angola, Afghanistan, Mozambique and 
others would be on a de facto basis, since no one of them has accepted the application of 
the Protocol 11 to its conflict. 
26625th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations Action in the Field 
of Human Rights, UN, New York, 1974, UN Pub., Sales No. E74, XVI, 2, p. 110. 
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However, before engaging in the study of the points included in this section, a general 
observation concerning the Drafting of Protocol 11 is in point, in order to show the 
important role played by the concepts of sovereignty and non-intervention in the shaping 
of many important rules of Protocol Il. 
Thus, two Red Cross Experts Conferences and two CGEDHL led to the adoption by the 
ICRC of the Draft Protocol 11, which was submitted to the Diplomatic Conference in 1974. 
The Diplomatic Conference after four sessions adopted a Draft Protocol 11 at the committee 
level which did not differ substantially from what was proposed by the ICRC. 
However, at the last session the leader of the Pakistani delegation, Judge Hussain, 
submitted another version of Protocol 11, the so-called 'simplified version', which was 
eventually accepted by the conference as Protocol 11. That simplified version contained 
many omissions and weaknesses, compared to what had been proposed by the ICRC, or even 
of what had been adopted at the committee level during four years of hard negotiations. 
This sudden change of mind was expressly justified on the grounds of sovereignty and non- 
267 intervention. 
Thus, the manoeuvring which led to the adoption of the simplified version or 'the 
Hussain Draft', gives us some illuminating insights into the operation of the two concepts 
of sovereignty and non-intervention, in the present development of humanitarian law. 
A. The Concept of the Victims of Internal Wars In Protocol 11 
As we have seen in section Il of the present chapter, Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
applies specifically to persons taking no part in the hostilities. However, there is no precise 
specification of the categories involved in that cited category. In other words, the personnel 
field of application of Article 3 is not explicitly stated. 
Protocol 11 on the other hand seems to me to fill this lacuna by first indicating the 
different categories of persons who are to be protected, and secondly by stating the 
normative rules which would apply to those categories. Thus, it stipulates in its Article 2/1: 
"This protocol shall be applied without any adverse distinction founded on race, 
colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar criteria. To all persons 
affected by an armed conflict as defined in Article I. n268 
267 Thus, Judge Hussain. the Chairman of the Pakistani delegation, explained the rationale behind his 
Initiative, In the foLlowfng fashion: 
"Its provisions Eof Protocol III must be acceptable to sit, and therefore, of obvious practical 
benefit. The provisions must be within the perceived capacity of those involved to apply them, 
and therefore, precise and simple. They should not appear to affect the sovereignty of any 
State party or the responsibility of its Government to maintain Law and order and defend 
national unity, nor be able to be invoked to justify any outside intervention; nothing in the 
protocol should suggest that dissidents must be treated legally other than rebels; and Lastly, 
there should be no automatic repetition of the more comprehensive provisions, such as those 
on civil defence, found in Protocol 1. To include such provisions would risk changing the 
material field of application to such an extent that States would either fait to ratify 
Protocol 11 or tend to argue for Its non-apptication in situations fatting within its scope, 
thereby Leaving the victims of those conflicts without adequate protectionle. 
DRDCHL (1974-1977). VII. CDDH/SR. 49, para. 11, p. 61. 
268D. Sch I ndter and J. Toman (ads. ): The Laws of Armed Conf II cts. Marti nus Nil hoff, Dordrecht, & Henri 
Dunant Institute, Geneva, 1988, p. 692. 
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In fact, the protocol applied to the whole territory where the internal conflict is taking 
place, and without any discrimination. Moreover, because in internal conflicts all elements 
of the population are affected in one way or another by the conflict, Article 2/1 is a 
welcome development, since every human being in a country torn by civil strife can be 
assumed to be an actual, or potential sufferer, whether he is in the area of the conflict 
stricto sensu or not. 
Besides, the principle of non-discrimination protects all civilians even foreigners against 
any ill treatment. Thus, all persons, whether participating or not in the hostilities, are 
protected against any abuse of power, either by the established Government or the rebels. 
It is interesting to note that the ICRC had submitted to the second conference of 
Government Experts a Draft Article 2, on the personnel field of application, which reads 
as follows: 
"The present protocol shall apply to all persons, whether military or civilian, 
combatant or non-combatant, who are in the territory of one of the high contracting 
parties, where an armed conflict within the meaning of Article I of this protocol is 
occurring ". 269 
The ICRC Expert explained that the protocol: 
"... [A]pplied to all persons who were in the territory of one of the contracting 
partieS". 270 
He then added that: 
"This provision seemed n cessary since the future protocol had to contain provisions 
relating to combatantS". 2fi' 
This mention of the word 'combatants, led the British Experts to submit a new proposal for 
a new version of Draft Article 2, which would restrict the personnel field of the protocol 
to those persons who are taking no direct part in the hostilities. 272 
However, the ICRC submitted to the diplomatic conference a Draft Article 2, which did 
not differ much from its Draft Article 2 submitted to the CGEDHL in 1972. The Draft 
Article 2 reads as follows: 
"I. The present protocol shall apply, without any adverse distinction, to all persons, 





272 The proposed Draft Articte 2, submitted by the British Experts reads as foitows: 
01. The benefits and obligations of the present protocol shall apply, without any adverse 
distinction toatt persons taking no active part Inthehostitftfes, including members of armed 
forces who laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention 
or any other cause, who are in the territory of a high contracting party where an armed 
conflict within the meaning of the present protocol is occurring, etc. 08 
2 CGEDHL 2nd Session, 3 May-3 June 1972, Report on the Work of the Conference (Annexes). Geneva, Juty 
1972, p. 46. 
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whether military or civilian, combatant or non-combatant affected by an armed 
conflict within the meaning of Article 1. 
2. Even after the end of the armed conflict, all persons whose liberty has been 
restricted for reasons in relation to the armed conflict and might not have been 
released, as well as persons arrested for these same reasons, shall enjoy the protection 
of Articles 8 and 10 until released. m273 
However, at the committee level many Drafting changes were made, 274 with the final result 
that the reference to 'combatants' was eliminated. This means in effect that States are still 
very sensitive to confer any status upon their enemies. 275 
At the committee level (the First Committee) Draft Article 2 was adopted by consensus. 
However, at least one delegation voiced its unhappiness with the new version of that 
Article. It was the Holy See which stressed that it: 
"... [I]t did not like the idea of distinguishing between various categories of victims 
of armed conflicts and regretted that the words 'all person 7g, whether military or 27 civilian, combatant or non-combatant' had been dropped". 
Since in its view they made the scope of the Article wider than that which was adopted. 
In the simplified version submitted by Pakistan, no changes were made in the Article 
(Article 2) adopted by the first committee, which meant that the protocol applies in the 
words of the ICRC representative: 
"... [T]o everyone, without distinction, affected by armed conflict whatever their 
nationality- including refugees and stateless persons: human treatment should be the "277 same for all. 
However, it seems to me that the personnel field of application of Protocol II is wider than 
that of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention since it protects "all persons affected by armed 
con fliCt"278 and not only those "hors de combat" . In this context, Rosemary Abi-Saab 
2731 ORDCHL (1974-77), pp. 33-34. 
274see in this context, 10 ORDCHL. (1974-1977), CDDH/1/238/Rev. /l, pp. 95-96. 
275 In this context, Rosemary Abf-Saab has rightLy stated: 
"Lee deLegations qui avalent dmis des rdserves ä tIegard du chmp d'opptieation matdriet de 
t'Articte premier, ont dmis (es mimes rdserves bas6es sur to souverainet6 et to principe du 
domeine rdservd des Etats en matibre de droft p6nat, particuLlbrement ä tlegard du second 
paragraphe de cet Art! cLe et de to pricision attach&e aux personnes concerndes per to confLit 
ermd, ä savoir (es personnes Imititelres ou civites, combattentes ou non-Combattantes', qui 
pouvalt taiser entrevoir un statut de combattant". 
Op. cit., supra. n. 103, p. 454. 
2768 ORDCHL (1974-1977), MDH/l/SR, 22, para. 44, p. 210. 
2771bid, 
para. 45, p. 210. 
278M 
. Et Kouhene stressed In his Interpretation of the expression of 'affected by the confticto that: 
I'll, sembLe quIen igard aux transformations survenues dans; 'Llart de ta querrel (guerre totaLe, 
participation des civiLs etc. ) on ait vouLu donner h Llexpression laffect6e par Le conf Lit un 
sens trbs Large"'. 
Les quarantfes fondamentates de to personne en droft humanitafre et droits de t'homme. Martinus 
Niihoff, 1986, p. 21. 
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rightly observes: 
"La suppression des termes 'combattants' est dvidernment importante, dans la mesure 
ou c"dtait IA la distinction essentielle, avec le champ d'application personnel de 
I'article 3 commun aux conventi ns, qui lui ne s'applique qu'aux personnes qui ne 
-- 
'379 
prennent pas part aux hostilites. 
She then adds: 
"On peut dire toutefois que les terms 'toutes les personnes affecties par un conflit 
arm6' sont suffisamment larges poyr pouvoir etres interprdtds dans ce meme sens, 
plus large que celui de I'Article 3". 80 
In my opinion, the expression 9persons affected by the conflict' means that even combatants 
are entitled to at least be treated humanely. This restricts the liberty of the established 
Government and also the rebels. They have to respect the guarantees and obligations, 
especially those established in Article 4 of the Protocol II, which I will deal with later in 
greater detail. 
Therefore, it would seem to me that Protocol Il considered all the population living in a 
country torn by civil war as victims of war, to which certain fundamental human rights 
should apply. This restricts the sovereignty of the Government in dealing with its own 
nationals. 
Thus, Protocol 11 establishes the first category of victims of war, namely 'all those 
affected by the conflict, which is indeed very wide as we explained. To this general 
category, the protocol establishes a general system of obligations and rights. 
It also establishes a special regime of protection for other victims, which may be called 
the stricto sensu victims of internal wars. They are: 
A. Persons whose liberty has been restricted in connection with the conflict. 
B. The civilian population. 
C. The wounded and sick, also religious and medical personnel involved in their assistance 
and care. 
However, it must be noted that the Protocol continued the tradition established by Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions. in denying the status of POW's to captured insurgents, in this 
point the argument of sovereignty carried the day as we will see later. 
After this general introduction to the concept of the victims of internal wars, I will deal 
with the actual norms of protection for each category as established by the Protocol, in 
order to see the influence and the working of the two concepts of sovereignty and non- 
intervention. 
B. The Fundamental Guarantees of Article 4, the Contents and their Evaluation 
Article 4 of the Protocol 11 stipulates: 
*1. All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in 
hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to respect for 
2790P. 




their person, honour and convictions and religious practices. They shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction. It is prohibited 
to order that there shall be no survivors. 
2. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against the 
person referred to in para. 1 are and shall be prohibited at any time and in any place 
whatsoever: 
(a) violence to life, health and physical or mental wellbeing of persons, in particular 
murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any forms of corporal 
punishment; 
(b) collective punishments; 
(c) taking of hostages; 
(d) acts of terrorism; 
(e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, 
rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; 
(f) slavery and slave trade; 
(g) pillage; 
(h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts. 
3. Children shall be provided with the care and air they require, and in particular: 
(a) They shall receive an education, including religious and moral education, in 
keeping with the wishes of their parents, or in the absence of parents, of those 
responsible for their care. 
(b) All appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families 
temporarily separated. 
(c) Children below the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the armed 
forces nor allowed to take part in the hostilities. 
(d) The special protection provided by this Article to children below fifteen years of 
age shall remain applicable to them if they take a direct part in hostilities despite the 
provisions of subpara. (c) and are captured. 
(e) Measures shall be taken, if necessary, and whenever possible with the consent of 
their parents who by law or custom are primarily responsible for their care, to 
remove children temporarily from the area in which hostilities are taking place to a 
safer area within the country and ensure that they are accompanied by persons 
responsible for their safety and wellbeing. "281 
In fact, Article 4 contains a very complicated set of rules, some of them belong to human 
rights, some to the Geneva law, and even some to The Hague law. Essentially it was Drafted 
as Article 6 by the ICRC, it kept the same number in the Draft drawn at the Committee 
level. However, during the last session, the simplified version eliminated many rules 
contained in other articles of the Protocol 11, especially those which had any connection 
with means and methods of warfare. On the other hand, some other rules were included in 
the present Article 4. 
The first question which may arise concerning Article 4 is who are the persons protected 
by it? and the second concerns the content of the rules involved in it. 
1. Persons Protected by Article 4 
Initially most of the rules contained in the present Article 4 were to be applied to all the 
population in the country torn by civil strife. Thus, the ICRC submitted to the second 
CGEDHL three Articles 282 which dealt in detail with the rules contained now in Article 4. 
2818othe 
et at., op. cit., supra. chapter 3, n. 186, p. 638. 
282 They were Articles 4,5 and 6. Article 4 (Torture and fit treatment) provides: 
"In order that the prohibition stipulated in Article 3(1) should obtain its fullest effect, 
the parties to the conflict shatt take all necessary measures to ensure that their military 
or civf Han agents should not commit, nor Issue orders to commit, nor condone acts of torture 
or brutality. " 
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When the ICRC delegate presented those Articles (4,5 and 6) which were contained in 
Chapter 11 of the ICRC Draft, he expressly stated that: 
"Chapter Il was devoted to the general protection of the population in the territory 
of a Sia e place". 
Ae where an armed conflict not of an international character was taking 
He then added that: 
"The subject of the chapter therefore, was not the protection of the civilian 
population as such ... but the prohibition 
in relation to the general population, of 
certain cases of ill-treatment already forbidden by the four Geneva Conventions". 284 
This means that essentially the rules are to apply to the whole population without any 
distinction. It is in reality the extension of the principle of human treatment to cover the 
whole population, and not only the victims of internal war stricto sensu. 
The majority of the Experts supported the view of the ICRC and stressed the need for 
the identity of the rules of protection in internal and international wars. This conception, 
in their opinion: 
"... [D]id not imply interference in the internal affairs of States, but that Governmentý 
should exercise their sovereignty in conformity with humanitarian law standards". 285 
Articie 5 (Terrorism, reprisats, pittage), stipuLates: 
111. Acts of terrorism, as wait as reprisals against persons and objects indispensable to their 
survival are prohibited. 
2. Pillage is prohibited. 
3. Women and children shatt be protected, in particular against rape and any form of indecent 
assautt. " 
Articte 6 (Measures in favour of chitdren) reads as foltows: 
111. Children shalt be the object of special protection. The parties to the conflict shalt 
provide them with the care and aid which their age and situations require. 
2. To this end, the parties to the conflict undertake, at least: 
(a) to ensure the identif ication of chi tdren, particularly by making them wear identity discs; 
(b) to take care that children who are orphaned or separated from their families as a result 
of armed conflict are not left abandoned; 
(c) to endeavour to conclude local agreements for the removal of children from combat zones; 
such children shalt be accompanied by persons responsible for ensuring their safety; aLt 
necessary steps shalt be taken to permit the reunion of members of families temporarily 
separated; 
(d) to take care that children under fifteen years of age do not take any direct part in 
hostilities. 
3. The death penalty shalt not be pronounced on civilians below 18 years of age at the time 
when the offence was committed, nor on mothers of infants or on women responsible for their 
care. Pregnant women shalt not be executed. " 
Op. cit., supra. n. 272, pp. 16-17. 
2830p. 
cit., supra. n. 269, para. 2.107, p. 72. 
2841bid, 
para. 2.107, p. 73, 
2851bid, 
para. 2.110, p-73- 
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During the Diplomatic Conference, the ICRC submitted Draft Article 6 which contained 
the fundamental guarantees. 286 In introducing the Draft Article to discussion at the second 
session in 1975, the representative of the ICRC stressed that Part 11 of Protocol 11, which 
contained Draft Article 6, was designated to protect 'all persons who took no direct part or 
who had ceased to take a part in hostilitieS'287 and then added: 
"It [Part 11] set out to protect all persons affected by the armed conflict without 
creating s ecial categories of protected persons enjoying special status or 
treatment". 
988 
This meant in his opinion that combatants who were 'hors de combat' and had fallen into 
the hands of the adverse party are not to be transmuted into POW. 
The conclusion is that the expression in Article 4/1 that "all persons who do not take a 
direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has 
been restricted' has to be interpreted to include all persons in the country where civil war 
is taking place, and not only the civilian population stricto sensu, including combatants who 
either are 'hors de combat' or those who still fight, because Article 4/1 in its last paragraph 
stipulates that 'it is prohibited to order that there shall be no quarter'. Thus, even 
combatants in the field of operation have some kind of protection. 
The effect of this interpretation is once a State accepts the applicability of Protocol 11, 
or rather once the Protocol is said to be applicable to the internal conflict, all persons living 
in the country are protected, from any actions that may violate their respect for their 
person, honour and their religious and moral convictions. This interpretation is valid, when 
it is taken together with Article 2, which stresses as we have seen that the Protocol applies 
to all those affected by the conflict. 
Thus, it seems to me that it is safe to assume that States are under Protocol 11 more tied 
than Article 3. Their sovereignty is restricted since all the population is under the protection 
of an international instrument, and also no plea of intervention can be used against those 
who demand protection of the whole population. 
286Draft Articte 6 submitted by the ICRC to the DipLomatic Conference stiputates: 
111. All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take a part in hostilities, 
whether or not their liberty has been restricted are entitled to respect for their person, 
their honour and their religious convictions and practices. They shalt in all circumstances 
be treated humanely without any adverse distinction. 
2. The following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph I are and shalt remain 
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruet treatment 
and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) acts of terrorism In the form of acts of violence committed against those persons; 
(d) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(e) slavery and the stave trade in &It their forms; 
(f) pillage; 
(g) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts. 
3. women shall be the object of special respect and shalt be protected In particular against 
rape, enforced prostitution, and any other form of Indecent assautt. " 
op. cit., supra., n. 273, p. 35. 
2870P. 
cit., supra. n. 276, CDDH/I/SR. 32, para. 3, p. 323. 
2881bid, para. 5, p. 323. 
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2. The Content of the Guarantees of Article 4 
The first observation concerning this point is that the rules contained in the Article do not 
bar the application of national law to persons who may have violated that law. 289 This is a 
fundamental concession to advocates of the sovereignty of the State, since the Government 
can always resort to the punishment of those who may try to topple it. Protocol 11 does not 
take away that right, it is there. The only obligation as we will see later is to treat them 
humanely, but there is no prohibition to the application of internal law, which always 
makes it a crime to take arms against the Government, or try to assist those insurgents who 
are fighting the Government. 
Returning now to the rules included in this important Article (4). The latter essentially 
tries to fill a loophole in Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, that is the definition of the 
notion of humane treatment. 
Thus, the ICRC delegate at the Diplomatic Conference specifically stressed the intimate 
relationship between the provisions of Draft Article 6, and the United Nations Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. 290 and at least one representative expressed the view that the 
rules included in the Article came closer to the subject of human rights rather than that of 
humanitarian law. 291 
During the discussion two views concerning Draft Article 6 become clear. The first view 
was happy with what was proposed by the ICRC, however with some of its supporters 
advocating some minor Drafting changes. 292 
The second view stressed that some of the rules included in the Draft Article 6 constitute 
a violation of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Thus, Nigeria. who was 
among the leaders of the second view maintained that Draft Article 6: 
'... IW)ould appear to be an attempt to destroy the careful balance between internal 
and international jurisdiction*. 293 
To him, there was no obvious reason why the Draft Article should seek to lay down legal 
rules that are covered already in most domestic systems. 
289The ICRC representative made It very ctear that: 
OAtthough It (Part 11) told down rules regarding human treatment of protected persons, It in 
no way shielded from the application of national tow any person who might have violated that 
law in connection with the arined conflict". 
Op. cit.. supro. n. 267. p. 323. 
290 OP. cit.. upro.. n. 276. CDON/l/SR. 32. pars. 6, p. 324. 
291 lbl. pars. 18. p. 326. 
292 Thus, Pat" stated that It: 
0 (Ely4wessed satisfaction with the ICRC Draft Articte 60. 
Ibid. pars. 17. p. 326. See stso the Statente-ts of BeIghmp (ibid. pars. 27, p. 328); Austratia C ibid, 
pars. 26. p. 328); Swittertand (ibid. pers. 299, p. 328); Ukrainian Soviet Sociatist Repubtic (ibid. 
pers. 33. p. 329); UK (ibid, pera. 39. p. 330): and New Zest" Cibid. pera. 42. p. 331). 
2931bid. 
pers. 21. p. 327. 
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Argentina stressed that it shared: 
"... [T]he concern of some representatives whq considered that Article 6 entailed too 
much interference in national sovereignty,,. 294 
Thus, we see that to some at least, the inclusion of fundamental human rights and 
fundamental humanitarian rules can be considered as an intervention in their internal 
affairs. 
However, Article 6 was adopted by consensus after some minor changes had been 
introduced by a working group and that by Committee I in 1975. 
In the explanation of their votes on Article 6, some States continued to raise the question 
of the incompatibility of the rules of the article with demands of sovereignty and non- 
intervention. A typical example of this was voiced by Iraq, which strongly attacked Article 
6 and other Articles of Protocol 11. Its fundamental objection to those Articles is that 'they 
placed the State and a rebel party on an equal footing'. 295 However, Iraq noted that it was 
not against the principles included in the Article. 
In the simplified version Article 6 became Article 4, it did not change much from what 
had been proposed by the ICRC and the first committee. However, the Draft Articles on 
quarter and protection of children (Articles 22 and 32 respectively) were included in the 
new Article 4. 
Article 4 as adopted is very long, it is in effect a small convention in itself. Compared 
to common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, it is extensive in its interpretation of the 
concept of human treatment. 
The concept of human treatment in the article contains many rules which belong to 
human rights law, Geneva law and even Hague law. The main human rights included are: 
1. Respect for the person, his religious and moral convictions. 
2. The right to life for those who do not take a direct part in the hostilities. Murder, and 
cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishments are all 
prohibited. 
3. Protection of women in their dignity, and the children and their right to protection and 
education. 
4. Prohibition of slavery and slave trade. 
It must be noted here that many of these rights are covered by international instruments 
of human rights. Moreover, all the rights mentioned in the article are concerned with the 
personal and moral integrity of individuals. This means that the article continues the 
tradition of the human rights instruments in providing that no derogation is possible in the 
application of these fundamental rights. 
Thus, the article stipulates that all acts mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 'are and shall 
remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever'. This is very important since 
294 lbid, para. 30, p. 328. 
295 lbid, MDH/I. SR. 40, para. 28, p. 426. On the other hard, the Syrian representative noted that he 
supported ArtfcLe 6, because of its humanitarian ruLes. but he was not happy with the wording of the 
ArticLe since it imptfed a strict juridicat equaLity between the Government and the rebets. lbid, 
CDDH/I. SR. 40, para. 4, p. 421. 
torture, terrorism, collective punishments, and the taking of hostages can be resorted to 
frequently in internal conflicts, in order to extract information, or as a method of 
intimidating the population and the insurgents. Moreover, it must be noted that many of 
the rules of the article derive from the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.296 
The Article also contains in its paragraph 1, a rule which belongs to the law of The 
Hague, it relates to the question of quarter, and makes its withholding prohibited. The 
prohibition is based on Article 23/D of the regulations of The Hague respecting the laws 
and customs of war on land. 
This is a protection for the soldiers in the field of combat and is a vitally important 
provision in the context of internal wars, where the hatred between the warring factions is 
intense. It is argued that this provision indirectly places some restraints upon the methods 
employed in the conduct of military operations, which may by their effects lead to the 
extermination of those who are involved in the fighting in specific operations. 
It is to be observed that the article not only prohibits the commission of the acts listed 
in it, but it actually expressly forbids even 'threats to commit any of the foregoing acts' 
which means that the discretion of Governments in choosing the means of combating the 
insurgents and vice-versa has been greatly curtailed, in favour of more extension of 
297 humanitarian ideas to this inhuman experience (civil wars and their cruelty) The general, 
conclusions concerning Article 4 are as follows: 
1. The Drafting history suggests that there is a general agreement between States that they 
are not against the extension of humanitarian protection to large segments of the population', 
if not to the whole population. Thus, the personnel field of application of the rules of 
Article 4 must be seen as wider than Common Article 3. 
This conclusion carries with it that the sovereignty of the State has been, in this field at 
least, restricted since, nearly all the population has certain fundamental rights which derive 
directly from an international instrument. This in my view is a logical consequence of 
accepting human rights as a fundamental limitation on State sovereignty. 
2. Furthermore, it is argued that the plea of sovereignty and non -intervention were raised 
not against the rules involved in the Article, which represent in fact some of the most 
generally accepted principles of civilisation, against which no civilised State can protest, at 
least publicly, but rather against the implication that the rebels stand as equals to the 
established Government. However, even that contention was not pushed further, since 
essentially what was proposed by the ICRC was accepted even in the simplified version of 
Protocol 11. 
3. The extension of some fundamental rules of the Geneva law, especially those of the 
fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and even of some rules of Hague law, which were 
applied only between States in international wars, to internal wars is obvious in Article 4, 
296 Thus, para. 2/D is borrowed from Article 33 of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 (acts of 
terrorism); para. 2/E from Article 27 (women); para 2/G from Article 33 (Pillage). The Preamble of 
para. 3 from Article 32/1; para 3/A from Article 24/1 (education for children); para. 3/8 from Article 
26; para. 3/C from Article 50; para. 3/E from Articles 17,24/2 and 50 of the fourth Geneva Convention. 
297For 
a general discussion of Article 4, see Sandoz et aL., OP. cit., supra. chapter 3. n. 23, 
pp. 1368-1381. 
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which means that the sovereignty of the State has been curtailed in some important aspects. 
Thus acts of terrorism, pillage, taking of hostages and collective punishments are all 
prohibited. 
B. Protection of Detained and Imprisoned Persons 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions did not contain any special protection for 
persons whose liberty has been restricted for reasons connected with the internal conflict. 
However, as it has been said when dealing with Article 3 in Section II of the present 
chapter, the only provision that applies to captured combatants is that they are protected 
against summary execution. This means that the right of the established Government to 
punish its enemies in accordance with its own laws is by no means restricted whatever the 
barbarity of such law. 
However, it must be stressed that the accordance of the status of POW to captured 
insurgents has very grave consequences for the established Government. It gives the rebel 
organisation respectability and legal status, which no Government dares to admit, because 
it undermines its authority, and its claim to the monopoly of representing the State. 
The accordance of the POW status to rebels is thus seen by the established Government 
as constituting a big challenge to State sovereignty, and as opening of the doors of the State 
to foreign intervention. It seems to me, that the travaux prkparatolres show in a very clear 
way how the invocation of the principles of sovereignty and non- intervention have in fact 
killed any attempt to extend POW status to rebels. 
1. The Red Cross Experts' View 
The Red Cross Experts were not against the extension of what they termed 'POW treatment' 
to captured insurgents. They stressed: 
"The fact of applying the humanitarian rules to rebels did not amount to a recognition 
of belligerency. In other words, the fact that they were treated as POW does not give 
them the status of POW according to the third Geneva Convention, and hence has no 
effect, in international law, on the status of the collectivity or the authority to which 
"298 they belong. 
Thus, the Experts in fact did ask for the extension of 'POW treatment' to captured- 
insurgents, and not the status of POW, in order to avoid the question of the legal status of 
the insurgent party, since according to the third Geneva Convention the status of POW is 
conferred only to captured combatants belonging to a State, as a general rule, or to a 
resistance movement. 
On the other hand, the Red Cross Experts wanted to stress that the efforts to alleviate the 
sufferings of captured combatants must not prejudice the right of the established 
Government to withhold the granting of POW status, since it will be seen as a kind of 
recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the insurgents. This means that the Experts 
tried to pay strong attention to the demand of sovereignty. 
2980p. 
cit., supra. n. 100, p. 65. 
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2. The Government Experts' View 
It seems that the ICRC has taken into account what has been proposed by its Experts, since 
it submitted to the second conference of Government Experts a Draft Article 25 which 
stipulates: 
"Article 25. Treatment of combatants who have fallen into the power of the 
adversary: 
Members of regular armed forces and members of those armed forces which have 
fulfilled the conditions stipulated in Article 4A (2) of the Geneva Convention 
relative to the treatment of POW of August 12,1949, shall receive, after having 
fallen 
into the power of the adversary, a treatment similar to that provided for POW in the 
"299 said convention. 
This Article in fact has been the subject of a heated discussion in the conference. Two 
trends can be detected. The first view, although it was not in principle against the idea of 
extending POW treatment to captured insurgents, was sceptical about the exact meaning of 
the notion of 'similar treatment' used by the ICRC. To this view it was a vague concept, 
since in practice it is very difficult to draw the line between those PTOViSions of the third 
Geneva Convention to be applied under the heading of 'similar treatment' and those which 
300 would remain peculiar to the said convention. 
The second view was espoused by the defenders of the sovereignty of the State. They 
attacked the very idea of either placing the captured insurgents on equal footing with POWs 
captured in international conflicts, or indeed any regulation of their status in an 
international instrument. To them the insurgents had broken the laws of allegiance by 
committing the Crime Of rebellion, which was condemned by every penal code in the 
WOTId. 301 
However, some Experts suggested that persons who had taken arms against the regular 
armed forces should be treated humanely 'in accordance with the law', that is the local law. 
In their opinion, this is the logical solution, since it is in accordance with the principle of 
respect for territorial sovereignty and in line with the desire to preserve this sovereignty 
from any outside intervention during an armed confliCt. 302 
Thus, the general trend was against the inclusion of any article which may be interpreted 
as giving some kind of status to captured insurgents. The result was the deletion of Article 
25 proposed by the ICRC, which means that demands of sovereignty and non- intervention 
have carried the day. 
3. The Diplomatic Conference Attitude 
In proposed Protocol 11, submitted by the ICRC to the Diplomatic Conference, no mention 
was made of the granting of the treatment of POW to captured insurgents. The arguments 
of sovereignty and non- intervention had killed the ICRC attempt at the level of CGEDHL. 
2990P. 
cit., supra. n. 269, p. 78. 
3001bid, 
para. 2.173. p-79- 
3011bfd, para-2-172, P-79. 
3021bid, pars. 2-171, P-79. 
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In fact, the ICRC delegate stated clearly in the Diplomatic Conference in 1975 that: 
"... [C]ontrary to its earlier proposals and in accordance with the recommendations of 
the Experts it had consulted, the ICRC had given up the idea of assimilating 
combatants who were hors-de-combat and had fallen into the hands of the adverse 
party, to pOW". 303 
He then added that: 
"A captured combatant would only enjoy the protection provided in Articles 8,9 and 
10 (Articles 5 and 6 of the actual Protocol 11) and if he had committed an offence in 
connexion with the armed conflict might be prosecuted, tried and sentenced in 
accordance with national law". 304 
This means that no POW treatment is to be accorded to captured insurgents. The latter are 
still criminals under local law. However, the Government is under a duty to respect some 
humanitarian and penal rules concerning detention, judgment and sentencing of those rebels 
when captured, as I will show later when dealing with Articles 5 and 6 of the Protocol II. 
It must be noted that the ICRC, although it ruled out the extension of POW treatment to 
captured insurgents in its Draft Protocol II submitted to the diplomatic conference, 
nevertheless tried to Write down in Protocol II some rules which would mitigate the 
suffering of captured rebels, hence giving them some kind of needed protection. The 
example was Draft Article 7,305 which was essentially based on Article 23/C of the 
Reglementation of The Hague of 1907,306 which forbids the killing or wounding of an 
enemy who laid down his arms. 
At the committee level it has been upheld and even strengthened, since the category of 
those who compose the 'hors- de- combat' has been clearly defined. It (Draft Article 7) 
3030p. 
cit., supre. n. 276, CDDH/l/SR. 32, para. 5, pp. 323-4. 
3041bid, CDDH/I/SR/32, para. 5, p. 324. 
305Draft Article 7 of the Protocol 11 submitted by the ICRC to the Diplomatic Conference stipulates: 
"Article 7. Safeguard of an enemy hors-de-combat: 
1. In accordance with Article 6, it is forbidden to kill, injure, M-treat or torture an 
adversary hors-de-combat. An adversary hors-de-combat is one who, having Laid down his arms, 
no Longer has any means of defence or has surrendered. These conditions are considered to have 
been fulfilled, In particular, in the case of an adversary who: 
(a) is unable to express himself, or 
(b) has surrendered or has clearly expressed an intention to surrender, 
(c) and abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape. 
2. If a party to the conflict decides to send back to the adverse party those combatants it 
has captured. it must ensure that they are in a fit State to make the journey without any 
danger to their safety. " op. cit., supra. n. 273, p. 35. 
306Articte 23/C of The Hague Convention on Land Warfare of 1907 provides: 
"23. in addition to the prohibitions provided by special conventions it is specifically 
forbidden: ... 
c. To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of 
defence, has surrendered at discretion. " 
op. cit., supra. n-28, P-77. 
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became Article 22 biS; 307 it stressed that combatants who become hors de combat cannot be 
the object of an attack. 
However, Article (22 bis) has been deleted in the simplified version submitted by 
Pakistan. But it must be noted that at least one delegation (Belgium) had made it clear when 
explaining its vote, that the deletion of Article 22 bis cannot mean that the principle 
underlying it cannot be respected. In its view, the principle still stands in Article 4/1 which 
308 prohibits the withholding of quarter. 
In my view, this is the correct interpretation, since it is in harmony with the object and 
purpose of Protocol 11 and especially Article 4/1. 
Thus, the travaux pr6paratolres show in a very clear way that the arguments of 
sovereignty and non- intervention, either directly or indirectly, were responsible for the 
elimination of any attempt at giving captured insurgents the status of POW. 
4. Articles 5 and 6 of the Protocol 11 and the Protection of Detained Persons 
Articles 5 and 6 contain some fundamental human rights concerning the treatment of 
detained persons in connection with internal war. Article 5 concerns the rights of persons 
interned or detained for reasons related to the conflict and Article 6 contains the rules 
which must be respected in the prosecution and punishment of persons who committed 
criminal offences related to the armed conflict. 
The two articles refer to civilian and military persons interned or detained, who are to 
be prosecuted for reasons related to the conflict. This means that the articles are not 
confined only to combatants captured by the Government, but also to all civilians who have 
committed offences relating to the conflict. Thus, their personnel field is wide and 
corresponds in my view to the real situations of civil wars, where the rate of interned and 
detained civilians is greater than insurgent combatants, because essentially of the guerrilla 
method, which is widely resorted to in internal conflicts. 
These two articles, it must be emphasised, represent what States are ready to grant to 
their enemies. States made sure that nothing in the articles will imply that they recognise 
any legal status to insurgents. 
In fact, the two article imply that persons covered by them have committed offences 
against the local law. Hence they are to be punished under that very law. On the other hand, 
established Governments under the two articles are under a duty to bring their national law 
in line with the rules included in them. However, it must be indicated that common Article 
307Draft ArticLe 22 bis entitted "Safeguard of an Enemy Hors de Combat" adopted by the third committee 
at its 49th meeting (4 June 1976) and by consensus, reads: 
"I. A person who is recognised or shoutd, under the circumstances, be recognised to be hors de combat, 
shatL not be made the object of attack. 
2. A person Is hors de combat if: 
(a) he is in the power of an adverse party; or 
(b) he cLearty expresses an Intention to surrender; or 
(c) he has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and he is 
therefore incapabie of defending himseLf; 
and in any case, provided that he abstains from any hostite act or does not attempt to escape. as 
15 GRDCHL (1974-77), Federat Potiticat Dept. (1978). CDDR/236/Rev. 1, p. 420. 
308op. 
cit., supra. n. 267, MDH/SR/52, p. 139. 
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3 of the Geneva Conventions contains no special safeguards concerning the protection of 
detained and interned persons and no rules on the prosecution of offenders. 
In this respect, these two articles constitute a welcome and important innovation, since 
they limit the discretionary power of the legal Government in dealing with its enemies, 
even when the national law still considers them basically as common criminals. 
In order to show the influence of the concepts of sovereignty and non- intervention on 
the Drafting of these two articles I will study the two articles separately. 
4.1. Article 5 
Article 5 of the Protocol Il provides: 
"5. Persons whose liberty has been restricted: 
1. In addition to the provisions of Article 4, the following provisions shall be 
respected as a minimum with regard to persons deprived of their liberty for reasons 
related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained: 
(a) The wounded and the sick shall be treated in accordance with Article 7; 
(b) The persons referred to in this paragraph shall, to the same extent as the local 
civilian population, be provided with food and drinking water and be afforded 
safeguards as regards health and hygiene and protection against the rigours of the 
climate and the dangers of armed conflict. 
(c) They shall be allowed to receive individual or collective relief; (d) They shall be allowed to practise their religion, if requested and appropriate, to 
receive spiritual assistance from persons, such as chaplains, performing religious duties; 
(e) They shall, if made to work, have the benefit of working conditions and 
safeguards similar to those enjoyed by the local civilian population. 
2. Those who are responsible for the internment or detention of the persons referred 
to in paragraph I shall also, within the limits of their capabilities, respect the following provisions relating to such persons: (a) Except when men and women of a family are accommodated together, women 
shall be held in quarters separated from those of men and shall be under the immediate supervision of women; 
(b) They shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards, the number of which 
may be limited by competent authority if it deems necessary; (c) Places of internment and detention shall not be located close to the combat zone. The persons referred to in paragraph I shall be evacuated when the places where they 
are interned or detained become particularly exposed to danger arising out of the 
armed conflict, if their evacuation can be carried out under adequate conditions of 
safety; 
(d) They shall have the benefit of medical examinations, 
(e) Their physical or mental health and integrity shall not be endangered by any 
unjustified act or omission. Accordingly, it is prohibited to subject the persons 
described in this article to any medical procedure which is not indicated by the State 
of health of the person concerned, and which is not consistent with the generally 
accepted medical standards applied to free persons under similar medical 
circumstances. 
3. Persons who are not covered by paragraph I but whose liberty has been restricted 
in any way whatsoever for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be treated 
humanely in accordance with Article 4 with paragraph l(a), (c) and 2(d) of this 
article. 
4. If it is decided to release persons deprived of their liberty, necessary measures to 
ensure their safety shall be taken by those so deciding. "309 
309 H. S. Levie (ed. ): The Law of Non-Internationat Armed Conftict. Protocot 11 to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventfons. Martfnus Nilhoff, 1987, pp. 240-41. 
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Originally this article was Drafted as Article 8 in the proposed version of Protocol Il 
submitted by the ICRC to the Diplomatic Conference. 310 However, the first question which 
arises concerns the personnel field application of the article. In this context the ICRC 
delegate in presenting the Draft Article 8 interpreted the key expression 'persons whose 
liberty has been restricted' as comprising: 
"... [A]II persons without distinction, both civilians and militiry, whose liberty has 
been restricted for reasons in relation to the armed conflict". 1 
Thus, it appears that the personnel field of application of the Article seems to be wide, and 
responds in a way to the needs of the internal conflicts. The commentary of the ICRC to 
Article 5 in fact, stressed that: 
"The expression 'persons whose liberty has been restricted' was chosen in preference 
to more specific words such as 'prisoners' or 'detainees' to take into account the full 
extent of the Article's scope of application, which covers all detainees and persons 
whose liberty has been rgstricted for reasons related to the conflict, without granting 
them a special status. "312 
In other words, all persons who were captured or arrested in relation to the conflict, 
although basically still considered as criminals who break the local law, would benefit from 
the humanitarian rules of the article, and there is no doubt that their number would be big, 
31ODraft Articte 8 submitted by the ICRC reads as fol. lows: 
"Article 8. Persons whose liberty has been restricted. 
1. Ali persons whose liberty has been restricted by capture or arrest for reasons in retation 
to the armed conflict shalt, whether they are Interned or detained, be treated humanely, in 
accordance with Article 6. 
2. In addition, the parties to the conflict shalt respect at least the following provisions: 
(a) The wounded and sick shalt be treated in accordance with Article 12; 
(b) The persons referred to in paragraph I shalt be accommodated in buildings safeguarded as 
regards hygiene and heat th and provided efficient protection against the rfgours of the cti mate 
and the dangers of the armed conflict. 
(c) They shalt be supplied with adequate supplies of drinking water and with food rations 
sufficient to keep them in good health. They shalt be permitted to secure or to be provided 
with adequate clothing; 
(d) Women shalt be held in quarters separated from ments quarters. They shalt be under 
immediate supervision of women. This does not apply to those cases where members of the same 
family are in the same place of Internment. 
3. The parties to the conflict shalt also respect the following provisions within the limits 
of their capabilities: 
(a) The persons referred to in paragraph I shalt be allowed to receive individual or collective 
relief; 
(b) They shalt be allowed to practice their religion and receive spiritual assistance from 
chaplains and other persons performing similar functions; 
(c) They shalt be allowed to send and receive letters and cards. The parties to the conflict 
may limit the number of such letters if they deem it necessary; 
(d) Places of interment and detention shalt not be set up close to the combat zone. The 
persons referred to in paragraph I shalt be evacuated when the places where they are detained 
or Interned become particularly exposed to dangers arising out of the armed conflict, if their 
evacuation can be carried out in adequate conditions of safety. 
4. Measures of reprisals against the persons referred to in paragraph I are prohibited. 
5. Subject to temporary and exceptional measures, the parties to the conflict shalt endeavour 
to facilitate visits to the persons referred to in paragraph I by an impartial humanitarian 
body such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. " 
lbid, pp. 205-206. 
3110P. 
cit.. supra. n. 276, MDH/I/SR. 32, para. 65, p. 336. 
312 Op. cit., supra. n. 297, p. 1364. 
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especially among civilians. 
On the substantive level, the ICRC Draft Article 8 was very ambitious. It sets two kinds 
of obligations. The first are mandatory, which needed for their implementation, some 
positive measures. The second category included what may be called 'within the capacity 
and if conditions permit' obligations. The first category included strict standards which 
must be complied with, such as providing food, water, shelter, health, hygiene, adequate 
clothing and separate places of internment for men and women. 
However, 'within the capacity and if conditions permit obligations' States are to respect 
the rights of detained and interned persons to practise their religion, to receive spiritual 
assistance from qualified persons, to correspond. Moreover, camps of detention and 
internment are not to be situated near combat zones. 
Third World countries quickly challenged the idea of imposing any kind of mandatory 
obligations. In their opinion, they are not in a position to grant a more favourable treatment 
than that for the ordinary civilian living in the country. Thus, Mexico, as an example, 
considered that the obligations Stated in the Article (Article 8/2 (b) and (c) were 
'unrealistic9 and then added: 
"... [M]ost non-international armed conflicts occurred in developing countries in which 
living conditions described in paragraph 2 would be regarded as an ideal". 314 
Nigeria was more explicit. To it, the mandatory provisions of paragraph 2 appear to be 
"incongruous in such an instrument. They seem to be higher than those obtaining for law- 
abiding citizenS". 315 Iraq and India in fact hinted that the article implied some kind of 
external supervision, which would inevitably lead to intervention in the internal affairs of 
316 States. 
313This 
wouLd be the imptication of the ICRC representative's answer to a question from the UK 
deLegate, on the exact scope of Articte S. The former (ICRC deLegate) stressed that: 
"The formuta retained (persons whose Liberty has been restricted) has been intended to cover 
aLl. persons whose Merty had been restricted: persons interned without judfciaL proceedings 
and persons awaiting triat during the whoLe period of their detention from the time of their 
arrest untit, their retease. " 
Op. cit., supra. n. 309, p. 217. 
3140p. 
cit., supra. n. 276, CDDH/I/SR. 32. para. 65, p. 336. 
315 Ibid, para. 84, p. 340. 
316 In this context, India stated that It: 
11... ECIonsidered that, though Article 8 was excellent from a humanitarian point of view, its 
provisions could not be implemented by all the forces concerned- In particular, paragraph 2 
(b) and (c) and paragraph 3 (c) and (d) could not easily be implemented and therefore 
, unrealistic. Any obligation to respect 
the provisions implied supervision. As his delegation 
had already stated, Protocol It should not become an instrument for interference in the 
internal affairs of States". 
Jbid, para. 87, p. 340. See also Iraq, fbid, CDDH/I/SR. 32. para. 90, p. 341. 
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These attacks led to the watering down of the tone of the ICRC Draft at the committee 
level. 317 Thus, the mandatory obligations of the parties in regard to detained persons were 
qualified by the phrase 'to the same extent as the local population'. In other words, the 
objections of Third World States were taken into account; hence standards of food, drinking 
water, health, hygiene and shelter were to take into account the conditions of life outside 
the camps as guidance. 
Eide criticised this attitude since in his opinion: 
"... [W]hile this sounds plausible, it may nevertheless be somewhat misleading since the 
local population, whose liberty is not restricted, has some possibilities on their own 
initiative to improve their conditions when in severe difficulty, while the detained 
or imprisoned pemle entirely rely on the conditions provided for them by the S8 3 detaining power". 
However, the ICRC commentary stresses in this respect that: 
"The obligation of the detaining power remains an absolute ne, but its content varies 
depending on the living conditions prevailing in the area " 19 
Thus, food available for the guards of the detainees should also be a criterion; in other 
words, detainees should receive as much food as those guarding them, the commentary adds. 
After the introduction of this fundamental change (the inclusion of the phrase 'to the 
same extent as the local population') it must be noted that Draft Article 8 was in fact 
strengthened by adding new obligations, both in the mandatory and 'within their possibility 
and if conditions permit' obligations. 
Thus, in the former category of obligations, States are directed to respect the working 
conditions whenever they decide to make detainees and interned persons work. In other 
words, those persons should not work in dangerous or unhealthy conditions. They should 
always benefit from the legal working conditions similar to those which apply to normal 
workers. This is very important, since the authorities may use work as a real disguise for 
humiliating or even torturing their captured enemies. 
In the latter category (within their possibility and if conditions permit) States are under 
a duty to seek to provide medical examinations for persons deprived of their liberty. The 
aim of this important provision is: 
"... [T]o ensure, generally, good medical attention in places of internment or detention; 
on the one hand, so that no one remains in a condition of distress without receiving 
care, and on the other hand, to ensure that cont! 4ious diseases are detected in time, 32 in the interests of detainees and guards alike". 
This is very important, taking into account the mental and physical State of persons 
317 For the work done by the sub-working group and working group B of the Committee, see op. cit., 
supra. n. 309, pp. 220-223. 
318A 
. Elde: The New Humanitarian 
Law in Non-Internationat Armed ConfLicts, in A. Cassese (ed. ): The 
New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conftict. Ed. Scientifica, S. r. L. NapoLi, 1979, p. 284. 
3190P. 
cit., supra. n. 297, p. 1387. 
320 ibid. p. 1391. 
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deprived of their liberty, and the State of places of detention and internment with 
overcrowding and sometimes, the absence of elementary standards of hygiene. 
Moreover, a new paragraph (3) was introduced. It concerns in fact, a special category of 
victim of internal conflicts. They are persons who are neither interned nor detained, but 
nevertheless, their liberty is restricted in connection with the conflict, such as individuals 
who are ordered to live under house arrest or under surveillance. 
Those persons, in addition to the benefits of Article 4 (the fundamental guarantees) can 
enjoy the benefits set for detained and interned persons which do not concern the material 
conditions of internment or detention, such as their right to practise their religion, to 
receive relief, to correspond and receive mail. 
However, after the introduction of these innovations, which did not appear in the ICRC 
Draft Article 8, the Article (8) was adopted by consensus by Committee 1.321 
In their explanation of votes, one delegation at least continued to view the content of the 
article as an intrusion in the sovereignty of State. 322 
In the simplified version of Protocol 11 submitted by Pakistan at the last session of the 
Diplomatic Conference, the same approach adopted by the first committee has been upheld. 
However, all references in the article to 'the parties to the conflict' or 'authority' had been 
omitted. The aim of course is very clear. It is to make it clear that the insurgents possess 
no legal status whatsoever, even if they are obliged also to carry out the obligations of the 
article. 
Furthermore, it is to be noted that the simplified version added a new paragraph, which 
was not contained either in the ICRC Draft Article 8 or Draft Article 8 adopted by the first 
committee. The new paragraph (Article 5/2 (e)) in fact, reiterates Article II (I) of the First 
323 Protocol. The paragraph sets the general principle of the protection of the physical and 
mental health of persons interned or detained in connection with the conflict, and then 
specifies the governing medical procedures which must be complied with. Thus, acts or 
omissions which may endanger the physical or mental health of persons are prohibited, 
and then implicitly medical experiments are prohibited. 
321 Op. cit., supra. n. 309, pp. 222-230. 
3221n this respect, Iraq made it ctear that: 
0... [TIhe fact that his delegation had not called for a vote on Articles 6,6 bis and 8 did 
not mean that it agreed with the principles underlying those articles or the details contained 
in them; it thought that to take a vote in a conference on humanitarian taw was incompatible 
with the humanitarian spirit, which should be one of unanimity and general goodwill". 
lbid, p. 233. 
323Article 1111 stfputates that: 
NThe physical or mental health and integrity of persons who are In the power of the adverse 
party or who are interned, detained or otherwise deprived of liberty as a result of a situation 
referred to in Article I shall not be endangered by any unjustified act or omission. 
Accordingly, it is prohibited to subject the persons described in this article to any medical 
procedure which is not indicated by the State of health of the person concerned and which is 
not consistent with generally accepted medical standards which would be applied under similar 
medical circumstances to persons who are nationals of the party conducting the procedure and who are in no way deprived of Liberty". 
lbid, p. 149. 
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The article then was adopted by consensus and became Article 5 in the final version of 
Protocol 11.324 
The main conclusions to be drawn from the history and actual wording of Article 5 are 
in my opinion as follows: 
1. There is no doubt that it is a very important Article, because of the mere fact that it 
deals with the most hated category of the victims of the internal wars; captured insurgents 
and their allies among the civilian population. This is in itself an innovation, since common 
Article 3, as we have been, nearly totally ignores the plight of those victims. 
However, it must be stressed that the article did not go as far as giving POW status to 
detained and interned persons. The reason is very clear. Sovereignty, as the travaux 
prkparatolres show, was used systematically to eliminate any such prospect, but the article 
which in fact supplements Article 4 (fundamental guarantees) (the latter as we have seen 
contains general prohibitions) contains concrete measures, which would if complied with 
make the life of those interned or detained less harsh and more humane. 
2. To me, the basic idea behind the article is the protection of the fundamental human 
right, namely the right to life. This right cannot be sustained in reality, in detention and 
internment places, if concrete measures are not taken concerning food, water, medical care, 
hygiene and shelter. They are in fact, the ingredients of the right to life, especially in the 
Third World, where all of the civil wars are taking place. 
3. Article 5 is an attempt, in my view, (from the moral and legal point of view), to prove 
that the claim that in civil wars all methods and means are permissible to finish off the 
enemy, is not accepted, at least on the normative level, in the age of human rights. Article 
5 in fact limits the conduct of the warring factions vis-i-vis this important category of 
victims of war, which means implicitly that the discretion of Governments has been 
curtailed to a significant degree in this sphere. 
4. It is also interesting to n. that in the travaux prkparatolres no State has claimed, at least 
publicly, that insurgents and their allies among the civilian population who are detained or 
interned need no protection, because of the sole fact of disobeying their State's laws. In 
fact, even sovereignty- oriented delegations conceded that humanitarian rules were needed. 
However, they were only against giving the insurgents any legal status or higher protection 
than that given to civilian population. In this sphere then the concept of human rights, as 
a limitation of State sovereignty, was upheld and confirmed. 
4.2. Article 6 of Protocol II (Penal Prosecutions) 
Article 6 of Protocol 11 provides: 
"I. This Article applies to the prosecution and punishment of criminal offences 
related to the armed conflict. 
2. No sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed on a person found 
guilty of an offence except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a court offering 
the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality In particular: 
(a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay of the 
particulars of the offence alleged against him and shall afford the accused before and 
324 lbid, pp. 240-241. 
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during his trial all necessary rights and means of defence; 
(b) no-one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual penal 
responsibility; 
(c) no-one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under the law, at the time when 
it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was 
applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the 
commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter 
penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby; 
(d) anyone charged with the offence is presumed innocent until proven guilty 
according to law; 
(e) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his presence; 
(f) no-one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. 
3. A convicted person shall be advised on conviction of his judicial and other 
remedies and of the time-limit within which they may be exercised. 
4. The death penalty shall not be pronounced on persons who are under the age of 
eighteen at the time of the offence and shall not be carried out on pregnant women 
or mothers of young children. 
5. At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the 
broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or 
those deprived of ýheir liberty for reasons related to the conflict whether they are interned or not. "32 
In fact, this Article embodies the essentials of the penal policy which the parties to the 
conflict must respect and apply to criminal offences committed in relation to the armed 
conflict. It contains both procedural and substantive rules which the parties must comply 
with. The influence of human rights is by no means absent, especially of the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights of 1966. 
However, it must be emphasised that the Article is based on the assumption that the right 
of the established Government to prosecute, try and convict persons who committed crimes 
in connection with the armed conflict was upheld and left intact. In this particular and 
important sphere, it is not different from Article 3. it continued in fact the same tradition, 
hence sovereignty still holds the day. 
On the other hand, Article 6 must be seen as going further in its protection of persons 
who committed criminal offences in connection with the conflict than Article 3. In fact 
Article 6 supplements and develops Article 3, paragraph 2, sub-pararagraph I (d), which 
prohibits: 
*The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions, without previous 
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial 
guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by civilized peoples. " 
Ratione personae, the Article is "quite open and applies equally to civilians and combatants 
who have fallen in the power of the adverse party and who may be subject to penal 
"326 prosecution. The importance of the Article, it must be indicated, springs from the fact 
that in most cases national laws in emergency cases are very harsh, if not totally inhuman 




towards those who struggle against the established Governments, be they military or 
civilian. 
The most common sentence imposed on them is the death penalty. Also the tribunals 
which deliver such sentences (if they exist) are military tribunals which are composed 
generally in a way which does not guarantee any chance of fair trial, and contains no 
element of independence and impartiality. 
4.2.1. The Red Cross Experts' Opinion 
It must be noted from the start that the ideas contained in this important Article had been 
the subject of heated discussions from the beginning of the ICRC's attempt to codify rules 
for non- international conflicts. 
In this context, and at the very beginning, the ICRC suggested to the Red Cross Experts 
that it intended to extend three main substantive rules on the question of penal prosecution 
of offences related to the internal conflicts, namely: 
1. Immunity to be granted for the sole fact of having taken part in hostilities. 
2. Deferment, during hostilities, of the execution of any death penalty. 
3. General amnesty at the end of hostilities. 327 
These general rules were to be applied to combatants who did not commit grave breaches 
of the laws of war, that is combatants who conduct their operations in accordance with the 
governing rules of humanitarian law, criminals who breached those rules have to be 
provided with necessary judicial guarantees. 
The Red Cross Experts in general seem to be reluctant to endorse the ICRC suggestions. 
They pointed out the difficulties inherent in their application, especially in the first period 
of the conflict, where the established Government would be inclined to take energetic steps 
to stop attacks upon its authority and existence. They stressed that the most that can be 
done in those circumstances is to try to get the consent of the established Government to 
introduce in their penal laws provisions which stipulate that the mere fact of participation 
in the conflict would not be punished by death. 
However, concerning the question of granting amnesty at the end of the hostilities, they 
pointed out that this prerogative belongs to the established Government, which can accord 
it as it sees fit. 328 
Thus, the Red Cross Experts seem to pay strong attention to the attitude of the 
established Governments in regard to the introduction of new rules which are to be applied 
essentially to those who carry arms against it, and those who support them. implicit in their 
argument is that Governments are not likely to accept easily such far-reaching limitations 
upon their discretionary power, hence their sovereignty to punish their enemies according 
to their laws. 
4.2.2. The Governments' Experts' View 
3270P. 
cit., supra. n. 100, pp. 56-59. 
328 Ibid. 
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At the CGEDHL in 1972, the ICRC submitted in fact two Articles (27 and 2S). 329 The first 
one contains of the generally accepted principles of penal law, namely, individual 
responsibility, and thus prohibits collective penalties. The second Article, however, deals 
specifically with the prosecution of combatants. Its essential aim was the prohibition of the 
death penalty for the sole fact of taking arms against the Government, by combatants who 
generally satisfy the conditions of Article 4/A (2) of the third Geneva Convention. 
Draft Article 28 thus, touches a very sensitive point, namely the right of legal 
Governments to impose the death penalty on those who defy its laws and resort to force in 
order to topple it. Hence, the Article was the subject of a heated discussion, which in fact, 
reveals that the concept of sovereignty has been used extensively by some Experts to retain 
the right of the Government to use the death penalty against captured insurgents. 
In this context, some Experts simply proposed the deletion of the Article, the reason 
being that it 'concerns a matter falling within the domestic jurisdiction of the State'. 330 
Another Expert doubted: 
"... [W]hether a State would agree, in accordance with the terms of the protocol to be 
drawn up.. 1 
to grant such immunity to its nationals in the event of an armed 
conflict. "" 
Moreover, it was pointed out that no Government would decide to comply with the protocol 
by introducing changes in its own legislation when it was caught up in a civil war. The 
332 death penalty would be used as a means of repression. 
However, the majority of Experts seem to favour some form of restricting the power of 
established Governments, to use the death penalty against persons for the sole fact of taking 
up arms against it. Thus, the Experts proposed the addition of many important rules 
concerning penal prosecution. They suggested in fact, that the following rules must be 
respected by authorities: 
"I. No sentence shall be passed or execution carried out against a person who has 
committed an offence related to the conflict without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording [all] the judicial guarantees which are 
329Articte 27 reads as fotLows: 
"No person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personatty coninitted. Cottective 
penattles are prohibited. " 
On the other hand, Article 28, which Is entitled "Penal prosecution against combatants", stipulates: 
"After having faLLen into the power of the adversary, combatants who wHl have fuLfiLLed the 
conditions stipuLated in ArticLe 25 of the present protocoL, as weLL as those combatants who, 
without having fuLfiLLed the conditions stfputated inArticLe 4A (2) of the Geneva Convention 
retative to the treatment of POW of August 12,1949, witL have, at teast in the course of their 
operations, distinguished themseLves from the civ! Lian popuLation by some distinctive sign or 
by any other means and who have compLied with the provisions of the present protocoL, shaLL 
not be punished by death if they become the object of penat prosecutions onLy by reason of 
having taken part in hostiLltles or having been members of armed forces. " 
Op. cit., supra. n. 269, pp-83-84. 
3301bid, 
para. 2.210, p. 84. (This was the view of the Experts of Romania). 
331 Jbid, para. 2.111, p. 84- 
3321bid, 
para. 2.223, p. 86- 
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generally recognised [as indispensable] by the principal legal systems of the world. 
2. A person convicted of such an offence shall be entitled, in accordance with the 
laws in force, to avail himself of the right of appeal or petition from any sentence 
pronounced upon him. He shall be fully informed of his right of appeal or petition. 
3. At the conclusion of the hostilities, the parties to the conflict should endeavour to 
grant amnesty to as many as possible of those who have participated in the conflict 
or have been convicted of offences or deprived of liberty in connection with the 
conflict. 
4. War crimes are prohibited. Penalties for war crimes shall be imposed and carried 
out in accordance with the conflict. 
5. No execution shall take place in public. "333 
These rules, although they did not rule out the Tight of the legal Government to resort to 
the use of the death penalty, establish general standards of fair trial. Hence, they restrict 
the discretionary power of established Governments in suspending or abolishing those 
fundamental standards. Thus, the Experts in fact, tried to find a balance between the 
demands of sovereignty and those of humanity. 
4.2.3. The Diplomatic Conference Attitude 
At the Diplomatic Conference, the ICRC submitted two Draft Articles (9 and 10)134 which 
were largely based upon the Governments' Experts suggestions. The former dealt with the 
general principles of penal law, and the latter dealt with some procedural penal points. No 
mention of the word 'combatant' was used. These Articles were to be applied to persons 
who have committed offences related to the armed conflict. They were designed in fact, to 
333 lbid, p. 87. 
334 Article 9, entitled "Principles of Penal Law" stipulates: 
111. No one may be punished for an offence which he or she has not personally committed; 
collective penalties are prohibited. 
2. No-one may be punished on account of any act or emission contrary to a duty to act which 
was not an offence at the time when it was committed. 
3. No-one shall be liable to be prosecuted or punished for an offence for which he has already finally been acquitted or convicted. 
4. No-one shalt be held guilty of an offence except under those provisions of taw which were in force at the time when the offence was committed. 
5. Everyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty according to taw". 
On the other hand, Article 10 entitled "Penal. prosecution" reads as follows: 
111. No sentence shalt be passed or penalty inflicted upon a person found guilty of an offence 
In relation to the armed conflict without previous judgment pronounced by a court offering the 
guarantees of independence and impartiality which are generally recognised as essential, in 
accordance with a procedure affording the accused the necessary rights and means of defence. 
2. Everyone shall have the right of appeal against any sentence pronounced upon him. He shall 
be fully informed of his right to appeal and of the time Limit within which he may do so. 
3. The death penalty pronounced on any person found guilty of an offence in relation to the 
armed conflict shalt not be carried out until the hostilities have ceased. 
4. The death penalty shall not be pronounced for an offence in relation to the armed conflict 
committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shalt not be carried out on pregnant 
women. 
5. In case of prosecutions carried out against a person only by reason of his having taken part 
In hostilities, the court, when deciding upon the sentence, shall take into account, to the 
greatest possible extent, the fact that the accused respected the provision of the present 
protocol. 
6. At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shalt endeavour to grant amnesty to as 
many as possible of those who have participated in the armed conflict, in particular those 
whose liberty has been restricted for reasons In relation to the armed conflict, whether they 
are Interned or detained. " 
OP- Cit., supra. n. 309, pp. 245-46. 
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limit excess in the trial prosecution and conviction of captured insurgents and civilians who 
support them. 
In the discussions which followed, many States especially from the Third World, attacked 
the Articles by using the arguments of sovereignty and non- intervention. It was argued that 
the penal rules contained in Article 9 of the ICRC Draft Protocol 11 have no place in that 
protocol, since they exist in all legal systems of the world, hence their inclusion in Protocol 
II is superflUOUS. 335 
Concerning the question of the death penalty, which in fact was prohibited in two cases 
only according to Draft Article 10, namely, offenders under the age of 18 and pregnant 
women, and despite the ICRC delegate assurance that "with those two exceptions, Article 
10 left intact the right of the authorities to pronounce the death penalty in accordance with 
national law", 336 some Third World countries were not content. Thus, the Indian delegate 
stressed that Draft Article 10: 
"... [W]ould be in conflict with his country's national I w, and that its provisions 
constitute interference in the sovereign right of States. "137 
Thus, the precedence of national law over international law is advocated in order to protect 
the sovereignty of the State. 
Similarly, Pakistan after noting that each country had its own criminal laws, stressed that 
any attempt to impose principles which differed from those followed by national laws 
would be pointless in his country. He emphasised that: 
"... [I]nsurgents would be executed, and any attempt to impose international legislation ... would in his opinion constitute interference with the sovereign right of "338 States. 
Thus, some States resist any attempt to codify, in an international instrument, even some 
general principles of penal law accepted by all States in their national laws. The reason is 
clear, they wish to be free to deal with their enemy. 
However, at the committee level, the two Articles (9 and 10) were merged into one 
Article (Article 10). It was adopted by the First Committee after lengthy Drafting 
335 
In this context, Iraq argued that: 
"Article 9 was of such a general nature that it was out of place In Draft Protocol 11; no 
mention was made in it either of armed conflicts or of victims. The rules of penal taw 
enunciated therein could be found in the general practice of penal taw as well as in certain 
international conventions relating to human rights; which could be applied to everyone and in 
all circumstances". 
OP. cit., supra. n. 276, CDDH/I/SR. 33, para. 51, p. 351. Indonesia also stressed that Article 9 had a 
very general scope and contained provisions already existing in the penal legislation throughout the 
world. For that reason he considered It inopportune for the Article to appear in protocol 11, which had a welt-defined objective. lbid, para. 68, p. 354. 
336 
lbid, para. 4, p. 357. 
337 
lbid, para. 13, p. 359. 
338 
lbid, para. 17, p-360. 
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changeS. 339 The new Article340 can be seen in fact as more elaborate than that of the ICRC. 
Thus, in addition to what the ICRC submitted, other rights were included, and which all 
go in the direction of strengthening the right to fair trial. Among the rights are the 
following: 
1. The accused must be informed without delay of the particulars of the offence against 
him. 
2. The accused must have the right to defence before and during his trial. 
3. No heavier penalty should be imposed on the accused, other than the one that was 
applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. However, when lighter penalties 
are subsequently imposed on the same offence, the accused should benefit from it. 
4. The accused has the right to be tried in his presence. 
5. No-one can be obliged to testify against himself or to confess guilt. 
6. Persons charged and sentenced for criminal offences in relation to the armed conflict 
shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the death sentence. 
Thus, it seems that at the committee level, despite the misgivings of a handful of Third 
World States, the majority supported the strengthening of the Article. Part of the answer 
lies in the fact that most of these rights were already included in other international 
agreements, especially human rights instruments. 
But, at the final session of the Diplomatic Conference, Pakistan proposed in its simplified 
339For a detalied version, see op. cit., supra. n. 309, pp. 246-292. 
340New ArtfcLe 10, adopted at the committee tevet. (First Committee), stipuLates: 
"I. This Article applies to the prosecution and punishment of criminal offences relating to 
the armed conflicts. 
2. No sentence shalt be passed or penalty executed on a person found guilty of an offence 
except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a tribunal offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality. In particular: 
(a) The procedure shalt provide for an accused to be Informed without delay of the particulars 
of the offence alleged against him and should afford the accused before and during his trial 
all necessary rights and means of defence; 
(b) no-one shalt be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual penat 
responsibility; 
(c) no-one shalt be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international taw at the time when It 
was committed; nor shalt a heavier penalty be Imposed than the one that was applicable at the 
time when the criminal offence was committed. If subsequent to the commission of the offence 
provision is made by taw for the imposition of a tighter penalty, the offender shalt benefit 
thereby; 
(d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty according to taw; 
(e) anyone charged with an offence shalt have the right to be tried in his presence; 
(f) no-one shalt be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. 
3. A convicted person shalt be advised on conviction of his judicial and other remedies and 
of time limits within which they may be exercised. 
4. The death penalty shalt not be pronounced on persons below 18 years of age at the time of 
the offence and shalt not be carried out on pregnant women and mothers of young children. 
5. In case of prosecutions carried out against a person only by his having taken part in 
hostilities. the court, when deciding upon the sentence, shat, t take Into consideration, to the 
greatest possible extent, the fact that the accused respected the provisions of the present 
protocol. in such a case the death penalty shal. I not be carried out unti t the armed conf I Ict. 
6. Anyone sentenced shalt have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence of death 
in all cases. 
7. At the end of hostilities the authorities in power shalt endeavour to grant amnesty to as 
many as possible of those who have partf cf pated in the armed conf I Ict, or those whose t iberty 
has been restricted for reasons in relation to the armed conflict, whether they are interned 
or detained. " 
OP. cit., supra. n. 274, CDDH/234/Rev. 1, para. 95, pp. 131-33. 
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version of Protocol 11 the deletion of paragraphs 5.6 and 7 of Draft Article 10 as adopted 
at the committee level. All these three paragraphs, it must be noted, deal in one way or 
another with the question of the death penalty and therefore directly relate to the fate of 
captured insurgents. 
Nevertheless, only paragraph 7 has been retained, which means that in practice 
Governments can sentence to death their enemies and swiftly carry out the execution, 
without having to wait u, ntil the end of hostilities. The aim here is very clear. Governments 
want to give an example to all those who may wish to disobey its laws. It is a way of 
breaking the will of an adversary by resorting to the harshest sentence - death. Also the 
implication of paragraph 6 (the right to seek, after the sentence of the death penalty, 
commutation or pardon) means that the Government wants to signal to its enemies that they 
have no hope of pardon or mercy. 
It must be stressed that even after the deletion of paragraphs 5 and 6, some States 
especially from the Third World, continued their attacks upon the Article. Thus, on one 
hand, Kenya thought that the Article is -'superfluoUS'. 
341 On the other hand, Nigeria 
emphasised that 'this kind of provision constitutes interference with the internal systems 
obtaining in States, 342 and then added that the Article as adopted: 
"... [V]eers dangerously towards imposing a kind of new criminal procedure for ýJajes 
parties thereto, which to us represents a dangerous trend in international law". 4 
It then warned: 
"This trend, if not arrested in time, will escalate and pad Ihis protocol to such an 
extent that many States would find it difficult to ratify it. " 44 
Zaire went even further. In explaining its vote against the retention of paragraph 7 of Draft 
Article 10 (which became paragraph 5 of Article 6 of the final version of Protocol 11, the 
paragraph concerns clemency and amnesty), it considered the obligation contained in the 
paragraph as a mere recommendation devoid of any mandatory force. It expressly stated: 
"... [I]t is in no way a binding obligation, nor even a simple obligation in the technical 
sense; that is, a legal bound requiring any sovereign State to amnesty, no matter how 
under pressure certain forces involvZd, persons who have done their country serious 
"3 5 harm by serving foreign interests. 
3410P. 





345 Ibid. Similarty, Spain, in exptaining Its vote against the retention of paragraph 7 of Articte 10 
stated: 
USuch measures (of ctemency and amnesty] fatt within the exctusive competence of States, which 
bearing atways; in mind the common good of the community they govern, can atone decide whether 
or not an amnesty or conducive to the restoration of pubtic peace. " 
Ibid, p. 103. 
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However, despite these misgivings, which it must be confessed may explain the non- 
ratification of Protocol 11 (in October 1989, the number of States which ratified Protocol 
11 stands at 78346) by a significant number of States. It seems that the majority were in 
favour of what has been accepted in Draft Article 10, which became in the final version 
of Protocol Il Article 6 (cited above). 
I believe that the adoption of Article 6 is a very important step towards the protection 
of one important category of the victims of internal wars. Their number is very high, since 
it does not only include captured insurgents but also large numbers of civilians who may 
assist them in different contexts and situations. 
The importance of the Article also springs from the fact that as a first step in combatting 
insurgents and their allies among the civilian population, States resort to the suspension of 
the constitution and the declaration of emergency or State of seige, hence suspending all 
standards and rules of fair trial. 
The Article makes it clear at least implicitly, that no suspension of the general penal rules 
are possible in the event of civil wars governed by Protocol 11. This is the effect of Article 
6/2. Then, no derogation from the components of a fair trial is possible. 
The influence of human rights is by no means absent in this context. The ICRC 
commentary of the two protocols stresses: 
"Article 6 reiterates the principles contained in the third and fourth conventions 
[Articles 86,89-108 of the former and Articles 64-78 of the latter] and for the rest 
it is largely based on the international covenant on political and civil rights, 
particularly Article 15, from which no derogation is B) 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation. " 4vmitted, 
even in the case of 
The list of rights which the Government cannot suspend, or derogate from, in Article 6 is 
very wide indeed, and compared to Article 3 is a real development of humanitarian law in 
cases of internal conflicts, the list of these rights include: 
1. Right to fair trial in general (Article 6/2). 
2. Right to information (Article 6/2 (a)) (about the particulars of the offence, of which the 
accused is to be tried). 
3. The right to defence (Article 6/2 (a)). 
4. The principle of individual responsibility (Article 6/2 (b)). 
5. The principle of non-retroactivity (Article 6/2 (c)). 
6. The principle of presumption of innocence (Article 6/2 (d)). 
7. The right of the accused to be present at his own trial (Article 6/2 (e)). 
8. The right not to be compelled to testify against oneself or to confess guilt (Article 6/2 
(0). 
9. The right to be informed of judicial remedies and of the time limits in which they must 
be exercised (Article 6/3). 
10. The right of persons aged under 18, and pregnant women, not to be sentenced to the 
death penalty (in fact, it is prohibited to do so) (Article 6/4). 
346 IRRC, 1989,29th year, No. 272, p. 490. 
347 Op. cit., supra. n. 297, p. 1397. 
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These are the essential guarantees for the protection of the right to fair trial, and there 
is no doubt that if adhered to much suffering and cruelties, which are very common in 
internal conflicts, would disappear. 
However, some authors argue that despite the importance of the provisions of Article 6 
they are not wholly satisfactory. Eide stressed that Article 6 contained 'no further provisions 
as to the way in which the impartiality is to be safeguarded'. 348 He maintained that during 
internal armed conflicts, military tribunals take the place of civilian tribunals. This state 
of affairs, coupled with the control of political power by usually a military regime, makes 
'these tribunals easily degenerate into a mechanism for the arbitrary maintenance of 
political controlv. 349 
Despite these criticisms, which seem to be too general, Article 6 in my opinion, when 
coupled with similar provisions of non-derogable rights in Articles 14 and 15 of the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, establishes a desirable system of the protection of 
due process and human rights in general in internal conflicts. Consequently, it contributes 
to the safeguard of the fundamental rule of right to life, which is not only threatened by 
killings and massacres in the field of combat, but especially through lack of respect for the 
due process of law and fair trial. 
For all this, it seems to me, to be correct to indicate that Article 6 constitutes a real 
derogation from State sovereignty. In the last analysis, it curtails to a great extent the 
discretionary power of established Governments, which is greatly used in cases of state of 
emergency to suspend and even abolish any prospect of fair trial. 
4.2.4. Conclusions concerning the Evaluation of Article 6 
1. It is postulated that the influence of the idea of human rights is clearly present, especially 
in Article 6. Some of its provisions were taken nearly verbally from Articles 14 and 15 of 
the Covenant on Civil and Political RightS. 350 In fact, even at the Diplomatic Conference 
some States linked the contents of the present Article 6 to the law of human rightS. 351 
This, in my view, seems to explain in part at least, the acceptance of States of the 
important rules of Article 6, since if they were adhered to in one international instrument, 
there is basically no reason why they should not accept them in another such instrument. 
3480P. 
cit.. supra. 318, p. 285. 
3491bid. 
3501n this respect, it is indicated that: Article 6/2 (a) corresponds to Article 14/3 (a) and 14/3 
(b)(d); Article 6/2 (b) corresponds to Article 14/3 and 14/3 (b)(d); Article 6/2 (c) corresponds to 
Article 15/1; Article 6/2 (d) corresponds to Article 14/2; Article 6/2 (e) corresponds to Article 14/3 
(d); Article 6/2 (f) corresponds to Article 14/3 (g). Cited by Bothe et at., op. cit., supra. n. 281, 
p. 651. 
3511n this context, Belgium indicated during the discussion of Draft Articles 9 and 10 that the 
principles contained in them 'fall in the realm of international taw and human rights', op. cit., 
supra. n. 276, CDDH/I/SR. 33, para. 41, p. 350. Similarly, some delegations referred to the Covenant in 
order to take from it the correct wording. Thus, East Germany for instance explained the aim of its 
amendment (CDDH/I/89) to Draft Article 9 as: 
... Mo harmonise that text (Article 9/2 of the ICRC Draft Protocol III with Article 15 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rightsel. 
lbid,, para. 38, p. 349. 
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2. Moreover. it seems fair to state that humanitarian law has been extended and 
strengthened to an area which was barely regulated, since Article 3 of the Geneva 
Convention purports only the general principle that it is prohibited to pass sentences and 
carry out execution without a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted 
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by 
civilised peoples. The generality of the provision constituted the main weakness in Article 
3. Furthermore, in Article 6 the details of fair trial are well put and clear. Meron rightly 
noted that: 
"These provisions of common Article 3 have been greatly strengthened by those of 
Article 6 of Protocol 11. "352 
3. However, it must be conceded that the argument of sovereignty and non- intervention 
still holds the balance, since captured combatants and civilians tried for offences related to 
the armed conflict have no POW status. They are still considered as common criminals, tried 
for the simple fact of taking up arms against the established Government. 
Besides, the travaux prkparatolres establish that the limitation of State sovereignty in the 
context of Article 6 is that these 'criminals' are not to be tried and sentenced according to 
what the Government want, but in accordance with some general rules and some specific 
TUIes and measUTes fTOM which no derogation is possible. 
The mere codification of these general principles, and these specific rules in an 
international instrument is by itself an important intrusion into State sovereignty. 
D. The Protection of the Civilian Population In Protocol 11 
The protection of the civilian population from the sufferings and cruelties of internal wars 
has become a matter of urgence, since they are the main victims of internal wars. Their 
protection was, it must be emphasised, an essential aim of the Protocol Il from the start. 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as it has been shown in section 11 of this 
chapter, was not enough. It left many loopholes in the protection of the civilian population 
from the cruelties of internal conflicts. 
The fourth Geneva Convention which deals specifically with the protection of civilians, 
was based on concepts which are not present by any means in internal conflicts. 
Thus, at the Conference of Red Cross Experts, the majority expressed their doubts as to 
the feasibility of the application of the fourth Geneva Convention. Their argument was that: 
"The Fourth Convention is based on concepts of sovereignty, nationality and 
occupation, and these concepts are not consistent with the nature of non- international 
armed conflicts. *353 
Despite this fundamental reservation, the Experts felt that they: 
352 Op. cit., supra. n. 249, p. 22. 
353 Op. cft., supra. n. 100, p. 69. 
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"... [D]esired to find restated in an additional protocsl all the provisions which could 
logically be applied in non- international conflicts. " 54 
Thus, implicitly the Experts argued for the extension of humanitarian rules concerning the 
protection of civilians, which do not conflict with the concept of sovereignty of the State. 
At the second CGEDHL, the ICRC submitted four Draft Articles dealing with the 
civilian population (Articles 14-17 ). 355 
In general, it tried to establish in the sphere of civil war the fundamental distinction 
between combatants and non-combatants. It gave a very broad definition which in fact 
perfectly responds to the needs of internal conflicts. It proposed that the presence of 
354 Ibid. 
355Thus, Draft ArticLe 14: "Definition of the CivMan PopuLation" reads as folLows: 
"I. Any person who is not a member of the armed forces and who, moreover, does not take a 
direct part in hostilities Is considered to be a civilian. 
2. The civilian population is composed of all civilians fulfilling the conditions in paragraph 
1. 
3. Proposal 1: The presence, within the civilian population, of individuals who do not conform 
to the definition given in paragraph 1, does not prevent the civilian population from being 
considered as such. 
Proposal 11; The presence, within the civilian population of individual combatants does not 
prevent the civilian population from being considered as such. " 
op. cit., supra. 269, p. 113. Draft Article 15 entitled "Respect for and Safeguarding of the Civilian 
Population" stipulates: 
111. The civilian population as such, as welt as individual civilians, shalt never be made the 
object of attack. 
2. in particular, terrorisation attacks shalt be prohibited. 
3. Attacks which by their nature are Launched against civilians and miLItary objectives 
indiscriminately, shalt be prohibited. NevertheLess, civilians who are within a military 
objective run the risks consequent upon any attack Launched against this objective. 
4. The civilian population or individual civilians shalt never be used in an attempt to shield, 
by their presence, military objectives from attack. " 
Ibid, p. 114. Draft Article 16 entitled "Respect for and Safeguarding of Objects IndispensabLe to the 
Survival of the Civilian Populations' reads as follows: 
"Proposal 1: 
1. Objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population shall not be the object 
of attack. 
2. The parties to the conflict under whose control objects indispensable to the survival of 
the civilian population are placed, shatL refrain from: 
Ca) using them in an attempt to shield military objectives from attack; 
Cb) destroying them, except in cases of unavoidable military necessity and only for such time as 
that necessity remains. 
ProposaL II: 
1. objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population shaLL not be the object 
of attack. 
2. The parties to the conflict under whose control objects indispensable to the survival of 
the civilian population are placed shall, refrain from destroying them or using them in an 
attempt to shield military objectives from attack. U 
lbid, p. 115. Lastty, Draft Articie 17 entitted "Precautions when Attacking" stipuLates: 
"So that the civilian population, as welt as objects Indispensable to Its survival who might 
be in proximity to a military objective be spared, those who order or launch an attack shall, 
when planning and carrying out the attack, take the following precautions: 
(a) They shatt ensure that the objectives to be attacked are not civilians, nor objects of a 
civilian character, but are identified as military objectives; if this precaution cannot be 
taken, they shalt refrain from launching the attack. 
(b) They shatt warn, whenever circumstances permit, and sufficiently in advance, the civilians 
threatened, so that the tatter may take shelter". 
lbid, p. 117. 
295 
individual combatants within the civilian population, does not prevent the latter from being 
considered as civilian. Articles 15,16 and 17 introduced, for the first time, some 
fundamental rules of jus In bello to the arena of internal conflicts. 
The discussions which took place at the CGEDHL revealed that there was some 
difference of opinion as to the feasibility of defining the civilian population. Some Experts 
felt the necessity and importance of such definitions, and stressed that the distinction 
between civilians and combatants must be kept, whatever the nature of the conflict internal 
or international. 
Others felt that because of the nature of internal conflict, combatants and non- 
combatants are involved, either as full or part-time combatants. Hence, any attempt to 
356 uphold the distinction is unrealistic. The practice in their view is very vague. 
On other issues concerning the protection of civilians, the general picture of the debates 
of the Governments' Experts shows that the latter did not challenge the position of the 
ICRC, in the introduction of the main principles of The Hague law to internal conflicts, 
since the rules suggested would in practice tend to make internal conflicts more humane. 
At the Diplomatic Conference, the ICRC submitted a complete 6 ArticleS357 which 
356See 
op. cit., ibid, p. 113 for the details of the discussions. 
35 TDraft Article 24 submitted by the ICRC to the Diplomatic Conference which is entitled "Basic 
Rules", stipulates: 
"I. In order to ensure respect for the civilian population, the parties to the conflict shall 
confine their operations to the destruction or weakening of the military resources of the 
adversary and shall make a distinction between the civilian population and combatants, and 
between civilian objects and military objectives. 
2. Constant care shall be taken, when conducting military operations, to spare the civilian 
population and civilian objects. These rules shatt. in particular, apply to the planning, 
deciding or launching of an attack". 
Draft Articte 25 entitted "Definition", reads: 
01. Any person who is not a member of armed forces is considered to be a civilian. 
2. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians. 
3. The presence, within the civilian population, of individuals who do not fait within the 
definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character. H 
Draft Articte 26 entitted I'Protection of the Civitian Poputation", reads as foLtows: 
01. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be made the 
object of attack. in particular, methods intended to spread terror among the civilian 
population are prohibited. 
2. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Article unless and for such time as 
they take a direct part in hostilities. 
3. The employment of means of combat, and any methods which strike or affect indiscriminately 
the civilian population and combatants, or civilian objects and military objectives, are 
prohibited. in particular, it is forbidden: 
(a) to attack without distinction, as one single objective, by bombardment or any other method, a 
zone containing several military objectives, which are situated in populated areas and are at some 
distance from each other; 
(b) to Launch attacks which may be expected to entail incidentat tosses among the civilian 
population and cause the destruction of civilian objects to an extent disproportionate to the direct 
and substantial military advantage anticipated. 
4. Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited. 
5. The parties to the conflict shail. not use the civilian population or civilians in attempts 
to shield military objectives from attacks. " 
Draft Article 27 entitled "Protection of Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian 
Population", reads as follows: 
Nlt is forbidden to attack, destroy or render usetess objects indispensabte to the survivat 
of the civiLian poputation, namety foodstuffs and food-producing areas, crops, Livestock, 
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regulate the protection of the civilian population. The ICRC tackled the question of the 
protection of the civilian population by introducing detailed rules which would restrict the 
right of the belligerents to choose the means and methods of combat. 
However, it seems that this approach was not favoured by the majority of States, for 
different reasons. For some States, the detailed regulation would limit the freedom of the 
Government in dealing with its enemies. To other States, the ICRC approach brings a 
detailed regulation to a domaine where it seems only simple rules would suffice. 
In general, it appears, as Rosemary Abi-Saab rightly observes: 
"Les discussions en commissions des Articles du projet du CIRC concernant la 
protection de la populaton civile, ont mis A nouveau en dvidence, et cela de faqon 
particuliýrement nette, le clivage entre les d6fensseurs des principes d'une protection 
humanitaire essentielle, et les ardents d6fenseurs du principe de la souverainetd 
"358 6tatique . 
It must also be pointed out that before the official opening of the Diplomatic Conference, 
the US Deputy Legal Adviser of the State Department, Mr. G. H. Aldrich, attacked the 
philosophy behind the ICRC proposals on the protection of the civilian population in 
general. He stated: 
"... [These] proposals for revolutionary change which would require a fundamental 
reordering of national security. However desirable they may be, I submit that they 
demand more than lawyers and diplomats who attend the conference to supplement 
the Geneva Conventions can be expected to produce, and we must see them as longer 
"359 range objectives. 
He thought that improvement in civilian protection can be achieved by concentrating on 
'proposals that are more limited. 360 He gave, as example, the devising of rules that would 
drinking water suppLies and irrigation works, whether it Is to starve out civitfans, to cause 
them to move away or for any other reason. " 
Draft ArtlcLe 28, entitted "Protection of Works and InstaLtations Containing Dangerous Forces", reads 
as fol. Lows: 
"I. It is forbidden to attack or destroy works or installations containing dangerous forces, 
namely, dams, dykes and nuclear generating stations, whenever their destruction or damage would 
cause grave Losses among the civilian population. 
2. The parties to the conflict shall endeavour to avoid Locating any military objectives In 
the immediate vicinity of the objects mentioned In paragraph 1.0 
Draft Article 29, entitled I'Prohibition of Forced Movement of Civilians" reads as follows: 
mi. The displacement of the civilian population shatt not be ordered unless the security of 
the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. ShouLd the parties to the 
conflict undertake such displacements, they shaL I take at L poss I bte measures In order that the 
civilian population be received under satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and 
nutrition. 
2. Civilians shatt not be competted to leave their own national territory. " 
Op. cit., supra. n. 273, pp. 40-41. 
3580p. 
cit., supra. n. 103, p. 177. 
359A. W. Rovine: Digest of United States Practice in International, Law. (1973), Dept. of State, Washington, D. C., p. 504. 
3601bid. 
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promote care by the armed forces in avoiding unnecessary injury to civilians, protect their 
property and to make safety zones a workable concept in the real world. 
He believed that prohibiting attacks on hydroelectric dams and power stations was 
'unrealistic'. He also specified the prohibition of starvation as a method of warfare as 
desirable. Nevertheless, he defended the crop destruction practised by the US in Vietnam. 
It was justified and legal, since 'the evidence was strong that the crops were intended for 
enemy troopS., 361 
It must be noted here that the American position was not confined to the protection of 
civilians in internal wars. It was in fact, a general statement which covered the protection 
of civilians whatever the character of the conflict. 
What is clear from the statement, however, is that the US wanted in advance to declare 
that it was not ready to accept any substantial limitation on the use of some weapons whose 
legality is doubtful, and that this question was not part of the business of the Diplomatic 
Conference on humanitarian law. 
It seems that the Soviet Union held virtually the same position, at least concerning 
internal wars. In this context, it stressed that: 
"There were differences between international and internal conflicts With regard to 
the latter it was essential to make rules that everyone could accept. " 62 
Canada in a way explained what the Soviet Union and the majority of States would accept. 
It stated that: 
"It was important that Draft Protocol II should embody rules that were practical. It 
could already be foreseen that some of the rules in the present Draft based on moral 
principles would be unworkable. They must 'ý, - omitted, to avoid the danger of &63 
adopting a code which could not be respected. 
Thus, the approach favoured by the big powers, and many other States, was against the 
similarity of rules concerning the protection of civilians in internal and international wars. 
To them, the articles on the protection of civilian population in internal conflicts should be 
short, cogent and direct in order that the parties might clearly see their obligations. 
However, the minority favoured the ICRC approach. Norway, supported by Italy, the 
Holy See and others, advocated forcefully that the civilian population must be given the 
same protection irrespective of the nature of the conflict. They defended the need for the 
codification of detailed rules on the protection of civilians on the following basis: 
"The concept of military necessity has lost much of its meaning in many modern 
conflicts, where one side is often technologically superior to the other and where at 
least one of the sides is often fighting not for survival but for other reasons. It would 
therefore be neither unrealistic nor impossible to lay down very trict criteria 
64 providing the greatest possible protection for the civilian population. 
3611bid. 
362 14 ORDCHL (1974-1977), Federat PoLitfcal Dept, Bern (1978), CDDH/lll/SR. q, para. 14, p. 73. 
3631bid, 
para. 11. p. 72. 
364 lbid, MDH/ll[/SR. 8, pars. 3, p. 59. 
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It seems to me, that the two views, both favoured the regulation of the protection of the 
civilian population in internal wars. However, they differed as to degree of such protection 
and as to the best method of achieving that protection. 
In my view, some favoured an approach which emphasised the element of human rights 
in that protection, whereas others preferred an approach which would place rigorous limits 
on the methods and means of conducting war as the only way of providing real protection 
to the civilian population against the rigours of war. 
It seems that the former approach won the day, as we will see later when analysing 
different rules relating to the protection of the civilian population. 
To me, this state of affairs reflects that States can accept the validity of the concept of 
human rights as a limitation upon their sovereignty, since to them that concept can be used 
safely as a real means of the protection of civilians in time of internal wars. 
However, I will tackle the question of the protection of civilians by studying different 
rules proposed by the ICRC, and how in every case States reacted, especially when using 
the concepts of sovereignty and non- intervention, to stop sometimes some fundamental 
rules proposed by the ICRC. 
1. The Distinction Between Combatants and Non-Combatants 
Draft Article 24 submitted by the ICRC restates the customary rules of the obligation to 
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, and the duty to confine military 
operations to the weakening of the military might of the enemy, also the duty that when 
planning, deciding or launching attacks, civilians and civilian possessions must be avoided. 
The ICRC delegate, when presenting draft Article 24, specifically and explicitly referred 
to some UNGA resolutions such as Resolutions 2444 (XXIII) and 2675 (XXV) which 
stressed, among other things, the duty of all belligerents to make distinctions between the 
365 civilian population and combatants, and between civilian and military objectives. 
These resolutions in fact, referred to the application of such distinctions to 'all armed 
conflicts' which was presumably interpreted by the ICRC to apply also to internal conflicts. 
Moreover, it must be recalled that those resolutions had been adopted unanimously or 
almost unanimously, which would indicate that there is a general consensus that the 
customary concepts contained in them must be extended to internal wars. 
365 lbid, MDH/Ill/SR. 2, para. 14, p. 15. 
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At the committee level (the Third Committee) Article 24 was adopted easily, and without 
any fundamental change of the ICRC proposal. 366 However, the Article was deleted in the 
simplified version submitted by Pakistan. 
It would seem to me, that the essentials of Article 24 are to be found especially in Article 
411 of the final version of Protocol II, which provides that: 
"All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in 
hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to respect for 
their person, honour and convictions and religious practices. They shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction, etc. " 
The travaux prkparatolres support this view. The latter in fact show that there are two 
versions concerning the effect of the deletion of draft Article 24. The minority contended 
that it had no counterpart in other Articles of Protocol 11. Norway stated explicitly that: 
"Article 24 made a fundamental distinction between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives. Those distinctions, 
which were essential for the proper protection of the civilian population and Vian C ý6 
objects, were not made in Article 7 [which became Article 4 in Protocol 11]. " 
Norway was strongly supported by Italy, 368 and the Holy See. 369 
However, the majority, it seems stressed that the essentials of Article 24 were included in 
draft Article 7 (Article 4/1). Thus, Pakistan argued that: 
"... [I]t was not in favour of retaining Article 24 as a whole. Article 7 of e simplified 
draft submitted by his delegation was intended to replace Article 24A110 
Pakistan was Supported by France, 371 Canada, 372 USA, 373 Iraq, 374 Iran, 375 Ghana376 and 
366Draft ArticLe 24 (Basic RuLes) as adopted by consensus by the Third Comittee on ApriL 24th, 1975 
reads as foLLows: 
01. In order to ensure respect and protection for the cfviL Ian popuL at ion and cfviL Ian objects, 
the parties to the confLfct shatt at aLL times distinguish between the civitlan poputatfon and 
combatants and between Ovitfan objects and mititary objectives and shatL direct their 
operations onLy against mfLftary objectives. 
2. Constant care shaLL be taken, when conducting mRltary operations, to spare the civRian 
popuLation, cfvfLians and cfv! Lfan objects. This ruLe shaLL in particutar appLy to the 
ptannfng, deciding or taunching of an attack. " 
Op. cit., supra. n. 307, CDDH/215/Rev. 1, p. 319. 
3670p. 
cit., supra n. 267, CDDH/SR. 52, para. 68, p. 133. 
3681bid, 
paras. 30-32, p. 129. 
3691bid, 
para. 33, p. 129. 
3701bid, 
para. 53, p. 131. 
3711bld, 
paras. 65-66, p. 133. 
3721bid, 
para. 38, p. 130. 
373 lbid, para. 63, p. 132. 
374 [bid, para-72, p. 133. 
375 lbid, para. 69, p. 133. 
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Cameroon. The latter in fact, stated that Article 24 would be superfluous when Article 7 
was accepted. 377 
It is my opinion, that the fundamental distinction between civilians and combatants, and 
civilian objects and military objectives, survives in Protocol 11. Indeed any contention to 
the contrary would be against the object and purpose of the whole Protocol 11, which is 
essentially the protection of the victims of internal wars. Such protection will never be 
fulfilled in the absence of those distinctions. 
2. The Definition of Civilians 
The definition of civilian, as is well known, is a vitally important question in the context 
of internal wars, where the use of the guerrilla method of warfare often obscures the 
criteria of distinguishing between a civilian and a combatant. In the discussions of draft 
Article 25 of the ICRC, no State suggested the restriction of the definition of civilian. On 
the contrary, nearly all States who either submitted amendments or intervened in the 
378 discussions, favoured the broadening of the definition. 
This situation led to the adoption at the committee level of Draft Article 25, entitled 
'Definition', which provides that: 
"I. A civilian is anyone who is not a member of the armed forces or of an organised 
armed group. 
2. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians. 
I The presence, within the civilian population, of individuals who do not fall within 
the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character. 
4. In case of doubt as to whether a person is a civilian, he or she shall be considered 
"379 to be a civilian. 
In fact, this article is broader in its definition of the civilian population than the Draft 
Article 25 submitted by the ICRC. The example is the addition of the important paragraph 
4, which was proposed by Egypt. 
This means that at that stage humanitarianism won the day. The discretion of 
Government has been greatly curtailed. Its freedom to indicate who is and who is not a 
civilian is not without limitation. But, it seems that the tide has been reversed at the final 
session of the Diplomatic Conference, since the simplified version submitted by Pakistan 
deleted Draft Article 25. 
3761bid, 
para. 36, p. 130. 
3771bid, 
para. 59, p. 132. 
378Thus, Egypt in its amendment (CDDH/111/33 of 15/3/74) to Article 25 proposed a new paragraph, which 
reads: 
114. In case of doubt as to whether any person is a civilian he or she shalt be presumed to be 
so. 81 
4 ORDCHL C1974-1978), Federal. PoLftical. Dept, Bern, 1978, pp. 73-74. 
379 Op. cit., supra. n. 307, MDH/215/Rev. 1, p. 320. 
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It seems to me, that in this respect defenders of the sovereignty of State and non- 
intervention in its internal affairs triumphed, since at least implicitly it is up to the 
established Government to define the scope of civilians. Nevertheless, it is argued that this 
determination must take into account the object and purpose of the protocol and especially 
Article 4. This will in effect, restrict any dictatorial attempt from the established 
Government to determine arbitrarily who is a civilian. 
3. The Protection of the Civilian Population 
Article 13 of Protocol Il covers the subject of the protection of the civilian population. It 
stipulates: 
"I. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection 
against the dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this protection 
the following rules shall be observed in all circumstances. 
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the 
object of attack. Acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to 
spread terror among the civilian population. are prohibited. 
3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this part unless and for such time 
"380 as they take a direct part in hostilities. 
In fact, the ICRC Draft Article 26 was more ambitious in its drive to protect the civilian 
population. It introduced some fundamental rules on methods and means of warfare, such 
as the rule that civilians shall not be the object of an attack, and especially paragraph 3, 
which literally prohibits the use of methods and means of combat which do not discriminate 
and distinguish in their effects between civilians and combatants, and between civilian and 
military objects. 
Thus, bombardment of military objectives, which are in a zone which is populated is 
prohibited. Similarly, attacks which may incidentally cause damage to civilians and their 
objects, which are not proportionate to the military advantages gained are prohibited. 
During the discussions a minority of States considered that especially paragraph 3 of 
Draft Article 26 should be deleted. Their reason was: 
"No paragraph 3 was needed at all, on the ground that the intermingling of civilians 
and combatants in non -international conflicts makes a rule against methods or means 
of combat which affect civilians indiscriminately or a rulS against indiscriminate 
attacks unsuitable for application in international conflicts. 81 
However, other delegations stressed that the provisions concerning the protection of 
civilians should be the same whatever the nature and character of the confliCt. 382 
380 Op. cit., supra. n. 309, pp. 469-470. 
381 OP. cit., supra. n. 307, MDH/111/275, pp. 363-364. 
3821n this respect, Norway was represented by Professor Eide, who noted that: 
11... ETI hat the civitf an poput at I on must be given the same protect Ion irrespect I ve of the nature 
of the confLict". 
He then added: 
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At the end the Third Committee adopted Article 26,383 which did not differ much from 
the ICRC proposal. The Committee even went further by adopting a completely new 
Article384 (Article 26 bis) which contained a general prohibition against attacks on objects 
of a civilian character. Thus, attacks were only to be directed against objects which by their 
own nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to armed action by the 
parties to the conflict. 
Moreover, at the committee level, it seems that humanitarianism was very present, and 
eventually opened the way for the regulation of one of the most difficult problems of 
internal conflict, namely the effective protection of the civilian population. 
However, the triumph was not long, Pakistan in its simplified version simply deleted the 
two Articles (26 and 26 bis). It seems, that considerations of sovereignty, military planning 
and security, and the obsession of many States to delete any detailed regulation in matters 
touching internal conflicts have all in different degrees contributed to that deletion. The 
statement of the US Deputy Legal Adviser to the State Department, and the Pakistani 
delegate when introducing his simplified version of Protocol IT, cited above, confirm the 
correctness of this assessment. 
The deletion of Articles 26 and 26 bis have in fact, led Bothe and others to contend that 
Protocol 11, and especially its Article 13: 
"... [D]oes not, however, explicitly provide protection against indiscriminate or 
disproportionate attacks, nor does it prohibit explicitly the use of civilians to shield 
military operations. Moreover, it omits any direct reference to the prohibition against 
11... 10]bLigations undertaken under a ProtocoL 11 which gave full protection to the civilian 
population would hardly go further than those already undertaken by Governments with respect 
to the civilian population under general principles of humanitarian Law, which had now become 
customary taw. Governments would simply have the benef It of more precise rules that would make 
it possible for them to defend themselves against unfounded criticism". 
Op. cit., supra n. 309, pp. 456-57. The same argument atso has been used by ItaLy, ibid, p. 459. 
383Articte 26 as adopted by Committee III on May 5th, 1977 stiputates: 
111. The civilian population and individual civilians shalt enjoy general protection against 
the dangers arising from military operations. To give effect to this protection the following 
rules shalt be observed in aLt circumstances. 
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shalt not be the object 
of attack. Acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among 
the civilian population, are prohibited. 
3. Civilians shalt enjoy the protection afforded by this chapter, unless and for such time as 
they take a direct part in hostilities. 
4. The employment of methods or means of combat which strike or affect indiscriminately the 
civilian population and combatants, or civilian objects andmiLitary objectives, is prohibited. 
5. An attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military objective 
a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village 
or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects is to be 
considered as indiscriminate. 
6. The parties to the conflict shalt not use the civilian population or civilians in order to 
attempt to shield military objectives from attacks. " 
Op. cit., supra. n. 307, MDH/407/Rev. 1, p. 503. 
384 The Article (26 bis) (General Protection of Civilian Objects), stipulates: 
"Civitian objects shatt not be the object of attack. Attacks shatt be timited strictty to those 
objects which by their nature, tocation, purpose or use make an effective contribution to the 
armed action of the parties to the conftict". 
lbid, p. 504. 
303 
direct attacks of disproportionate collateral damage with respect to civilians. "385 
In my opinion, this negative picture is not wholly correct. Firstly, the distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants is implicitly included in the protocol, and clearly one 
fundamental effect of such distinction is prohibition of the acts listed by Bothe. Secondly, 
the travaux pr6paratoires, of'either the discussions in the committees or working groups, 
do not support the contention advanced by Bothe, no State has clearly and publicly stated 
that it considered that the acts listed by the above writer were legal. Thirdly, even Bothe 
speaks about Article 13 as not providing 'explicitly' for the acts he listed, which means in 
effect, he does rule out the possibility that those acts are implicitly prohibited. 
Finally, the commentary on the two protocols produced by the ICRC stresses that: 
"Article 13 sets out first of all the general principle of protection, i. e. the immunity 
to which the population is entitled under the law. This in particular, implies an 
absolute prohibition of certain methods of combat: direct attacks against the civilian 
"386 population and intimidation. 
Further, the commentary stated that: 
* ... [Rjadical simplification does not reduce the degree of protection which was initially envisaged, for despite its brevity, Article 13 reflects the most fundamental 
rules. How to implement them is the responsibility of the parties, and this means that 
the safety measures they are obliged to take under the rule on protection will have 
to be developed so as to best suit each situation, the infrastructure available and the 
means at their disposal. "387 
In my view, an interpretation in good faith, and which takes into account the object and 
purpose of the protocol as a whole of Article 13, would instantly reveal that many important 
rules on the protection of civilians can be said to exist. 
In this context, paragraph 2 of Article 13 speaks about the enjoyment of the civilian 
population of 'general protection against the dangers arising from military operations'. This 
means that the obligation 'does not consist only in abstaining from attacks, but also in 
avoiding, or in any case reducing to a minimum, incidental losses and in taking safety 
, 388 measures. 
Moreover, to ensure such general protection of the civilian population many measures 
should be tak. -I en by the parties when planning or deciding to attack. Among them, the 
parties to the conflict should not intentionally place military installations within the vicinity 
of populated places, in order to avoid the use of civilians as a shield against attacks of the 
enemy. 
In fact, to bring real protection to the civilian population many customary rules may be 
said to apply, such as: 
1. Minimum force is required to harm the enemy, otherwise any contrary action would be 
3850p. 
cit., supra. n. 281, p. 676. 
3860p. 






considered terror, which is explicitly prohibited by Article 13/2. 
2. The principle of distinction and proportionality would make it forbidden to attack where 
such an action would result in harming the civilians and their objects, without resulting in 
clear military advantages. 
Thus, despite its brevity Article 13 can be said to contain a good many rules for the 
protection of the civilian population, and thus places many restrictions on the liberty of the 
parties to the conflict to choose the means of combat. Hence, the Article, indirectly at least 
places, some fundamental limits on the sovereignty of the State in this field. 
4. Protection of Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian Population 
Starvation is an old method, which was used in times of war in order to defeat the enemy. 
It played a very important role in influencing the outcome of civil wars. The American 
Civil War, the Boer War and the Biafran War are good examples. 
Starvation as a method of war may take three ways, as Rosenblad affirms. The first 
involves the destruction of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, 
e. g. foodstuffs and food-producing areas, crops, livestock, drinking water resources within 
an area, e. g. by means of devastation or destruction of food supplies. The second way aims 
at cutting the adversary off from supplies of food or water from outside, e. g. by means of 
siege, contraband measures or blockade. The third way envisages scorched earth tactiCS. 389 
On the legal level there is no indication that starvation is prohibited. In fact, the Lieber 
Code specifically stresses its legality. Thus, Article 17 stipulates: 
"War is not carried on by arms only. It is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, 
armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy. "'90 
Article 3 is silent, although the concept of humane treatment may be said to prohibit such 
practice because it is essentially an extreme form of inhumane treatment. 
However, Article 14 of the second protocol provides: 
"Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited 
to attack, destroy, remove or render useless, for that purpose, objects indispensable 
to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for 
the production of foodstuffs crops, livestock, drinking water installations and 
supplies and irrigation works. ". 391 
The ICRC submitted to the conference Draft Article 27, which dealt with the subject of 
starvation. The aim of the Article was to prohibit a particular cruel method of war, namely 
the destruction of essential means of survival of the population and the destruction of the 
environment. 
From the discussions and many amendments submitted by State representatives, two 
positions can be clearly distinguished. The majority stressed the importance of the Article, 
389E. Rosenblad: International, Humanitarian Law of Armed ConfLict: Some Aspects of the PrincipLe of Destruction and Retated Probtems. Geneva, Institut Henry Durant, 1979, p. 103. 
390 OP. cit., supre. n-28, P. 6. 
391 OP. Cit., supra. n. 309, p. 4aS. 
305 
and even demanded the extension of the means covered by the prohibition, such as food 
producing areas, crops, objects of national economic value, houses, installations and means 
of transport. 392 Others demanded that civilian objects should not be the object of reprisals 
and any form of attack. 393 
However, the minority view which was advocated by Canada and supported only by the 
US, simply demanded the deletion of Draft Article 27. Canada invoked the ground of 
394 sovereignty specifically to suggest such deletion. The US delegate supported Canada s 
attitude, and further stressed that the Article constituted an intervention in the internal 
395 affairs of States. Ireland and the Soviet Union, among others, specifically argued against 
the Canadian approach, and stressed the importance of the Article in Protocol 11.396 
This atmosphere led to the adoption of Article 27 at committee 11 without any major 
modification as to the ICRC proposal. 397 This means that at that stage there was a widely 
392For 
an exampte of this trend, see the Romanian amendment (CDDH/111/12 of 12/3/1974), ibid, p. 473. 
See atso Austratia (CDDH/111/47 of 15/3/74), ibid, p. 474. 
393 Seethe amendments submitted by Egypt, Iraq, Ma Ii and Syr ia (MDH/111/62/Rev/ I /add. 1 of 19/3/1974), 
ibid, p. 474. 
394 Thus, Canada's detegate argued that: 
11 ... EN3 is deLegati on proposed that Art 
icte 27 should be deleted ECDDH/111/36 of 15/3/741 &rose 
from its conviction that, If Draft protocol 11 was to represent an Important evolution of 
humanitarian taw, the effect its provisions would have on the sovereignty of States must be 
carefully weighed. In view of the fact that both parties to non- international armed conflict 
were generally fighting on their own territory, it would perhaps be inappropriate to suggest 
to them that they could not deal with certain objects as they saw fit. u 
He then added: 
11... [Als the Canadian proposal might appear to run counter to the aims of the conference, he 
wished to make it clear that his delegation was not in favour of attacks on the types of 
objects inquestion. However, the situation Innon-Internationat armedconfLicts was oftenvery 
different from that obtaining in international conflicts and would be inappropriate to 
overburden Draft Protocol 11 with provisions that were merely copies of those in Protocol 111. 
op. cit., supra n. 362, CDDH/111/SR. 17, para. 41, pp. 149-150. 
395The US delegate pointed out that: 
"In his delegation's opinion, Draft Protocol 11 should be based entirely on the principle of 
the sovereignty of States within their borders and should be limited to humanitarian 
considerations. He agreed with the Canadian representative that the wording of Article 27 
amounted to interference in internal affairs of States. Those provisions should be modified 
for they were too broad. Their scope should be limited to a simple ban on starving out the 
civilian population". 
lbid, MDH/111/SR. 18, para. 7, p. 152. 
3961retand indicated that: 
"It did not share the opinion expressed by Canada ... that such prohibition wouLd affect the 
sovereignty of States, and the USSR emphasised that there coutd be no question of deLeting 
ArtlcLe 27 for that wouLd endanger the civiLian popuLation and the objects IndispensabLe to 
their survivaLl'. 
Op. cit., supra n. 309, p. 478. 
3971)raft Articte 27 was adopted by Committee 11 by consensus on June 4th, 1976 (MOH/111/359), It 
stiputates that: 
"Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited and therefore it is forbidden to 
attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civi Han 
population, such as foodstuffs and food producing areas, crops, livestock. drinking water 
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shared consensus that the essential means of survival of the civilian population must be 
spared, and that there is no real military advantage can be said to come from their 
destruction. Despite this, the Pakistani simplified version listed Article 27 among the list 
of Articles which were proposed to be deleted. 
At that point the delegate of the Holy See intervened, and made a very emotional 
statement in order to spare the Article. After observing that he was watching with 
increasing concern the dismantling Article by Article of Draft Protocol 11. He declared: 
"Now that the conference was being called on to decide whether or not to delete 
Article 27, which was essentially concerned with food and water supplies for the 
civilian population, the delegation of the Holy See, as well as others, had to face a 
problem of conscience, for the protection of civilians was one of the aims, possibly 
even the main aim, of the two protoCOIS. "398 
Many delegations supported the Holy See, among them: Sweden, the USSR, Ecuador, 
Algeria, Libya and Italy. 399 France, in order to dispel the fears of sovereignty-oriented 
these States pointed out: 
"All Article 27 contained was a purely humanitarian provision, which no-one should 
oppose. The text did not authorise any interference in the internal affairs of a State 
"400 and in no way ran counter to the requirement of national defence. 
These efforts led finally to the sparing of Article 27, which was adopted by consensus. It 
became Article 14 in the final version of Protocol 11. Thus, starvation as a cruel and 
inhuman method of warfare against civilians is finally prohibited. Article 14 in fact 
prohibits the different ways through which starvation can be brought about, such as the 
destruction of foodstuffs and areas which produce foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking 
water installations and supplies and irrigation works. 
The list is not exhaustive, since as the commentary of the two protocols of the ICRC 
stated, starvation can also result from omission. It stressed: 
"To deliberately decide not to take measures to supply the population with objects 
indispensable for its survival in a way would b come a method of combat by default, 
"481 and would be prohibited under this Article. 
Moreover, the use in Article 14 of the verbs 'attack, 'destroy', 'remove' and 'render useless' 
was aimed at covering all eventualities. This indicates that it is prohibited to pollute the 
water supplies by whatever means, and to destroy the harvest by using any kind of 
chemicals. 
The Article in my view is another positive step in the direction of real protection of 
instaLLatfons and suppLies, and frrfgation works, for that purpose". 
lbid, p. 482. 
3980P. 
cit., supra. n. 267, MDH/SR. 52, para. 82, p. 136. 
3991bid, 
paras. 84,87,91,93 and 94, pp. 136-137. 
4001bid, MDH/SR. 52, para. 86, p. 137. 
4010p. 
cit., supra. n. 297, p. 458. 
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fundamental human rights, the right to life. MacAlister-Smith stressed in this respect: 
"Article 14 establishes without reservation the prohibition of starvation as a method 
of warfare and its terms assume particular iMj2ortance in the light of weaknesses in 
the remaining provisions concerning relief. """' 
He then indicated that: 
"... [Flailure to provide relief may constitute a violation of the prohibition of 
starvation of civilians laid down in Article 14. "403 
In conclusion, Article 14 constitutes a welcome development in an area where it is most 
wanted, internal conflict, placing as it does a real restriction on the discretion of the 
warring factions. 
5. The Protection of Works and Installations Containing Dangerous Forces 
Article 15 of the Protocol 11 provides: 
"Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear 
electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these 
objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous 
"404 forces and consequently severe losses among the civilian population. 
Resort to the use of natural and artificial forces to combat the enemy, and achieving 
victory, is an inhuman act, since its main victims are always civilians. The representative 
of Vietnam in the Diplomatic Conference said that during the war in Vietnam 661 sections 
of dyke had been either damaged or destroyed, and it had been calculated that the bombing 
of the dykes in North Vietnam carried out systematically with explosives and penetration 
bombs, could have effects comparable to those of a hydrogen bomb. The flooding of the 
delta and other acts led to the death of two or three million inhabitants by drowning or 
starvation. 405 However, the substance of Article 15 cited above, was included in Article 28 
of the ICRC Draft Protocol 11. 
During the discussions at the committee level, and from the amendments submitted to the 
Article, we can deduce three positions. The first supported the ICRC's position, like the 
latter, it was in favour of the prohibition of attacks against objects which contain dangerous 
forces, but only when such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and 
consequently cause severe losses among the civilian population. This means at the end, that 
406 the prohibition is not wholly absolute, since the possibility of attacks remains. 
The second view stressed that the prohibition must be absolute. It suggested the deletion 
402 P. MacAlister-Smith: International, Hunanitarlan Assistance: Disaster Retfef Actions in 
International, Law and Organisation. Martfnus Wfjhoff, Dordrecht/Boston, Lancaster, 1985, p. 31. 
4031bid, 
P. 31. 
404 OP- Cit. * supra., n. 307, p. 505. 
405 OP- Cit., supra. n. 362, CDDN/111/SR. 19, para. 2, p. 161. 
406This 
was the position of Australials amendment (CDDH/111/46 of March 19th, 1974), op. cit., supra n. 309, p. 490. 
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of any qualification in the Article which may be interpreted that attacks are sometimes 
permitted, and further suggested that those objects which contain dangerous forces shall not 
407 be the object of reprisals. 
The third view simply proposed the deletion of Article 28 on the ground that it had no 
place in Protocol 11, because it constitutes an intervention in the internal affairs of States. 408 
However, at the committee level it was the first position which won the day, and the 
Draft Article 28 adopted seems to afford a better protection than that which was envisaged 
in the ICRC Draft Article 28. In this context, paragraphs 2 and 3 were added. The first 
made an obligation for the parties to endeavour to avoid locating military installations and 
objectives in the vicinity of works or installations containing dangerous forces. And the 
latter (third paragraph) induces the parties to mark such works and installations with special 
409 marks. However, Article 28 was adopted after the imputation of paragraphs 2 and 3. In 
other words, a return to what had been proposed in the ICRC Draft Protocol 11. 
On balance, it seems that Article 15 is an innovation in the context of Protocol 11, no such 
provision can be found in Article 3. It obliges the parties to the conflict not to attack 
objects which contain dangerous forces, whenever severe losses of civilians would result 
from such attacks. In that respect, the Government cannot claim that these works and 
installations are in the national territory, and it is only the legal authority which can decide 
what to do with them in the event of internal conflict. Its sovereignty in that respect is 
curtailed at least to a certain degree. 
On the other hand, it must be conceded that the Article contains many loopholes. Thus, 
the list of installations and works which cannot be the object of attack is exhaustive, since 
the Article uses the term 'namely', which means that many installations and works which 
contain in effect, dangerous forces are not immune from attack, such as facilities and works 
used for the storage of crude oil products, and chemical agents. Moreover, the protection 
of civilians in the Article is not absolute since the prohibition is qualified by 'severe loss' 
which means when there is no severe loss then civilians must bear the horrors of attacks on 
those installations. 
S. Protection of Cultural Objects and Places of Worship 
Article 16 of the Protocol 11 provides: 
"It is prohibited to commit any acts of hostility directed against historic monuments, 
works of art or places of worship which constitute the cul ural or spiritual heritage 
of peoples, and to use them in support of military effort. "110 
The ICRC, it must be indicated, submitted nothing concerning this important question. The 
407 This was the effect of the Romanian amendment to Article 28 (MDH/111/327 of April 30th, 1970), 
ibid, p. 489. 
408 This was the opinion of Canada. It demanded the deletion of Article 28 for the same reasons which it had advanced for the deletion of Article 27. In fact it advanced grounds of sovereignty and non- intervention. Op. cit., supra n. 362, CDDH/III/SR 20, para. 20, p. 176. 
409 See op. cit., supra n-309, pp. 501-502. 
410 Mid, p. 526. 
309 
Article originated in an amendment tabled by II States, which proposed the addition of new 
Article 20 bis4l' dealing with the subject of the protection of cultural objects and places 
of worship. 
During the discussions at the committee level, the majority did not see any problem in 
adding a new Article dealing with that subject. However, at least the US and Japan pointed 
out that: 
1 "... [T]he incorporation 
in Draft Protocol 11 of such executive international remlations 
of internal conflicts did not enhance the protocol's chances of acceptance. 
12 
413 
However, Article 20 bis was adopted by consensus at the level of the Third Committee. 
In its simplified version, Pakistan proposed the deletion of Draft Article 20 bis. But, the 
majority of States led by Greece appealed to the Pakistani delegate not to insist on that 
deletion, since many of the world's treasures were in danger of being destroyed in the 
course of internal armed confl iCt. 414 Iraq was against the majority, its delegate stated that: 
"its Government and people need not an Article in Draft protocol 11 to tell them that 
"415 such acts as those mentioned in Article 20 bis were prohibited. 
The US also stressed that, if adopted, the Article would be bound to prevent some States 
from becoming parties to Protocol 11, and signalled its willingness to vote against the 
inclusion of the Article in Protocol 11.416 However, at the plenary meeting of 6 June 1977, 
the Article (20bis) was adopted by 35 votes to 15, with 32 abstentionS. 
417 Even after the 
vote, India explained its negative vote for Article 20 bis on terms of its contradiction with 
State sovereignty. 418 
411 Amendment (MDH/I I I/GT/95 of May 25th, 1976) f ormutated by Af ghanf stan, Egypt, Ghana, Greece, Noty 
See, Itaty, Japan, Jordan, Spain and Yugostavfa. lbid, p. 509. 
4121bid, p. 512. 
413The ArtlcLe adopted reads: 
"Without prejudice to the provisions of The Hague Convention on the protection of cultural 
property in the event of armed conflict of 14 May 1954, it is prohibited to commit any acts 
of hostility directed against those historic monuments or works of art which constitute the 
cultural heritage of peoples, and to use them in support of the military effort". 
Ibid, p. 514. 
414 Greece was supported by Iretand, the HoLy See, France, ItaLy, Austria, Spain, Cotombla and Turkey. 
See ibid, pp. 515-516. 
415 Ibid, p. 515. 
416 Ibid, p. 515. 
417 Ibid, p. 523. 
418 It stressed that: 
"The Indian delegation objects strongly to the reference to any International convention to 
which only sovereign States can be parties, in Protocol 11, which will apply to internal 
conflicts". 
lbid, p. 524. 
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The adoption of Article 16 is a very welcome development. In a way, if compared with 
Article 19419 of The Hague Convention for the protection of cultural property, it grants 
more comprehensive protection, thus, it covers also places of worship. Also Article 16 
contains no possibility of derogation from the prohibitions listed there, even where the 
imperatives of military necessity so require, whereas Article 19 contains such possibility. 
To that extent, I think that Article 16 brings a further limitation on the sovereignty of the 
State, as such, it is indeed an innovation. 
7. Prohibition of Force Movements of Civilians 
Article 17 of Protocol Il provides: 
"I. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons 
related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative 
military reasons so demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out, all 
possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be received 
under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition. 
2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected 
with the con fliCt. "420 
It is to be observed that the forced displacement of the civilian population during civil wars 
still causes untold sufferings. The examples of Algeria, Vietnam, and recently of Cyprus, 
Nicaragua and El Salvador among others reveal clearly the correctness of such assertion. 
On the normative level, there was no international regulation of the question. Article 3 
is silent on the point, which meant in practice States were free to order such relocation for 
whatever reason they see fit. This important loophole had to be filled. The ICRC had just 
done that by submitting Draft Article 29, which deals with the subject. 
The Article in fact, poses the general principle that the relocation of the civilian 
population for reasons related to the conflict is prohibited. However, such relocations can 
take place exceptionally in two cases. The first, is when the safety of the population itself 
is in danger. Secondly, when imperative military necessity so demands in that these cases 
are necessary actions and measures must be taken to make such displacements smooth and 
humane. Paragraph 2 indicates that civilians must not be forced to leave their national 
territory. 
The travaux pr6paratolres show that the Article was seen as touching a very sensitive point, 
4 19Article 19 (Conflicts not of an International Character) stipulates: 
01. In the event of an armed conftict not of an Internationat character occurring within the 
territory of one of the high contracting parties, each party to the conftfct shatt be bound 
to appLy, as a minimum, the provisions of the present convention which retates to respect for 
cutturat property. 
2. The parties to the conftfct shatt endeavour to bring into force, by means of special, 
agreements, att or part of the other provisions of the present convention. 
3. The UN Educational, Scientific and Cutturat Organisation may offer its services to the 
parties to the conftict. 
4. The apptication of the preceding provisions shatt not affect the tegat status of the parties 
to the conftict. " 
Op. cit.. supra.. n. 28, pp. 679-70. 
420 Op. cft., supra. n. 309, p. 543. 
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namely the right of the established Government to take all necessary measures to maintain 
public order. Two views concerning the Article can be said to emerge from reading those 
travaux prkparatolres. 
1. The first view, which is the majority view, welcomed the idea of covering the subject 
of deportations and displacements in Protocol 11, then supported the ICRC Article. Some 
delegations went even further. Thus, it was proposed that the prohibition of displacements 
must not only cover the civilian population, it must be extended to cover any transfer of 
civilian objects or installations. 421 Cyprus, which according to its delegation had the greatest 
proportion of displaced persons, since 2 out of 5 had been uprooted in inhuman conditions, 
supported strongly the strengthening of the Article and its preservation in the context of 
Protocol 11. In its eyes displacement constitutes 'an inhuman and unacceptable practice, 
422 
and it stressed also that: 
"... [O]f all inhumanities of an armed conflict the Government of Cyprus coniiders the 23 displacement. of the civilian population to be among the most deplorable". 
The second view explicitly invokes the concepts of sovereignty and non -intervention, to 
state the dissatisfaction with the inclusion of anything concerning the question of 
displacement in Protocol 11. Canada led this group. It proposed the deletion of the Article. 
The rationale behind this is that: 
"In case of insurrection or non- international conflict, Governments had the right to 
transfer part of the civilian population from one region to another if they considered 
it necessary. The prohibition of forced movement of civilians was justified in Draft 
Protocol 111, which applied to international conflicts, but in the case (? f an internal 
"424 conflict it becomes interference in the domestic affairs of a country. 
The US supported Canada425 Indonesia also indicated that: 
* ... Article 29 could be interpreted as leading to interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States, which had the right to decide on the measures required for their 
safety and that of the population even where the displacement of the civilian 
population was concerned. *426 
During the discussion at the committee level, Norway answered indirectly those who raised 
421this is the effect of the Romanian amendment (MDR/111/12 of March 12th, 1974). The Soviet Union, 
Switzeriand, Norway and Cyprus. See lbid, pp. 529-35. 
422 Op. cit., supra. n. 307, CDDH/111/327, p. 95. 
4230p. 
cit., supra. n. 267, CDDH/SR. 53, p. 156. 
424 Op. cit., supra. n. 309, p. 531. 
425The US argued that: 
"... Article 29, as Drafted, would undoubtedly lead to the non-appLicatfon of Protocol 11. Wo 
State was likely to acknit that existing authority within Its territory was challenged to the 
point at which the provisions of Protocol 11 would apply". 




the issue of sovereignty in these terms: 
"Of course, sovereignty was important in that it afforded protection against outside 
interference, but it had ceased to be a screen behind which Governments had 
unrestricted freedom to act in their relations with the nationals of the country. The 
development of international humanitarian law had shown that Governments were 
"427 ready to accept restrictions on their freedom of action. 
428 At the committee level, Article 29 was adopted. Basically, it did not depart from what 
has been proposed by the ICRC. The only change was in paragraph 2, which although it had 
upheld the principle that civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for 
reasons related to the conflict. It opened an exception, and that is in the case in which 
individuals convicted by final judgment of crimes are required to leave the territory, or 
when they elected to do so when offered that opportunity; and finally in cases of 
extradition which must, however, be in conformity with the law. 
In the simplified version in which the Article was kept, it was not suggested for deletion. 
The only change is the deletion of the expression 'the parties to the conflict' which aims at 
not giving any chance of legal status to the insurgents. 
The main conclusions to be drawn concerning this important Article are: 
1. There is no doubt that Article 17 fills an important gap, namely the question of 
displacements, which are becoming a normal means of conducting the war in internal 
conflicts, as the practice in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mozambique and Afghanistan among 
others will show later. Article 17 is an innovation, since Article 3 is silent on the point. In 
429 fact, the article was specifically inspired by Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
4271bid, 
p. 533. 
428ArticLe 29 as adopted by the Third Committee on May 10th, 1977 stiputates that: 
" I. The displacement of the civiLi an poput at ion shalt not be ordered by a party to the conf Lict 
for reasons relating to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or 
imperative military reasons so demand. Should a party to the conflict undertake such 
displacements, it shatt take att, possible measures in order that the civilian population may 
be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition. 
2. Civilians shatL not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with 
the conf Lf ct except in the case in which individuals convicted by f inat judgment of crimes are 
required to leave that territory or, having been offered the opportunity of leaving the 
country, elect to do so, or in the case of individuals extradited in conformity with taw". 
lbid, pp. 541-542. 
429See the comment of the ICRC representative, when he presented Articte 29, ibid, p. 530. Articte 49 
stiputates: 
"individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from 
occupied territory to the territory of the occupying power or to that of any other country, 
occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive. 
Nevertheless, the occupying power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area 
If the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacuations 
may not involve the displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied 
territory, except when for material reasons it is impossible to avoid such displacements. 
Persons thus evacuated shall. be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the 
area in question have ceased. 
The occupying power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure, to the greatest 
practical extent, that proper accommodation is provided to receive the protected persons, that 
the removals are effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition, 
and that members of the same family are not separated. 
The protecting power shalt, be Informed of any transfers and evacuations as soon as they have 
taken place. 
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and in that respect the protection of civilians from displacement is similar in internal and 
international wars, which is in itself a fundamental change from the thinking of the 1949 
Conference. 
This leads one to conclude that the assertion that the established Government enjoys a 
complete freedom of action vis-A-vis its population, especially in times of emergencies, has 
been restricted and even curtailed to a great degree. The majority of States felt that the 
inhuman tragedies of displacement must be prohibited as a general principle. The discretion 
of the Government in this domain is limited. 
2. Moreover, it can be safely advanced that on the subject of displacements, it seems that 
humanitarian ideals have overcome demands of sovereignty and non- intervention. The non- 
inclusion of Draft Article 29 in the list of the Articles demanded for deletion by Pakistan 
in its simplified version of Protocol 11 is a case in point. 
3. Furthermore, we must not be over-optimistic, since Article 17 contains some important 
loopholes. Thus, the prohibition of displacements, according to the Article, ceases to be 
operative when 'the security of the civilians' is involved, and when 'imperative military 
reasons' so demand. These grounds may be used and interpreted to justify massive 
displacements. 
However, it seems that an interpretation in good faith, and in accordance with the object 
and purpose of the protocol would limit excesses to a significant degree. In this context, the 
commentary of the ICRC stresses in connection with the expression 'imperative military 
reasons" that "the situation should be scrutinised most carefully as the adjective 'imperative' 
reduces to a minimum cases in which displacements may be ordered". 430 The commentary 
also indicates that: 
"... [C]learly, imperative military reasons cannot be justified by political motives. For 
example, it would be prohibited to move a population in order to exercise more 
effective control over a dissident ethnic group. "431 
However, as concerns the notion of 'the security of civilians', it seems that a good faith 
interpretation requires, as the Norwegian delegate rightly pointed out during the 
conference, that 'the security of civilians should not require their forced displacement, 
because if their security was genuinely threatened civilians would be prepared to move off 
of their own accord. 432 
The occupying power shalt not detain protected persons in an area particularly exposed to the 
dangers of war unless the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. 
The occupying power shalt not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the 
territory it occupies". 
Op. cit.. supra. n. 28, p. 448. 
4300P. 
cft., supra. n. 297, p. 1473. 
4311bid. 
432 op. cit.. supra. n. 362, MDH/111/SR. 25, para. 4, p. 229. 
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S. General Conclusions Concerning the Articles on the Protection of Civilians 
1. The general impression is that Articles 13-17 constitute the biggest contribution of 
Protocol 11 to humanitarian law applicable in non- international conflicts. Compared with 
Article 3, Protocol 11 has indeed filled many normative gaps, which were not regulated by 
any international instruments. Thus, civilians cannot be the object of attack. Objects 
necessary for the survival of those civilians are also protected from attack or manipulation, 
and civilians are protected from starvation etc. 
2. Moreover, it is asserted that the deletion of many important rules, such as Draft 
Articles 24 and 25 of the ICRC Draft, which established the distinction between combatants 
and non-combatants, and established a general presumption in favour of the civilian 
population in cases of doubt, has to some extent limited the importance of the rules 
contained in Articles 13-17. Although, an interpretation in good faith and in accordance 
with the object and purpose of Protocol Il would reveal that those rules, and even some 
rules on methods and means of warfare, can be found in Article 4 and Articles 13-17. 
3. It is asserted here that the arguments of sovereignty and non- intervention have played 
a major role in the imputation of many important rules for the protection of civilians. 
Indeed Pakistan, the author of the simplified version of Protocol 11, had advanced them as 
the main reason for making the protocol 'simple' and capable of being accepted by States 
and also being practical. 
However, it is clear also that considerations of humanity have pjayed a major role in 
persuading States to accept many rules for the protection of civilians. Indeed, the mere fact 
of the acceptance of those rules is a challenge to the sovereignty of States. 
Furthermore, it must be noted the group of States which favoured an extension of rules 
of humanitarian law concerning civilians to internal wars (which was led by Norway, Italy 
and the Holy See, and was supported by many other States), had the upper hand at the 
committee level. Their strategy was to stress the humanitarian nature of the provisions and 
emphasise that they did not in any way amount to intervention or breach of sovereignty. 
However. at the last session it seems that defenders of State sovereignty made it clear there 
must be either simplification (which means that many rules had to go) or abandonment of 
Protocol Il. This blackmail left no alternative but 'something is better than nothing. 
4. Further, I think that the philosophy of human rights has facilitated the effort to 
produce more rules for the protection of civilians. Since after all, Articles 13-17 are all 
designed in a way to protect the fundamental human rights of right to life and the right to 
be treated humanely in all circumstances. No State has challenged at least explicitly the use 
of human rights in that direction. Indeed no State has argued against the relevance of the 
concept of human rights to the question of the protection of civilians in times of war. 
E. The Protection of the Wounded and Sick In Protocol 11 
As has been indicated in Section 11, Article 3, apart from posing the general principle that 
the sick and wounded shall be collected and cared for, did not give any details on how it 
was to be implemented. 
Thus, no protection is given to the medical personnel or civilians who try to assist and 
care for the wounded and sick, nor is there protection for medical establishments and 
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vehicles. These omissions do not facilitate the protection of victims of internal wars. 
In fact, the ICRC has signalled the need for a thorough protection for the wounded and 
sick, as far back as 1957, when it adopted in the XIX International Red Cross Conference 
in New Delhi, Resolution XVII, in which the wish was expressed that: 
"That a new provision be added to the existing Geneva Conventions of 1949 
extending the provisions of Article 3 thereof so that: 
(a) The wounded may be cared for without discrimination and doctors in no way 
hindered when giving the care which they are called upon to provide in these 
circumstances. 
(b) The inviolable principle of medical professional secrecy may be respected. 
(c) There may be no restrictions, other than those provided by international 
legislation, on the scale and free circulation of medicines, it being understood that 
these will be used exclusively for therapeutic purposes". 
The Resolution then made "an urgent appeal to all Governments to repeal any measures 
which might be contrary to the present resolution., 
433 Moreover, the UN Secre tary- General, 
in his second report on human rights in armed conflicts, advocated the same course of 
434 action. 
1. The Red Cross Experts' View 
When the Red Cross experts were consulted on the question of the protection of the 
wounded and the sick in their conference in 1971, they unanimously recognised the need 
for more effective protection of this helpless category of the victims of internal conflicts. 
They were for: 
"... [I]ncreasing the respect shown to the emblem of the Red Cross, for strengthening 
the protection of medical personnel, whether military or civilian, as well as for the 
immunity of hospitals. Furthermore, they expressed the wish that the civilian 
population would not be punished simply for having aided or assisted the wounded 
"435 and sick. as well as refugees. 
Thus, no question of sovereignty or non -intervention was raised either implicitly or 
explicitly. 
2. The Governments' Experts' View 
The ICRC, encouraged by the view of'its experts, and by its experience in the field, 
submitted a whole seven Articles dealing with all aspects of the question of the protection 
433 ICRC-and League of Red Cross Societies, op. cit., supra. n. 266, pp. 642-643. 
434 
The LIN Secretary-General stated in fact that: 
"It may therefore be suggested that an additional provision be adopted, under which personnel 
such as that of the Red Cross carrying out medical and relief activities and displaying the 
appropriate emblem should be protected from killing, Ill treatment In all circumstances, and 
given the necessary facilities, whenever available, to perform their mission. Such a provision 
should also cover persons acting In an individual capacity solely for the purpose of giving 
medical aid and relief, provided their identity and whereabouts are made known to all 
participants to the conflict". 
Report of the Secretary-Generat, UW Doc A/8052, para. 150. 
435 
Op. cit., supra. n-100, P. 54. 
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of the sick and wounded . 
436 The ICRC in fact, made it clear that it was important to use 
the same wording in these provisions as in the first protocol, since those provisions only 
refer to purely humanitarian aspects, and hence implicitly, they do not touch the 
sovereignty of States, and open no way to foreign intervention. 
However, two experts at least were not happy with the ICRC approach. In their view, 
%ituations in non- international armed conflicts differed widely from those in international 
armed conflicts to the State and the role of the civilian population., 437 Thus, they were not 
opposed to the widening of the protection of the wounded and the sick, but the use of the 
same wording in the two protocols. However, the majority were of the opinion that the 
same wording should be adopted in the two protocols. 
It is interesting that no-one questioned the validity of extensive protection for the 
wounded and sick, which means that humanitarianism was the master of the situation in this 
important field. 
3. The Diplomatic Conference Attitude 
At the Diplomatic Conference, the ICRC submitted 8 Articles (11-18) which cover, 
essentially, the whole problems raised by the need for effective protection of the wounded 
and the sick and the shipwrecked. 438 
At the beginning of the discussions of the ICRC Articles, Bothe, the West German 
delegate, doubted "whether the issue of sovereignty really arose with regard to Articles 
dealing with the wounded and sick o439 To him, the ICRC was only fulfilling a basic 
humanitarian need by providing better protection for the most unfortunate and weakest of 
victims of armed conflicts. Hence he failed to see how the requirements of State sovereignty 
could be construed to prevent that. Sweden also pointed out that it. 
"... [A]ppreciated the importance of State sovereignty, non -interference and so forth, 
but believed that these considerations should not prevail over the application of 
humanitarian law, especially in cases involving the protection of the wounded and 
sick. "440 
These comments were true to a large extent, no State has, in fact, made a statement to the 
effect that the extension of the rules on the protection of the wounded and sick can be seen 
as an infringement of State, or an intervention in its internal affairs. In this context, Solf 
summarised correctly the situation vis-h-vis protection of the wounded and the sick, at the 
436 Thus, Articles 7-13 deal respectively with Protection and Care; Search; the Role of the Population; 
Medical and Religious Personnel; MedicaL Establishments and Transport; Evacuation; and the Distinctive 
Emblem. For their content, see op. cit., supra n. 269, pp. 100-104. 
4370p. 
cit., supra. n. 100, para. 2.359, p. 100. 
438Articles 11-18 deal respectively with Definitions. Protection ard Care; Search and Evacuation; Role 
of the Civilian Population; Protection of Medical and Religious Personnel; GeneraL Protection of 
MedicaL Duties; Medical Units and Transports; and the Distinctive Emblem. Op. cit., supra. n. 273, 
pp. 37-38. 
4391, ORDCHL (1974-1977), Bern (1978), CDDH/Il/SR. 21, para. 38, p. 207. 
440ibid, 
para. 44. p. 210. - 
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committee level, he noted: 
"Insofar as its [Part Il of Protocol 11 dealing with the wounded and sick] scope deals 
only with the humanitarian obligations to provide protection to the wounded, sick 
and shipwrecked, the committee believed that this part does not involve the political 
n441 problems of status and sovereignty which may have been involved in other parts. 
However, at least one Article (Article 16: General Protection of the Medical DutieS), 442 
roused a great deal of discussion at the committee level, and the arguments of sovereignty 
and non-intervention were used extensively. 
Article 16/3 especially, was the focus of attack, since it envisages a complete protection 
of the medical personnel involved in the assistance to the wounded and sick. They were not 
obliged to report to the parties to the conflict any information that would endanger the lives 
of their patients or their families. 
Canada, and the US to a lesser extent, argued for the deletion of the Article, or at least 
its paragraph 3. The former stressed that paragraph 3 'could be regarded as an infringement 
9443 of sovereignty and should be deleted . 
Indonesia endorsed Canada's view, because it 
'would have difficulty in accepting paragraph 3 of Article 16, whose provisions were 
, 444 contrary to existing law in Indonesia. 
However, another view was advocated by the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and was 
supported by Sweden, Cuba and the USSR. It stated that: 
"... [Paragraph 3] had nothing to do with sovereignty; it was a question of providing 
protection to medical personnel in the case of an internal conflict. T delete the 
paragraph would seriously weaken the impact of the whole protocol. . 4143 
This divergence Of views led to the creation of a working group to deal with paragraph 3, 
which produced two texts of the paragraph. 
The first text stressed that medical personnel have full discretion concerning giving 
information on the sick and wounded under their care 'except as provided form in the law 
441 W. A. SoLf: Development of the Protection of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked under the Protocol 
Ils Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in Swinnarski (ad. ), op. cit., supra. chapter 1^1, 
p. 239. 
442 Draft Articte 16 as submitted by the ICRC provides: 
"I. in no circumstances shatt any person be punished for carrying out medical activities 
compatible with professional ethics, regardless of the person benefiting therefrom. 
2. Persons engaged in medical activities shaU not be compelled to perform acts or to carry 
out work contrary to rules of professional ethics or to abstain from acts required by such 
rules. 
3. No persons engaged 'in medical activities may be compelled to give to any authority 
information concerning the sick and wounded under his care should such information be likely 
toproveharmfut to thepersons concernedor to their families. Compulsory medical regulations 
for the notification of communicable diseases shall however be respected. " 
op. cit., supra. n. 309, p. 363. 
4430p. 
cit., supra. n. 439, CDDH/I[/SR. 28, para. 14, p. 283. 
4441bid. 
445 This was the statement made by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Ibid, para. 22, p. 284. See 
also ibid, para. 25, p. 284 (USSR). para. 27, p. 285 (Sweden) and para. 30, p. 285-86 (Cuba). 
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in force prior to the beginning of the conflict'. This version which attempted to be a 
compromise between the advocates of sovereignty and humanitarianism was not acceptable 
to sovereignty oriented delegations. Indonesia seems in fact, to state the majority view, 
when it stated: 
"It considered the text a great improvement on the ICRC text, particularly since 
it 
provided an exception with respect to the 'law in force'. It 
feared, however, that the 
phrase 'prior to the beginning of the conflict' might constitute an 
interference with 
the right of a Government to enact legislation at any time, even after the outbreak 
of an internal con fliCt. "446 
Then the working group produced another version of Article 16/3 which paid great 
attention to the considerations of sovereignty, since the obligation not to give information 
on the sick and the wounded was respected 'subject to national law', which means among 
other things, that the door is open for Governments to enact laws, even after the outbreak 
of internal conflicts, to reduce that obligation. 
The Draft Article, as adopted at the committee level, takes into account the second 
version of the working group texts. No deletion or modification was proposed for that 
Article in the simplified version. In the final Protocol 11, it became Article 10, and it 
provides that: 
"I. Under no circumstances shall any person be punished for having carried out 
medical activities compatible with medical ethics, regardless of the person benefiting 
therefrom. 
2. Persons engaged in medical activities shall neither be compelled to refrain from 
acts required by the rules of medical ethics or other rules designed for the benefit 
of the wounded and sick, in this protocol. 
3. The provisional obligations of persons engaged in medical activities regarding 
information which they may acquire concerning the wounded and sick under their 
care shall, subject to national law, be respected. 
4. Subject to national law, no person engaged in medical activities may be penalised 
in any way for refusing or failing to give informalion concerning the wounded and 
"4 7, sick who are, or who have been, under his care. 
However, it must be noted that two important Articles, 12 bis and 14, have been deleted 
in the simplified version of Protocol 11 submitted by Pakistan. The first concerns the 
protection of persons in their mental and health integrity. Thus, it prohibits physical 
mutilation, medical experiments or removal of organs for transplantation (this Article was 
not proposed by the ICRC; it had been Drafted at the committee level). 448 The second, 
4461bid, 
CDDH/II/SR. 39, para. 33, pp. 424-425. 
4470P. 
cit.. supra. n. 309, p. 402. 
44BArticte 
12 bis as Drafted ard adopted by Committee 11 which stipulates: 
"I. The physical or mental health and integrity of persons who are Interned, detained or 
Otherwise deprived of Liberty, by any of the parties to an armed conf Lict for reasons relating 
to that conflict, shatt not be endangered by any unjustified act or omission. Accordingly, it 
Is prohibited to subject the persons described in this Article to any medical procedure which 
is not Indicated by the State of health of the person concerned, and which is not consistent 
With the generally accepted medical standards applied to free persons under similar medical 
319 
which deals with the role of the civilian population, concerns their assistance to the sick and 
wounded. 
But, it seems that their essentials and spirit can be found in other Articles of Protocol 11. 
Thus, on one hand, it is argued that the spirit of Article 12 bis is found in Article 511 (e). 
449 Indeed, such was the intention of the Pakistani delegate. On the other hand, civilians are 
protected by virtue of Article 18/2 which provides that: 
"The civilian population may, even on its own initiative, offer to collect and care for 
the wounded, sick and shipwrecked. "450 
Moreover, it is important to note that the ICRC has proposed a very important Article 
(Draft Article 11) concerning definitions of the terms 'sick' 'wounded' and 'shipwrecked'. 
At the committee level, some delegations voiced their opposition to the inclusion of such 
definitions, because they feared that the complex sets of such definitions might make 
Protocol 11 difficult to read and understand . 
45 1 The UK representative even suggested that: 
"There was also a psychological consideration: rebel leaders might be discouraged 
from observing the protocol if their first glimpsS of it was a lengthy list of technical 
definitions of apparently commonplace terms. *4 2 
However, the majority of States at the committee level were of different opinion. They 
supported the inclusion of such definitions, which led the committee to adopt Draft Article 
11.453 
But, in the simplified version of Protocol 11, Article II was deleted, the reason being the 
simplification of Protocol 11 in order to make it effective. The ICRC commentary on the 
two protocols, suggests that the definitions used in Protocol I (Article 8), although not 
binding in Protocol IT, 'nevertheless constitute a guide for the interpretation of the 
, 454 terms. 
circumstances. 
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 1, It is, In particular, prohibited to carry out on 
such persons, even with their consent: 
(a) physical mutilations; 
(b) medical or scientific experiments; 
(c) removal of tissue or organs for transplantation. " 
Ibid, p. 320. 
449See his comment on introducing his proposal for the deletion of Article 12 b1s. Ibid, p. 320. 
4501bid, 
p. 601. 
45112 ORDCHL (1974-1977), Federal. Political Dept, Bern 1978, CDDH/II/SR. 79, pare. 18, p. 260. 
4521bfd, 
para. 32, p. 262. 
453For the text of this very tong Article see: 13 ORDCHL (1974-1977), FederaL Political Dept, Bern, 
1978, CDDH/406/Rev. 1, pp. 421-422. 
454 Op. cit., supra. n. 297, p. 1405. At least the US seems to support such a course of action, since 
it expressed its understanding was that: 
"It is the understanding of the United States of America that the terms used in Part III of 
this protocol 1111 which are the same as the terms defined in Article 8 of Protocol III shat L 
so far as relevant be construed in the same sense as those definitions". 
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The general impression, however, is that many important rules have been adopted 
concerning the protection of the wounded and the sick. They indeed fill the loopholes and 
gaps which practice has shown. The rules adopted afford protection to the sick, wounded 
and shipwrecked, and also protection for those who assist them, either medical, religious 
or civilian personnel; and lastly protection for the material means necessary for the real 
protection of this category of victims of internal conflicts. These rules may be summarised 
as follows: 
1. The wounded, sick and shipwrecked are to be collected, searched for and cared for, 
whatever they may be, insurgents, soldiers of the Government, civilians or military. No 
discrimination on whatever ground can be resorted to. 
2. Medical and religious personnel have full protection, when engaging in their assistance 
and caring of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked. It is no longer a crime to do so. The 
parties are under strict obligation to grant all the means available for those personnel in 
order that their task is fulfilled properly. 
3. Medical units such as hospitals, and means of transport whatever their nature, cannot 
be the object of attack, unless they have deviated from their humanitarian mission. 
4. The distinctive emblem of the Red Cross, Red Crescent or Red Lion and Sun has to 
be displayed by medical and religious personnel and medical units and transport. It must 
be respected. 
These are essential rules for any effective protection of the sick, wounded and 
shipwrecked. They constitute in fact a real development of Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions. In general, there was a wide consensus that they must be respected, since 
they are far from touching any questions of sovereignty or intervention. They are purely 
humanitarian rules, which all cultures and religions of the world accept. This explains in 
part why Pakistan, in its simplified version, did not basically operate fundamental changes 
of what was accepted at the committee level. 
F. The Practice after the Adoption of the Two Protocol Ils vis-i-vis the Protection of the 
Victims of Internal Wars 
Although no State experiencing an internal conflict has yet recognised the application of 
455 Protocol 11, except may be El Salvador, it seems to me very interesting to review the State 
practice after the adoption of Protocol IT, in order to see whether its innovation's concerning 
the protection of the victims of internal wars has, at least indirectly, influenced the conduct 
of such conflicts. By the same token, we intend to show whether the rules adopted in 
Protocol IT can stand a good chance of application or not. 
1. The Practice In Relation to the Protection of Civilians 
It seems that the civilian population is still by and large the main victim of internal 
conflicts. All its horrors still fall on them. The practice supports such a contention in a very 
clear way. 
Op. cft., supra n. 439, p. 240. 
455 At teast the ICRC seems to support this view. See The ICRC WorLdwide, 1988, p. 11. 
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1.1. El Salvador 
In El Salvador it seems that the civilians had in many instances become a military target 
themselves. Ground and air forces are involved in such practices, especially in the areas 
suspected to harbour insurgents. Thus, the Commission of the Church on International 
Affairs stated that: 
"... [W]e can no longer speak of the mere violation of human rights in El Salvador. The 
statistics prove that in quantitative and qualitative terms I 6pol 
icy of systematic 
extermination has been designed and is constantly updated. " 
In a report of a fact-finding mission to El Salvador led by two members of the US 
Congress, it is alleged that 'El Salvador is engaged in a civil war but more people die by 
murder than in combat. '457 
Besides, the New York Tribunal on Central America and the Caribbean emphasized that 
attacks against civilian targets are an almost inevitable component of a military 
, 458 campaign , and then 
it adds: 
"That is a large part of what military counterinsurgency strategy in El Salvador is 
about: air attacks and ground troop sweeps through 'contested areas, areas where 
Government control is not secure; attacking villages, destroying homes, burning 
crops, massacring civilians, and tearing apart the social fabric, causing people to leave 
their villages and run for their lives, fleeing through the mountains and the jungle 
for months without food or medicine until they are prostrate, until they give up 
running and turn themselves in to the apthorities and live as refugees in the 
relocation centers run by the Government. n459 
Similarly, it was reported that: 
"It is now plain that the Salvadoran armed forces are attempting to win the war by 
forcing out of zones controlled by the guerrillas. Apparently the purpose is to deprive 
the guerrillas of access to the civilian population from which they may obtain food 
"460 and other necessities. 
Moreover, The American Watch and the Lawyers Committee for International Human 
Rights in El Salvador arrived at the same conclusion. It revealed that: 
"The evidence we have gathered makes it clear to us that the armed forces of El 
Salvador, ground and air, are engaged in indiscriminate attacks upon the civilian 
population on conflict zones, particularly in guerrilla controlled conflict zones of El 
456 Commission of the Church on International Affairs, Jan. 1981, Background Information, EL Salvador: 
One Year of Repression, p. 28. 
457 J. Jeffords, S. Richardson, J. Oberstar CUS Representatives): Report of a Fact-Finding Mission 
Sponsored by the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, p. 3. 
458 P. Ramshaw and T. Steers Ceds. ): Intervention on Trial: The New York Crimes Tribunal on Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Praeger, New York, Westport, Connecticut, London, 1984, p. 17. 
459 Wd, p. 18. 
460 An American Watch Report: Draining the Sea, 6th Supplement to the Report on Human Rights in El 
Salvador, March 1985, p. l. 
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"461 Salvador. 
It seems that the military view the civilians living in zones under guerrilla control as fair 
game. Thus, according to Col. J. Adalberto Cruz Reyes, Commander of the Garrison in San 
Francisco Gotera, Morazan, when the FLMN (the insurgents) is present, civilians'who don't 
want to cooperate leave the area, and those who remain are collaborating'462 which means 
that bombings of civilianS463 and the use of prohibited weapons were used extensively 
against civilians. In the latter case, the air force commander stated expressly that 'before 
the US started helping us, we had to use napalm, because we did not have any other 
equipment'. 464 
Resort to aerial bombardments of civilians in particular has been, it must be stressed, 
criticised even by the Americans who by their assistance have made the Salvadoran air force 
the most powerful air force in Central America. Thus, a classified report by the US Defence 
Advisory Panel reportedly criticised those air forces. Retired Major General John Singlamb, 
the panel's head, emphasised in an interview thatdropping 500 pound bombs on insurgents 
is not the way to go, '465 and added 'there is a tendency to escalate to a higher level of 
, 466 violence than is appropriate. 
However, the bombing tactics have placed the Government in a very uncomfortable 
position, which led the President (Duarte) to issue a set of guidelines for air force pilots. 
The Directive C. 1 11.03.1984, permits aerial attacks only on mobile guerrilla forces, which 
are: (1) actually engaged in fighting with Government troops; (2) attacking a Government 
installation; or (3) moving supplies or personnel. 467 
In practice, the military, in order to give lip service to the presidential directive, have 
resorted to what they call 'softening up bombardments' (bombardo de ablan damiento)468 
which are aimed at moving the guerrillas from areas where it is supposed that they have 
contact. 
461 J-W. Hopkins (ad. ): Latin America and the Caribbean Contemporary Record. Vol. 3,1983-84, HoLms & 
Heir, New York and London, 1985, p. 526. 
462 Ibid. 
463 In this regard, see Christian Science monitor of March 26th, 1984, p. 1 and 32. 
464 OP. cit., supra. n. 457, p. 4. 
465 OP. cit., supra. n. 461, p. 526. 
466 Ibid. 
467 
For the actual. text of the Directive, see op. cit., supra n. 460, pp. 29-30. 
468 
As an exampte of such exercise, the Press Office of the Satvadoran Armed Forces (COPREFA) made some 
statements which were reported by the Satvadoran press. It is asserted that: 
"The armed forces reported that artittery units are participants in efforts to soften the 
position of the FKLN in the hitts of San Pedro and La Camparra In the Canton La Joya (San 
Vicente), white ptanes and heticopters of the air force are providing reconnaissance, 
observation and sometimes bombing services... The armed forces count on the support of the 
artittery and whenever they deem it convenient, that of aviation, in order to soften the 
positions of the guerritteros". 
lbid, pp. 27-28. 
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However, even the Americans claim that such groupings and fixed rebel installations are 
469 Opractically non-existent', which means that the civilians are the main victims in the end 
of such tactics. 
The terror tactics of the military have resulted, according to a US Senate staff report, in 
there being currently about half a million internally displaced persons in El Salvador. In 
addition, there are estimated to be another quarter million either in refugee camps in 
Honduras, Nicaragua or Costa Rica, or in Mexico. Approximately half a million more are 
believed to have fled to the US. These figures represent 25% of El Salvador's total 
470 population. 
Moreover, the International Commission of Jurists estimated in December 1986 that 
700,000 Salvadorans had fled the countryside to the cities, another 700,000 have taken 
refuge in other States. It also stated that human rights violations which spring from the 
conflict itself, including massacres in rural areas to indiscriminate bombings and death 
squad killings, have resulted in the killing of more than 40,000 persons. All this in a 
471 population of not more than 5 million. 
Furthermore, the guerrillas also are accused of some serious human rights violations. 
Thus, during 1985 the Justice and Peace Commission of the Archbishop reported 173 cases 
of persons killed, disappeared or kidnapped by the guerrillas. It was the highest number 
ever recorded since the start of the civil war. 472 However, many of the deaths attributed 
to the insurgents are due to land mines laid without proper precautions to protect guerrilla 
controlled territories. 473 
The overall impression is that the provisions concerning the protection of civilians are not 
respected, especially by Government forces. Attacks, displacements, harassments and 
killings are widely reported. 
The Government has tried in vain to mitigate the sufferings of the civilian population by 
introducing guidelines to action, especially of the air force. However, the military in the 
field do not seem to be disposed to apply them. In their view, anyone living in an area 
suspected of harbouring the guerrillas must bear the responsibility for the actions of the 
insurgents. Legal restraint seems to play no significant role in their decisions and acts. 
1.2. Nicaragua 
In the context of the Nicaraguan civil war, two important issues of humanitarian law arise. 
First, the attacks of the insurgents of essential objects of living of the civilians. Secondly 
the question of forced relocation of the Miskito Indians. 
As to the first issue, there is enough evidence to the effect that the insurgents seem to see 
469 Cited by R. Weiner: The Agony and the Exodus: Reporting Salvadorfans in Viotatfon of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention". 18 NYUJILP. 1986, p. 721. 
470 Op. cit., supra. n. 461, p. 526. 
471 The Review (ICJ), No. 37, Dec 1986, pp. 9-10. 
472 lbid, p. 11. 
473 lbid, p. 12. 
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civilians and civilian objects as a legitimate object of attack. In this context, the New York 
Tribunal on Central America and the Caribbean revealed that: 
"The Contras have conducted a campaign of terror against the civilian population of 
Nicaragua. The Contras pick out teachers, health workers and religious leaders as 
special targets of their terr 
.?. 
rist attacks. Some they kidnap, torture and Tape, some 
they murder and mutilate. " 74 
It added: 
"Over sevenýfive hundred Nicaraguans have been killed, wounded or 
disappeared. " 
The Contras also concentrated their attacks: 
"... [O]n schools, clinics, grain storage facilities, and agricultural cooperatives. In 
addition they attack targets important to the country's economy, such as major 
bridges and the fuel storage facilities. These att;, $ks have disrupted agricultural 
production and exacerbated hardship and hunger. "4 6 
As an example of the Contras' behaviour, it was reported that in the village of Abisinia 
residents watched the burning of 40 houses, the cooperative store, the community kitchen, 
the educational ministry building etc. After that, the Contras gathered people and their 
Leader said: 
"They [the civilians] should leave here or they could come back and do worse thin M' 
he said even if they rebuilt Abisinia 100 times they could destroy it 100 times.. 4 
Similarly, it was reported that in the northwestern mountain areas in Nicaragua, the FDN 
(Frente Democratico Nicaraguense) has engaged repeatedly in kidnappings, torture and 
murder of unarmed civilians, mostly in villages or farm cooperatives. Peasants have also 
complained of mortar shelling by FDN forces against villages and on cooperatives that have 
resulted in the destruction of property and the death of civilians. 478 Likewise, it was stated 
that: 
"In combination, the Contra forces have systematically violated the applicable laws 
of war throughout the conflict. They have attacked the civilians indiscriminately. 
They have tortured and mutilated prisoners. They have murdered those placed hors 
de combat by their wounds. They have taken hostages; and they have committed 
4740p. 
cit., supra. n. 458, p. 75. 
4751bid. 
476 ibid. See atso the testimony of Father Bob Stark: The effect of War: Economic Destruction and Human 
Suffering. He stated: 
"As from May 15.1984 there have been some 7391 direct victims of the war that Inctudes 2,311 
people killed. 1.900 wounded and 3,720 disappeared or kidnapped. That death toll, considered 
as a proportion of the country's total population, is three times greater than the death toll 
the US experienced in Vietnam". 
lbid, p. 95. 
477 Christian Science Monitor, Augt. 20th, 1987, p. 12. 
47SAn American Watch Report: Hunan Rights in Nicaragua, 1984, New York, pp. 44-45. 
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outrages against personal dignity. "479 
A clear conclusion could be deduced from the above: 'Violations of non-combatants' 
protection under the laws of war have been committed by all Contra groups, evidently as 
a matter of policy since 1980 and continue to the present., 480 
On the second question of the relocation of the Miskito Indians, the matter seems 
interesting, since the case of such relocations was taken to the Inter-American Commission 
of Human Rights. It illustrates clearly how in the context of a civil war the instruments of 
human rights may play a useful role in diminishing the sufferings of the civilian population. 
The Miskito population as a whole is roughly 70,000. When the counter-revolutionary 
activity began the Government decided to relocate some 8,000 civilians who lived in the Rio 
Coco. The evacuation began in 1982. It is alleged that the Government resorted to burning 
houses and livestock in order lo move the population quickly. The rationale behind the 
Government decision was that: 
"... [Tlhe resettlement will safeguard the Miskito population from attacks of counter- 
revolutionary bands, and ensures protection of their principal human right: the right 
"481 to life and the right to work in peace. 
However, the plan was envisaged to be voluntary, but circumstances changed, mainly 
because of the military situation, which led the Junta, in the words of Commander 
Campbell, to: 
"... [D]eclare this strip [of Rio Coco] territory of a high security military zone, and 
proceed to reinforce detachment. This situation meant that the civilian population was 
trapped between military forces. 9482 
In other words, it was imperative military reasons and the safety of the population itself 
which was the reason behind the Government decision to relocate the Miskito Indians. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the Government assessment of the situation was right. Thus, an 
American Watch Report considered that: 
"... [U]nder these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the decision to evacuate 
these villages was not justified by the military need to defend borders and facilities 
against attack". 483 
Then it concluded that: 
"Our opinion on this matter [of relocation] is consistent with what we stated about the 
first evacuation in our report of May 1982. We believe it is also consistent with the 
479An American Watch Report: Violations of the Laws of War by both Sides in Nicaragua, 1981-1985, R. K. 
Goldman, J. E. Mendes, Aryehmeir and Jamera Rone, C. Brown (ed. ). March 1985, p. 6. 
480 lbid, p. 40. 
481 N. Buergenthat: Human Rights: The inter-American System, Vol. 4, (Part 3. Cases and Decisions), 
Oceana Pub., 1986, p. 45. 
482 lbid, p. 44. 
4830p. 
cit., supra. n. 479, p. 11. 
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"484 standards of the international convention on the law of war. 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights also approved the contention of the 
Government that there was indeed a genuine case of emergency, since the security of the 
State was threatened. However, it found that many violations of human rights had been 
committed, many Miskitos being illegally detained under vague accusations of counter- 
revolutionary activities, and that many persons had been illegally killed. 4115 
The Commission in fact stressed that even if the Government had a right to relocate the 
Miskitos due to the military situation, it emphasised that in accordance with Article 27/1 
of the American Convention on Human Rights, the measures should be adopted for 'a 
, 486 period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation . 
The Commission then indicated that: 
"The Government should expressly declare that the Tsba Pri project [which envisaged 
the relocation of the Miskitos] may only be carried out with the Miskitos who 
voluntarily choose to remain there, and in addition, should declare that it will assist 
in resettling other Miskitos who wish to return to the Coco region, which entails 
granting them adequate compensation for the loss of their property. "487 
On the question whether the relocation process was discriminatory because it was aimed at 
a specific ethnic minority, the Commission observed: 
"In this case, the commission is of the opinion that the relocation for military reasons 
was not carried out in discriminatory fashion, but if the Miskitos are not helped to 
return to the Coco river region once the military emergency is over, their prolonged 
"488 stay in Tasba Pri will become a form of discriminatory punishment. 
However, it is to be noted that in a note dated 15th June, 1982, addressed by the 
Nicaraguan Government to the Commission, the former stated that: 
"When the danger on the border is over those who wish to return to their places of 
origin may do so, and the Government of Nicaragua has surpassed the adequate 
compensation suggested by giving these Nicaraguan citizens land homes, seeds, 
"48V fertilizers and farm tools, and medical attention without charge. 
Moreover, the ICRC Worldwide 1986 observes that: 
4841bid. 
485 The American Watch Report of March 1985 in fact, found that: 
Nln the case of the Nicaraguan Government. major abuses were committed in December 1981, when 
its forces massacred 14 to 17 Miskitos and Lermus, and in 1982 when its forces massacred 7 
Miskitos at Watpasksa and when they caused some 70 Miskitos to disappear". 
lbid, p. 4. 







"These people [Miskitos] who had been displaced in 1981 because of the conflict had 
returned to their homes near the Honduran border, but were completely destitute". 490 
This means that many promises were not kept. Nevertheless, there is tangible evidence that 
the Government has done its best to improve its relations with the Miskito population. 
Thus, certain officials who were involved in the violations of human rights were dismissed 
and replaced. Also on I December 1983 the Government issued Decree No. 1352, granting 
amnesty to all Miskitos who had been accused of violent activities taking place after 
December I st, 198 1; and in its Decree No. 1353 of December 4th, 1983, all Nicaraguans (not 
limited therefore to Miskitos) who had left the country were offered the opportunity to 
return without fear of prosecution, whether they had actively participated in 'counter- 
revolutionary' activities or not. 491 
This case shows clearly how an approach based on human rights law may very well, and 
indeed can, solve real problems of humanitarian law, in this case the question of relocation 
and displacements which are dealt with in Article 17 of Protocol IL 
The Commission argued the problem on the basis of the right of residence and movement, 
and the suspension of guarantees during the State of emergency. The Commission did not 
refer at all to Protocol 11, which is understandable since Nicaragua has not indicated its 
acceptance. The Government in fact chose an approach based on human rights, which 
means that it accepts wholeheartedly human rights as a limitation on its sovereignty. 
An approach based on human rights is preferred in this case by the Government because 
it does not involve either directly or indirectly, the implication of recognising the insurgents 
or giving them any legal status. In fact its claim to be the sole legitimate and legal authority 
within the State is preserved. 
1.3. Other Cases 
The Practice after the adoption of Protocol 11 offers many instances in ongoing civil wars 
that civilians were simply considered as a lawful object of attack. This is due in my 
opinion, mainly to two reasons. Either because the weapons or the methods of war are 
indiscriminate in their effects, or it is a deliberate attempt to break the will and morale of 
the civilians in order to force the Government to negotiate. 
In Angola and Mozambique, the insurgents, respectively UNITA and RENAMO 
especially, lead a terrible war against civilians. The latter become the first target of attack 
and military objectives are in second place. 
Thus, as concerns Angola it is reported that: 
"The most disturbing aspect of UNITA's campaign ... is the degree to which it increasingly resembles the brutal st%tegy employed by RENAMO in Mozambique, 
with similarly devastating effectS. "49 
490 The ICRC Wortdwide 1986, ICRC PubLications, Switzertard, p. 15. 
491 Op. cit., supra. n. 478, p. 14. 
492 Africa Report: Angola: War, Politics and Famine. March-Aprit 1988. p. 42. 
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Angola in fact, has become the home of the largest number of amputees in the world. It is 
estimated that 20,000 civilians have lost arms, legs or both. 493 Moreover, clinics, schools, 
grain storage facilities and other infrastructure essential to a functioning rural life have 
been systematically destroyed by the insurgents. Land mines laid along fields and roads have 
made cultivation impossible in very large areas of the country, which led to a massive 
displacement of civilians. Their number is estimated to be, as a minimum, between 600,000 
494 and 700,000 persons. 
Furthermore, the insurgents in Angola are using terror tactics against the civilians, in 
contravention of the spirit and the letter either of Protocol 11 or Article 3, or indeed any 
legal or humanitarian standard. 
In Mozambique the situation is worse. Renamo, the insurgents organisation, has been said 
by Chester Crocker, the top US State Department specialist on Africa, to be 'the creation 
495 of alien forces" and a 'largely destructive army with little homegrown legitimacy'. 
Thus, in a Government assessment of the situation in early 1988 it is revealed that in 
addition to the destruction of roads, railways and bridges, the insurgents destroyed 1800 
health centres, 720 schools, 900 rural shops, 1300 lorries and 44 agricultural enterprises, 
496 including major tea and sugar factories. 
In addition, there is strong evidence that rebels operate slave labour camps. In this 
context, it was reported that rebels hold tens of thousands of peasants in slave labour camps, 
which operate as supply bases for therebels. It was stated that: 
"The existence of the camps, ea containing as many as 3000 prisoners, has been 'Y' 
reported by escaping inmates". 49 
It is estimated that by the beginning of 1988 a total of 5,000,000 subsistence farmers had 
been forced from their lands; rebels slaughtered livestock, burned grain stocks and even 
blocked springs and wells, sometimes with corpses. 498 
Moreover, Bob Geldof, who visited Mozambique, was reported as saying that 'the right- 
wing Renamo forces have terrorised the economy, attacking mainly civilian targets. '499 He 
revealed that: 
4931bid. See atso Christian Science monitor, JuLy 20th, 1987. p. 13. Moreover, the ICRC WorLdwide 1988 
reports as an exanpLe that "the orthopaedic workshop run by the ICRC in Bomba ALta ... operated at fuLL 
capacity throughout the year. In 1988 the two workshops produced 1,250 and 310 prostheses 
respectiveLy". ICRC WorLdwide 1988, p. 8. 
494 Op. cit., supra. n. 492, pp. 42-43. 
495 Christian Science Monitor, Augt. 3rd, 1987, p. 9 
49636 Keesing's. 1988, p. 35685. 
49724 Africa Research Bultetin (PoLitical, Issues), 1987, p. 8406. 
4980P. 
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499The Guardian, Dec 14th, 1987, p. 4. 
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*... [Ilf a town is dependent on a sugar refinery they will blow that u They I 
specifically go in and kill huge numbers of people in the most brutal way.. 
360 
He concluded by stating that the rebels 'think it out in a very clear-cut way how to 
brutalise and terrorise a people and render the economy a shambles. '501 
However, the tragedy of Homoine village, which occurred in July 1987, in fact, revealed 
beyond any doubt the tactics of Renamo. According to official figures 386 people were 
killed within 5 hours. The majority were civilians. The attackers, according to eye 
witnesses, went from 'straw hut to straw hut, kicking and killing people inside., 502 They 
also opened fire on patients of the local hospital and on women and children who had 
sought refuge there when the shooting started. Following the massacre 3,000 people fled 
from the town in fear. 503 
It seems that in Angola, and especially in Mozambique, the insurgents respect no 
restraints whatsoever. They conduct a viciously bloody war against the entire population 
with no respect for basic humanitarian norms. This makes any attempt to apply 
humanitarian law unlikely, since Governments in power view these organisations as bands 
of criminals financed and directed by outsiders, specifically South Africa. 
In Afghanistan, it seems that the massacre of civilians has attained record levels. 
According to the Bibliotheca Afghanica (a research institute in Switzerland) one million 
Afghan civilians are believed to have died in the war so far. Moreover, some 80,000 
guerrilla and 15,000 to 20,000 Soviet troops are believed to have been killed. 504 Thus, the 
proportion of civilian deaths is immensely higher. According to one source, the cause of 
such huge numbers of victims is mainly due to the fact that: 
"Moscow and Kabul's policy of so-called "migratory genocide'- massacres, bombing 
of villages and destruction of crops has created the world's largest refugee population. 
Some 5 million Afghans, from a pre-war population of 15 to 17 million have fled the 
country. "505 
Similarly, in a report for preseniation to the UNCHR, it is alleged that the Afghan 
Government forces and 'foreign forces' were waging a campaign of 'systematic brutality 
against the rural civilian population as a scorched earth policy was radically altering the 
country's demographic structure., 506 
Moreover, in another report, it was revealed with concrete examples the tactics used by 
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resorted to indiscriminate bombings, reprisal killings and massacres, summary executions 
and random killings, killing of farmers, destruction of food supplies, destruction of 
irrigation works, arrest, forced conscription, torture and the use of anti-personel mineS. 507 
It must be indicated that the Government forces are not alone in committing horrible acts 
against the civilians. The insurgents frequently attack civilian targets, especially in the 
cities. 508 Finally, a report prepared to the UNCHR in 1988 seems to suggest that there is 
'some improvement in the human rights situation'509 '- and then added that 
'serious 
contraventions of humanitarian law and human rights had taken place in combat areas. 
In Lebanon, a report published by the Government on Ist October, 1987 estimated the 
total number of people killed as a result of 12 years of civil war as 130,000 with 14,000 
kidnaps being reported. The situation in Lebanon is unique. The Government is helpless in 
the face of warring factions occupying different parts of the country, together with Syria 
and Israel. Fighting is endless; civilians are caught in the middle and they are the greatest 
victims. 
Thus, in the war of camps between Amal organisation and the Palestinians, the former 
held the occupants of the camps responsible until those who carried arms gave up their 
weapons. They were in fact held as hostages. This policy, combined with preventing all 
relief to the camps and preventing even women, children and the elderly from leaving the 
camps, seems to indicate that a policy of genocide and total war was going on. Only the 
entry of the Syrian troops seems to have brought this unhappy situation to an end. 
To conclude, it seems fair to me, to say that the situation of civilians in internal conflicts 
is worsening all the time, due especially to the increased availability of highly sophisticated 
and destructive weapons. This state of affairs is compounded by the total absence of 
adherence of the warring parties to any humanitarian standard. There is an all too frequent 
assumption that in internal conflicts all means of crushing the enemy are legitimate. 
Moreover, it is evident that foreign assistance to some insurgent movements. such as the 
Contras, RENAMO and UNITA, which observe few limits on their military actions, has 
given them all the means to pursue a policy of real terror against civilians. 
These cases indicate that if the parties to the conflict adhered to the basic rules laid down 
in Protocol Il concerning civilians, many cases of human suffering would be prevented, and 
human lives would be spared. However, the case of the Nicaraguan civil war seems to 
suggest that the Government has tried to adhere to certain humanitarian rules, not through 
the recognition of the application either of Article 3 or Protocol 11, but through a human 
rights approach. The reason is in order to escape the implication that the Government 
regards the insurgents as having a legal status. 
2. The Practice vis-i-vis the Protection of Captured, Interned -and Detained Persons In 
connection with Internal Conflicts after the Adoption of Protocol II 
507 A Report from Hetsinki Watch: Tears, Stood and Cries. Human Rights In Afghanistan Since the 
Invasion 1979-1984, Dec 1984, New York, pp. 23-80. 




The situation of detained and interned persons in connection with internal conflicts is 
mixed. The emergency legislation of many States which was adopted after Protocol II, at 
least on paper, affords the necessary standards of due process and fair trial. On the other 
hand, the practice in the field of combat and in detention centres and courts is a little 
different. 
2.1. Emergency Legislation and Detained and Interned Persons In Connection with the 
Conf lict 
In Nicaragua the Junta of National Reconstruction promulgated the Fundamental Statute 
on 20 July 1979, that is before the outbreak of the civil war. This statute protects the right 
to life, liberty and security of person, also the right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest 
or detention and the right of everyone charged with a penal offence to all the guarantees 
necessary for his defence. Article 5 in fact provides that: 
"The right to life is inviolable and inherent in the human person. There shall be no 
death penalty in Nicaragua. "510 
The abolition of the death penalty was established even in the Law on Military Offences, 
(Decree No. 600). Thus, the death penalty does not exist, even in the case of internal war. 
Moreover, Article 6 of the Fundamental Statute deals with the rights of defendants. It 
stipulates that: 
"All persons shall be entitled to respect for their physical, mental and moral integrity. 
Punishment shall not extend beyond the offender himself. No one shall be subjected 
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It shall not be 
permitted to impose a penalty which, either severally or collectively, lasts for over 
30 years. "S" 
These rights, according to Article 49 of the Statute, are protected even in cases of 
emergencies which threaten the life of the nation. 
The Prevention of Terrorism Act (Decree No. 5 of 29 August 1979) established special 
courts to deal with questions of order and security. However, these courts have never been 
created, which means that even offences related to the conflict are dealt with by the 
ordinary courts, which affords all the guarantees necessary for fair trial. 
This means that the situation in Nicaragua; at least according to its laws, guarantees all 
the rights of those who committed offences in relation to the conflict. Its laws are in total 
accordance with human rights instruments, and even better than Protocol 11, since the death 
penalty is not prohibited in the latter. 
In Sri-Lanka the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which came into operation on 20 July 
1979, was enacted to deal with the situation of civil war. It con tains some safeguards for 
persons arrested or detained for offences related to the conflict. 
Thus, according to the Act's section 6 the power of arrest is given only to a speclific 
person (the superintendent), provided that he is authorised in writing to do so. The arrested 
510Yearbook 




person must be informed duly for the reason of his arrest, and when he is taken to custody, 
he is served with a copy of the detention order. The latter must contain the reason for his 
detention and the place of such detention. 512 
However, the act was criticised by Leary, in her view, certain of its provisions were 
unduly vague, created offences retroactively and provided for detention Incommunicado 
contrary to internationally accepted standards. 513 
In El Salvador cases of treason, espionage, rebellion, sedition and other offences against 
the peace or independence of the State, according to the emergency legislation, are dealt 
with by military courts, 514 which are generally severe, and afford no guarantees of due 
process and fair trial. 
In December 1980, under another Decree No. 507, even the Military Code procedures 
were seen as not meeting the needs of the situation. A special regime was brought into 
operation. Thus, even persons under the age of 16 years may be tried for the crimes cited 
above. 
Moreover, under the above decree, those suspected of crimes against the State could be 
held incommunicado for up to 180 days. If no proof of guilt had been established by the 
end of this period a sentence of four months corrective detention could nevertheless be 
515 imposed. This means that even in the legislation itself, the elementary rules of penal law 
were not respected, in contravention of all international instruments on human rights. 
It is to be noted that many States facing civil wars have in recent times resorted 
frequently to the use of amnesty, by releasing those who were charged with crimes and 
offences in relation to the conflict. However, the motivation is always political, e. g. to 
encourage national conciliation. 516 
2.2. The Practice In the Field 
The practice shows that in many instances persons captured and detained for offences in 
connection with the conflict are harshly treated. In Angola, the death penalty awaits all 
those who commit crimes against State security and endangering the revolution. The penalty 
applies to civilians as well as foreigners. The crimes involve: treason, spying, the exposure 
of the country to armed aggression or the spreading of false information damaging to the 
good name of Angola. 517 The Government had resorted to the execution of UNITA 
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In El Salvador, it seems that the situation of captured combatants, either of the 
Government or the insurgents, is slightly better. Thus, it was stated that: 
"... [In respect of treatment of captured soldiers] the practice of the FMLN compares 
very favourably with the practice of the Salvadoran armed forces. As best as we can 
determine, the Salvadoran armed forces rarely take POW from among guerrilla 
combatantS. "519 
Then it was added that: 
"There are apparently no prisoner of war camps in El Salvador nor are there captured 
"520 guerrilla combatants in Marrona prison. 
Moreover, it was revealed that the FMLN continued to release captured soldiers through 
the ICRC, and that a handful of guerrilla combatants are known to have been taken alive 
and exchanged for high ranking prisoners captured by the FMLN. 521 
Thus, in El Salvador, it is the civilians who are accused of collaborating with the 
insurgents who are the victims of the violations of the most elementary principles of fair 
trial and justice. 
In Nicaragua, the insurgents especially are accused of resorting simply to the killing of 
any Government soldiers who fall into their hands, especially the FDN and the Misura- 
522 Misurasata have summarily executed prisoners. 
As to the Government, according to American Watch reports, the most serious complaints 
about the treatment of detainees refer to detention centres that are not under the 
jurisdiction of the penitentiary system, but of the security police centres. The abuses are 
mainly present in the interrogation period. 
However, the reports confirm that the procedures before the courts which deal with 
detainees for offences in relation to the conflict, conform to the due process requirements. 
Thus, defendants are given an opportunity to be confronted with evidence against them, 
to make personal appearances before the court, to present evidence on their own behalf, and 
to be assisted by counsel. Sentences seem to be based on evidence. The courts must explain 
523 their findings. 
In Afghanistan, the situation is very bad for detained persons, either civilian or military. 
It is revealed that 'widespread and systematic' abuses of human rights exist. Civilian 
detainees in the country's prisons were regularly subjected to electric shocks, beatings and 
other forms of torture. Moreover, the general conditions in prisons were severely criticised. 
It was reported that extra-judicial executions and detention without trial of people 
"90p. 
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524 suspected of sympathising with the rebels had occurred . 
There is also evidence that the Government forces and the Soviet Union do not take 
prisoners. They just kill them. In this context. a Soviet soldier was asked how the Soviets 
treated Afghan prisoners and he replied 'they destroy theM. '525 
It is reported that prisoners accused of offences relating to the conflict wait some months 
without charge or trial. They cannot meet family or lawyers, confront witnesses or prepare 
a defence. In many cases, the main evidence is a confession obtained under torture. The 
accused are judged bya revolutionary court". The latter, in fact, always confirms the Khad 
(the secret police) verdict. Moreover, no appeals from the decision of the revolutionary 
court are allowed. The death penalty may be imposed and carried out. 
526 
The conclusion in regard to prisoners, detained and interned persons in connection with 
offences in relation to internal conflicts is mixed. In a few cases, like in Nicaragua there 
is enough evidence that the Government has tried its best to conform to the general 
standards concerning the treatment of detained and interned persons. The main reason 
seems to be political. The Government seeks to prove to the world that it is respectful of 
human rights, even in extreme circumstances of internal conflict. However, in the other 
cases, it seems that detained persons, who are in the majority civilians, suffer greatly from 
the conditions of detention which are very bad, and especially from outright violations of 
the most fundamental rules of due process and fair trial. 
It seems that Governments in these instances use the non-respect of the basic standards 
of penal law and the suspension of rights and freedoms of individuals as a real tactic of 
terror in order to make the population abandon its collaboration with its enemies. However, 
these tactics, as experiences show in Algeria, Vietnam and other cases, are counter- 
productive, since many innocent people become victims. Hence, it is the Government which 
makes them new recruits of the insurgents. 
Besides, it seems that the patient policies of the ICRC have led many Governments in 
recent times to allow the representatives of the Red Cross to visit the detainees and 
detention centres. Those visits generally end with promises from Governments, and even 
insurgent movements, to make their situation better. During those visits, the ICRC 
endeavour to distribute relief, and facilitates the problem of correspondence between the 
detainees and their families. This happened in Afghanistan, El Salvador, Lebanon and 
527 Mozambique. 
It seems that the new international climate, in which the super-powers seem to be willing 
to resolve many outstanding conflicts by encouraging negotiation between the warring 
factions in countries faced by civil wars, goes towards explaining why the established 
Governments in those countries are trying to amend their positions. This state of affairs 
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may help pave the way towards an ultimate solution; tragedy and suffering will never aid 
such that course of action. 
Again it is very clear that the rules of the protection of detained and interned persons for 
offences relating to the conflict, contained in Protocol 11, seem to offer (if adhered to by 
the parties to the conflict) a solid humanitarian ground for solving many problems and 
plights of that category of victims of internal conflicts. 
3. The Practice and the Protection of the Sick and Wounded 
The practice concerning the protection of the wounded and sick is in general favourable. 
There are no systematic violations of the basic rules relating to the protection of that 
category. However, there are some examples, especially of violation of some basic 
obligations in relation to the protection of medical personnel, medical units and 
transportation; the non-respect of the Red Cross emblem, and even of killing the wounded 
and sick and preventing their assistance. 
Thus, in Lebanon the ICRC delegate was kidnapped in December 1988. Death threats 
were made against those who work with the ICRC, which led to the suspension of its 
valuable activities for seven weeks in 1989. However, in March 1989, and after intensive 
contacts, it was able to resume its activities. 528 Moreover, the ICRC in its Worldwide Report 
of 1986 indicated that some workers of the Red Cross were " 
killed and some injured because 
the Red Cross emblem, which was supposed to protect them, was not respected. 529 
Furthermore, vehicles and relief supplies were stolen, and on several occasions the ICRC 
delegates were prevented from assisting the wounded. 530 
Further, in its Worldwide Report of 1988 the ICRC noted that "ICRC delegates together 
with volunteers from the Lebanese Red Cross, evacuated and cared for the wounded, 
distributed food and relief and returned the dead to their families. "531 In its Bulletin of 
June 1989, the ICRC indicated that its delegates continued to provide medicines and 
medical material for hospitals treating victims of the conflict. A medical programme for 
over 140 dispensaries was set up in the south to deal with the influx of refugees coming 
from Beirut. 532 
In Nicaragua, there are some indications that especially the Contras resorted in some 
instances resorted to the killing of wounded opponents. In fact the American Watch attested 
to that. 533 However, the same report made clear that the ICRC vehicles that were clearly 
marked did not experience any difficulties in their mission of assisting the wounded and 
528 ICRC Buttetfn, March 1989, No. 158, p. l. 
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534 displaced persons. 
In El Salvador its seems that the situation is in general very positive. The ICRC and the 
local Red Cross organisation work in the conflict area, evacuating the wounded from the 
combat zones to hospitals. Moreover, they constituted medical mobile teams. Their work 
535 consisted in giving medical aid and dental consultation and vaccinations. 
Furthermore, it is reported by the ICRC that at the end of June 1987 an agreement was 
signed by both parties to the conflict authorising the ICRC to organise the transfer abroad 
for medical treatment of 98 war invalids opposed to the Government. 536 
The ICRC Worldwide of 1988 indicates that the ICRC is working without any major 
difficulties in assisting medically those in need, especially in areas where violence is taking 
537 place. 
In Afghanistan during the first years of the conflict, the situation for the sick and 
wounded was bad. There is in fact, evidence that the Soviet-Afghan military units have 
searched for and arrested civilian medical personnel, who assisted and cared for the 
wounded insurgents. Further, Soviet aircraft bombed hospitals. Nor was ICRC allowed to 
provide medical care for victims of the confliCt. 
538 
According to the ICRC, the situation is becoming more promising for the wounded and 
sick. The ICRC works without difficulty. Many hospitals were opened, through the 
invaluable help of the ICRC, to care for the wounded. Thus, it was reported: 
"Despite extremely precarious security conditions, ICRC delegates and doctors made 
several trips to the provinces of Balkh in the north of the country, and Herat in the 
north west, where they provided mergency medical assistance to the regional 
hospitals caring for war casualties. 115S9 
In 1989, the ICRC embarked on large-scale operation, in setting up bases, first aid posts 
and surgical hospitals to deal with the increased number of wounded and sick. 540 
In Angola, despite the crash of one of its aircraft in October 1987, and the eventual 
killing of 8 of its delegates, which led to the suspension of all its activities in the country, 
the ICRC in February 1988 has resumed its activities to deal especially with the wounded, 
where there is an increased influx of people wounded by the fighting. 
The conclusion is that, in relation to the protection of the wounded and sick, 
Governments and insurgents alike are in general ready to cooperate, at least on an ad hoc 
basis, or through the ICRC, to deal with the problems of that category of victims of war, 
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of the argument of sovereignty and in that respect humanitarianism seems to win the day 
in this important aspect of internal war. 
338 
CHAPTER FIVE 
COMPLIANCE WITH AND IMPLEMENTATION 
OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 
Introduction 
One of the most difficult problems of international law is the question of its enforcement 
and implementation. Unlike domestic law, where there is an authority which monitors its 
application and has the material and legal capabilities which makes it capable of punishing 
those who may breach its provisions. In international law, there is no such authority above 
the States obliging them to conform to the law, which means that violations may go 
unpunished. 
This state of affairs, led in legal theory to a lively discussion on the nature of international 
law. Some writers had simply claimed that international law, is not a law at all, to them it 
is a mere moral, devoid of any obligatory force. 
' 
However, the majority opinion acknowledges that international law is law; but its 
elaboration and application methods differ from domestic law, since it is a law between 
States and not above them. Thus, in an arbitration between the O. S. K. and the owners of 
the S. S. Prometheus. The acting Chief Justice stated in a case involving a charter-party 
stipulation that the vessel was not to carry contraband of war (during the Russo-Japanese 
war): 
"It was contended on behalf of the owner of the Prometheus that the term law as 
applied to this recognised system of principles and rules known as international law 
is an inexact expression, that there is, in other words no such thing as international 
law; that there can be no such law binding upon all nations inasmuch as there is no 
sanction of the law, that is to say that there is no means by which obedience to such 
law can be imposed upon any given nation refusing obedience thereto. "2 
However, the acting Chief Justice did not support this assertion, he stressed: 
"I do not concur in that contention. In my opinion a law may be established and 
become international law, that is binding upon all nations by the agreement of such 
nations to be bound thereby, although it may be i T3POSSible to enforce obedience 
thereto by any given nation party to the agreement. " 
He then added: 
"... [T]he resistance of a nation to a law to which it has agreed does not derogate from 
the authority of the law because that resistance cannot perhaps, be overcome. Such 
resistance merely makes the resisting nation a breacher of the law to which it has 
given its adherence but leaves the law, to the establishment of which, the resisting 
'See J. Austin: Lectures on Jurisprudence. 4th ed. Rev. & ed. by R. Campbell. John Murray, London, 
1873, pp. 81-106; and for a thorough discussion of the question whether International taw is taw, see: 
A. D'Amato: International Law: Process and Prospect. Transnationat Pub., Inc. Dobbs Ferry, New York 
1987, pp. 1-26. 
2W. Bishop: International. Law: Cases and Materiats. 3rd ed. Brown, Boston Littte, 1971, p. 10. 
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"4 nation was a party subsisting . 
In other words, the absence of means of redress in case of the breach of rules of 
international law, does not affect its claim that it is law. 
However, such assertion does not solve the question of how then international law is to 
be made effective. Hackworth notes in this respect, that it is the will of the State which can 
make law effective and also: 
"... [I]n the State's ultimate responsibility for its own action or failure to act, in its fear 
of war or reprisals in the effect of world opinion, or in the combination of any two 
or more of these. "' 
Thus, it is essentially such means as reprisals and wars which are mutual in character (in 
other words which depend directly on the will of the States) which serve to enforce the law. 
To me, this is due to the important influence of ideas of sovereignty and non- intervention, 
which exclude third party or centralised machinery, which can supervise the application of 
international law. This opinion has been clearly stated by Lauterpacht, who writes: 
"... [T]he function of law is to regulate the conduct of men by reference to rules whose 
formal-as distinguished from their historical- source of validity lies, in the last resort, 
in a precept imposed from outside. Within the community of nations this essential 
feature of the rule of law is constantly put in jeopardy by the conception of the 
sovereignty of States which reduces the binding force of international law from the 
will of each individual member of the international community. "6 
In practice, this meant that the conception of sovereignty, has blocked any significant 
development, in the area of providing adequate means for supervising the implementation 
of international law. 
Returning now to humanitarian law, which is a part of international law, it is asserted 
that the question of enforcement, supervision, control and implementation of its rules, is 
of fundamental value, since lives of human beings are at stake in the event of its breach. 
Thus, if the belligerents do not respect the principle of distinction between combatants 
and non-combatants, then it is clear that the right to life would be fair game, since 
innocents can be attacked, women and chilren would be murdered. 
However, despite the urgency and great need for suitable machinery which can be used 
to supervise the application of law in times of war hence, reducing the risk of gross 
violations of the law. Forsythe has observed that: 
"The practice of supervising the law of armed conflict has been little known, little 
"7 understood, and little studied . 
4 Ibid. p. 10. 
5 Nackworth: Digest of International. Law. Vol. 1, Government Printing Off Ice, Washington, D. C., 1940, 
p. 12. 
6 H. Lauterpacht: The Function of Law in the Internationat Community. Ciarendon Press. oxford, 1933, 
p. 3. 
TD. Forsythe: Who Guards the Guardians. 76 AJIL, 1976, p. 41. 
340 
A very similar point has been stressed by Aldrich the US Deputy Legal Advisor to the State 
Department, who maintained in April 13th, 1973 that: 
" ... [D]eficiencies are 
found in both substance of existing law [humanitary law] in its 
application and enforcement. Of the two the latter is, in our view, the more 
"8 important and probably correct. 
Then, the question of compliance has been considered as one of the most difficult questions 
of humanitarian law. This applies to both international and non- international conflict. 
However, to me, the question must be seen as acute in non -international conflicts. Since if 
even in international wars compliance poses great and complicated problems between 
subjects of international law, then in civil wars, the question is even worse. The reason 
for this being that one of the parties is considered by the other as no more than a band of 
criminals, which results, in many cases, that no standards are to be respected when dealing 
them. 
Moreover, compliance in practice may involve first, some kind of third party control over 
the actions of the parties, for the established Government, this would restrict its freedom 
of action in dealing with its enemies, since its acts would be under international scrutiny. 
Secondly the mere fact of accepting such machinery, is bound to give certain legal status 
to its enemies, and in any event it would be seen as intervention in its internal affairs. 
My aim in this chapter, is to reveal the role of the principles of sovereignty and non- 
intervention in blocking any attempt at the normative level for bringing any obligations on 
the field of ensuring respect for humanitarian law. That is the stopping of any machinery 
for the control of the application of humanitarian law in internal conflicts. It must be 
stressed at the outset that the term compliance as used in this chapter, includes the ideas of 
implementation, enforcement and supervision. 9 In general all means of ensuring respect for 
the law. 
SECTION I: Customary International Law, and the Question of Compliance with the Laws 
of War In General 
A. Introduction 
Thr rule is that customs and usages of war are applicable only between States. Their respect 
was not based on any system of third party machinery, it was exclusively based on the idea 
of self-help. 
By reason of its sovereignty, each actor on the international stage was authorised to 
respond in its own way to any alleged violations of the laws of war. Pictet summed up the 
practice in the antiquity concerning the sanctioning of those who commit crimes during the 
war. He observed: 
8A. W. Rovine: Digest of United States Practice in 'Internationat Law. (1973), State Dept Pub., 
Washington, D. C., 1976. pp. 492-493. 
9 Draper defines Implementation as 'those devices, Institutions and rules designed to monitor and 
ensure its observance' and defines enforcement as $the collection of mechanisms and rules available 
to the taw of war to secure the restoration of observance when that taw has been violated. 1 G. I. A. D. 
Draper: The Implementation and Enforcement of the Geneva Convention and the Additional Protocols of 1978. RCADI, 1979/111, P-9. 
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"Dans I'antiquit6, on chatiait parfois des capitaines pour avoir trahi a -failli, mais on ne songait gu6re A leur reprocher leur cruaut6". 10 -ýY 
Thus, sanctions of soldiers occured only when they violate their allegiance to their 
sovereign, whereas committing horrible crimes against enemy soldiers or civilians were not 
considered worthy of punishment. This appears to me the logic of absolute sovereignty. 
However, it must be noted that the mere development of a body of rules concerning the 
conduct of war jus In bello must be considered in itself as a means of restricting the horrors 
of war, and implicitly a primitive way of ensuring respect for lives of human beings and 
their property. 
History also gives us some examples of primitive methods of controlling the application 
of what is called 'the laws of arms. ' The latter has been defined by Keen as: 
"... [T]he law of arms was an international law, but the middle ages knew of no 
permanent international court in which international cases could be tried. "" 
He cited many cases which had been brought before courts especially in France and Britain, 
concerning the question of ransom. 
The 'law of arms' in the Middle Ages allowed the freeing of captured soldiers on the 
condition of paying ransom. However, some captives upon their return just forgot about 
their deals. Permanent courts were established to deal with the problem and many cases 
were brought before them. 12 
In England, it was the Court of Chancery which dealt with such matters, and was 
presided by the Earl Marshall and the High Constable, and sat at the White Chamber at 
Westminster, and heard cases at least from the reign of Edward 111.13 The courts of these 
Constables and Marshals were permanent courts because they were permanent tribunals with 
14 settled jurisdiction. They were open to suitors who wished to bring cases at any time. 
The main weakness of such system was, in my opinion, that the courts were essentially 
only open to disputes between knights. They involved high costs, delays and travel. The 
questions raised in front of them were mainly concerned financial dealings and 
undertakings, humanitarian motives toward the wider population were not involved. 
The military law which developed thereafter, in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries 
responded essentially to the changes which took place in the organisation of armies. Armies 
based largely on feudal levies were replaced by more professional armies, many being 
composed largely of mercenaries and commanded by nobles and condottiere. The latter 
subjected their mercenary armies to harsh discipline. 
10 J. Pictet: Evolution du droit international p6nat, in Hangartner at at., (eds. ), op. cit., supra. 
chapter 3, n. 167, p. 206. 
"M. N. Keen: The Laws of War in the Middle Ages. Routtedge & Paul, London. Univ. of Toronto Press, 
Toronto. 1965, p. 23. 
12 Examples of such cases can be found In see Keen, Ibid, p. 24-44. 
13 Ibid, p. 27. 
14 Ibid, p. 28. 
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Many States resorted to enactment of military laws, in order to keep discipline and thus, 
effectiveness in the field. The Swedish Kings Gustavus Adolphus, Charles X and Charles 
XI as well as Czar Peter the Great issued 'War Articles' which contained severe punishments 
for certain crimes committed during war. 
Under the Czar Peter the Great War Articles of 1716 mutiny, killing of prisoners of war, 
women, children, clergymen and the aged, and the burning of churches, Schools and 
hospitals, were heavily punished. 
However, Rosenblad rightly observed: 
"... [T]he military law thus implemented was as a rule not enacted for humanitarian 
considerations. Rather it was proclaimed for military reasons, inasmuch as 
maintaining strict discipline was rightly held to be an indispensable key to success 
in warfare". 15 
This system basically serves the practical interests of the State concerned in maintaining a 
disciplined and strong army. The State was the judge in its own case, there was no room for 
third party control. The main conclusion is that there is no system of control beyond the 
will of the State, which reflects accurately the weight of the concept of sovereignty at that 
time. 
Moreover, it is maintained that military law was enacted essentially to rule the army in 
times of war against other States, that is in international wars and not in internal wars, 
which means there were no normative or procedural rules concerning such wars. The 
absolute concept of sovereignty was totally ascendent in such situations with all its grave 
practical consequences vis-AL-vis rebels and those who assist them. 
B. Classical Writers and the Question of Compliance with the Laws of War 
The importance of classical writers views and writings lies in the fact that they influenced 
the theoretical foundations and the subsequent development of the laws of war. Thus, it is 
necessary to return to them to trace the beginning of ideas, rules and procedures of the laws 
of war. 
It can be safely stated at the outset that no writer dealt directly with the questions of 
implementation and enforcement of the laws of war. This, in my opinion, was a logical 
situation, since at that time the most important issue was to provide substantive rules which 
mitigate the sufferings of the victims of war. They concentrated on proving the usefulness 
of accepting a body of rules of Jus In bello, in conducting wars, rather than providing 
means of ensuring respect for such rules. 
However, to this general observation, it is necessary to make some exceptions, since 
indirect references to the quest of compliance can be found from time to time. 
1. Franciscus De Victoria 
He developed certain limits to the idea of just war and made recourse to war restricted. 
Thus, diversity of religion, extension of an Empire and personal glory or advantage were 
not just causes of war. According to him 'seule, une injustice peut constituter une juste 
15Rosenbiad, op. cit., supra. chapter 4, n. 389, p. 9. 
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cause de la guerre'. 16 Once the justice of war is clear, he argued: 
"ll est permis de faire tout Ce qui est n6cessaire pour ddfendre le bien public. Cest 
6vident, car le but de la guerre est de d6fendre et de prot6ger I'Etat". 1 
Accordingly, he adds that: 
"ll est permis de recouvrir tous les biens perdus ou leur 6quivalent. Cela est tTOP 
6vident pour avoir besoin de preuves, car c'est dans ce but que l'on entreprent ou que 
l'on fait la guerre. " 18 
Moreover, the Prince may in his view: 
"... [M]8me aller plus loin, dans la m6sure oü c'est n6cessaire pour obtenir des enemis 
la paix et la securit6". 19 
These sweeping pronouncements would imply that once the just cause of a war is 
established, then every means of conducting the war is justified which, in fact, negates the 
essence of the Jus In bello, and hence there is no rule to observe in just war. This means in 
other words since there are no rules to be respected, logically there is no system of 
enforcing them. 
However, Victoria made several references to unlawful actions even in just wars-20 He 
envisaged even in just wars, a possible punishment for those soldiers who may loot or burn 
21 without authority. In this case, they are bound to make restitution. 
Victoria also admitted the possibility of the claim that the war may be just on both sides, 
which in his view may be attributed to ignorance. In these circumstances, only god knows 
which side is fighting a just war. In such a situation, Johnson stressed that Victoria was of 
the opinion that: 
"... [T]he belligerent should be chastened in the realisation that both sides might seem 
to be equally in the right, and so be especially scrupulous in observing the jus In 
"22 bello, the rules of war. 
16D. 
cle Victoria: Lecons sur Les fncliens et sur te drolt de guerre. Introduction, tracluction et notes 








"De soi, it West jwwis permis de tuer votontafrement un Innocent". 
He then added that: 
"It West pas permis de punir des Innocents pour tes fautes des m6chants". 
lbid, p. 139. 
211bid, 
p. 151. 
22j. J. Turner: Ideotogy, Reason and the Limitation of War: ReLlgious and SecuLar Concepts 1200-1740. 
PUP, Princeton, 1975, p. 20. 
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Thus, the doctrine of 'simultaneous ostensible justice', plays a fundamental role in making 
the parties observe and comply with the rules of war. Ferencz observed concerning 
Victoria's contributions to the laws of war and its enforcement: 
"Many of Victoria"s ideas, articulated in the first half of the 16th century, such as 
elements of a definition of aggression, the limits of permissible self-defence, 
proportionality, restraints on wanton destruction, the notion of military necessity, 
responsibility of heads of State and the unavailability of superior orders as a defense, 
were early forerunners of doctrines that were to become accepted principles of 
"23 international criminal law four centuries later. 
Thus, some ideas relating to enforcement of the laws of war can be found in Victoria's 
writings, especially in relation to actions and declaration of unjust wars, were the 
criminality of leaders for waging the war, and ordering violations of the laws of war, were 
seen as crimes. 
2. Balthazar Ayala 
He noted: 
"Cicero lays it down that in a well-ordered State the laws of war should be 
scrupulously observed. Alike in beginning a war and in carrýjng it on and in ending 
it, law has a most important position and so has good faith. 24 
He then adds: 
"War, therefore, is justifiable when its object is to procure peaceful existence and 
freedom from outrage, and when begun in such a way as that peace may appear to 
be its sole objeCt. "25 
The implication of these two important statements is that the belligerent must make it their 
duty to respect the law in their wars in good faith, that is to abstain from intentional 
violations of the laws of war, since that would undermine any subsequent gains. Because 
the situation of peace, which has been established after violations of the law of war cannot 
be permanent, the sense of vengeance and injustice will lead the vanquished to seek 
recourse to war. 
Ayala relies on the advantages which the belligerent can gain from observing the laws of 
war, as an effective means of inducing them to respect them. 
3. Alberico Gentill 
He observed: 
"I said "a just strife' for I maintain that the war must be just and that all the acts of 
war must be just. In this sense one speaks of a just and righteous war and of just and 
238.6. Ferencz: Enforcing International Law. Vol. 1, Oceana Pub., Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1983, p. 8. 
24 Ayata Batthazar: Three Boooks on the Law of War and Duties Connected with War and on Mititary 
Disciptfne. Vot. 2, transtated by J. P. Bate, The Carnegie Institution of Washington, Washington, D. C., 
1912, p. 7. 
25 lbid, p. S. 
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"26 righteous arms. 
In fact, Gentili introduces an important idea, that the just war must be just in its resort and 
its conduct, in other words justice must be adhered to in Jus ad bellum and Jus In bello. 
This idea would have important effect for the observance of the law, since violations of the 
rules of war is seen as violations of the just war as a whole. 
Gentili like the majority of writers of that period stressed that peace is the real aim of 
the war, justice in conducting the war, that is the observance of the law of war, is the 
essential condition for a real condition of peace. In this regard he observes: 
"Therefore there is but one enduring principle, namely justice which has been 
observed in punishment and should be preserved also in taking vengeance and making 
conditions for the future. For one who has been injured beyond his deserts will not 
be tranquil, but will continually deserve revenge; and one who is forced to accept 
pitiless conditions will carry the burden only so long as he is under the necessity of 
"27 obedience. 
Thus, Gentili introduces the idea of justice as an element which encourages respect for the 
laws of arms. Since, when there is no justice, that is when there are violations of the law, 
there is consequently no real basis of a future permanent peace. This would not be 
implicitly in the interest of the belligerent. 
4. Grotius 
According to him, it is false to assume that in wars all laws are in obeyance, on the contray- 
"War ought not to be undertaken except for the enforcement of rights; when on 
undertaken it should be carried on only within the bounds of law and good faith. 
"SS 
In his view, compliance with and observance of the laws of war must be seen as an integral 
part of the doctrine of just war. In effect, he advocated that just cause must be served by 
just means. Thus, respect for the laws of war in good faith is, according to Grotius, a 
necessary ingredient of the just war doctrine. 
However, it is in the event of unjust wars that Grotius has made a very important 
contribution to the subject of enforcement of the laws of war. He introduced the element 
of responsibility of those who brought the unjust war'either by the exercise of their power, 
or through their advice. '29 He then makes clear the extent of their responsibility: 
"Their accountability concerns all those things, of course, which ordinarily follow in 
the train of war; and even unusual things, if they have ordered or advised any such 
26A. GentHl: De Jura BeLti Libri Tres. Vot. 2. transLation of the 1612 by J. C. RoLf, CLarendon Press, 
Oxford, Humprey MiLford, London, 1933, p. 13. 
27 lbid, p. 354. 
28Grotfus, 




thing, or failed to prevent it when they might have done So. "30 
What Grotius in fact, advocates does not differ much from what the tribunals at Nuremburg 
and Tokyo have said, when in establishing the responsibility of political leaders for waging 
an aggressive war; that is crimes against peace and also for war crimes they have ordered 
or failed to stop from being committed. 
Grotius, stressed that: 
"Generals are responsible for the things which have been done while they are in 
command; and all soldiers that have participated in some common act, as the burning 
of a city, are responsible for the total damage. In the case of separate acts each is 
responsible for the loss of which he was the sole cause, or at any rate was one of the 
causes. "31 
Here Grotius introduces the concept of criminal responsibility of commander and soldiers 
who violate the laws of war, implicitly the idea of superior orders may not be used as a 
valid defence. 
As to the punishment of those crimes, Grotius advocates two kinds of punishment. The 
first finds it roots in the concept of 'moral justice' which is in fact a religious punishment. 
Thus, the punishment of those who 'knowingly perform such acts, or co-operate in them, 
are to be considered of the number of those who cannot reach the kingdom of heaven 
without repentance. '32 
Moreover, the second form of punishment which it seems is preferred by Grotius, is that 
"true repentance again, if time and means are adequate, absolutely requires that he who 
inflicted the wrong, whether by killing, by destroying property or by taking booty, should 
make good the wrong done. "33 In other words, Grotius considers that religious and moral 
punishment is not enough, legal punishment (by implication courts and tribunals) is 
preferable, since the guilty would be obliged to repair the wrong he has done. 
Grotius" ideas in the field of enforcing the laws of war are more clear. His contribution 
can be seen as a forerunner to what has been established, especially after the Second World 
War, in the form of trial of leading officials for their role in committing crimes against 
peace and war crimes. However, it is clear that his ideas were to apply between States, since 
in his opinion just and unjust wars are public wars between sovereign princes, which means 
internal wars are without any regulation. 
5. Vattel 
He was the first jurist who tried to discuss the question of the application and observance 
of the laws of war in civil wars. In this respect, Siotis writes: 






"34 la doctrine de son 6poque. 
Vattel in fact, likened civil wars to international wars, and argued for the application of all 
rules of war to such eventS. 35 Consequently, he holds the two parties to be bound by those 
rules which are applicable between States. 
Nevertheless, Vattel who champions the application of laws of war to civil wars (a very 
advanced stand in his own time), did not attempt to elaborate on ways of ensuring respect 
for the law of war, apart from the goodwill and free acceptance of the parties themselves 
to do so. 
He did, however, write extensively on means of enforcing international law, but his all 
references, it seems were made to the law of peace rather than the laws of war. He in fact, 
concontrated on means of ensuring respect for obligations laid down in treaties. He was 
sceptical about reliance on good faith of the parties as a sufficient guarantee against the 
breach of obligations. 
He stressed the importance of introducing methods which are independent from the 
parties themselves such as the institution of 'guaranty' where a powerful sovereign acts as 
a guarantor, to ensure the respect of the treaty between two States, which means this did 
not exclude the possibility of a third party machinery. 
6. Conclusions as to the Views of Classical Writers 
In my opinion, the following conclusions can be made: 
(i) All the references to the necessity of observing the laws of war were made in 
connection with "public wars' that is wars between sovereigns and princes, and not civil 
wars. The exception being Vattel who in this matter does not differentiate between civil and 
international wars which means that in civil wars, in the opinion of the majority of writers, 
the question is left entirely to the discretion of the rulers. 
(ii) They stressed the necessary of compliance with the laws of war by linking the concept 
of just wars to Jus In bello which made the resort to just wars, connected with the necessity 
of conducting justly, that is to observe the laws and customs of war. 
This is a very important element which can induce the belligerents to respect the laws of 
war, since the hatred and violations of those rules may be mitigated if the belligerents 
believe deeply that observance of the laws of war is a duty imposed by just war itself. 
Thus, the doctrine of just war, which is essentially a doctrine aiming at limiting resort 
to war, has been made the very vehicle through which we can impose compliance with the 
rules of warfare. 
(iii) Self-interest has been advanced as a very important means of encouraging 
belligerents to respect the laws of war. All classical writers stress the importance of the idea 
that the object of war is to live in peace. This means among other things, that we must 
observe the laws when conducting our wars, since victory by means contrary to the laws of 
war will not bring a real base for permanent peace. The vanquished would wait for any 
34Softis, 
op. cit., supra. chapter 4, n. 62. p. 58. 
350P. 
cit., supra. chapter 1, n. 9, Vot. 1, pp. 243-244. 
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occasion to avenge their losses. This will not be in the interest of those who won the war, 
whereas, on the contrary by observing the laws of war, enemies can be converted to friends. 
(iv) In connection with unjust wars, it seems that classical writers condemn any resort to 
them, since they are against the law of nature, however whenever they erupted all acts are 
to be considered unjust, especially actions contrary to the law of war. On the other hand, 
it is in the context of unjust wars that classical writers tried to develop certain means of 
ensuring respect for the laws of war and develop also certain fundamental principles 
concerning criminal justice in general. Thus, the first reference to the need to punish those 
guilty of waging unjust wars, and those who order or commit violations of the laws of war, 
and also the non -availability of the plea of superior orders, as a defence in connection with 
the committing of such crimes can be observed. 
(v) However, generally classical writers rested the need to ensure respect of the laws of 
war on the good faith, justice, and self-interest. There was no attempt to introduce third 
party control, which leads me to speculate that the evolving notion of sovereignty had made 
such an attitude unworthy of consideration at that time. 
C. Internal Wars and Compliance with the Laws of War In Customary International Law 
It has been said in the third chapter that customary international law, considered civil wars 
to fall within the domestic jurisdiction of States, which means that it is criminal law and 
not international law which regulate the relation between the established Government and 
the rebels. The question of compliance then finds no place, since there is nothing to comply 
with. 
However, the legal device through which customary international law allowed the 
application of the laws of war to internal conflict was the institution of recognition of 
belligerency. Thus, once that recognition has been obtained the civil war becomes in effect 
an international conflict which means that the question of compliance and observance of 
the laws of war arises in these circumstances. On the other hand, it must be noted that the 
cases of recognition of belligerency are very rare, and the majority of civil wars were not 
conducted in accordance with the laws of war. 
There is a wide consensus between writers that one of the major legal effect of 
recognition of belligerency is the obligation on both parties to comply with the laws of war. 
Castren observes that: 
"... [Slubsequent to the recognition (of belligerency) the lawful Government is under 
an obligation to comply with the international rules of war in warfare against the 
insurgents, and is likewise entitled to expect the insurgents to observe theM. "36 
Consequently then, it is not only the Government which is obliged to respect the laws of 
war, the insurgents also are bound to do so. 
The question which arises in this context is how to justify the application of rules, which 
are meant to regulate the relation between two States, to insurgents who are not subjects 




of international law. In this context, Zorgbib observes: 
"Le parti insurge, une fois reconnu, possbde une compdtence spicialisie projitee vers 
une finaliti particuliere: la conducte des hostilitis-comp8tence specialisee mais 
intigrale, gui le met vis-i-vis de sdä-a'J-versaire dans lý, meme situation d'un ennemi 
itranger. $@ 7 
Thus, at least in the matter of application of the laws of war the insurgents are regarded as 
having the status of a subject of international law. Castren makes this very point, he notes: 
"... [Ilnsurgents recognised as belligerent are nonetheless sub ects of the law of nations 
"3j to some extent, particularly in regard to the law of war. 
Therefore, the insurgents are obliged to respect too the laws of war like the established 
Government. 
This is the most important legal effect of the recognition of the status of belligerency. 
Zorgbibe observes in this regard that: 
"La communauti bellig8rente jouit donc des 'pouvoirs implicites' n8cessaires ä la 
conduite des hostilit8s. Elle doit appliquer les lois de la guerre et a le droit ä leur 
so39 application. 
State practice also suggests that once the recognition of belligerency has been given, the 
insurgent movement is entitled to 'exercise complete sovereign authority within the territory 
actually within its authority, 40. This means that the legal personality of insurgents is here 
extended to other branches of the law, other than the laws of war. 
The conclusion then at this stage is that once the recognition of belligerency has been 
granted, the two parties are international persons, at least in connection with the duty to 
adhere to the laws of war. The question of compliance by implication, then, is the same as 
in international wars which leads us to raise the question, what are the means of securing 
observance of the laws of war in the context of customary international law. 
1. The Means of Compliance In Customary International Law 
The traditional means of ensuring respect for the laws of war apply in the context of 
international wars and civil wars, when the recognition of belligerency is accorded. 
According to Oppenheim: 
"... [S]ince war is not a condition of anarchy and lawlessness, international law requires 
that belligerent shall comply with its rules in carrying on their military and naval 
operations. vv41 
37Zorgbib, 
op. cit.. supra. chapter 2, n. 66, p. 52. 
38 Op. cit., supra. n. 36, p. 152. 
39 Op. cit., supra. n. 32, p. 52. 
40 N. A. Smith: Great Britain and the Law of Nations. Vol. 1, Kraus Reprint Co. MI L Lward, New York, t975, 
p. 329. See also pp. 330-333. 
41 Op. cit., supra. chapter 4, n. 37, Vot. 2.7th ed., p. 557. 
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In the opinion of these learned jurists, war conducted in accordance with the rules of the 
laws of war is 'legitimate warfare' and the measures which constitute such legitimate 
warfare in customary law are classified under three heads as follows: (i) The first class 
comprises measures of self-help, reprisals; punishment of war crimes committed by enemy 
soldiers and other enemy subjects and the taking of hostages. (ii) The second class includes 
complaints lodged with the enemy and with neutral States; good offices; mediation and 
intervention by a third and neutral State. (iii) The third class comprises the right to 
compensation, 42 
However, it seems that the first class of means of enforcing the laws of war constitutes 
the means which the parties resorted to frequently in practice, and even among the means 
mentioned in that class, it is reprisals which stood as the real means of ensuring respect for 
the laws of war. 
Regarding the general position on the observance of the laws of war Schwarzenberger 
pointed out that this 'rests primarily on the expectation of their self- enforcement. '43 In 
other words, reciprocity governs the attitude of belligerents concerning observance and 
compliance with the laws of war. 
According to him, the rules of war which do not interfere seriously with the necessities 
of war benefit greatly from the principle of reciprocity, such as rules relating to the 
protection of the wounded and sick. In this sphere, the principle of reciprocity benefits 
both sides and hence, operates as a very positive means of ensuring respect for the rules of 
war. 
However, the real problem of observance is represented by those rules of warfare in 
which the standard of civilization overrides the necessities of war or a true compromise is 
achieved between thern. 44 In that case two hypothesis exist. The first is that the belligerent 
party instruct their army to observe the laws of war, and would punish any violations of the 
laws of war, in that case no problem can arise, since law is respected. 
In the second hypothesis, it is the authorities of the belligerent power themselves who 
order, or connive at large-scale violations of the laws of war. In this case, which more 
closely reflects the practice of States (as the two world wars reveal), international law does 
not provide any means of stopping such violations. 
According to Schwarzenberger in this case, the belligerent victim of such violations has 
either: 
blic opinion "... [T]o bide his time, rely on the effects of his enemy's lawlessness on pu 45 in allied and neutral countries and settle accounts when victory is won. " 
However, if that belligerent prefers immediate action, the only means provided by 
international law is reprisals, which in the opinion of Schwarzenberger 'reverse the 
operation of the chief working principle behind the laws of war from positive to negative 
42 lbid, p. 558. 
43 Op. cit., supra. chapter 4, n. 44, VoL. 2, p. 452. 
44 Ibid. 
45 lbfd, p. 453. 
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reciprocity. 946 
Because of the prominent role played by the institution of reprisals in the domaine of 
ensuring respect for the laws of war, I propose to deal with them briefly. 
1.1. Reprisals 
Reprisals constitute in customary international law the main means of enforcing the law of 
war; in the words of Draper. 
"It is probably the oldest and most primitive mechanism for the application of the law 
of armed confliCt. "47 
They were known and practised by States for a long time. Nahlik maintained the reason for 
this is that: 
"Dans un presque-vide juridique et organisationel il 6tait bien naturel de ne compter 
que sur ses propres forces et ses propres moyens pour dissuader I'adversaire de 
poursuivre les atrocitds auquelles il 6tait livr6 A 1'encontre des personnes ou des biens 
"48 d6pendant de celui qui voulait protdger. 
This means that in the absence of a centralised agency which supervise the application of 
the law, individual members have to take the law into their hands and seek revenge. Thus, 
unlawful acts are remedied by unlawful acts. 
Many judgments especially by prize courts, upheld the right of belligerent to resort to 
reprisals. 49 Lord Sterndale in the Noordam-Case stressed that: 
"A Convention of this kind [Hague Convention No. XII cannot deprive one 
belligerent of the right of reprisal against anoth 
is breaking every canon of international laW. "59 
r, especially if that other belligerent 
The Oxford Manual of 1880 maintained the legality of reprisals as a mode of ensuring 
respect for the laws of war, however, under strict conditions of necessity and 
proportional ity. 51 
On the other hand Lauterpacht-Oppenheim observed that: 
"... [R]eprisals between belligerent cannot be dispensed with, for the effect of their 
use and of the fear of their being used cannot be denied. Every belligerent and every 
member of his forces, knows for certain that reprisals are to be expected in case they 
461bid. 
47G. I. A. D. Draper: Implementation and Enforcement of International Hunanitarian Law in Armed 
Conflicts. 28 International Affairs, 1972. p. 49. 
48S E. Nahtik: Les probt6mes des ripresaities A ta tumi6re des travaux de is Conf6rence DipLomatique 
sur te droit humanitaire. 82 RGDIP, 1978, p. 130. 
49See the Annual Digest and Reports of International Law (1919-22), Case No. 288. See also Case No. 297. 
Longmans Green & Co., London. New York, Toronto, 1932. 
50 Ibid, p. 430. 
5'See Articles 85 and 86 in Schindler and Toman (eds. ), op. cit., supra. chapter 2, n. 63, p. 48. 
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violate the rules of legitimate warfare. "52 
Some writers doubted the efficacy of reprisals in practice, to them reprisals have been used 
as a 'convenient cloak for violations of international law. '53 The majority of writers 
especially since the end of the 19th century and the advent of the First World War have 
54 become increasingly critical of reprisals. 
The general picture is that reprisals were admitted in customary international law as an 
effective means of ensuring respect for the laws of war. However, because in practice they 
usually hit the innocent, a growing body of opposition to their use has arisen. 55 
Moreover, it seems to me that reprisals in effect represent a very good instance of the 
operation of the unlimited notion of sovereignty, since the intervention of a third party for 
the enforcement of the laws of war and hence repression of violations of such laws) was not 
allowed at that period. 
2. Case Studies 
It is very important to try to find in the practice of civil wars, in which recognition of 
belligerency has been granted, the means by which the belligerent tried to secure the 
observance of the laws of war. 
2.1. The American War of Independence (1774-83) 
In that war the institution of recognition of belligerency, as a legal institution has not 
appeared yet. However, at the beginning of the war Sir James Robertson, the British Chief 
Commander, wrote to General Washington of his readiness to conduct the war according 
to the rules of humanity, 56 and inviting him to take the necessary measures to punish 
violations of the rules of war. General Washington accepted the offer. 
It seems in general that: 
520p. 




a different opinion on the subject, see R. G. Blerzanek: Reprisats as a Means of Enforcing the 
Laws of War: the OLd and the New Law, in Cassese (ed. ), op. cit., supra. chapter 4, n. 94, p. 237 ff. 
551n this context, Kalshoven writes: 
wThere are, however, two main drawbacks: beltigerent reprisats tend to constitute an over- 
reaction to the originat wrong, and they are HkeLy to hit innocent peopte". 
F. KaLshoven: The Law of Warfare. A. W. Sijhoff & Henry Dunant Institute, Geneva, 1973, p. 111. 
56 Sir J. Robertson wrote: 
"Monsieur, ayant reýu une commission du rot qui me norwe commandant en chef de ses forces dans 
te pays, un des premiers soins que le prends, clest de vous convaincre de mon d6sire de faire 
ta guerre conform6ment aux r6gles trac6es par ilhumanit6, et aux exemptes que nous recommandent 
tes nations tes ptus civitis6es. Je vous fais cette dicLaration de ma rksotution dans tlespoir 
de trouver une disposition anatogue de votre c8t6. Pour attaindre ce but, convenons de privenir 
ou de punir les viotations des rkgLes de in guerre, chacun dans la sph6re de notre 
coiTuiandement. u 
Op. cit., supra. n. 34, p. 60. 
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ny a aucun doute qu'en rýgle g6n6rale, les lois de la guerre furent observ6 
de part et d'autre dans les hostilitds entre les troupes Britaniques et Americanes. "; 
'ý 
This means that reciprocity in adherence to the laws of war was essential for compliance 
with the law in that case. The history of that war also affords us with examples of the 
desire of the belligerent to punish violations of the usages of war. Thus, General 
Washington on September 24th, 1776 wrote against the practice of plundering and ordered 
punishment for those guilty of its use: 
"I have ordered instant corporal punishment upon every man who passes our lines, 
or is seen with plunder, that the offenders may be punished for disobedience of 
orders; and I have enclosed to you (Joseph Reed) the proceedings of a court-martial 
held upon an officer who with a party of men robbed a house a little beyond our line 
of a number of valuable goods... He was met by a brigade major who ordered him to 
return the goods taken contrary to orders; which he not only refused to do but drew 
up his party and swore he would defend them at the hazard of his life; on which I 
ordered him to be arrested and tried for plundering, disobedience of orders and 
mutiny. For the result I refer to the proceedings of the court, whose judgment 
appeared so exceedingly extraordinary that I ordered a reconsideration of the matter, 
upon which, and with the assistance of fresh evidence, they made shift to cashier 
hiM. "58 
It is clear that there is a real will on the part of General Washington to abide by the laws 
and customs of war and enforce them when they are broken. In my opinion, this serves two 
important purposes; first to make the troops conform to what he agreed with the British, 
and secondly to keep discipline within his army. 
However, the first attempt to issue orders which make some acts war crimes and establish 
tribunals of adjudication was during the Mexican War when the famous General Order 20 
of February 19,1847 was issued by General Winfield Scot. The order states that: 
"Assassination, murder, poisoning, rape or the attempt to commit either, malicious 
stabbing or maiming, malicious assault and battery, robbery, theft, the wanton 
desecration of churches, cemeteries, or other religious edifices and pictures, the 
interruption of religious ceremonies, and the destruction, except by order of a 
superior officer, of public or private property, whether committed by Mexicans or 
other civilians in Mexico against individuals of the US military forces, or by such 
individuals against other such individuals or against Mexican or civilians should be 
brought before military commissions. "59 
These commissions were used extensively, they dealt mainly with criminal offences which 
would be tried in civilian courts. General Scot also established a 'Council of War' which 
tried violations of the laws of war proper. The main charges referred to this council were 
guerilla warfare or violations of the laws of war by guerillas, and enticing or attempting to 
60 entice soldiers to desert their service. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Cited by E. Coiby: War Crimes. 23 MLR, 1924-1925, pp. 500-501. 
59 
W. Winthrop: Mititary Law and Precedents. 2nd ed., Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1920, para. 1298, p. 832. 
60 Ibid, para. 1299, p. 832. 
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The importance of the creation of military commissioners lays in the fact, that they were 
the originals of the military courts created later in the American Civil War. 
2.2. The American Civil War 
In this case I will concentrate on the means of enforcing the rules of war, stipulated in the 
Lieber Code, and also the real practice vis-&-vis this subject in the conduct of the 
belligerents. 
It is to be stressed at the outset that the mere fact of codifying the rules of war in an 
official act, and the instruction of the army to follow its rules, is in itself a real means of 
ensuring respect for the laws of war, since ignorance of the law often leads to barbarity. 
The main means envisaged by the Code to ensure compliance with the law, reflect in 
essence what customary international law says about the matter, reprisals, punishment of 
war crimes and lastly the taking of hostages. 
2.2.1. Reprisals 
The Code admits of reprisals, as a clear legal means of ensuring respect for the laws of war. 
Article 27 states: 
"The law of war can no more wholly dispense with retaliation than can the law of 
nations, of which it is a branch. Yet civilized nations acknowledge retaliation as the 
sternest feature of war. A reckless enemy often leaves to his opponent no other means 
"61 of securing himself against the repetition of barbarous outrage. 
This is an exposition of the general principle. The Code then lists the criteria to which 
resort to reprisals must be adhered to. Article 28 indicates that reprisals are never 'measures 
of revenge! They are only 'means of protective retribution'. Hence, reprisals may be 
resorted to only 'after careful inquiry into the real occurrence, and the character of their 
, 62 misdeeds that may demand retribution. 
It is clear here that resort to reprisals does not depend on the free will of the belligerent, 
but on stringent criteria, which if adhered to in practice, would make recourse to it very 
rare. 
The Code'contains specific cases where reprisals are permitted and instances where it is 
forbidden. As to the first, they are permitted in Articles 58,59,63 and 65.63 This is an 
example. ATtiCle 58 PTOvides: 
"The law of nations knows of no distinction of colour and if an enemy of the US 
should enslave and sell any captured persons of their army, it would be a case for the 
severest retaliation, if not redressed upon complaint. "64 
As to the second, the Code prohibits reprisals in case of Article 70, which states that: 
61 Op. cit., supra. n. 51, p. 7. 
621bid. 
63 lbid, pp. 11-12. 
64 Jbid, p. 11. 
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"The use of poison in any manner. be it to poison wells, or food, or arms, is wholly 
excluded from modern warfare. He that uses it puts himself of the pale of the law 
"65 and usages of war. 
However, the practice shows that many examples of reprisals existed. On July 30th, 1863, 
President Lincoln issued an order of 'counter- retaliation. In it was stipulated that: 
"... [F]or every Union soldier killed in violation of the laws of war a rebel 
soldier ... (was to' be placed at hard labour-and (so) 6gontinued ... until the other... (should) receive the treatment due a prisoner of war. " 
Moreover, when the Confederate forces executed two Union prisoners as retaliation for the 
execution of the Union of two of its officers for espionage charges, Present Lincoln ordered 
the immediate seizure of General Lee's son and a Confederate prisoner and hanged them 
67 the moment authentic information was received of the execution of the Union officers. 
Furthermore, in 1862 President J. Davis declared that in retaliation for the use of slaves 
by the Union forces, Union's Generals Phelps and Hunter were to be tried as outlaws and 
68 executed upon capture. 
The cruelty especially of the Confederate army vis-&-vis prisoners of war they captured 
led Congress to adopt a resolution recommending retaliation to stop such acts. Discussions 
in the Congress reveals that the general mood was with the adoption of an open policy of 
retaliation, as the only means of inducing the Confederates to conform to the laws of war. 
Thus, Senator Lane supporting such policy, argued: 
"Now, sir, if this is to be a war of extermination let not the extermination be all upon 
one side. Mercy to felons and traitors is cruelty to our own soldiers in southern 
prisons ... they now indulge in a system of warfare the most barbarous and atrocious known to the history of modern civilisation, and they can do no worse if we resolve, in justice to our soldiers to mete out to those we have captured from the rebel army 
their own measure; at least until they shall reform their conduct in reference to our 
men. Will any acts6? f ours further exasperate those felons and traitors and demons, in human shape. " Congressman Wade argued for giving the same inhuman 
treatment of Union prisoners, he stressed "I have no doubt that a prompt and stern 
resort to retaliation will have ... beneficial effect. w70 
However, a minority of senators and congressmen argued against such course. Congressman 
Hendricks stated: 
"I am free to say I do not feel that the condition of my friends in the southern prisons 
will be made any better, and they be made any happier, by seeing some men in our 
651bid, p. 13. 
66Cfted by R. Arens: Vicarious Punishment and War Crimes Prosecutions: The Civil. War or Mice Through the Looking Gtass. WULO, 1951, p. 75. 
671bid. 
681bid, p. 74. 
691bid, p. 78. 
701bid, p-79. 
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prisons here in the North starved to death. "71 
Senator Summer observed that: 
"I believe that the Senate will not undertake in this age of christian light, under any 
inducement, under any provocation, to counsel the executive Government to enter 
*72 into any such competition with barbarism. 
However, on January 31st, 1865. the US Senate passed a resolution which generally leans 
towards advocating a policy of retaliation. It stated: 
"The executive and military authorities of the US are hereby directed to retaliate 
upon the prisoners of the enemy in such manner, in conformity with the laws and 
usages of war among civilised nations, as shall be effective in deterring him from 
the perpetration in future of cruel and barbarous treatment of our soldiers. "73 
The conclusion is that reprisals which were originally seen in the Lieber Code with 
suspicion and distrust since they may lead belligerent in the words of Article 28 'nearer to 
the intercine wars of savages', have become in practice an accepted Federal and Confederate 
policy in dealing with what they see in each other's conduct as violations of accepted rules 
of war. 
The two belligerent claimed that the purpose for resorting to retaliation and counter- 
retaliation was to enforce respect for rules of warfare. However, the practice shows clearly 
that it is the innocent who became the victim, and that instead of stopping violations 
reprisals have led to more violations. 
2.2.2. Punishment of War Crimes: 
The second method used in the American Civil War to enforce the laws of war, was the 
creation of what is called 'military commissions' with the mandate to try criminals of war. 
The practice shows that even before the Lieber Code some instances of creating 'military 
commissions' to deal with violations of the laws of war can be found. In 1861, at Yorktown, 
General McClellan ordered that: 
"All acts committed by either officers, soldiers or other persons, connected with the 
army, or by inhabitants or other persons, which are commonly recognized as crimes 
against society; or which may be done in contravention of the established rules of 
"74 war, shall be punished by a court or military commission. 
The Lieber Code contains a series of crimes punishable by death penalty (Articles 44,46, 
47,88,89,91,95.96 and 101). Generally, the acts punishable by death penalty concern acts 
of treason by citizens and spying by enemy subjects. Military commissions which grew 
71 Ibid, p. 78. 
72 Ibid. 
73 lbid, p. 79. 
74 R. M. D'Apotito: My Lai: Jurisdiction over the GuRty CiviLians. 6 NELR, 1970, p. 108. 
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essentially from custom and use75 had jurisdiction to deal with the following persons: 
(i) Individuals of the enemy's army who have been guilty of illegitimate warfare or other 
offences in violation of the laws of war; (ii) inhabitants of enemy's country occupied and 
held by the right of conquest; (iii) inhabitants of places or districts under martial law; and 
(iv) officers and soldiers of our own army, or persons serving with it in the field who, in 
time of war, become chargeable with crimes or offences not recognisable or triable by 
76 criminal courts or under the Articles of war. 
During the period of the Civil War and until the end of reconstruction these commissions 
77 tried nearly 2000 cases. 
The main offences in violation of the laws of war dealt with by these commissions were: 
breaches of the law of non-intercourse with the enemy, engaging in illegal warfare as a 
guerrilla, spying, taking life or obtaining any advantage by means of treachery, abuse or 
violation of a flag of truce, etc. 78 The US Supreme Court upheld the decisions of such 
courts in many instances. It also stressed that one of its duties is the application of the laws 
of war. Thus, in the Ex Party Oulng Case, it stated: 
"... [F]rom the beginning of its history this court has recognised and applied the law 
of war, for the conduct of war. The status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well 
"79 as of enemy individuals. 
After the end of the war, however, President Johnson decreed on May 29th, 1865 a general 
amnesty for all with the exception of the leaders of the rebellion. The Lieber Code did not 
in fact prohibit trial of rebels after the war for treason (Articles 154 and 157). Indictments 
were issued against President J. Davis and his Cabinet. He was held for two years in prison 
and the members of his Cabinet for shorter periods. None were tried. Only Henry Wirtz was 
tried and hanged for his brutal treatment of Union prisoners of war. 80 
The practice of the American Civil War shows that very modest steps were taken to 
ensure respect for the laws of war, reprisals in theory were restricted within certain limits 
of necessary. However, the practice did not conform fully to that stipulation. 
As to the use of military courts, it seems that their practice confined itself in the big 
majority of cases to enemy violations and also of citizens who helped the enemy. In other 
words, the majority of cases turned around spying and treason which can be explained 
easily by the desire of the Union to protect its armed forces. Hence self-interest was the 
obstacle to a real extension of the powers of these tribunals. 
Moreover, there is no indication whatsoever that the established Government, in this case 
75 Op. cit., supra. n. 59, para. 1307, p. 838. 
76 lbid, para. 1309-1313, pp. 839-841. 
770p. 
cit., supra. n. 74, p. 198. 
78 lbid, p. 108. 
79 H. Lauterpacht. (ed. ): Annual. Digest and Reports of Pubtic International, Law Cases. (194t-1942), 
Butterworth & Co. Pub., Ltd. London, 1945, p. 568. 
80W. A. Dunning: Reconstruction Potlcy and Econcxnic 1865-1877. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1962, p. 22. 
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the Federal Government, had contemplated, or thought of the introduction of third party 
machinery, for the control of the application of the laws of war. This would I suspect, have 
been considered a direct violation of its sovereignty. Thus, reprisals and military 
commissions were in a way the means of enforcing the laws of war, which were in 
accordance with the requirements of sovereignty and non-intervention. 
2.3. Other Cases 
The general picture is that in other cases of civil wars which occurred during the 19th and 
early 20th century, no recognition of belligerency has been granted, except perhaps in the 
Boer war, which meant that no respect has been shown by the belligerents to the laws of 
war, since especially in the view of the established Government the matter is solely 
regulated by criminal law and thus sovereignty overrides any other consideration. 
In the Paris Commune, which lasted only 70 days, and resulted in 30,000-35,000 deaths, 
the established Government's view was that criminal and military law regulated relations 
between themselves and the rebels It declared in one instance that: 
"Quelques hommes reconnus pour appartenir ä l'arm6e saisis les armes ä la main, ont 
ite pass8s par les armes, suivant la rigueur de la loi militaire qui frappe les soldats 
combattant leur drapeau w. 81 
This meant that they were tried and executed for treason, not according to the laws of war, 
but according to the military law of the French army. This stand of the established 
Government led the insurgents to follow a policy of reprisals, which meant a serious 
escalation in atrocities. 
The insurgents declared that: 
"le gouvernement de Versailles se met en dehors des lois de la guerre et de I'humanitd; 
force nous sur d'user de r6presailles. Si, continuant A m6connaitre les conditions 
habituelles de la guerre entre peuples civiles nos ennemis massacrent encore un seul 
de nos soldats, nous rdpondons par 1ex6cution d'un nombre igal au double de 
"82 prisoniers. 
The result was horrible, prisoners killed, hostages taken and executed by the two sides. 
There was a complete absence of laws of war, which meant that the question of compliance 
had no place. Thus sovereignty led in the end to the absence of humanity. 
The same picture prevailed in other cases of civil wars, in the Spanish Latin American 
wars, violations of the laws of war was systematic, especially by the Spanish troops. 83 The 
Greek war of independence also witnessed the most flagrant violations of the laws of war 
by both sides, total disregard for the laws of war prevailed in these instances. Siotis 
concluded in regard to this war that: 
810p. 






"Sans donner Nnum6ration d'ailleurs inutile des crimes les plus cruels nous pouvon$ 
conclure que les lois de la guerre ne furent nullement appliqu6es dans le confli t. "84 
It seems that in these cases established Governments saw themselves as acting in a manner 
which was consistent with their sovereignty, hence their right to put down rebellion by any 
means at their disposal, the concept of absolute sovereignty was still at its height. 
In the Boer War, the answer as to whether the British troops were conducting the war 
according to the laws of war, is by no means clear. At least, it is certain that no official 
instruction to the army to conform to the Hague Regulations of 1899, to which Britain was 
a party, had been issued. However, statements from British officials were contradictory. 
Field Marshall Lord Wolseley, the Commander- in-Chief at the War Office, wrote: 
"I know the Boers of all classes to be most untruthful in all their dealings with us and 
even amongst themselves. They are very cunning, a characteristic common to all 
untruthful races ... To accept to tie our 
hands in any way, no matter how small, by the 
'laws and customs of war' proposed for civilized nations at the peace conference 
would in rný opinion be suicidal, for the Boers would not be bound by any such 
amenities. "8 
He then added: 
"I cannot conceive how any notifications by us during the present war, that we shall 
act upon the above referred to 'laws' etc. would help us, but I can imagine many 
positions and circumstances where any such one-sided adherence to those laws could 
be prejudicial to our military interests of the moment. "86 
The heart of this argument is that the British cannot apply rules of war because that would 
be against the military advantages which may be gained by non-adherence. 
However, in total opposition to this stand, Major-General Sir John Ardagh, the Director 
of Military Intelligence (1896-1901) who acted as an expert on land warfare to the British 
delegate at the Hague Conference of 1899 stressed: 
"Although the Boers have not acceded formally to the Hague Conventions and its 
provisions are not binding technically in a war between a contracting and a non- 
contracting power, the consequence of this condition is to relegate the conditions 
upon what is and is not permissible to the general body of international law, in which 
principles identical with the above have for many years been incorporated. For 
practical purposes, therefore, the Hague Convention may be properly applied to by 
"87 both sides. 
However, it seems that there was a general consensus that even if the Hague Convention of 
1899 did not apply (since the insurgents also did not issue any declaration that they 
recognised this convention) usages and customs of war apply in the context. 
The practice shows that gross violations occurred and that Lords Roberts and Kitchener 
841bid, 
p. 72. 
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used methods which were against the usages of war. They resorted to reprisals, the taking 
of hostages and collective responsibility not as means of enforcing respect for the laws of 
war, but in order to induce the insurgents to lay down their arms and surrender. 
When Lord Roberts on May 3rd, 1900 occupied the locality of Brandford, he issued the 
following warning: 
"I shall hold Brandford responsible for any damage done to the railway from this 
point to Karee Siding (south of Brandford). You can make what arrangements you 
like for the protection of the line and telegraph, but if either are damaged the six 
principal inhabitants of Brandford will be made prisoners of war and dealt with by 
martial law. "88 
Thus, collective punishment as a reprisal for any attacks of trains and telegraph lines, has 
been resorted to, this is in flagrant violation of customs of war, since it is the duty of the 
belligerents to protect such objects and not the civilians. Roberts also ordered that civilians 
should be sent on trains as hostages to prevent attacks by the insurgents. 
The Boar's official account of the negotiations with the British at the end of the war, 
stressed that: 
"... [N]ot the arms of the enemy which directly compelled us to surrender, but another 
sword which they had stretched out over us-namely, the sword of hunger and 
nakedness, and what weighted most heavily of all the awful mortality amongst our 
women and children in the concentration camps. 
ý9 
It is by all accounts clear that concentration camps were against the customs of war. 
However, there is evidence that the British have convened war crimes in some instances to 
punish flagrant violations of laws and customs of war. 90 
The general conclusion is that the British Government by failing to instruct its forces to 
adhere to the Hague regulations to which it was a party, has in fact opened the way for the 
non-respect of the laws of war which followed. Demands of military advantage had 
Prevailed over demands for respect of the law and humanity. 
88 lbid, p. 51. 
89 Ibid, p. 284. 
90 
Ibid. at p. 294. Thus, the 4th ctause of the Vereeninging Agreement stiputates that: 
"No proceedings civil or criminal will be taken against any of the burgers for any acts in 
connection with the prosecution of the war. The benefit of this clause will not extend to 
certain acts, contrary to usages of war which have been notified by Commander- in-Chief to the 
Boer Generals, and which shall be tried by court-martial Immediately after the close of 
hostiLities. " 
The second sentence of this ctause had not been in the originat draft. It has been added upon a request of the Cabinet, since in the words of Chambertain it Is necessary: 
0... [T]o bear in mind that we have inf tI cted death penalty on our own officers and men for acts 
contrary to the usages of war and that the exemption of Boers from liability to prosecution for such offences might arouse strong feelings here and in colonies. " 
lbid, P. M. 
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3. The Effects of Codification of the Laws of War and Means for Compliance with Them. 
The efforts which began as from 1864 to codify the laws and customs of war, did not in 
general bring important changes to the question of implementation, enforcement and 
supervision. In fact, all the conventions concluded were expressly to apply only to wars 
between States, civil wars were excluded, the State retained its freedom in dealing with its 
enemies. The conventions relied for their application on the good will of the parties to carry 
out their obligations in the spirit of reciprocity. 
The first Geneva Convention of 1864 dealt with the amelioration of the condition of the 
wounded in the armies in the field. Pictet observes in connection with that convention: 
"The Convention was the point of departure for the great movement in international 
law for the protection of war victims represented by the Geneva Convention as a 
whole. "91 
However, Article 8 concerning implementation stipulates that: 
"The implementing of the present convention shall be arranged by the commanders- 
in-chief of the belligerent armies following the instructions of their respective 
Governments and in accordance with the general principles set forth in this 
"92 Convention. 
Therefore, the Convention is not self-executing. The Government must enact the necessary 
instructions to their armies to comply with it. Local legislation is a necessary means of 
implementing the Convention. There is no mention of reprisals in it, this can be interpreted 
that they were excluded. That interpretation would be in accordance with the object and 
purpose of the treaty which is the protection of the weakest victims of war, namely the 
wounded. However, the Convention does not contain any sanction clause which may be 
applied against soldiers and officers who may breach its rules. 
The Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 (Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of 
War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 grammes weight) also relies on the goodwill of the 
parties to respect their obligations. Further, it contains what is called 'the general 
participation clause' which in practice reduces the obligation of the parties to nothing, when 
a non-party enters the war. It stipulates: 
"This engagement is compulsory only upon the contracting or acceding parties thereto 
in case of war between two or more of themselves; it is not applicable to non- 
contracting parties, or Parties who shall not have acceded to it. " 
It then added: 
"It will cease to be compulsory from the moment when, in a war between contracting 
or acceding arties, a non-contracting or a non-acceding party shall join one of the 
belligerent. "Fý 
91 J. Picted (ed. ): Commentary I Geneva Convention: For the, Ametioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick In Armed Forces in the FieLd. ICRC, Geneva, 1952, p. 11. 
921bid, 
p. 251. 
93 lbld, p. 96. 
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Thus, the obligation to observe the Declaration is very fragile indeed, since it can be ended 
at any time, when a non-contracting or non-acceding State enters the war. 
The two Conventions of 1864 and 1868 contain no clause dealing with the prosecution of 
their violations. This led Monyier, one of the founding fathers of the ICRC, to say that the 
two Conventions: 
"... [N]e sont pas une loi imposde par une autorit6 supdrieure A ses subordonn6es 
mais... seulement un contrat, dont les signataires ne peuvent 6dicter des peines contre 
"94 eux-m8mes. 
However, following the adoption of the Geneva Convention of 1864, a general practice 
developed, whereby the belligerents began to admit voluntary medical personnel sent by the 
ICRC in order to assist regular medical services. Domb observes in this respect that: 
"Obviously the mere presence of personnel belonging to the ICRC constituted a 
I deterrent for the potential violations of the Convention. "95 
In fact, the Convention of 1864 was very useful in the Franco-German War of 1870. Relief 
activities were undertaken on behalf of the wounded by the national societies of the 
belligerents and neutral States. The ICRC coordinated such activities, and created and 
managed the first 'international agency for the relief of sick and wounded personnel', better 
known as the "Base] AgenCy. '96 
On the other hand, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 regulate essentially the 
conduct of war. They were not vigorous enough concerning means of ensuring respect for 
them. However, they contained some measures which in general were modest and rest 
primarily on the will of the party itself. The main means included are: 
(i) Instruction to the armed forces (enacting manuals): It must be noted that even before 
the Hague Conventions, many States have in fact, issued manuals which embody the rules 
and customs of war, for example, France in 1877, Portugal in 1890, Spain in 1882 and Italy 
in 1896.97 
However, the new factor in the Hague Convention is that the enacting of such manuals 
has become obligatory, and also the substance of the rules have been defined in the 
regulations themselves. Thus, it establishes unity in this field. Article I of the IV Hague 
Convention on Land Warfare of 1907 stipulates: 
"The contracting powers shall issue instructions to their armed forces which shall be 
in conformity with the regulations rtlpecting the laws and customs of war on land, 
annexed to the present Convention. "" 
94 Op. cit.. supra. n. 10, p. 206. 
95 F. Domb: Supervision of the Observance of International Humanitarian Law. 8 IYHR, 1978, p. 181. 
96 See in this respect, G. Wiltemin, R. Heacock and J. Freymond: International Organisation and 
Evolution of World Society. Vol. 2, ICRC, Geneva, 1984, p. 20. 
97 OP. cit., supra. n. 47, pp. 54-55. 
980p. 
cit., supra. n. 51, p. 65. 
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Accordingly. new manuals were issued by many States in application of this Article, such 
as Germany in 1902, France in 1913, the UK in 1914, and the US in 1914. Draper observes 
in connection with the German Manual that 'the work was in fact a polemic for 
inhumanity. '99 However, it seems that the measure of enacting manuals, is a very important 
element in the efforts of dissemination of the laws of war, which can reduce violations. 
(ii) Relief societies for prisoners of war: this is in my view an indirect means of ensuring 
respect of the laws of war, since they assist the parties to the conflict to fulfil their 
obligations under the conventions. Article 15 of the 1907 IV Convention of the Hague, opens 
the way for the possibility of creating relief societies, which can undertake charitable 
activities for POWs such as distributing relief in places of internment. 
However, such societies must be established in accordance with he 
, 
laws of their country, 
which means that only national societies can act. In practice, it seems that the ICRC was not 
banned from acting under the same Article (7). 
(iii) Compensation: Article 3 of the IV Hague Convention of 1907 stipulates that: 
"A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said regulations shall, if the 
case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall ýe responsible for all acts 
committed by persons forming part of its armed forces. " 00 
Generally compensation can be claimed after the end of the conflict, which may mean that 
only the victor can claim it. Despite this, tribunals have been set up to deal with some 
problems relating to compensation. Thus, Gray listed 435 Arbitral tribunals set up between 
1792 and 1972. She found that at least 261 had dealt with claims for damages, 45 of these 
concerned international wars and 36 concerned civil wars. 101 
In the context of civil wars, it must be made clear that all claims were connected with 
damages to alien property during civil wars, rebellions and insurrections. The application 
of Article 3 to civil wars was not, however, uniform. It has sometimes been held to be 
applicable to internal conflict on other occasions, not. 
In the Calre Case, the Franco-Mexican Claims Commission's President Verzijl noted: 
"Je crois tout de m6me devoir admettre que, les Etats, en s'accordant sur le principe 
pour la guerre internationale l'ont consideri encore comme un principe nouveau, 
d'application restreinte, et qu'ils Wont point voulu en reconnaitre l'applicabilit6 
ginirale dans tous les ýas oü la responsabilit6 internationale pour les actes d'une force 
arm6e serait en jeu. "'u2 
In fact, he refrained from the application of Article 3, to civil wars, his main argument as 
it appears implicitly from the passage cited above, is that it applies only between States. 
However, Judge Max Huber in the British Claims in the St)anish Zone of Nlorocco Case, 
maintained that at least the general principle contained in Article 3 of the IV Hague 
99 Op. cit., supra. n. 47, p. 55. 
looop. 
cit., supra. n. 51, p. 65. 
101 C. D. Gray: Judicial Remedies in international Law. Clarendon Press, oxford. 1,987, p. 11. 
102Estate 
of Jean-Baptiste Calre tFrance) V. exican States 0929), 5 UNRIAA, 1929, p. 528 
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Convention, applies to civil wars. He pointed out: 
"... [S]ans doute, cette convention [IV Hague Convention) West directement applicable 
A aucune des situations dont le rapport doit s'oecuper, mais le principe quelle etablit 
mdrite d'etre retenu 6galement en ce qui concerne 1'6ventualitd d'une action militaire 
en dehors de la guerre proprement dite. "10 
However, Schwargenberger stressed that: 
"[It is] 
... doubtful whether such a restrict view of Article 
3 of the IV Hague 
Convention is any longer accurate. It is probably pref rable now to treat this Article 
as being declaratory of customary international law. "TO4 
It seems to me that the importance of this Article in the context of civil wars, is fading 
away, since it protects generally alien property. It belongs to an era when foreigners 
especially of powerful States, enjoyed special treatment. Nowadays the picture has changed 
dramatically, since foreign owned property is regulated by local law, which makes 
compensation very hard to attain. 
(iv) Reprisals: The Hague Conventions are silent on the question of the legality of 
reprisals. This led to different positions on the level of doctrine. Some rely on Article 50 
of the IV Hague Convention, which condemns collective penalties on civilian population, 
as a very important limit on recourse to reprisals. 105 However, the practice during the two 
world wards witnessed widespread recourse of the belligerents to reprisals. 
The general picture concerning the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 is that no real 
progress has been made in the area of developing means for ensuring respect for the laws 
of war, to match what has been done at the substantive level. All the means mentioned 
depended in their implementation on the will of the parties. States, it seems, wanted to 
protect their sovereignty in its absolute form, since no third party control is envisaged. 
Also Article 2 limits the obligations of the parties to a great extent, since it maintained the 
'General Participation Clause' whereby the conventions would apply only between 
contracting parties, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention. 
However, it was in the case of the Geneva law that the beginning of new ideas 
concerning means of ensuring respect for humanitarian law, can be traced. This is, in my 
view, due partly to the subject-matter of such conventions, which dealt with the protection 
of war victims. In this area, States were in general ready to accept some obligation 
concerning the means of application, since the victims do not constitute a real danger to the 
conduct of war. Secondly, they do so because it is in the interests of their own soldiers. 
The Geneva Convention of 1906, which was a revision of 1864 Convention on the 
amelioration of the situation of the wounded and the sick continued the tradition of 
including the clause of 'General participation' (Article 24) which goes against the object of 
103 Affalre des Biens Britaniques au Maroc Espagnot (Espagne contre Royaume Uni) (1925), 2 UNRIAA, 
p. 615. 
104 Op. cit., supra. n. 43, p. 680. 
105See in this respect, Blerzanek, OP. cit.. supra. n. 54, pp. 232-257. 
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the Convention itself, in my opinion. However, it contained a very important provision, 
which concerns the enforcement of the Convention. 
Article 28 indicates that the parties have to take the necessary legislative measures to 
repress 'individual acts of robbery and ill treatment of the sick and wounded'. Thus, it 
introduced the element of punishment of violation of humanitarian law, as a means of 
enforcing the law. In practice only two States'06 have given effect to that provision in the 
form of enacting laws. 
Of two Geneva Conventions of 1929 the first concerned the Sick and Wounded and was 
a revision of the 1906 Convention. The second was wholly concerned with prisoners of war. 
These two Conventions brought some fundamental elements of progress in the area of 
implementation, enforcement and control of application of humanitarian law. These 
elements are: 
(i) The infamous 'general participation clause' has been done away with. Thus, Article 
25 of the Wounded and Sick Convention and identical Article 82 of the Prisoners of War 
Convention provide: 
"The Present Convention shall be respected by the high contracting parties in all 
CiTCumstances. If, in time of war, a belligerent is not a party to the Conventions, its 
provisions shall nevertheless, be binding as between all the belligerents who are 
parties thereto. "' 07 
This is a real triumph of the idea of humanity over military concerns, since the entrance 
of a non-party to the war does not affect the obligation of the belligerents to continue to 
apply the Convention. This may in fact, encourage the non-party State to respect the 
Conventions. 
(ii) Reprisals were expressly prohibited in the Prisoners of War Convention the last 
sentence of Article 2 stipulates: 
[M]easures of reprisals against them [POW's] are forbidden". 
This is the first instance of prohibiting this inhuman method in an international instrument. 
However, the First Convention (Sick and Wounded) contained no such provision. Nahlik 
observes that: 
"... [Q]uant aux bless6s et malades, on croyait en toute dvidence qu'une interdiction 
expresse des r6presailles serait superflue. " 
He then quickly notes: 
"... [O]r, les exp6riences Wastes de la seconde guerre mondiale ont d6montr6 
qu'aucune limitation de la licence du belligdrent ne pouvait etre prdsum6e". 109 
106 Op. cit., supra. n. 10, p. 207. 
107 Op. cit., supra. n. 51, p. 264 and 290. 
108 S. E. Nahtik: Le probtbme de sanctions en droit international humanitaire in: Swinarsk! (ed. ). Op. 
cit., supra. chapter 1, n. 1, p. 473. 
109 Ibid. 
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In fact, during the second world war the practice showed that the belligerents did not 
respect these provisions. 
(iii) The System of Protecting Power- The Convention on POW's, introduces for the first 
time in an international instrument the idea that States at war should entrust the mission of 
controlling the implementation of their obligations contained in the Convention to a third 
party machinery. 
The idea of protecting power is an old institution in international law. However, its use 
in the context of the laws of war is traced to the Franco-German war, when Prussia 
requested the USA to protect its interests in France. 110 
Article 86 introduces this institution formally into the Law of Geneva. Thus, the 
guarantee of the regular application of the Convention 'will be found in the possibility of 
collaboration between the protecting powers charged with the protection of the interests of 
the belligerent! The main functions of the protectors are: 
(a) Lending good offices in any case of dispute regarding the application of the 
Convention (Article 87). 
(b) Receiving complaints from POW's (Article 42). 
(c) Conferring with representatives of POW's (Articles 43- 44). 
(d) Supervising judicial prosecutions against POW's (Articles 60,62, and 66). 
In practice, the institution worked very well in the First World War, before its formal 
insertion in a treaty. In the Second World War, the number of neutral States who could act 
as protecting powers was reduced dramatically. Switzerland represented at the end of the 
war 35 States, Sweden and Spain also acted as protecting powers. "' 
Article 86 worked well during the Second World War. However, Pictet who recognised 
the value of this Article especially for the protection of POW's saw 'the drawback of the 
Article was that it abandoned though it did not altogether exclude the idea of obligatory 
control by a neutral and independent agency. '112 In fact, the acceptance of the services of 
the protecting power was not mandatory, Article 88 also allowed the ICRC to perform its 
function in protecting the POW's. But, this also was not mandatory, since the consent of the 
belligerents was required. 
The general conclusion is that despite these developments in the field of strengthening 
means of enforcement of the laws of war, especially that of Geneva. It seems to me that 
even in cases of international wars, States were still hesitant to bind themselves especially 
by the control of third parties. They still prefer, as the Hague Conventions witnesses, means 
which depend entirely on their consent and will. 
Thus, until 1929, no obligatory third party machinery has been arrive at in the context 
of international war. 
In civil wars, the situation is worse, for two reasons. First, the Conventions were 
"OSee G. Abi-Saab: The Imptementation of Humanitarian Law, In Cassese (ed. ), op. cit., supra. chapter 
4, n. 94, pp. 311-313. See aLso M. Takemoto: The Scrutiny System under International, Humanitarian Law. 
19 JAIL, 1975, pp. 1-2. 
"'See G. Abi Saab Obid, p. 313), and Pictet, op. cit., supra. n. 91, pp. 86-93. 
1120P. 
cit., supra. n. 91, p. 90. 
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expressly to be applied between contracting States. Secondly, the recognition of 
belligerency, which was the only device through which the laws of war can be applied in 
civil war, had become obsolete; no recourse to it was made at the conclusion of the 
Conventions at the Hague and Geneva. 
This leads me then to deal with two points, which in my view, may throw some light on 
how in practice the question of observance of the law of war in internal conflict has been 
coped with, the two points being: (i) The role of the ICRC in internal conflicts up to the 
Second World War; and (ii) the Spanish Civil War and the question of compliance. 
(i) The role of the ICRC in internal conflicts up to the Second World War: 
It must be made very clear that in the context of civil wars, the ICRC lacked any legal 
basis upon which to claim to control the application of the laws of war. States were not 
ready to give any third party, be it the ICRC or any other organ or institution, any power 
to control their actions during civil wars. Indeed, even in international wars, the 
intervention of the ICRC can be made only with the consent of the belligerents. 
Moreover, States generally claim that insurrection is a purely domestic affair and there 
is no room for the application of the laws of war. Hence, there is nothing to control. 
However, despite these enormous legal handicaps, the ICRC managed on many occasions 
to intervene by lending its relief and assistance to the victims of war. Thus, it did 
contribute at least implicitly to induce the belligerents to conform to certain basic standards 
and rules of the laws of war. 
In the Russian Civil War, the ICRC delegate after meeting Lenine, succeeded in obtaining 
an agreement to create what was known as the 'political red cross' which consisted of a 
group of neutral red cross societies and the Russian Red Cross. Its mission consisted of 
visiting political prisoners and providing them with relief and assistance. 113 
It seems that in general, the application of the laws of war were absent. Magliazza 
observed that: 
"... [L]a guerre civile Russe 1917-1920 permit d'ailleurs de constater non-seulement 
I'absence de toute application des lois de la gu 711 e, mais encore I'absence de toute 
protestation contre une pratique de telle sorte. " 
Therefore, the very modest contribution of the ICRC was overshadowed by the gross 
violations of basic humanity. 
At the Xth International Conference of the Red Cross in Geneva in 1921 the intervention 
of the ICRC was given a 'legal basis' at least, in the context of the law of the Red Cross 
movement which is not binding on Governments. It was given the 'mandate of intervening 
in the work of relief in the event of civil war'. 115 Acting on this new mandate, the ICRC 
succeeded in 1932 in obtaining from the warring factions in the civil war in Upper Silesia, 
113M. Veuthey: The Red Cross ard Non-Internationat ConfLicts. RICR, 1970, p. 411. 
114 A. Migtiazza: Lldvotution de la rdgtementation de la guerre ä la tumtbre de la sauvegarde des 
droits de L'homme. RCADI, 1972/111, p. 212. 
115 International Red Cross Hancbook, ICRC and League of Red Cross Societies. 12th ed., Geneva, July 1983, p. 641. 
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an authorization to visit the camps of the prisoners, and give the necessary relief and care 
to women and children. 
However, the most important thing was the agreement of the two parties to apply the 
whole Geneva Conventions to the conflict, thanks to ICRC efforts. This was the first 
instance in history where the parties to civil war accepted the application of the Geneva 
Conventions in their totality to the conflict. 116 
In my opinion, the importance of this case must not be exaggerated. None of the 
belligerents was the legal Government; Upper Silesia was administered by an international 
commission representing the League of Nations and finally it was not a State in 
international law hence, the conflict cannot be said to have the legal characteristics of a real 
civil war. 
The ICRC also intervened in the Hungarian Revolution in 1919 by giving relief and 
assistance to the victims. However, its offers of aid have been rejected by both belligerents 
in the Irish Civil War, as being hostile. 117 
The conclusion is that the ICRC acted in an area where only State sovereignty was 
predominant. It tried to accommodate itself to that demand by acting in practice, only when 
the consent of the belligerent was given, and even when it was authorised to offer its 
services, its mandate was not to supervise the application of the laws of war (since in many 
cases the established Government does not recognise their application at all) and its 
observance by the belligerents, but was confined only to activities of visitation of POW's 
and distributing relief and news. In that sense the ICRC was pragmatic. It was not a 
guardian of the law but a rather timid assistant in inducing the established Government to 
apply a minimum of fundamental rules of humanity, which cannot be seen in any way as 
a violation of its sovereignty. 
(ii) The Spanish Civil War and the Question of Compliance: 
In this war, no recognition of belligerency was granted. The main reason was political. 
The powerful States during this period (the UK, France and the US) were against such 
course, because it would internationalise the conflict which they wished to remain purely 
local. The legal Government, however, considered that it was fighting an international war 
against Germany and Italy. 118 
The practice of war shows that despite the absence of recognition of belligerency which 
is the key to the operation of the laws of war in internal conflicts, the general view of third 
States, the League of Nations and the ICRC, was that certain fundamental rules of 
humanitarian law should be applied to the conflict. Cassese considered that this attitude 
116Schtoget, 
op. cit., supra. chapter 4, n. 96, p. 126. 
117 Ibid. 
11%lhen the Spanish Goverment raised the question of the situation prevalLing in the country to the 
League of Nations, it justified this on the ground that: 
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cannot be considered as: 
"... [A] partial recognition of belligerency since the State concerned, all too clearly, 
emphasised they withheld any such recognition but rather as indicative of the 
gradual development of customary rules concerning civil war". 9 
Cassese found that the Spanish case produced an interesting development in the law of civil 
wars, namely that even in the absence of recognition of belligerency, four rules of 
humanitary law are applicable to the civil war on the condition however that its intensity 
must match the Spanish civil war. These rules are: 
(i) The rules on the protection of the victims of the war, especially the wounded and sick. 
The two parties declared to the ICRC their intention to apply the 1929 Geneva Convention 
on the subject. 
(ii) The prohibition of the intentional bombing of civilians. Many States declared the 
illegality of such practice. 120 The League Assembly adopted a resolution on September 30th, 
1938 which states that 'the intentional bombing of civilian population is illegal"21 in the 
context of the Spanish Civil War. 
(iii) The rule forbidding attacks on non-military objectives especially of open towns. The 
122 Assembly and the Council adopted resolutions condemning such practice. 
(iv) The rule authorising reprisals against enemy civilians, in the event where the enemy 
has previously attacked civilians. The last point concerns of course the methods by which 
humanitarian law is enforced, it shows that the brutal means Of reprisal was accepted. 
In fact, the Spanish Civil War witnessed many acts of reprisals, in which many innocents 
were the victims. The taking of hostages was also resorted to. 123 The trails and executions 
carried out by both sides, especially by the rebels, were not for violations of laws of war, 
but for fighting with the other side. The policy of trial and execution continued even after 
the end of the war. 124 Thus, reprisals, taking of hostages and summary executions were 
frequently used by the belligerents, in my view they were not employed as a means of 
ensuring respect for the laws of war but simply as a means of prosecuting the war, through 
11 9 A. Cassese: The Spanish Civil War and the Development of Customary Law Concerning International 
Armed Conflicts, in Cassese (ed. ), op. cit., supra. chapter 4, n. 1, p. 293-4. 
120 The British PM specifically mentioned the Illegality of intentional bombing of the civilians. See 
House of Commons Debates. VoL. 337, June 21st, 1938, Col. 937. Similarly, the French and British 
Governments drew the attention of the Franco Administration that: 
"Direct and deliberate attacks on civilian populations are contrary to the principles of 
international Law as based on the established practices of the civitised nations, to the taws 
of humanity and the dictates of public opinion". 
Cited by Cassese, ibid, p. 299. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid, p. 305. 
123 For details, see M. Junod: Warrior without Weapons. Translated bY E. Fitzgerald, Jonathan Cape, 
London, 1951, pp-98 ff. 
124 A. V. W. Thomas and A. J. Thomas Jr.: International Legal Aspects of the CiviL War in Spain (1935- 
39), in Falk (ed. ), op. cit., supra. chapter 2, n. 8, p. 125. 
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which the will of the other party to fight is broken. 
However, the protests of the League of Nations against the violations, and the work of 
the ICRC can be considered as modest steps in the field of inducing the parties to respect 
the law. The League, in reality, protested verbally but no concrete actions to stop the 
violations were taken. 
The ICRC on the other hand was in the field and helped, with its customary silence, to 
contribute modestly to improve the situation of the victims. Moreover, it distributed relief 
125 and acted as an intermediary in the exchange of prisoners which sometimes took place. 
D. The General Conclusions 
(i) From the beginning, it seems that the laws of war were based on the assumption that 
they are applicable between States and not within them. The rise of the concept of State, 
with its inevitable Westphalian components of sovereignty and non -intervention, closed any 
attempt to give the insurgents legal status. Thus, by reason of that sovereignty, States were 
free to do as they saw fit. Hence, the attention of classical writers was basically 
concentrated on the subject of the law between States only. 
Even on the matter of law between States, the methods for ensuring compliance with its 
rules rested primarily on self-help, good faith and reciprocity. The concept of sovereignty 
was absolute, no third party machinery or interventions were thought of or proposed. 
In this respect, it is the state of nature in its Hobsian sense that prevailed. Thus, talk of 
means of ensuring respect for international law in general, was in total contrast with the 
spirit and reality of that period. The modest suggestions made by classical writers always 
rely on the will of the belligerent. This to me, is an entirely logical situation, since these 
writers were essentially concerned with giving conceptual basis to the Westphalian model 
of State. In this model, the concept of third party machinery was absent. 
(ii) The era of codification did not depart essentially from what has been said in the first 
conclusion, although it made law more clear and unified, it did not provide effective means 
of ensuring respect for the laws of war, especially in The Hague Conventions. The latter 
Conventions concentrated on indirect means of ensuring respect for the laws of war, rather 
than effective and direct means, like the intervention of a third party. Thus, the ideas of 
dissemination, the obligation to publish military manuals were inaugurated officially, which 
must be seen as important steps in the long road of producing effective means for 
compliance with the law. 
Geneva law, on the other hand, with its concentration on the protection of the victims 
of war rather than regulating the conduct of war in the field made modest but important 
developments in the area of compliance. The protecting power institution was introduced, 
punitive measures for violations of the rules of protection of the victims were suggested to 
the State and the role of the ICRC was accepted. However, all these initiatives were to be 
carried out only between States and with their consent. Sovereignty still overrode the 
dictates of humanity. 
125 For an exceLLent account of these activities, see the work of the ICRC detegate at that time MarceL Junod in Spain, op. cit., supra. n. 123, pp. 87-134. 
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(iii) In civil wars, the obsolescence of the recognition of belligerency which in many ways 
facilitated the application of the laws of war, as witnessed in the American Civil War, has 
in the Spanish case encouraged violations of the laws of war, since the parties were under 
no firm legal basis to respect the laws of war. Protests by third States also lacked that legal 
basis. 
In the matter of means of ensuring respect for the laws of war once recognition has been 
granted, it is customary methods which apply in civil wars, reprisals, taking of hostages and 
also punishment of war crimes. 
(iv) Another interesting phenomenon can be observed in the Spanish Civil War. The 
Spanish Government did not, in fact, attempt to characterise protests made by the third 
States of the League against violations of the laws of war, as intervention with internal 
affairs which, in my opinion, means that at least morally drastic violations of the rights of 
the victims of war, cannot be justified at all and in all circumstances as necessary means 
to protect the monopoly of sovereignty. 
(v) In the overwhelming majority of cases of civil wars, the ICRC, in acting to give relief 
and ass istance, ind irectl y helped in the application of the law of war. It has never claimed 
that it supervise the application of the law. This is the only way by which it has been 
accepted by the States. 
SECTION 11: Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Compliance 
The era after the Second World War witnessed, in relation to the subject of enforcement and 
implementation of humanitarian law, two important events. First, the trial of war criminals, 
for war crimes against peace and crimes against humanity at Nuremburg and Tokyo. It must 
be remembered that the first attempt after the First World War to try the German Kaiser 
and also those who were accused of war crimes (Versailles Treaty Articles 228-230) was 
disastrous. The German Emperor was not at his trial because the Netherlands refused his 
extradition. Moreover. Germany refused to hand over to other States war criminals and it 
proposed instead to try them in Germany itself. 
The trials were, in effect, a mockery of justice. Thus, the Commission of Allied Jurists, 
which was set up in January 1922 to inquire into the Liepzig trials concluded unanimously 
that 'some of the accused who were acquitted should have been convicted and that in the 
case of those convicted the sentences were not adequate. '126 Thus, the trials were not 
international and also were not a good case for enforcing the law of war. 
However, although the trails in Tokyo and Nuremburg were confined to the losers of the 
war, they were a very important landmark in the history of enforcing humanitarian law. 
They established a precedent which may be resorted to at any time. Pictet rightly observed: 
"En tout 6tat de cause Nuremberg a marqud I'avtnement d'un droit international 
pdnal. Si 1'experience fut imparfaite elle t riche en enseignement et montre A la foi, 
la voie i suivre et les erreurs A iviter. "'T? 
126Cited by S. Gtueck: War Criminals, Their Prosecution and Punishment. Knopf, New York, 1944, p. 32. 
1270p. 
cit., supra. n. 10, p. 208. 
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The introduction of the concept of crimes against humanity is a novelty, and it is important 
in the case of internal wars, since atrocities against the citizens by their own Government 
have become international crimes. This is a limit on States sovereignty, since Government 
officials who commit crimes of genocide may be tried and punished. This has been 
confirmed by the Genocide Convention of 1951. 
The second most important development is the clarification and consolidation of means 
of ensuring compliance with humanitarian law, contained in the Geneva Conventions of 
1949. The new system of enforcement includes the following: 
(i) Reprisals against the victims of war are prohibited expressly in all Geneva 
Conventions (e. g. Article 13 of the 3rd Convention and Article 33 of the 4th Convention) 
expressly forbid reciprocal torture or execution of soldiers or civilians. 
(ii) The institution of protecting power: It has been defined by Pictet as 'a State instructed 
by another State (known as the power of origin' to safeguard its interests and those of its 
, 128 nationals in relation to a third State 'known as the State of residence. The institution of 
protecting power is 'la pi6ce maltresse de ce syWme [of control] est I"institution de la 
129 puissance protectrice. 
The main changes introduced by the Geneva Conventions, consist in extending its role 
to the four Geneva Conventions. It has also been made mandatory at least in principle. 
Official substitutes were provided for (see common Article 10.10.10.11) its functions have been 
defined and enlarged this in addition to the traditional functions, the whole Convention. 
Thus, according to common Article 8.8.8.9 'the present Convention shall be applied with 
the cooperation and under the scrutiny of the protecting powers'. Pictet observes in his 
commentary: 
"This command is addressed to the parties to the conflict in the first place, since the 
responsibility for application is theirs. They are ordered to I ascept the cooperation of the protecting power. If necessary, they must demand it. " 3 
In practice in the words of Abi-Saab the system Wa pas fonctionn6 de fagon 
satisfaisante". 131 Therefore, since 1949, the cases in which a protecting power has been 
designated were very rare, in fact, only in three cases (Suez, Goa and Bangladesh) and 
even in these cases, it did not work according to the way it was designed in Geneva in 
1949.132 
The reasons for such a state of affairs have been well put by the UN Secretary- General 
in one of his reports concerning human rights in armed conflicts. They are: 
*The relatively small number of States which could be considered as truly neutral by 
128 op. cit., supra. n. 91, p. 86. 
129G. Abi-Saab: Les m6canismes de mise en oeure du droit humanitaire. 82 RGDIP, 1978, pJ04. 
1300P. 
cit., supra. n. 91, p. 95. 
131 G. Abi-Saab: Le r6inforcement du systbme d'appitcation des r6gtes du drolt humanitaire. 14 RDMDG, 
1974, p. 277. 
132See in this respect, Forsythe: op. cit., supra. n. 7, pp. 46-48. See also Et Kouhene, op. cit., 
supra. chapter 4. n. 278, p. 173. 
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all parties to the armed conflicts, the cumbersome and time consuming procedure of 
appointment of a Protecting Power which calls for the agreement of the belligerents 
as to these powers at the time when hostilities are raging, the fact that the military 
phases of some of the armed conflicts were over before A Protecting Power could be 
appointed. The burden in terms of material and human resources which is imposed 
on States solicited as potential Protecting Powers has also been mentioned as a 
deterrent M well as the risks of political embarrassment vis-A-vis the parties to the 
conflict". 
(iii) Punishment of violations of the Conventions. 
The precedent of the trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo seems to have influenced those who 
met at Geneva in 1949. It is to be noted that Article 6/1 (a) of the Agreement of London 
(December 8th, 1945) defines war crimes as: 
"... [V]iolations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not 
be limited to, murder, ill treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other 
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill treatment of 
prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or 
private property, wanton destrugion of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not 
justified by military necessity. "I 4 
This definition in fact, is found in the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Thus, common Articles 
(49,50,129 and 146) and common Articles (50,51,130 and 147), introduce a very important 
system for suppressing breaches of the Conventions, where the parties are obliged to enact 
legislation for the suppression of breaches. Moreover, they are under obligation to search 
for and try persons guilty of such breaches. They can also hand over such criminals to any 
other contracting party who has made out a prima facie case against them. 
It must be stressed that these obligations are made in relation to the category of 'grave 
breaches of the Convention' which are: 
"... [T]hose involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or 
property protected by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment 
including biological experiments, wilfully causing greater suffering of serious injury 
to body or health and extensive destruction and appropriation of pro eTty, not 
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly735 
The general view is that in practice these innovations did play only a very modest role. The 
reasons according to Sandoz are: 
"... [O]n peut y voir trois raisons principales: la difficult6 psychologique dans un climat 
de guerre qui suscite g6n6ralement la haine de 1'ennemi; le fait que la responsabilit6 
des infractions incombe souvent aux autorit6s elles-memes coupables soit 
intentionnellement soit, plus souvent, du fait de n6gligence dans l'instruction en 
matiýre de droit international humanitaire-et que la s6paration des pouvoirs 
judiciaires et politiques est souvent sdrieusement compromise dans ses situations; 
I'absence, enfin, rdpdtons le, de juridiction obligatoire et de moyens coercitifs 
133 Report of the Secretary- Genera I: Respect for Human Rights In Armed Conf t Icts. A/7720 of Oct. 20th, 
1969, para. S. 
134 See the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis, signed at London on Aug. 8th, 1945, op. cit., supra. n. 51, p. 826. 
1351bid, 
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supranationaux permittant d'imposer aux Etats le respect de leurs engagements. "136 
Nonetheless, Blishchenko maintains that: 
"... [L]'application des Conventions de Genbve dans plusieurs conflits arm 
Nfficacit6 du r6gime instaurant la responsabilit6 en cas de violations". 13f 
sa r6v616 
The examples given to substantiate this claim is that the US from 1965 to August 1973 made 
36 accusations of war crimes against army personnel in court martial. 20 cases have been 
138 tried and condemned. Similarly, the trial and punishment in Angola in 1976 of 
mercenaries fighting with the rebels. 
However, these examples are singular cases, since many violations took place which may 
easily be considered as'grave breaches' but have never been brought to trial. This happened 
in many conflicts which took place after 1949. In this respect, Meyer correctly wrote: 
"... [T]he criminal sanctions against violations have not proved to be very effective. 
The Nuremberg and other post 1945 war crimes trials remain rather singular. 
Although many qýve breaches of the law have occurred since 1945, only a few have 
been repressed. " 
The general conclusion is that the important developments made in Geneva in 1949 in 
connection with the means of control of the application of humanitarian law were from the 
theoretical point of view a real advancement, because they introduced the missing element 
of third party control. Furthermore, they opened the possibility of cooperation between 
States in the domaine of punishment of war crimes. 
In practice, it seems that these innovations had no real impact. Self-interest, the claim of 
freedom of action, and military security, have prevailed over any other reasons. Moreover, 
the absence of a permanent international penal institution, which can try those guilty of 
grave breaches, had a negative effect, since the search for and trial of those persons has in 
practice remained in the hands of States, which often would take into consideration political 
reasons in any decision to try such criminals. The second conclusion is that all these 
innovations in a way were expressly restricted to international wars, internal wars, then, 
have not benefitted from them. 
Following this introduction, I now turn to Article 3 itself in order to see how the problem 
of compliance is dealt with. The following points will be considered: 
A. Travaux Prkparatolres of Article 3 and the Question of Compliance 
136Y. Sandoz: Mfse en oeuvre clu droit humanitaire, in: Les dimensions InternationaLes clu droit 
humanitaire. UNISCO-Institut Henry Dunant, ed. A. P6clone, Paris, 1936, p. 321. 
137 1. BLishchenko: ResponsabiLit6 en cas de vioLations du drolt fnternatfonat humanitaire, ibid. 
p. 333. 
138 Ibid, p. 334. 
139M A. Meyer: Report on the Proceedings of the Conference on the AppLication of InternationaL 
Humanitarian Law. British Red Cross Society. March 12th, 1986. London, p. 3. 
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Initially, the question of means of ensuring respect for humanitarian law in internal 
conflicts, was not a real subject of discussion at the Conference in 1949. The central 
question was; whether to codify at all any rules applicable to internal conflicts, this meant 
that it was the question of the definition of armed conflicts of a non -international character 
and what are the rules to be applied to such conflicts, that took much time and energy. 
States, it seems, were not ready yet to tie their hands substantively and procedurally. They 
concentrated on the first rather than the second choice. 
Despite this general statement, references were made to some points which have an 
important impact on the question of compliance with the law in the context of internal 
wars, such as the legal basis of the obligation of insurgents to apply Article 3, the question 
of reciprocity and the role of the ICRC in the context of such wars. 
1. Protecting Power In Civil Wars 
During the initial discussion of the Draft Article 2/4 of the ICRC, some States made the 
point that the proposed Article brought the institution of protecting power to civil wars, 
which was not acceptable in their view. Canada stressed that in its present form, the fourth 
paragraph would justify a demand on the part of a small group of rebels for the recognition 
of protecting power, and except in the case of a large-scale civil war in which extensive 
section of the national territory was in the rebels hands, this would be absurd. 140 
This meant that protecting power may operate only in conditions of civil war which 
resemble international war in intensity, and where the insurgents have the characteristics 
of a State. In all other cases, this would not be acceptable, presumably because it can be 
considered as an intervention in the internal affairs of the belligerent Government. On the 
other hand, Mexico took a different view, since in the context of civil wars, the ICRC can 
act as a protecting power since this would protect the right of the State and place the 
question on purely humanitarian grounds. 141 
The third view which it seems was more to the liking of the defenders of the doctrine of 
State sovereignty, was against any reference to protecting power, even when undertaken by 
the ICRC. General Oung of Burma noted 'the mere presence of aliens on the national 
territory might be a source of suspicion. '142 This in fact, excludes any intervention of third 
parties, even by impartial organisations such as the ICRC, for distributing relief and 
assistance. 
In fact, all the five drafts which have been submitted to the Conference, except the 
second draft of the first group which stipulates that: 
"The provisions relating to Protecting power shall however not be applicable except 
in the instance of special agreement between the parties to the conflict. " 
The other draft did not mention at all any reference to Protecting power which means in 
140 Final. Records of the DipLomatic Conference of Geneva, L949. VoL. 2 section 6, FecleraL Potiticat 
Dept. Bern, 1950, p. 13. 




my opinion that States have implicitly excluded any possibility for third party control of 
the application of the rules of Article 3. This of course, would be considered an unwanted 
intervention in their internal affairs. 
2. The Legal Basis of Obligation of the Insurgents 
This is a very important legal and practical question, since if the established Government 
can be held as obliged to respect and apply Article 3 because it signed and ratified the 
conventions. This is not the case with insurgents since the Conventions are open only to 
States. It is to be remembered that the institution of recognition of belligerency has 
afforded this legal basis for holding the insurgents bound to apply the laws of war 
In the Diplomatic Conference, some delegations tried to establish such basis. The 
representative of Monaco has offered two reasons for holding the insurgents bound by the 
rules contained in the Article applicable to internal conflicts: 
"First because the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva Conventions are of a super- 
contractual character, and also, and more particularly, because the contracting parties 
undertake not only to respect them, but to ensure respect for them, an article 
providing for their dissemination among the population through instituti n. Therefore 
rebels are a part of the population in revolt of the contracting States. "? 43 
The argument, it seems, stress that the rules contained in the Article dealing with internal 
conflicts are in fact, jus cogens rules, which States are to respect independently of the 
Conventions, and secondly that the duty of dissemination means that everybody knows the 
rules. However, it appears to me that the weakness of such an argument is that it implicitly 
still holds the insurgents as part of the country and under the control of the Government, 
which is not the case. 
Greece on the other hand, observed that the insurgents are bound by the Conventions. 
In its view: 
"... [F]ailure by the insurgents to accede to the Conventions was not an insurmountable 
obstacle". 144 
He based his argument on two reasons: (i) The Conventions which were being drafted could 
and should be consideredas law-making conventions, i. e. as rules which should be applicable 
not only on behalf or against the contracting parties, but also in circumstances which were 
analogous to those governed by the said conventions. (ii) Insurgents and even bandits were 
obviously nationals of some State, and were thereby bound by the obligations undertaken 
by the latter. 145 
It seems to me, that these two arguments were couched in such a way as to exclude any 
conclusion that insurgents are even implicitly 'parties to the Conventions' which means that 
it is only the actions of the Government which binds the insurgents. This interpretation is 
143 lbid, pp. 78-9. 
144 lbid, p. 94. 
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in favour of the claim of the established Government that it holds the monopoly of 
representing the whole population, even when its authority is challenged from within. 
However, the words 'each party' found in Article 3 have been interpreted by Pictet in the 
following fashion: 
"Each of the parties will thus be required to apply Article 3 by the mere fact of that 
party's existence and of the existence of an armed conflict between it and the other 
party. The obligation is absolute for each of the parties, and independent of the 
obligations on the other party" 146 
This means that insurgents are bound by the Conventions, even if they are non-parties to 
the Conventions, it is the material element and not legal consideration which can be 
considered in this context. In other words, the effective control of certain parts of territory 
and the conduct of hostilities obliges the insurgent to respect its obligations. 
On the other hand, Pinto stresses: 
"Au cours de la pdriode de la guerre civile, 1'exdcution des obligations 
conventionnelles relýve ... de toute autorit6 qui pr6tend exercer et exerce un pouvoir d'Etat. Les autorit6s insurg6es sont tenues de respecter, A ce titre le drolt international 
g6ndral et conventionel. Cest la une consdquence du principe d'effectivitd". 147 
This interpretation would in effect give no legal status to insurgents, and in the same time 
obliges them to respect the Conventions. 
3. Reciprocity 
The idea of reciprocity was included in some drafts submitted to the Conference. This was 
done when the intention of these drafts was to apply the whole Conventions to internal 
armed conflicts. However, when it was decided that only minimum rules would apply to 
such conflicts, the reciprocity clause was dropped intentionally. 148 
Thus, the obligations contained in Article 3 are absolute, in the sense that the non- 
acceptance of the application of the Article by one belligerent or its violation, does not 
entitle the other party to breach its obligations. 
4. Reprisals and the Taking of Hostages: 
The four Conventions of Geneva all contain an Article prohibiting reprisals (Convention 
I Article 46; Convention 11 Article 47; Convention III Article 13 and Convention IV Article 
33). However, Article 3 does not contain such a prohibition. The question then is whether 
they are permitted in the context of internal conflicts. 
The travaux pr6paratolres do not show any efforts at dealing with this subject. Despite 
this fact, Pictet stresses in his commentary that the silence of Article 3 is not a real obstacle. 
To him reprisals are prohibited because: 
146 op. cit.. supra. n. 91, p. 51. 
147pinto, 
op. cit., supre. chapter 2, n. 66, p. 528. 
148 See Pictet, op. cit.. supra. n. 91, p. 51. 
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"... [T]he acts referred to under items (a) to (d) are prohibited absolutely and 
permanently, no exception or excuse being tolerated. Consequently any reprisal which 
entails one of these acts is prohibited, and so, speaking generally is any reprisal 
incompatible with the 'humane treatment' demanded unconditionally in the first 
clause of sub-paragraph (1). v9149 
It seems to me, that this interpretation is consistent with the object and the purpose of the 
Article, which is the protection of all victims of internal conflicts. Reprisals would in 
effect, deprive such persons from the protection provided by Article 3. 
The taking of hostages, which is in fact a form of reprisal, was expressly prohibited by 
Article 3. Thus, it is not only killing hostages which is prohibited, but even their taking is 
illegal. However, the important question is whether this prohibition applies only to persons 
hors de combat, or even to insurgents, combatants. The travaux pr6paratoires show that 
there is some evidence to support the contention that the prohibition of taking hostages 
applies only to persons hors de combat, combatants are not immune. 
In this respect, during the discussion of the Draft Article submitted by the second 
working group (which eventually became Article 3 after the introduction of some 
amendments) the Netherlands argued without opposition: 
"... [T]he new text covered only two categories of persons. Those who had been placed 
hors de combat. As a result of this certain persons remained without protection, 
which was Oparticularly regrettable 
in the instance of prohibiting the taking of 
hostages". 15 
According to Norway, the Government would then be free to execute combatants or take 
them as hostages. 
The conclusion in general is that these institutions of enforcing law (reprisals and taking 
of hostages) which in general are used against the innocent are prohibited at least vis-k- 
As non-combatants and the sick and wounded in the context of internal conflict, which 
must be seen as a very important step in restricting the discretion of Governments in 
internal conflicts. 
5. Punishment of Violations 
Article 3 is silent on this point, which means the breach and violations by soldiers and 
officers of its minimum rules, may very well go without any prosecution. The concept of 
grave breaches is not included in Article 3. The travaux pr6paratolres do not help in this 
respect. Therefore, when Italy suggested that 'the parties would be responsible for all acts 
committed by persons belonging to their armed forces'151 no real discussion took place on 
the issue. 
Article 3 on the other hand prohibits only 'summary justice', which means that the 
established Government can try and punish the insurgents according to due process of the 
local law. The mere fact of taking arms is punished, the suggestion that only those who 
149 Mid, p. 55. 
"'Op. 
cit., supra. n. 140, p. 84. 
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commit violations of Article 3 can be tried was not accepted. In this regard, the State 
sovereignty won the day, since insurgents can be tried and punished. The fact that they 
did not commit war crimes is irrelevant, whereas soldiers of the established Government 
may not be punished even for gross violations of Article 3. The Government is completely 
free to do what it sees fit in the circumstances. Thus, prosecution of violations of 
humanitarian law, which is an effective means of enforcing respect for the law, is totally 
absent in the context of internal conflicts. 
6. The Role of the ICRC 
Paragraph 2 of Article 3 gives the right of initiative to the ICRC or any other impartial 
organisation. During the Diplomatic Conference, the ICRC was not left out in the context 
of internal wars. In the discussions of the drafts submitted, the working groups, all views 
expressed supported the role of the ICRC in internal conflicts with the possible exception 
of Burma. 
However, the main difference was whether its offer of services must be obligatory or 
open to the consent of the belligerents. Britain and the USA proposed at different times that 
its services must be accepted by the belligerents. However, even the ICRC delegate was 
against such a course. He stressed that: 
"The strength of the ICRC was its independence, wpich would be jeopardized if the 
ICRC were mentioned in any mandatory clause. "15 
The Soviet draft on the Article applicable to internal conflicts did not, however, mention 
the ICRC at all. This omission has been attacked by the UK and France, the latter 
observing that 'the mention of the ICRC corresponds to an avoidable necessity, etC. "53 This 
led the Soviet Union to declare that it would agree to the mention of the ICRC. 
The final outcome was that the ICRC may offer its services to the parties, which means 
that the consent of the Government is needed for the ICRC to carry out its activities. 
Moreover, it is to be stressed that the ICRC does not act as a protecting power, it has no 
explicit right to control the application of Article 3, its main work consists of giving 
assistance and relief to the victims. 
Pictet comments on Article 3/2 as follows: 
"This paragraph may therefore appear at first sight to be merely decorative and 
without any real significance. Nevertheless, it is of great moral and practical value. 
Although it is extremely gimple, it is adequate and the international Committee itself 
asks for nothing more. " 14 
It seems that the mere mention of the ICRC is a triumph for humanitarianism. Since, even 
if the parties decline its offer. The new factor according to Pictet is that the parties 'can no 
1520P. 
cit., supra. n. 140, p. 95. The US amendment provided that the words may offer its services' 
was reptaced by Ishatt, be requested to finish' was rejected by the Speciat Committee at Its 38th 
meeting (JuLy 8th, 1949). 
1531bid, 
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longer look upon it as an unfriendly act, nor resent the fact that the organisation making 
the offer has tried to come to the aid of the confliCtS. '155 
7. Conclusions 
The main conclusions to be drawn from the travaux pr6paratolres and the question of 
compliance with Article 3 are: 
(i) It is to be noted that the main procedures for controlling and enforcing the application 
of humanitarian law (Protecting Power, and prosecution of violations) have been reserved 
for only international conflicts. Recourse to such methods in internal conflicts can be 
considered as intervention and a breach of sovereignty, since the established Governments 
would consider such methods as obstacles in fighting their opponents. 
(ii) I think also that States were more concerned about punishing insurgents for the 
violation of their laws, rather than their possible infringement of humanitarian law. 
Sovereignty is best served by trying insurgents for high treason, rather than the breach of 
some rule of the law of war, since the second choice would appear to give respectability to 
the insurgents. 
(iii) There was a general consensus that the ICRC has the right of initiative (which meant 
that a fundamental legal development has been achieved), and that the mere offering of 
services to the belligerent can of course, be refused. But, it can never be considered as 
intervention in the internal affairs of States. However, there is also a general view that the 
activities of the ICRC are of assistance and relief and not supervisi6ý of the application of 
the law. 
(iv) Although reprisals have been said to be implicitly prohibited as a means for enforcing 
the rules of Article 3, the fact that they were not so mentioned is a loophole which can be 
exploited in practice. 
(v) It seems to me that the general mood was not yet ripe for the acceptance of any means 
of controlling the application of the rules of Article 3. This in the eyes of the established 
Governments, would be a very serious handicap in their dealings with insurgents, and 
would in any event give a valid ground for the insurgents to claim a certain legal status. 
Since any means of control accepted would be resorted to by the two belligerents. It also, 
seems that the very minimum rules included in Article 3 do not deserve any complex system 
of control, especially by third parties. 
B. Subsequent Practice of Article 3 and Means of Compliance with Its Rules 
Under this heading, three points are to be examined, which all have relation to the means 
of enforcement. 
1. Reprisals and Taking of Hostages 
In internal conflicts the practice shows clearly that these inhuman methods have been 
resorted to not as a means of compelling the other party who violates the law to respect its 
obligation under Article 3, but usually as a means of conducting the war itself. Reprisals 
1551bid. 
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were therefore, used in Vietnam and Algeria against the civilian population, and especially 
in connection with POW's. The insurgents resorted to the execution of the Governments 
captured soldiers as a reprisal against the execution of their captured comrades; resort to 
the taking of hostages as a form of reprisal has been used by both parties to internal 
wars. 156 Also resort to collective punishment of non-combatants for the acts of insurgents 
have been used in Vietnam. 157 
2. The ICRC Role: 
The ICRC in practice intervened in many internal conflicts, in Algeria, Vietnam, Yemen, 
Nigeria and many other situations. Wilhem concludes that: 
"ll est permis de dire que le CICR, par ses multiples interventions, par ses visites aux 
ddtenus de toute nature, joue dans une large mesure le r6le d'un organisme qui 
concourt A l'observation rdguliýre des rýgles de I'Article 3. "158 
Cassese affirms that whenever the ICRC decides to offer its services the practice confirms 
that: 
"... [I]es parties au conflit ne peuvent ni refuser, ni entraver son action humanitaire 
et de contr6le. " 159 
These statements then have the implication that the ICRC has become, in practice, a Teal 
organ of controlling the application of the dispositions of Article 3. 
In my opinion, the role of the ICRC as an organ of control of the observance of Article 
3, must not be exaggerated, since claims of intervention and breach of sovereignty may be 
labled against such an attempt, and would also endanger the ICRC's humanitarian mission. 
The ICRC itself knows these limits. Thus the ICRC's President Mr. A. Haye, stated at the 
XXIV International Conference of the Red Cross in Manilla (November 1981): 
* ... [S]a pr6occupation principale 
West pas de qualifier juridiquement les situations 
conflictuelles ou de pr6ciser le status des personnes A protiger. 11 sait d'ailleurs bien 
qu'iI n'a ni la comp6tence ni le pourvoir d'imposer ses vues A ce sujet. De plus il 
risque en le faisant de ne plus avoir accýs aux victimes. Son attitude est donc dictde 
par lint6ret meme de ces derniýres. Ce que le CICR souhaite, non pour lui, mais 
pour les victimes que la communautd internationale lui a donn6 mission de prWger 
et d'assister, ce sont des possibilit6s d'action concr6te, au-dela des interpr6tation 
juridiques. "160 
This reference was made to both international and non- international conflicts and indicates 
the aim of the ICRC is to avoid legal controversies with belligerent and concentrate on the 
156See Veuthey, op. cit., supra. chapter 4, n. 189, pp. 129-131. 
157 For good detailed examples see: S. Melman (ed. ): In the Name of America: The Conduct of the War 
in Vietnam by the Armed Forces of the US as Shown by Published Reports. 1968, pp. 184-191. See also 
Hitter, op. cit., supra. chapter 4. n. 205, p. 165. 
lS8W! them, op. cit., supra. chapter 4, n. 131, p. 396. 
1590p. 
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16OCited by Et Kouhene, OP. cit.. supra. chapter 4, n. 278, pp. 19t-192. 
382 
protection of the victims. 
2.1. In Algeria 
The ICRC sought always the consent of the French Government in its activities. Thus on 
its report on the Algerian conflict it was indicated that'the ICRC's humanitarian action was 
more limited and depended on special authorisations for which it had to ask on each 
occasion. '161 Moreover, when the French Government on February 2nd, 1955 allowed the 
ICRC to visit places where FLN combatants were detained, it was firmly understood that 
the ICRC reports concerning detention conditions, would be communicated to the French 
alone. Furthermore, the ICRC delegates 'would not deal with the reasons for imprisonment 
, 162 or for assignation of residence. 
The ICRC was able to exercise a form of periodic inspection of places of detention. After 
these visits, the delegates of the ICRC would usually discuss the situation with the camp 
commander at the camp and inform him of their observations, and sometimes made 
suggestions as to how to overcome these shortcomings. 
163 
The ICRC also contacted the insurgents and its efforts led in some cases to the release of 
French POW's. The ICRC also engaged in cooperation with the French Red Cross and the 
Algerian Red Crescent, in large relief and assistance operations for civilians and refugees. 
2.2. In Nigeria 
The ICRC reminded the two parties of their obligations to conform strictly to the 
dispositions of humanitarian law and especially Article 3.1 
64 The two parties indicated their 
readiness to apply the Geneva Conventions. However, violations were immense. 
The most important aspect of the ICRC work, however, was relief. 
165 It must be stressed 
that the distribution of relief needs Government approval. Thus, the question of the 
Government consent was a major problem in Nigeria. This led at one time to the 
Government accusing the ICRC of intervention in its internal affairs, and eventually the 
ICRC representative in Lagos was declared persona non grata. 
166 This incident indicates the 
limits of action of the ICRC, even when struggling for humanity regard must be paid to the 
delicate sensibilites of sovereignty. Freymond correctly put it: 
161 Report on the ICRC and the Algerian Conflict. Geneva, 1962, p. 3. 
162 lbid, p. 4. 
163 Ibid, p. 6. 
164Rapport dlectivit6. CICR, 1967, pp. 37-8. 
165 For details see E. I. Nwogugu: The Nigerian Civil War: A Case Study in the Law of War. 14 IJIL, 
1971, pp. 33-34; and P. Mertens: Les modalit6s de Ilintervention du Comit6 International de la Croix- 
Rouge clans te conftit du Nigeria. 15 AFDI, 1969, pp. 183-209. 
166 See D. Forsythe: Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee of the Red Cross. Johns Hopkins 
Univ Press. Sattimore/London, 1977. p. 46. 
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"... [L]e CICR, meme s'il est le seul ou le principal representant de la politique 
humanitaire West qu"un des acteurs et il West pas le plus puissant. "167 
Heutsch, summarised the situation of the ICRC in Nigeria which, in my view, can be 
envisaged in any internatal conflict by stating: 
"... [L]a guerre du Nigeria a mis en 6vidence, plus cruellement peut-etre que beaucoup 
d'autres conflits, les obstacles diplornatiques auxquells se heurte une enterprise de 
secours internationale au coeur d'une guerre civile acharn6e et, dans cette enterprise, 
les possibilit6s et les limites d'une organisation telle que le CICR. "168 
The conclusion in regard to the practice of the ICRC is that nobody can deny the positive 
impact of its intervention in making the war more humane. Its activities may in fact, result 
in a de facto supervision of the the application of Article 3. 
The other important conclusion has been well put by Forsythe: 
"The ICRC is interested in the welfare of individuals; a party to the conflict may be 
primarily interested in securing control of the Government, or putting down a 
challenge to one's rule. " 6 
The result is that the belligerents try to reduce their obligations. Political necessity overrides 
humanitarian considerations. However, the role of the ICRC is to secure the protection of 
the victims of war. This aim cannot be held to obstruct political aims of the belligerents. 
3. Punishment of Violations of Article 3 
One of the weaknesses of Article 3, as it has been indicated, is that it contains no provisions 
for prosecution and trial of those who violate its fundamental rules. It seems, however, 
given the existence of a real political will and concern for humanitarian law, there is no 
reason why violators of such fundamental rules should not be punished, since their breach 
can fit easily in the category of 'grave breaches' contained in the Geneva Conventions. 
Cassese sustains that "rien n'exclut formellement que parmis les 'infractions graves' en 
question figurent les violations les plus importantes de I'Article 3.070 
However, State practice indicates that during the war, captured insurgents are either 
executed in the field, which is a flagrant violation of Article 3, (which expressly prohibits 
summary execution) or are tried and convicted for treason, which is a crime according to 
national but not international law. 
After the war, States are more interested in establishing conditions for national unity, 
rather than caring for enforcing humanitarian law. Amnesty laws, militate against any 
attempt to try war criminals in the context of internal war. Thus, in Iraq, Decision No. 1076 
of August 16th, 1979 and Decision 1077 of the Revolutionary Command Council declared a 
167 J. Fremond. Guerres, rdvolutions, Croix Rouge, r6flexions sur le r6le du Comit6 Internationat de 
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general amnesty for all prisoners and fugitive Kurds who were fighting a war of secession, 
without any exception. 171 
Moreover, there is no case of a third State attempting to try persons who committed gross 
violations of Arfticle 3 in the course of civil wars in another State. Any attempt would be 
considered as an intervention in the internal affairs of the State concerned, which is a valid 
argument, since Article 3 does not envisage such a possibility. 
It is to be noted that insurgent movements had in some cases set up 'people's and 
revolutionary courts' to try captured Government soldiers for war crimes, especially against 
the civilians. This happened in Algeria. 
However, a real attempt to enforce the rules of humanitary law including Article 3, has 
been made in the case of Bangladesh. In April 1973 the new State declared officially its 
intention to try 195 Pakistani prisoners 'for serious crimes, which include genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, breaches of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, murder, 
rape and arson. "72 The important precedent is the inclusion of breaches of Article 3 in the 
list of crimes to be prosecuted. This is a major event, since it is the first attempt to enforce 
Article 3 in court. 
In July 1973, Bangladesh's Parliament enacted the International Crimes Tribunal Act. 
Thus, the Government was permitted to set tribunals to try war criminals. However, the 
trials never took place and in 1974 Bangladesh allowed India to repatriate the 195 Pakistani 
POW's without any assurance that they would be tried. The reasons were not legal, they 
were political. Pakistan supported by China had made it clear that any prospect of pacific 
trilateral relations between it and Bangladesh and India were dependent on the return of the 
prisoners. 173 However, despite the lack of trial, the case of Bangladesh offers a very good 
precedent for the future enforcement of general humanitary law and especially Article 3 
violations. 
1.3. Vietnam 
Violations of Article 3 and indeed of all the rules of humanitarian law were common. 
Despite this, no real efforts were made to prosecute the violators. General Westmorland, the 
Commander of US forces in Vietnam, issued a statement part of which reads as follows: 
"... [W]e are sensitive to the incidents [killing of civilians and other crimes] and want 
no more of them. If one occurs, by mistake or accident, we intend to search i 
"171 carefully for any lesson that will help us improve our procedures and our controls. 
Despite this vague statement on the intention of enforcing respect for the laws of war, the 
practice seems to indicate that the view of the US Commander was that the very nature of 
171 Yearbook on Human Rights for t979. UN Pub., New York, 1986, p. 99. 
172Cited In the Review VCJ), N0.11, Dec. 1973,, p. 30. 
173 For a detaited discussion of the question see: J. J. Faust and A. P. Btaustein: War Crimes 
Jurisdiction and Due Process: The Bangtadesh Experience. 11 Vand. JIL, 1978, pp. 1-38. 
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the Vietnamese war allowed these crimes to happen and that it is very hard to try to punish 
violators in these circumstances. Taylor stated in this regard that the enthusiasm for the 
body count policy, devastation of large areas of the country, slaughter of villagers are 'due 
to features of the Vietnam conflict which have made the laws of war unusually difficult of 
application" 75. Few cases were tried by martial courts. Schwarz was sentenced to life 
imprisonment by a military court in Danang, for participating in the killing of 12 
Vietnamese villagers. 176 Many other trials took place. 177 The most famous was the May Lai 
(or Donmy) which occurred on 16 March 1968 where Lieutenant Calley ordered the killing 
of 347 civilians including women and children. Calley himself killed 22 civilians. The 
Investigation Commission found 30 persons guilty, only 4 were tried and only I person, 
Calley, was condemned. 178 
In the aftermath of Calley case the US Department of Defense issued a directive on the 
implementation of the laws of war. Among the objectives listed in this directive: (i) to 
ensure that the law of war and the obligations of the US Government under that law are 
observed and enforced by the armed forces of the US, 
(ii) to ensure that the alleged violations of the law of war, whether committed by the US 
personnel or enemy personnel, are promptly reported, thoroughly investigated, and, where 
179 appropriate, remedied by corrective action. 
After that the Directive added 'Under the head of Policy A', armed forces of the US will 
comply with the law of war in the conduct of military operations and related activities in 
armed conflicts, however, such conflicts are characteristed. 
180 The last sentence indicates 
clearly that these efforts of implementing and enforcing the laws of war are not confined 
to international conflicts, but also internal conflicts. 
Therefore there is nothing to prevent the punishment of violation of Article 3. This is a 
very interesting precedent, which can be used by other States, in order to create a 
favourable atmosphere for the real enforcement of the laws of war in internal conflicts. On 
the other hand, it seems that States which are faced with civil wars, will not go that far in 
their view. This will tie their hands in dealing with their enemies. 
4. The Nicaragua Case and the Question of Ensuring Respect for the Rules of Article 3 of 
Geneva Conventions 
The Court, it must be stressed, has not dealt at length with the question of ensuring respect 
for the application of common Article 3 and the means thereto. However, it emphasised 
some important points in connection with the obligation of States to respect Article 3. 
175 T. Taytor: Nuremburg and Vietnam. Random House, New York, 1970, p. 152. 
176 Mid, p. 153. ' 
177 See op. cit., supra. n. 131, pp. 333-34. 
178 See Ch. Rousseau: Le droit des conftits armbs. Ed. A. P6done, Paris, 1983, p. 185. See atso 80 
RDGIP, 1974, pp. 495-6. 




Thus, it held that: 
*The Court considers that there is an obligation on United States Government, in 
terms of Article I of the Geneva Convention to 'respect' the conventions and even 'to 
ensure respect' for them 'in all circumstances' since such an obligation does not derive 
from the conventions themselves but from the general principle of humanitarian law 
to which the conventions merely give specific expression. "" 
It then added that: 
"The United States is thus under obligation not to encourage persons or groups 
eýja ed in the conflict in Nicaragua to act in violation of the provisions of Article 
3.8ý 
The Main legal consequences of the pronouncement by the Court are in my view: (i) The 
obligation to'ensure respect' for humanitarian law has become, in the opinion of the Court, 
one of the general principles of humanitarian law'83. In my opinion, this means that States 
are under obligation not to encourage directly or indirectly, other States or insurgent groups 
of violating Article 3. They are under legal obligation to use all their efforts to stop such 
violations whenever they occur by using all their material and diplomatic influence, in 
accordance with the principles of the Charter of the UN, as defined by the Friendly 
resolution. 
(ii) All actions of third States which have the intention of 'ensuring respect' for the rules 
of Article 3 cannot be considered as intervention in the internal affairs of the State 
conducting a civil war. 
(iii) Third States also in order to ensure respect for Article 3 may resort to the trial and 
punishment of persons who committed gross violations of Article 3 whenever these violators 
come into their hands. 
5. Conclusions on Compliance with Common Article 3 In Practice 
(i) The practice makes it clear that the absence of any means of controlling the application 
of Article 3 meant that many violations cannot be prevented since there is no body who can 
control the Government or the insurgents in their observance of the rules of Article 3. 
Thus, the arguments of sovereignty and non -intervention which in effect pushed away any 
attempt to institute a real machinery of control, meant in practice that many victims deaths 
and sufferings could not be prevented. 
(ii) The ICRC, by its work of assistance of relief, however, when accepted by the legal 
Government, can effectively contribute to the amelioration of the conditions of the victims 
of war, especially persons who have no protection under Article 3. Hence, the ICRC 
contributes indirectly to the implementation not only of the rules of Article 3, but other 
humanitarian rules as well. However, it seems that any successful work by the ICRC must 
18125 ILM, 1986, para. 220, p. 1073. 
1821bid, 
para. 220, p. 1073. 
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always be undertaken with the consent of the Government. Respect of the sovereignty of 
the State is the cornerstone of any succession operation by the ICRC. 
(iii) Absence of penal sanctions coupled with the enactment of amnesty laws at the end 
of civil wars, meant in practice that demands of political expediency overrode demands of 
humanitarianism. However, in my opinion, there is nothing to prevent States from enforcing 
respect for the rules of Article 3 by the trial and punishment of its violators. The precedent 
of Bangladesh, read together with the pronouncement of the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case, 
may very well furnish a sufficient legal base for such actions. 
SECTION III: Protocol II and the Question of Compliance 
Introduction 
My contention in this section is that claims of sovereignty and non-intervention have been 
successfully used by States to block any development concerning means of ensuring respect 
for humanitarian law. The Protocol in fact, does not contain any means of control of its 
application, except the obligation of dissemination. There is no mention of the ICRC in any 
form. This led El Kouhene to rightly state that: 
"... [O]n constate donc encore une fois qye c'est paradoxalement I'Article 3 qui 
'd6veloppe et r6affirme' le Protocole 11. "154 
This indicates that Article 3 is in advance in relation to Protcol II. 
My second contention is that human rights instruments can play a significant role as a 
means of controlling the application of fundamental rights of humanitarian law. The 
practice of the UN and regional organisations show this tendency very clearly. In order to 
prove the first contention, it is necessary to go to the travaux pr4paratolres, and to prove 
the second it is essential to consult State practice and international organisations practice. 
In the travaux prkparatoires, I will deal with different conferences, ICRC experts, 
Government experts, and especially the Diplomatic Conference itself. 
A. The Travaux Prkparatolres and the Question of Compliance 
1. ICRC Experts Conferences 
Two important points concerning the observance of the application of the rules of the 
proposed Protocol 11 were dealt with by the Red Cross experts. The first concerned the 
reinforcement of the role of the ICRC, and secondly, whether other mechanisms of 
supervision can be developed. 
Concerning the first point, some experts felt that the parties to an internal conflict are 
bound to accept the offer of the services of the ICRC. However, other experts were 
reluctant to endorse such a course of action. They expressly invoked the principles of 
intervention and sovereignty. 185 They expressed the hope that 'the ICRC would continue 
184 Op. cit., supra. n. 160, pp. 177-i78. 
185 These Experts feared that: 
"The strengthened right of Initiative might be treated by some as a form of Interference In 
the Internat affairs of State". 
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to carry on its activity in pragmatic manner, as it has successfully done in the past"86 
which means that the consent of the Government is needed for the ICRC to act. 
On the second question, the experts consulted in 1969 were of the opinion that the ICRC 
should be invested with "internationally recognised functions of supervision, in order that 
it should be binding on the Governments to accept its assistance for the application of 
humanitary rules. "187 This meant that the ICRC would act as a body which oversees the 
observance of the application of humanitarian law, however, the term protecting power was 
not mentioned. 
In the 1970 Conference, the mood changed. Two opinions emerged, the first supporting 
the idea of creating a supervisory body which should be international, apolitical and neutral. 
Some felt that it 'should be composed of personalities known to be impartial. 
"88 Others 
considered that such a body could be set up by the UN or could constitute one of the 
branches of the 10189. However, some experts, presumably concerned about the impact of 
such suggestions on the ideas of sovereignty and non -intervention, were 'hesitant' about 
such suggestions. 
In his second report on human rights and armed conflict, the UN Secretary- General 
supported the first idea. He wrote that: 
"Conditions may now be ripe to encourage consideration of the idea of gradually 
moving away from the ad hoc approach... towards setting up, on a durable standing 
basis, an agency of implementation under the aegis of the United Nations. An 
absolute prerequisite for the establishment and success of such an agency would be 
that its character would be exclusively and strictly humanitarian; it would have to be 
scrupulously non-political and it should strive to offer all guarantees of impartiality, 
efficiency and rectitude. "190 
The conclusion is that the ICRC experts were divided on the subjects of either studying the 
role of the ICRC or creating other machinery for the supervision of the application of 
humanitarian law to internal conflicts. It would seem to me, that their stand and 
understanding of the position of the concepts of sovereignty and non- intervention in the 
world today, have contributed essentially to that difference of opinions. 
They also believed that: 
NThe question of reinforcement, or even of the imperative nature of the right to offer 
humanitarian services, was one of the most difficult problems, and that the time has not yet 
come when the right to act automatically in cases of non-internationat conflict can be given 
to a body, whatever it may be. " 
CGEDHL (24 May-12 June, 1971). V. Protectionof Victims of Non-InternationaL ArmedConfticts. Geneva, 
1971, p. 74. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Ibid, p. 76. 
188 Ibid, p. 77. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Report of the Secretary-Generat, A/8052, para. 246, p. 77. 
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2. The Government Experts Conferences 
The Second CGEDHL (1972) especially witnessed an important discussion concerning ways 
of implementing Protocol 11. Six Articles were proposed under the chapter dealing with 
'Executory provisions', which in fact indicates the urgency with which the ICRC takes up 
the matter of enforcement. The most important Article was Article 37 which is entitled 
'Cooperation in the observance of the present Protocol. ' This Article in fact made it 
obligatory for each party to the conflict to 'call upon a body whitý offers all guarantees of 
impartiality and efficacy to cooperate in the observance of the p esent Protocol etc. '191 
Thus, a third party is called to ensure that the parhie-ý 
7 
_observe the application of 
humanitarian rules in internal conflict. However, their power of discretion was limited to 
the choice of the humanitarian body which they prefer, but does not extend to the question 
of choosing that body or not. 
The Western Experts in general supported the ICRC proposed Article 37 and even tried 
to strengthen it. It was proposed that the body which was to be appointed according to 
Article 37 would have its competence extended throughout the territory where the conflict 
is taking place. 192 Moreover, the ICRC has been indicated as the compulsory substitute of 
the humanitarian body when it is lacking. The UK Experts proposed that the impartial body 
which supervise the implementation and observance of the Protocol 11 is the ICRC. 
However, non-Western States were in general sceptical about giving any mandatory form 
to the third party involved in observing the application of Protocol II. It was argued that 
the mandatory form of the ICRC proposed Article 37 was unacceptable since 'The use of 
the conditional would have been more conducive to rallying Governments to the Article in 
question. '193 It was suggested implicitly that the mandatory form limited the discretion of 
Governments, hence it is not in their interests. 
The Indonesian Experts submitted an amendment which would make the agreement of 
the established Government necessary, if draft Article 37 is to work, they stated: 
"... [I]nternational law should not try to weaken the powers of the sovereign States in 
situations which were actually threatening their very sovereignty and existence. " 194 
Thus, in this view any stipulation in favour of mandatory appointment of a body for 
supervising the implementation of the Protocol was seen as an incursion of State sovereignty 
and this deprives the Government in very dangerous circumstances from its right to do what 
it sees fit. 
However, the other Articles did not raise much discussion. 195 Nevertheless, at least one 
expert was sceptical about the practical consequences of the Article dealing with 
dissemination. He feared that: 
191 CGEDHL (Session 3 May-3 June, 1972). 1. Report on the Work of the Conference. Geneva, 1972, p. 93. 
192 Ibid, p. 44. The proposal submitted by the Experts of Austria and Switzerland. CE/COM 11/62o 
193 Ibid, para. 2.300, 'p. 94. 




"The dissemination of the present Protocol might help increase the possibility of 
rebellion, as the rebels would be able to find all information relating to their 
treatment in the text of the Protocol. " 196 
The travaux prkparatolres of the Government Experts Conferences show that there was a 
consensus, at least about the idea that third party control of the application of humanitary 
rules in internal conflicts is needed. However, there was no consensus concerning the legal 
nature of such control and whether it is mandatory or discretionary. Those who defended 
the right of the State want a discretionary control, which in practice would mean that the 
Government is at liberty in accepting or refusing the control. 
3. The Diplomatic Conference: 
Under the title 'Execution of Present Protocol' Part VII of the draft Protocol 11 of the ICRC 
contained four Articles dealing with the question of enforcement and implementation of 
Protocol 11 [Article 36: Measures for'Execution, Article 37: Dissemination. Article 38: 
Special Agreements and Article 39: Cooperation in the observance of the present 
Protocol]. 197 It seems from the reading of these draft Articles that the ICRC has, especially 
in regard to third party role in internal conflicts, opted for the idea of discretion, rather 
than any mandatory form, which would not be accepted by the majority of States. 
Again the discussions in the conference, especially in the last session of the Conference 
in 1977, of the Articles in question show clearly how the use of the arguments of 
sovereignty and non -intervention have virtually led to the elimination of any measures for 
implementing the Protocol II except a single weak Article on Dissemination. 
Eide, who was a member of the Norwegian delegation surnmarised the whole feeling 
concerning the Articles on implementation. He stated: 
"The concern for sovereignty, however, made the Governments participating in the 
conference very reluctant towards norms of implementation. The majority of States 
were not only reluctant to accept any kind of international supervision, but even to 
undertake an obligation of a specific nature concerning the international 
dissemination of the Protocol. "198 
In other words, the majority of States saw any reference to means of implementation as 
incompatible with their sovereignty. 
On one hand, Rosemary Abi-Saab writes that: 
"... [E]n rdalitd toute semblance d'intervention, meme par un organisme humanitaire 
impartial, n'dtait pas acceptable pour certaines ddldgations qui ont su rendre 
suffisamment cr6dible leur menace de refuser un texte qui attaquerait de la maniýre 
la plus minime soit-elle le principle de la souverainet6 dtatique dans le maintain de 
I"ordre. "199 
1961bid, 
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On the other hand, Cassese argued that. 
'This lack of any international scrutiny, which clearly resulted from the joint view 
of third world and socialist countries is no doubt most unfortunate, for it results in 
stultifying the effect of the protoCOI. "200 
In my opinion, all these views are in a way correct statements and observations of what 
really happened to measures for implementation during the conference, ideas of sovereignty 
and non-intervention, killed all attempts at remedying this loophole (of supervision) in 
internal conflicts. 
It is proposed here to deal with the travaux preparatolres, since they provide strong 
evidence of the workings of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, and how 
they were used to nullify piece by piece the proposals of the ICRC. 
Although the four Draft Articles (36-39) were interlinked it may be said that they 
contain two elements regarding means of implementing Protocol 11. Firstly, elements and 
measures which depended on the parties themselves (mutual means) and secondly, third 
party machinery. 
(i) As to'the first category, three Articles of the ICRC draft (36,37 and 38) deal with it. 
They include: 
(a) The obligation of each party to the conflict to take the necessary measures for 
ensuring respect for the Protocol by its persons subjected to its authority, either military 
of civil; 
(b) dissemination of the Protocol; and 
(c) special agreement between the parties to extend the application of other rules of 
humanitary law to their conflict. 
Articles 36,37 and 38 which dealt with these measures did not raise fundamental 
objections during the discussions at the Committee level. The new versions of those Articles 
adopted at the Committee level did not differ fundamentally from what was proposed by 
the ICRC. Nevertheless, they were not favourable to defenders of sovereignty and non- 
intervention. Thus, for instance draft Article 37 of the ICRC dealing with dissemination 
included a reference to the study of the Protocol 11 in the programmes of military and civil 
instruction. This reference was deleted. The new version speaks of the obligation of the 
parties to disseminate the Protocol so that it may become known to the armed forces and 
the civilian population which means in the end that the Government is free to choose ways 
of dissemination. 
Similarly, Article 38 dealing with special agreements in the ICRC version opened the 
possibility for the parties to bring by 'special agreements or by declarations' addressed to 
the depository of the Geneva Conventions or the ICRC all or parts of Geneva Committee 
of 1949. It is to be noticed here that the ICRC explained that by 'declaration' it meant 
unilateral declarations by either party, it stressed that: 
"If such a declaration was made by one party alone, it would be binding only on that 
party. in that case, the ICRC, by communicating it to the other party, would 
200 A. Cassese: Status of RebeLs under the 1977 Geneva Protocots. 39 ICLO, t981, p. 419. 
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encourage it to make a similar declaration". 201 
The implication of this ICRC statement is very clear. The insurgents can make a unilateral 
declaration which would embarrass the Government, and would give the insurgents a golden 
opportunity against the established Government. These hypotheses led at the Committee 
level to the modification of the wording of the Article in order to emphasise the mutual 
element even in declarations. This of course goes with the desire of the established 
Governments to close any door through which the insurgents may appear as responsible 
movements capable of acting at the international level, which would undermine the 
legitimacy of the Government in holding power. 
Despite these changes, the three Articles 36,37 and 38 were adopted at the Committee 
level by consensus. This indicates that there was a large measure of acceptance, that the 
parties to the conflict hold the ultimate responsibility for implementing the Protocol. In 
other words, the measures are left to the parties themselves. This stand goes with the 
theoretical view of the majority of States that they prefer mutual and agreed ways of 
enforcing international law rather than third party involvement in that process. 
(ii) Third party machinery- Draft Article 39, which was the subject of heated discussion 
in the Conference, stipulates that: 
"Co-operation in the observance of the present Protocol. The parties to the conflict 
may call upon a body offering all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy, such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, to co-operate in the observance of the 
provisions of the presenj Protocol such a body may also offer its services to the 
parties to the confliCt. "20 
The ICRC delegate at the Diplomatic Conference explained the rationale behind the 
inclusion of this Article in Protocol 11, as follows: 
"The parties might come up against certain difficulties in applying the provisions of 
Protocol 11, in which case the assistance of a body monitoring its implementation 
might be both desired and useful. "203 
He tried to assure defenders of sovereignty by insisting that: 
"... [I]ts activities [of the humanitary body] however, could only be an auxiliary 
"204 character. 
He also insisted that the mention of the ICRC was by way of an example, the parties were 
at liberty to choose any impartial body they like. The right of initiative of the ICRC, 
however, was confirmed in Article 39. 
Despite these ICRC assurances and despite the discretionary nature of resorting to third 
party cooperation for the implementation of Protocol 11, the very mention of such a 
2019 ORDCHL (1974-1977), Geneva, MDH/I/SR 59, para. 48, p. 245. 
2020p. 
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2041bid. 
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possibility in the context of internal armed conflicts, was enough for some States to demand 
its deletion, because it constitutes an intervention in their internal affairs and a breach of 
their sovereignty. 
Some Third World States led the attack against Article 39. In this context, they were 
greatly supported by Socialist States, which as a matter of principle stand against third party 
machinery in whatever form, in international law and international relations. They do not 
believe in neutrality in the age of which Socialism and Capitalism still live together. Mexico 
led the attack by pointing out that Article 39 was 'unacceptable since it would permit an 
intolerable interference in the internal affairs during a non- international Armed Conflict'. 
Mexico maintained that Article 39 was in fact, in a conflict with the Article of the Protocol 
205 prohibiting intervention. 
Iraq was very explicit, it stated that: 
"The distinction between international and non- international conflict was being lost. 
Article 39 dealt with matters involving the infringement of State sovereignty, and 
internal matters would become international matters. The sovereignty of the State 
over its territory would cease to exSt. "206 
Implicitly then, the mere possibility of third party machinery, has been seen as leading to 
the inevitable taking of important powers of the State, which would deprive it from 
overcoming its enemies. 
India on the other hand, gave another reason why in its view Article 39 had no place in 
the context of Protocol 11. It stated that once the Article is adopted it: 
"... [W]ould inevitably be used for political reasons by a party opposing or in rebellion 
against a government. A government which refused the services of the ICRC or some 
other impartial bo ý called in by the rebel party might be accused of having 7 something to hide. - 
The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic endorsed, with other Socialist States (Cuba and 
Mongolia), the view advocated by the above Third World States. The delegation of Ukraine 
stressed: 
had some doubts regarding the wording of Article 39. There was nothing to 
prevent the ICRC offering its help, even without such an Article, which in any case 
would have no effect on its activities. It might be possible to amend the Article by 
adding a reference to national Red Cross societies, but since some delegations thought 
that the provisions of Article 39 would endanger State sovereignty he was prepared 
to support the Mexican proposal that Article 39 should be deleted. "208 
Therefore, it is not only third party control of the application of Protocol Il which is seen 
as infringement of the sovereignty of the State, but even any mention of the ICRC. 
However, Western States especially backed by some delegates from the Third World, 
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supported what was proposed by the ICRC. Draper, the UK delegate, expressed their view 
when he stated that the provisions of Article 39 'were of undoubted value in Protocol 11'. 209 
He then added that 'it was self-evident that such conflict (internal) would lead to some 
erosion of sovereignty, but Article 39 in no way derogated from such sovereignty. '210 
Tunisia stressed the same point of view: 
"Article 39 was simply giving the parties the possibility of calling on the good offices 
of impartial bodies to that end. As long as it imposed no obligations, there was 
nothing in it that was prejudicial to the sovereignty of the State. "211 
This initial discussion of the ICRC Article 39 which shows a fundamental rift between two 
conceptions of sovereignty, led the Committee to refer Article39 to working groups and 
sub-groups. 212 Finally. Article 39 which was adopted at the committee level simply states 
'the ICRC may offer its services to the parties to the conflict' and even this modest version, 
which is in fact, identical with Common Article 3/3, was not accepted by consensus as draft 
Articles 36,37 and 38, it was adopted by 34 votes, 17 against and 2 abstentions. 213 
In the simplified version of Protocol 11 submitted by Pakistan, only Article 37 which 
became Article 19 in the final version of Protocol 11 survived. It simply stated: 'this Protocol 
shall be disseminated as widely as possible. ' All the other three Articles had been deleted. 
It must be repeated that the deletion of those Articles and other provisions of Protocol 11 
has been done in the name of simplicity and the protection of sovereignty and non- 
214 intervention in the internal affairs of States. 
The main conclusion to be drawn from the travaux prkparatolres is that the day of more 
procedural requirements for the control of the application of humanitarian law, in internal 
conflicts, has not yet arrived, all moves in such direction have been stopped. It is very clear 
that the failure of the Protocol to provide for a thorough system for the implementation of 
humanitarian law has been the result of insisting that it infringes the sovereignty of the 
State. The concept of sovereignty in the view of the majority denies any control of 
application of international law, when it is applied to internal conflicts. 
After dealing with travaux prkparatoires, it seems to me, appropriate to discuss some 
issues which relate directly to means of ensuring respect for humanitarian law, in the light 
of Protocol Il as adopted. They include the question of reprisals; repression of violations of 
Protocol 11; the relation between Article 3 and Protocol II concerning the right of initiative 
of the ICRC; and the question of relief. 
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3.1. Reprisals 
Many commentators agree that the absence of a prohibition of reprisals ift internal conflicts 
in Protocol 11 is a sad event, since the implication is such recourse may tolerated in case of 
violation of the rules of the Protocol. Bierzanek stresses that: 
*The fact that Protocol 11 does not contain any prohibitions of reprisals considerably 
reduces the practical importance of the prohibition of reprisals adopted till now, since 
non- international confliqvj in our times constitute no less a danger for human rights 
than international ones. ""': ) 
Eide comments on the fact that there was no prohibition against reprisals by stating: 
"The likelihood of an escalation in cruelty has not been much reduced by the 
"216 performance at the Diplomatic Conference. 
In fact, the ICRC's draft Protocol Il contained two provisions which prohibit reprisals, first 
against the wounded and the sick, Article 19 stipulates: 
"Prohibition of reprisals: measures of reprisals against the wounded, the sick, and the 
shipwrecked as well as against medical personnel, medical units and means of medical 
"217 transport are prohibited. 
Also Article 26/4 stipulates: 
"Attacks aginst the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are 
prohibited. " 18 
Thus, the protection of the victims of internal wars was assumed also by the way of 
prohibiting reprisals. 
When Article19 was opened for discussion, Australia explained its amendment for its 
deletion on the ground that: 
" ... [R]eprisals at least under international law, 
involved an act by one State against 
another State. However, in internal conflicts the concept of reprisals would seem to 
be inapplicable since one party was not a State and he other party was fighting 
within its own territory and against its own people. "24 
Iraq on the other hand, specifically thought that the inclusion of an Article on reprisals was 
an intervention in the internal affairs of States. It stressed that: 
"Draft Protocol II dealt with internal conflicts, in the context of which the idea of 
reprisals was inconceivable since a State must protect its own citizens. It must be left 
to municipal law to organise the relationship between citizen and State. A provision 
of the kind proposed [Draft Article 19] would be an interference with sovereignty and 
2150p. 
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*220 would never be applied . 
It seems to me that the delegations which proposed the deletion of Article 19 and 26/4 (on 
reprisals) did not at all imply they supported their legitimacy, they wanted to leave their 
regulation to their natural laws. This view is confirmed by Indonesia which noted that it: 
"... [W]as not opposed to the prohibition of reprisals; on the contrary it disapproved 
of any act of that kind, but considered that Article 19 as it stood represented an 
interference in national affairs, an international Protocol should not prescribe how 
a State should treat its own nationals. It was for the State itself to take appropriate 
measures and it would appear that most States had done SO. "221 
This initial discussion led the Committee to refer the matter of reprisals to working groups 
and subgroupS. 222 After a very lengthy discussions and amendments. Article 10 bis was 
adopted at the committee level; it stipulates: 
"Article 10 bis Unconditional Respect: 
The provisions of Parts 11 and Il and of Article 26,26 bis and 27 and 28 shall not, 
in any circumstances or for any reason whatsoever, be violated, even in response to 
a violation of the provisions of the Protocol". 
Thus, a compromise was found, where the idea of prohibition of reprisals was emphasised, 
without using the word itself in order to appease supporters of its deletion. 
At the final session, Pakistan proposed the deletion of this Article; the US supported that 
stand on the ground that 'the whole concept of reprisals had no place in Protocol ll. '223 
India specifically invited all Third World countries to follow its example in supporting the 
deletion of Article 10 bis. Their delegate stressed that: 
"While appreciating the desirability of comprises, he felt compelled to take a stand 
against gertain comprises which tended to jeopardize the national sovereignty of 
States. " 
Finally, the Article was deleted by 41 votes to 20 and 22 abstentions. 
The main conclusion to be drawn concerning the place of reprisals in the context of 
Protocol 11 is that it is the argument of sovereignty and non -intervention which killed it, 
even in its comprise formula in Article 10 bis. 
It seems to me that despite this above fact, there is room for arguing against the use of 
reprisals as a means of enforcing the rules of Protocol 11. Nahlik maintains that it may be 
220 lbid, CDDH/11/SR/32, para. 52, p. 336. 
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possible to find "des traces indirectes dans quelques dispositions sur les guaranties 
fondamentales, telles que, par example. Vinterdiction des 'punitions collectives' ou de la 
'prise dotages! '*. 225 Nevertheless, he admits 'mais le ne sont que des d6bris de ce quon avait 
auparavant envisagd. s226 
Italy, in its explanation of vote on Article 10 bis (it abstained) brought an interesting legal 
argument to support the contention that the deletion of the Article (10 bis) has no negative 
effect on the prohibition of reprisals. It noted that Protocol IT contains many provisions 
which mention obligations, which the parties Must respect 'in all circumstances' or rules 
which must be followed 'as a minimum'. This language highlights the need for 
unconditional respect for those rules. That kind of language was used in some fundamental 
Articles of Protocol IT such as Article 8 (Persons whose liberty has been restricted); Article 
12 (Protection and care). Italy, in fact, stated: 
"Clearly all those provisions demand unconditional reW; ct and their legal force is in 
no way diminished by the deletion of Article 10 bis. "" 
These kinds of argument are valid and can be very well used to argue against this inhuman 
method of enforcing humanitarian law. 
The prohibition of reprisals, it must be noted, has been argued for in the ICRC 
Commentary on the Additional Protocols. It has been advocated that: 
"The prohibition of collective punishment was included in the Article relating to the 
fundamental guarantees [Article 4] by consensus. That decision was important because 
it is based on the intention to give the rule the widest possible scope, and to avoid 
any risk of a restrictive interpretation. In fact, to include the prohibition on collective 
punishments amongst the acts unconditionally prohibited by A rticle 4 is virtually 
equivalent to prohibiting reprisals against protected persons". 
Thus, the idea of prohibiting collective punishments has been used as a vehicle for 
upholding the illegality of reprisals in the context of internal wars. This interpretation in 
my view is wholly consistent with the object and purpose of the Protocol 11, which is 
essentially the protection of victims of war from all forms of inhuman treatment and there 
is no doubt that reprisals are a very clear example of inhuman treatment, since they always 
hit the innocent. 
3.2. Repression of Violations of the Rules of Protocol H: 
The Protocol itself is silent on this point. The travaux pr6paratolres show also that there was 
no concern whatsoever for criminal prosecution of violations of its rules. In fact, neither 
the ICRC in its draft Protocol, nor States during the discussions raised the issue. 
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On the other hand, Article 6/5 of the Protocol in effect, encourage the enactment of 
amnesty laws at the end of hostilities. This may very well mean that all flagrant violations 
of the Protocol may go unpunished. In this context, it seems that Protocol 11 takes into 
account only the interests of States, in building a new atmosphere of political reconciliation 
after the war, without paying attention to the need for the enforcement of humanitarian 
law. 
Against this background, two possible positions can be taken in regard to the question of 
the repression of violations of Protocol II; either they do not exist, because they are not 
mentioned, or it can be argued that despite that absence of their mentioning, they still can 
be contemplated. Sandoz takes the first position. He writes: 
"... [L]a violation de I'Article 3 des Conventions de Genýve ou de dispositions du 
Protocol 11 ne pouvait etre qualifide d'infractions grave sticto sensu aux conventions 
et au Protocole, it n' ,ýa qu'une obligation 
d'y mettre fin, mais pas d'obligation de 
o22. punir leur auteur. 
However, Blishenko argues for the second position. To him, the effect of Articles 13 
(civilian population cannot be the object of attack) 7.10,12,14,15 and 17 of Protocol 11 is 
that: 
"11 faut on conclure que les actes prdcitds devraient We considdr6s comme des crimes 
appellant la poursuite et le chAtiment des criminelS. "230 
In his view, the violations of the above ATticles constitute waT CTimes which must be 
punished. He StTessed that: 
"... [Lles Protocoles de 1977 additionnels aux Conventions de Gen6ve de 1949 sur la 
protection des victimes de la guerre partant de la pr6somption que tout ordre de 
caractýre criminel est inadmissible' c'est-i-dire un ordre qui tend A enfreindre les 
dispositions de la convention et des Protocoles. Toute pSrjonne qui intime un tel ordre 
"3 devrait etre considdrde coupable de crime de guerre. 
According to him, punishment of war crimes is possible in internal and international wars 
alike. It seems to me that there is some support for this stand in State practice. Thus, in his 
letter of Transmittal of January 29th, 1987 to the US Senate recommending the acceptance 
of Protocol 11, President Reagan stated that: 
"This Protocol 11 makes clear that any deliberate killing of a non-combatent in the 
course of a non-international armed conflict is a violation of the laws 3f war and a 
"2 2 crime against humanity, and is therefore also punishable as murders. 
It is very clear that violation of some rules of Protocol 11 have been characterised as war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, punishable under the law. This is a very encouraging 
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precedent, since the silence of the Protocol has been interpreted in a positive way, in the 
direction of enforcing respect for humanitarian law. 
3.3. The Relation Between Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Protocol 11, In 
Relation to the Question of Right of Initiative of the ICRC. 
With the deletion of draft Article 39 which provides for the right of the ICRC to offer its 
services to the parties to the internal conflict, Protocol II does not contain any reference to 
the ICRC. The question then arises as to whether the right of initiative of the ICRC 
mentioned in Article 3 does or does not apply to conflicts covered by Article I of the 
Protocol H. 
To some authors, the deletion in the Protocol of any mention of the ICRC does not in any 
way affect its right to offer its services. In this respect, Abi Saab contends that Article 3: 
... 
[E]t en particular ses dispositions concernant loffre de service par les organtsmes 
humanitaires, continue A s'appliquer A tous les conflits rdgis par le Protocol ll. "233 
He then added that: 
"... [P]aradoxalement, nous pouvons dire que sur ce point c'est IArticle 3 commun qui 
s, 234 'ddveloppe" et 'compl6te' le Protocol 11 plut6t que le contraire. 
This means that the ICRC would be able to offer its services even in cases of conflicts 
defined by Article I of the Protocol, and not only in conflict of lesser intensity regulated 
by Common Article 3. 
Bothe holds the same view. To him, the deletion of draft Articles 36-38 and 39 does not 
constitute a real loss of substance in the matter of executing the Protocol since in his view: 
"Les questions rýgkes par les Articles 38 et 39 sont largement couvertes par les 
dispositions de I'Article 3 communs aux quatre Conventions. "235 
Then, in his opinion, the ICRC can offer its services in conflicts covered by Article I of the 
Protocol 11 and also there is nothing to exclude the possibility that the parties to the conflict 
can conclude agreements which bring more humanitarian rules into the conflict. He even 
suggests that these special agreements are not confined only to the Geneva Convention but 
also to the First Protocol. 
However, Cassese is more sceptical. He maintains that: 
"Le Protocol 11 non-seulement n'6tablit aucun mecanisme international; visant a en 
surveiller l'observation, mais il fait meme un pas en arri6re par rapport i I'ATticle 3 
of 1949. *236 
First, because the mention of the right of initiative of the ICRC has been deleted and 
233 G. Abi Saab: Les conftits de caract6re non-internationat, in Les Dimensions internationates du 
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second, because there is no similar provision like Article I of the Geneva Convention which 
obliges each party to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions. On the contrary, in 
his view, there is a provision in the Protocol which goes against the spirit of Article I of the 
Geneva Convention of 1949. That is Article 3/2 of the Protocol 11 (on non -intervention). in 
Cassese's opinion: 
"Cela peut impliquer qu'aucun autre Etat contractant ne peut exiger le respect du 
Protocol de la part d"un Etat sur le territoire duquel une guerre civile est en cours, 
car cette Etat pourrait considdrer une telle d6marche comme une grave ing6rence dans 
"237 ses affaires int6rieures. 
His conclusion is that: 
"La seule consolidation qui nous reste est que I'Article 3 'englobe' le Protocol. Je veux 
dire par 11 que toutes les fois qu'on appliquera le Protocole, I'Article 3 trouvera 
n6cessairement application, et le conflit arm6 interne b6n6ficiera des garanties 
pr6vues en faveur du respect de I'Article 3". 238 
He then insists that: 
"... [T]outefois le CICR et les autres Etats parties aux quatre conventions de Genýve 
nepourront exiger I'application rigoureuse du Protocole mais seulement de I'Article 3 339 
He then adds: 
"Cest pourquoi on peut dire que le Protocole est comme un guerrier sans armes: il 
ddicte des ommandements, mais ne dispose d'aucun moyen efficace pour les faire YO 
observer. 
It seems to me, that the contentions of Cassese are too restrictive. In my view, the parties 
to the Protocol II can always demand from the party who accepted the application of 
Protocol 11 in its internal conflict, strict adherence to the rules of that Protocol, since 
matters which are regulated by that international instrument are no longer within its 
domestic jurisdiction. Article 3 of the Protocol cannot bar that demand. 
Similarly, there is very strong support for the first position taken by G. Abi Saab and 
Bothe (that the ICRC can always offer its services even in conflicts of Protocol 11). In fact, 
no delegation stated categorically that in the context of conflicts regulated by Article I of 
the Protocol 11, the ICRC has no role to play. On the contrary many delegations confirmed 
the ICRC's right of initiative. 
Thus, Italy argued that: 
"Article 3 common to the 1949 Conventions remains fully applicable in all conflicts 







application of Protocol JI". 241 
This means automatically that the right of the ICRC to offer its services was upheld. 
The ICRC made a statement in the conference to the effect that: 
"The power extended to the ICRC of offering its services in such conrl s [internal] 
remains inviolate, even if it is not confirmed in the present Protocol. "RI 
The ICRC Commentary also goes in this direction. It states: 
"Common Article 3 gave the ICRC the right of initiative in situations of non- 
international armed conflict. Even in the absence of explicit ruffirmation, it 
"2 continues to apply, since Protocol 11 has an 'additional' character. 
It then adds: 
"The parties to the conflict retain complete freedom to refuse or accept such an offer 
of services, but it may not in itself be considered as a hostile act or as intervention; 
moreover, the Protocol provides for the possibility of appealing to a humanitarian 
organization in particular by mentioning the possibility of undertaking international 
relief actions. . 244 
The conclusion is then very clear. The ICRC has the right of initiative even in the context 
of the conflicts regulated by Protocol II, its offering of services can never be seen as an 
intervention in the internal affairs. In this respect, Article 3 indeed develops Protocol 11 and 
not wice-versa. Again this interpretation in my view, is consistent with the object and 
purpose of the Protocol. 
3.4. Relief and Assistance 
in my opinion, relief is a very important indirect means of ensuring respect for the 
application of humanitary law, in the context of internal conflict, its distribution can save 
the right to life and prevent starvation and diseases. 
However, the issue of relief which is humanitarian in essence, has very strong political 
oveLnes. Governments which experience civil wars, seem to have grave misgivings about 
it, since it is 'equated with foreign intervention, with foreign assistance to rebellion or at 
least a danger of these things happening. '245 
The ICRC in its Draft Protocol 11, submitted 3 Articles under Part VI under the title 
'Relief. '246 The main points were: 
(i) Relief to civilians shall be agreed to and facilitated by the parties to the conflict; (ii) it 
241 op. cit., supra. n. 214, CDDH/SR/53, p. 161. 
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has not to be seen as an intervention; (iii) the obligation of the parties to the conflict and 
other contracting States to facilitate and accelerate the entry, transport, obstruction or 
passage of relief; (iv) relief societies shall be permitted to pursue their humanitarian 
activities. 
At the outset of the discussions, which were lengthy, Nigeria, which experienced 
unhappy memories of relief during its civil war stressed (and was supported by Third World 
countries) that: 
"In non -international armed conflict relief action could make the situation worse; 
outside interference could magnify what was a small matter to the State 
concerned. "247 
Many amendments and compromises were necessary before the adoption of a single Article 
(18) in the simplified version. It must be noted that the essence of those amendments, 
compromises, was to preserve the liberty of the established Government to accept or refuse 
such relief. Article IS provides: 
"Article 18 Relief Societies and Relief Actions 
1. Relief societies located in the territory of the high contracting Party, such as Red 
Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) organizations, may offer their services for 
the performance of their traditional functions in relation to the victims of the armed 
conflict. The civilian population may, even on its own initiative, offer to collect and 
care for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked. 
2. If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to the lack of the 
supplies, essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and medical supplies, relief 
actions for the civilian population which are of an exclusively humanitarian and 
impartial nature and which are conducted without-any adverse distinction shall be 
undertaken subject to the consent of the high contracting party concerned. n248 
Article 18 in fact fills a gap, since Article 3 does not contain any mention of relief. 
However, the sovereignty of the State and the fear of intervention have been * 
looked for, 
since the Article as a whole is based on the idea that States are the principal agents for the 
organisation of relief. Similarly, the consent of the State concerned is expressly provided 
for, when international relief is envisaged. 
However, a practical difficulty may appear, and that is whether the consent of the 
established Government is necessary even to areas controlled by the rebels. The literal 
interpretation of Article 18/2 is very clear. the consent of the contracting party is needed 
always. 
According to Bothe 'when it comes to humanitarian relief, the competing claims of 
international status must not be allowed to determine the question of required consent'249 
and then he adds that: 
247H S. Levie (ed. ): The Law of Won-InternationaL Armed Conflict, Protocot 11 to the 1949 Geneva 
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"It is rather physical control of those areas through which relief consignment have 
to pass ý2r5 where they are distributed which, for practical reasons, have to be 
decisive. 0 
The commentary of the ICRC on the two Protocols goes nearly in the above direction. It 
states that: 
"The fact that consent is required does not mean that the decision is left to the 
discretion of the parties. If the survival of the population is threatened and a 
humanitarian organisation fulfilling the required conditions of impartiality and non- 
"251 discrimination is able to remedy this situation, relief action must take place. 
Despite the humanitarian intent of such arguments the practice suggests that the consent of 
Government is essential. Thus, Meyer notes that: 
"It may be said that in most cases under the Geneva Conventions and the additional 
Protocols, relief organisations are only able to operate if they have some form of 
Governmental authorisation, abstain from Folitical or military activity, and maintain 
impartiality in their humanitarian work.. 2 2 
Efficaty to him, means getting continued authorisation from the Government, which would 
prevent the actions of relief from being characterised as intervention. 
In this respect, when in June 1987 India undertook a relief supply by air over Jaffra, Sri 
Lanka condemned the act as violation of its sovereignty. However, when the Indian Red 
Cross sought the consent of the Sri Lanka Government, the latter accepted, but stressed that 
'253 it did so 'purely in the interest of good- neighbourly relations. 
It is to be stressed that the ICRC is not mentioned expressly as having the right to provide 
relief and assistance, in the context of Article 18. However, some argued that the right of 
initiative of the ICRC, includes also the right to provide relief and assistance and that this 
right however has become a part of customary law. 254 Some other authors are sceptical. 
Jakovijevic maintains: 
"The existing rules are certainly not sufficia ., nt 
to ensure the right to humanitarian 
"255 assistance in this type of armed situation. 
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That is in internal conflicts. However, to me, the first stand is more in conformity with the 
humanitarian spirit of the Protocol as a whole. 
3.4.1. Humanitarian Aid and the Nicaragua Case 
The ICJ, in fact, made a very important pronouncement concerning the issue of 
humanitarian aid, the question which was raised was whether the decision of the US 
Congress on October Ist, 1984 to restrict the funds of assistance to the Contras to 
'humanitarian assistance' can be characterised as intervention in the internal affairs of 
Nicaragua. 
The Court first stressed that: 
"... [T]here can be no doubt that the provisions of strictly humanitarian aid to persons 
or forces in another country, whatever their political affiliation or objectives cannot 
be reyrded as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international 
law. " 6 
It then made it clear what are the feature of such aid, which cannot be seen as 
intervention. First, it said that it must conform to the principles declared by the 20th 
International of the Red Cross, 257 and especially that: 
"... [Aln essential feature of truly humanitarian aid is that it is given 'without 
discrimination' of any kind. In view of the Court, if the provision of 'humanitarian 
assistance' is to escape condemnation as an intervention in the internal affairs of 
Nicaragua, not only must it be limited to the purposes hallowed in the practice of the 
Red Cross, namely 'to prevent and alleviate human sufferings and to protect life and 
health and to ensure respect for the human being" it must also, and above all be given 
without discrimination to all in need in Nicaragua, not merely to the Contras and 
their dependentS. "258 
The contribution of the Court lies in the fact that it stressed the element of giving the 
humanitarian assistance to all those who are in need, without discrimination on political 
grounds. Thus, it is the element of non -discrimination which is essential rather than the 
consent of Government or other bodies. In this respect, the judgment of the Court is more 
advanced than the Protocol 11 and is more in conformity with the ideas of humanity rather 
than sovereignty. 
2560P. cit.. supra. n. 181, para. 245, p. 1078. 
257These 
principles are: 
NThe Red Cross, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on 
the bat ttef I aid, endeavour-in its International, and nat Iona t capacity-to prevent and at tevi ate 
human suffering wherever It may be found. Its purpose is to protect tife and heatth and to 
ensure respect for human beings. It promotes mutuat understanding, friendship, co-operation 
and tastty peace amongst peoptes". 
And that: 
"it makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs. class or political 
opinions. It endeavour only to relieve suffering, giving priority to the most urgent cases of 
distress. " 
See fbid, para. 242, pp. 1078-79. 
2581bid, 
pare. 242. pp. 1078-79. 
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B. The Compliance with Humanitarian Law after the Adoption of Protocol II 
In the report of ICRC's activities, delivered by its President at the 25th International 
Conference of the Red Cross (Geneva, October 1986), he stated that: 
"... [n]ot only are conflicts increasing in number and length, but practices prohibited 
by international humanitarian law are becoming more and more common: The taking 
of hostages and sometimes their subsequent murder, acts of terrorism, torture and 
other ill-treatment of detained persons, and people reported unaccountably missing, 
it has even reached the point who whole civilian populations are subjected to 
starvation for the purpose of war. " 5 
He then added that: 
"260 "Grave problems are being encountered in the application of humanitarian law. 
This means that especially in internal conflicts, which constitute the majority of conflicts 
which are taking place, the picture of observance of the law is very grim indeed. 
In El Salvador, despite widespread revelations that certain officers are involved in 
rampant violations of human rights, attempts to prosecute them have failed. Thus, in 1983 
the then US Vice-President, G. Bush visited El Salvador and brought with him a letter from 
the US President which included a list of military and civilian officials identified by the 
US as being involved in death squads. The message contained an ultimatum 'suspend or 
cashier them' or the US aid will be cut by January Ist, 1984. However, nothing happened, 
no officer was charged and the aid continued. 261 This case indicates that there is an obvious 
lack of political will to stop such violations. 
It seems to me that two institutions at least in practice have contributed greatly to the 
question of controlling the application of humanitarian law in internal conflict, and by 
this they contributed to a certain measure to fill the loopholes left by Protocol 11 in this 
area. They are: (i) the role of the ICRC; and (ii) the role of human rights instrument. I think 
that their success, in practice, can be explained by the fact that their use cannot be seen as 
a breach of the sovereignty of the State, or as an intervention in its internal affairs. Since 
the ICRC has established a good record as a humanitarian organ devoted to humanitarian 
needs, and secondly because human rights have been generally accepted as a valid limitation 
upon State sovereignty. 
1. The Role of the ICRC 
It must be contended that the mere presence of the ICRC in situations of internal conflicts 
would, in practice, lead to a better protection of the victims of war, hence, implicitly 
reinforcing the application of the fundamental guarantees of humanitarian law. 
The non-recognition of the application of Protocol 11 or even Article 3 and the absence 
of any solid legal ground upon which the ICRC can oblige the parties to the conflict to 
2591RRC, 1987, No. 256, p. 61. 
2601bid. 
261Hopkins (ed. ), op. cit., supra. chapter 4, n. 461, Vot. 3, (1983-84), 1985, p. 525. 
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accept its intervention, has not in practice prevented the ICRC from action. It seems to me 
that the ICRC acts in fact on the assumption that its right to offer relief and assistance and 
its right to initiative has become a customary rule. 
A simple look at the monthly bulletins of the ICRC and its other publications, clearly 
reveals the immense work carried out, both in the past and at present. Moreover, they show 
that the ICRC is present in nearly every internal conflict. In fact, it is reported that the 
ICRC is present in Ethiopia, Chad, Uganda, Burundi, South Africa, Namibia, Sudan, 
Angola, Mozambique. Nicaragua, El Salvador. Peru, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Philippines, 
262 Indonesia, Burma and Lebanon. 
In all these conflicts its main work consisted in: 
1. Visits to detainees and detention centres of prisoners; 
2. Looking after displaced persons by providing food, shelter and medical care; 
3. Establishing hospitals and first aid posts for the wounded and sick; 
4. Monitoring the situation of civilians in conflict areas; 
5. Looking after refugees etc. 
These activities, of course, would reinforce the application of the fundamental rules of 
humanitarian law and prevent breaches of humanitarian law, at least partially. 
The success of the ICRC in these areas has been explained, among other things, by El- 
Kouhene in the following fashion: 
"Il [le CIRC] oppose ti la raison d'Etat la raison humanitaire. Et partout oil il va sa 
devise est la neutralitd, c'est la principale garantie de 1'efficacit6 de son action, de son 63 autorit6 morale et de sa credibilite. 
Thus, it seems that States at least publicly, in recent times, have abstained from challenging 
or accusing the ICRC of intervention in their internal affairs, when the ICRC seeks to act 
in internal conflicts. 
2. The Role of Human Rights Instruments In the Control of Application of Fundamental 
Humanitarian Rules 
The aim of human rights law and instruments is the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of the individual in times of peace especially. However, in times of wars and emergencies 
certain fundamental rights and freedoms are also protected by such instrument. 264 In fact, 
262See ICRC Woridwide 1988, ICRC Pub., Geneva, pp. 3-20. 
2630p. cit., supra, n. 160, p. 194. 
264Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 4 non-derogabte rights are mentioned (Articte 15/2: 
The right to life, freedom from torture, the prohibition of slavery and ex post facto taws): the 
United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, lists seven non-derogabLe rights (Article 4/2. 
Thus, the four rights mentioned in the European Convention are included plus the prohibition against 
imprisoned for nonfulfillment of contractual obligations, the right to be recognized before the law, 
and freedom of thought. conscience and religion). Lastly under the American Convention on Human 
Rights, no derogation is permitted from eleven rights, including the right to nationality, the right 
to participate in Government and the obligation of States to ensure and protect the judicial 
guarantees essential for the protection of these rights. That In itself is a non-derogable right under 
Article 27/2 of the Convention. See T. Buergenthat: The Inter-Amerfcan System for the Protection of 
Human Rights in: T. Meron (ad. ): Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Political Issues. VoL. 2. 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 450. 
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the African Charter of Human Rights does not contain any clause on emergencies and wars, 
which would imply that the Charter is applicable in times of peace and wars either 
international or internal. 
Thus, when the Government does not proclaim the application of Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions or Protocol 11, human rights instruments adhered to by the Government still 
apply, at least in their part reserved for emergencies. The UN Covenant on Political and 
Civil Rights, goes even further. Its Article 4 stresses that the derogation from the Covenant 
can only be valid when the public emergency is publicly proclaimed. This led Robertson 
to note that: 
"... [I]n order for a derogation to be lawful, the public emergency must be 'officially 
proclaimed'. This means that in situations of undeclared war or civil strife no 
derogation is permissible in the absence of an official proclamation of a State of 
emergency so that all the rights proclaimed in the Covenant continue to be 
"265 respected. 
Carty in fact, insists that: 
"There is a consensus that the State does not have an unqualified right to declare that 
a State of emergency exists which justifies derogations from human rights. A public 
emergency has to exist as a matter of objective fact, which J$ reviewable where the 
State submits to the jurisdiction of an international body. "266 
In other words, even in cases of public emergencies, the sovereignty of the State is not 
absolute. This is the logical effect of international conventions on human rights. 
In this respect, it must also be indicated that the Siracusa principles on limitations and 
derogations provisions in the Covenant interpreted the obligation of States under its Article 
2 (to ensure the enjoyment of the rights for all persons within their jurisdiction, and their 
duty to adopt measures to secure an effective remedy for their violations) to mean in cases 
of emergencies that States shall take special precautions to ensure: 
"That no official or semi-official groups engage in a practice of arbitrary and extra- 
juridical killings or involuntary disappearances, that persons in detention are 
protected against torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, and that no persons are convicted or punished under laws or decrees 
with retroactive effeCt". 267 
This means in effect that the right to fair trial and due process of law must be respected 
in all times. This will lead in practice to a real protection of victims of wars. 
Carty also indicated that in emergencies: 
265A. H. Robertson: Human Rights as Basis of Internationat Humanitarian Law. Proceedings of the 
Internationat Conference on Humanitarian Law. San Remo (24-27 Sept., 1970). Grassi Instituto Ed., 
1970, pp. 67-68. 
266A. Carty: Human Rights in a State of Exception: The ILA and the Third Wortd, in T. Campbett, D. 
GoLdberg, S. McLean and T. Multen: Human Rights from Rhetoric to Reatity. Basit BLackwett, oxford, 
1986, p. 62. 
267The Siracusa Principles on the Limitations and Derogations Provisions In the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. 7 HRO, 1985, p. 10. It must be noted that the said principles were drawn 
up by 31 distinguished international lawyers in 1984 in Italy. 
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"... [N]o measure taken may discriminate solely on grounds of race, religion, colour, 
nationality, sex or social origin. The judiciary retains the power to ensure that there 
is no encroachment upon non-derogable rights, and that measureldfecting derogable 
rights are in accordance with the principle of proportionality. " 
At least, we can indirectly assume that the fundamental rules of humanitarian law are 
contained in the non-deTOgable rights of human rights instruments. Hence, States which 
have not ratified Protocol 11 cannot derogate from its fundamental rules on the protection 
of the victims of war since they are the same or, at least, incorporated in the non-derogable 
rights. 
Through the non-derogable rights clauses contained in instruments of human rights, 
human rights law and humanitarian law, (at least in the part relating to the protection of 
the rights to life, prohibition of torture, inhuman treatment and punishment and the right 
to fair trial), can meet. Hence, human rights can play a useful role in furthering the 
269 application of humanitarian law in civil wars. 
However, it must be stressed that the existence of permanent institutions and organs 
which deal with alleged violations of human rights, can profitably be used during times of 
internal wars (which are a clear example of emergencies which threaten the life of the 
nation) to stop or at least prevent such violatioýs from being committed. It is precisely in 
that respect that human rights instruments, organs and procedures, can play a valuable Tole 
in monitoring and controlling the application of fundamental human rights, which are 
identical with the fundamental guarantees of humanitarian law. 
In this respect, I will concentrate on two case studies, first the UN instruments and 
institutions and their contribution to the control and application of humanitarian rules, 
through the human rights approach, with a special emphasis on the case of El Salvador, and 
secondly, the inter-American system and the protection of human rights in internal 
conflicts with special emphasis on the Nicaragua case, among other cases. It is hoped that 
these two case-studies will give us a clear picture of how, on the universal and regional 
levels, human rights instruments have been used as a means of controlling the application 
of fundamental humanitarian rules during situations of civil wars. 
2.1. The UN System and the Control of Application of Humanitarian Rules During Civil 
War Situations 
Different UN organs have dealt with questions of violation of human rights, in States where 
civil wars are taking place. These organs include the UNGA, the ECOSOC, the UNCHR 
and its Sub-Commission on Non - Discrimination and Minorities. 
These organs act under the UN Charter which contains several important references to 
the protection of human rights (particularly Articles 1,13,14,34,55 and 60) or under special 
procedures devised for these organs, which permit them to deal with gross violations of 
2680P. 
cit.. supra. n. 266, p. 63. 
269For 
a comprehensive study of the question of humanitarian taw and non-derogabte rights, and the 
probtems posed in this area see: T. Meron: Human Rights in Internat Strife. Their international 
Protection. Grotius Pub.. Ltd. Cambridge, 1987, pp. 29-70. See atso F. Hampson: Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law in Internat Confticts, in Meyer (ed. ), op. cit., supra. chapter 3, n. 190, pp. 55-80. 
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human rights such as Resolution 1235 XLII of June 6th, 1967 or Resolution 1503 (XLII) May 
27th, 1970, both resolutions were adopted by the ECOSOC. 
These organs denounced the violations, invited States concerned to respect rules of 
international law relating to the protection of human rights and even humanitarian law, 
appointed special rapporteurs to deal with specific cases of gross violations of human rights 
in certain countries. They invited the States concerned to punish those who are guilty of 
committing the violations, and even explicitly invited States engaging in civil wars to apply 
and conform to Article 3 and the Protocol 11. 
2.1.1. El Salvador Case 
The UN practice clearly shows, in the case of El Salvador, that all the above mentioned 
steps have been taken in relation to that conflict. Thus, one year after the eruption of civil 
war in that country, the UNCHR at its 37th session on March II th, 1981 requested its 
Chairman to appoint a special representative with a mandate to investigate all grave human 
rights violations and to recommend steps the Commission could take to help secure the 
enjoyment of human rightS270 in El Salvador. The Government of El Salvador and other 
States were invited to extend their cooperations to the Rapporteur. The ECOSOC approved 
the decision of the Chairman of the UNCHR on May 8th, 1981. 
The Special Rapporteur then visited El Salvador and had a meeting with the President, 
the Vice President and members of the Junta. He then submitted an interim report, which 
pointed out that a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights existed and which 
culminated with attempts on human life. 
Moreover, it was reported that members of the State security apparatus and violent groups 
of the left and right, were involved in committing murder and violations of human rights; 
also it is revealed that executive and judicial organs had adopted a widespread attitude of 
passivity and inactivity in regard to these gross violations. 271 
On October 28th, 1981, the UN Secretary-General transmitted this interim report to the 
UNGA. The latter then adopted Resolution 36/155 on December 16th, 1981 (by a vote of 90 
in favour 22 against and 53 abstentions). The Resolution contains several interesting points. 
In Paragraph 3 it states that the UNGA: 
"... [D]eeply deplores all acts of violence and all grave violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and regrets in particular the persistence of a situation in 
which Government paramilitary organisations and other armed groups continue to act 
with total contempt for the life, security and tranquillity of the civilian 
"272 population. 
Paragraph 4 stipulates that the UNGA: 
" ... [D]raws the attention of all parties concerned to the fact that the rules of international law, as contained in Article 3 of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 
1959, are applicable to armed conflicts not of an international character and requests 






the parties involved to apply a minimum standard of protection to the affected 
"273 population. 
In paragraph 7, the Government was urged to take the necessary measures to ensure full 
respect for human rights. Lastly, in paragraph 9, the parties to the conflict were invited to 
cooperate and not interfere with the activities of humanitarian organizations, which are 
dedicated to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population. 
In fact, the UNGA has touched many important issues of humanitarian law, it stressed 
the need for the protection of the civilians, and the need to provide them with relief and 
importantly, it did not hesitate to proclaim the applicability of Article 3 to the situation. 
This is an innovation, since neither the text of Article 3 nor its travaux pr4paratolres gives 
such a right to the General Assembly. 
In practical terms the action of the UNGA was confined to demand from the Government 
to ensure respect for human rights, no sanctions were envisaged. El Salvador, however, 
rejected the resolution as 'biased' and said 'it overstepped the humanitarian sphere and 
included highly political considerations which fell exclusively under internal 
, 274 jurisdictions. It further noted that it did not recognise the legitimacy of the nomination 
of the Special Rapporteur and the validity of his report. 
This means that the Government clings to ideas of sovereignty and non -intervention to 
oppose the UN actions. Nevertheless, the interesting thing is that El Salvador did not 
specifically question the competence of the UNGA to characterise its conflict as being 
governed by Article 3. 
Tunisia on the other hand, maintained that it was essentially up to regional organisations 
(in this case the OAS) to find solutions for problems of its members. 275 However, even 
Latin- American States did not oppose the resolution on that stand which means that they 
do not question the validity of the UN action. They rather concentrated on the element of 
selectivity of cases. Cuba stressed that the elimination of martial law and respect for human 
rights cannot be claimed to constitute interference in the internal affairS. 276 
At its 38th session, the UNCHR examined the second report of its Special Rapporteur. 
In this report it was observed that: 
"... [S]erious and massive human rights violations have persisted because of the 
continuing confliCt. "277 
Nevertheless, some positive signs have been mentioned, a slight increase in the punishment 
of human rights violations was noted, also the authorities concern to encourage judiciary 
activity was pointed out. Moreover, the report spoke of 'cases of humanitarian treatment 
273 Ibid. 
274 Ibid, p. 959. 
275 Ibid, p. 960. 
276 Ibid, p. 961. 
27736 UNY, 1982, p. 1124. 
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by both sides to persons captured in combat. '278 The UNCHR endorsed the report and: 
"... [C]alled on all Salvadorian parties to cooperate with humanitarian organisations and 
requested them to apply a minimum standard of human rights protection and 
humanitarian treatment of civilians. "279 
The UN Sub-Commission on Non -Discrimination and Minorities recommended the 
Government to apply the rules of international law, particularly Common Article 3.280 
The UNGA for its part adopted Resolution 37/185, December 17th, 1982, (71 in favour, 
18 against and 55 abstentions). The Resolution repeated in paragraph 2 the application of 
Article 3 to the situation, and at paragraph 9 it: 
"... [S]trongly urges the Government of El Salvador to fulfil its obligations towards its 
citizens and to assume its international responsibilities in this regard by taking the 
necessary steps to ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully 
respected by all its agencies, including its security forces ano other armed 
v. 281 organisations operating under its authority or with its permission. 
El Salvador rejected the resolution this time by stating: 
"... [T]hat it contrasted the report of the special representative and distorted reality. "282 
Thus, the outcry of these different organs have resulted in slight improvement in the 
situation of human rights, also the rejection by El Salvador of the UNGA Resolution was 
not so strong, since it did not at all invoke the breach of its sovereignty as a result of the 
UNGA action. Indirectly, the use of arguments of human rights have led the Government 
to try to do something about the violations, as the report of the Special Rapporteur reveals. 
In his third report of January 1983, to the UNCHR, the Special Rapporteur noted that the 
gross violations of human rights are the responsibility of the Government and the left as 
well. He emphasised that despite a slight increase in the punishment of human rights 
violations, he had not heard that any of the proceedings had resulted in a conviction. 283 He 
mentioned that the Geneva Convention and the two Protocols: 
"... [W]ere still not properly complied with, notwithatanding humanitarian treatment 
to, and even released persons captured in combat. "84 
2781bid. 
2791bid, p. 1123. 
28OThe Review (ICJ), 1982, NO. 29, p. 24. 
2810P. cit., supra. n. 277, p. 1127. 
2821bid. 
28337 UNY, 19B3, pp. B87. 
2841bid. 
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He seems to hold the view that the parties to the conflict are expected not only to apply 
rules of Article 3, but the whole rules of humanitarian law, including those relating to 
international conflicts. He recommended that the Government should adopt the following 
measures: 
"The repeal of all legal enactments' and other measures that were incompatible with 
international human rights instruments, institution of real Government control over 
the armed forces, and all armed organisations and individuals, adoption of legal 
measures to prevent and punish human rights violations, mass camgaigns to promote 
"2 5 respect for human rights and administrative and social reforms. 
The UNCHR by a resolution of March 8th, 1983 endorsed the report and declared: 
"... [O]nce more that the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Laws of War were 
applicable to the armed confliCt. "286 
This organ of human rights then found it necessary to arrive at the conclusion that for a 
better protection of human rights, not only fundamental human rights must be respected 
but, also all rules of humanitary law contained in Geneva Conventions. 
The UNGA also followed this road and urged the parties to respect all rules of 
humanitary law. Resolution 38/101 (December 16th, 1983). Paragraph 3 stipulates that the 
UNGA: 
"Again draws the attention of the Salvadoran parties concerned that the rules of 
international law, as contained in Article 3 and Additional Protocols I and 11 thereto, 
are applicable to armed conflict not of an international character, such as in El 
Salvador, and requests all parties to apply a minimum standarcl of protection of 
human rights and of humane treatment of civilian population. "'ar 
The resolution was adopted by 84 in favour, 14 against and 45 abstentions. Thus, in the view 
of a substantial number of States, the humanitarian rules applicable to international conflicts 
are also applicable to civil wars. This is a very interesting development, since the attitude 
of the majority of States at the Diplomatic Conference (1974-1977) was otherwise. 
El Salvador stated that. 
"The text was not constructive for the promotion of human rights, it was partisan, 
interventionist and ... ineffective and 
irrelevant". 288 
It seems to me, that these objections were largely directed against the negative attitude of 
the UNGA toward the elections which took place in March 1982 in the country, rather than 
the obligation of El Salvador to respect humanitarian rules contained in Geneva Conventions 






2881bid, p. 891. 
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be an intervention in El Salvador's internal affairs. 289 
In November 1984, the Special representative reported on the human rights situation in 
El Salvador. He indicated that the new Government was actively pursuing a policy of 
improving the human rights situation in the country. It had disbanded the intelligence 
section of the Treasury police, dismissed up to 45 local commanders, restricted the activities 
of 'death squads' and created a separate secretariat for public security in the Ministry of 
Defence, as well as a special commission to investigate political crimes having international 
relevance. 
Moreover, an investigation was ordered by the Minister of Defence of alleged 
290 participation of an army unit in a massacre of 68 peasants in July 1984. 
Continued pressure of the UN among other things, has in fact, led El Salvador to adjust 
itself at least partially, in order to conform to accepted human rights and humanitarian 
standards. The UNGA, after welcoming the changes made in El Salvador, stressed that it: 
"12. Deeply deplores the fact that the capacity of the judicial system in El Salvador 
to investigate, prosecute and punish violations of human Tights continues to be 
patently unsatisfactory and therefore urges the competent authorities to continue and 
strengthen the process of reform of the Salvadoran penal system, in order to punish 
speedily and effectively those responsible for the serious human rights violftions 
which have been committed and are still being committed in that country. "29 
No country, even El Salvador, challenged the UNGA approach as intervention or breach 
of sovereignty. However the main criticism was the rejection of selectivity in the text. 
Guatemala indicated that such a double standard (singling out certain countries for human 
rights violations while maintaining silence with respect to others for the same violations) 
weakened the credibility of human rights institutions and respect for the UN Charter. 292 
It is to be noted that the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 also established 
a system of supervision for the specific rights included in the Covenant. The Human Rights 
Committee, instituted under Article 40 has in fact the specific mission of such 
293 supervision. The main function of the Committee is to study reports submitted by the 
States parties, in accordance with Article 40/1 and to transmit its reports and such general 
comments as it may consider appropriate, to the States parties. It may also transmit these 
general comments to the ECOSOC, along with the copies of the reports it has received 
from the party States. However, it seems that El Salvador did not submit its reports on time, 
which made it difficult for the Committee to study the situation. 
It is reported that: 
*The Committee has conducted a constructive dialogue with States parties, has sought 
considerable information from States, and has been the source of much information 
289 lbid, p. 890. 
290 38 UNY, 1984, p. U8. 
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and publicity about the Covenant. In so doing it has contributed to a wider 
dissemination of information and a raising of consciousness on human rights issues 
"294 in the Governments and populations of States. 
2.1.2. Other Cases 
It must be stressed that the UN organs have also dealt with questions of violations of human 
rights in many other countries. The UNCHR has in fact established many subsidiary organs 
to deal with issues prevalent in internal conflicts. It establish ad hoc working groups of 
experts to deal with specific countries, such as the ad hoc working group on South Africa 
(1967), the ad hoc working group on Human Rights in Chile (1975). From 1979, the 
Commission replaced the ad hoc working groups by the designation of Special Rapporteurs, 
Special representatives and special envoys. 
In 1979, it appointed a Special Rapporteur in Chile, and in the same year another one in 
Equatorial Guinea; in 1981 a Special Representative in El Salvador, and also another one in 
Bolivia in 1982; in Guatemala, Iran, 1982; Poland 1982 and Afghanistan 1984 ( Ermacora). The 
functions of special rapporteurs seem to contain an element of fact-finding, preparing a 
report on the situation of human rights, and also an element of mediation, since they engage 
in dialogue with the established Government. 
The UNCHR, also from 1980, resorted to 'thematic procedures'. They consist in 
appointing a working group or special rapporteur to examine specific themes, primarily on 
the basis of desk research and visits to different countries. in this context, the Commission 
created six thematic procedures: (i) The working group on enforced or involuntary 
disappearances (1980). (ii) The Special Rapporteur on summary or arbitrary executions 
(1982). (iii) The Special Rapporteur on torture (1985). (iv) The Special Rapporteur on 
religious intolerance (1986). (v) The Special Rapporteur on mercenaries (1986) and (vi) The 
Special Rapporteur on monitoring investments in South Africa (1987). 
It is clear that the great majority of these themes have a direct relation with internal 
conflicts. They often take place in such a conflict. 
It has been asserted in effect that: 
"... [T]aken together the thematic procedures could well b regarded as an embryonic 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights". 
S95 
And that those procedures: 
"... [C]onstitute the only devices of the United Nations which act continuously and 
report publicly on human rights violations on a worldwide basis within the limitqtions 
"296 of their mandate. They tend to do this impartially and without political bias. 
294 F. ihabvala: The Practice of the Covenant's Human Rights Committee, 1976-1982, Review of the State 
Parties Reports. 6 MRO, 1984, p. 105. See atso D. D. Fisher: Reporting under the Covenant on Civil. and 
PoLitical Rights: The First Years of the Human Rights Committee. 76 AJIL, 1982, pp. 142-152; and P. R. 
Ghandi: The Human Rights Committee and the Right of IndividuaL Communication. 27 BYIL, 1986, pp. 201- 
251. 
295 M. T. Kamminga: The Thematic Procedures of the UNCHR. 34 NILR, 1987, p. 321. 
2961bid, p. 331. 
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And also that the thematic approach is therefore: 
"... [A]n effective antidote against the often heard criticism that the UN's response to 
human rights violations is selective and politically prejudicial. For this reason alone 
the thematic procedures deserve to be nurtured and strengthened". 297 
These different techniques used by the UNCHR (Special Rapporteurs for specific countries 
or thematic groups) have all contributed in different degrees to reveal the violations of 
human rights and they tried to remedy situations by mediation, recommendation and lastly 
by outright denunciations. Governments generally seem willing to cooperate with those 
groups, which means that they do not see that their work is an intervention in their internal 
affairs. 
As examples of the work of these organs and techniques, the Special Rapporteur on 
Afghanistan submitted a report to the UNCHR in which it was revealed that the situation 
in Afghanistan can be considered as a situation of gross violations of human rights. On the 
basis of the report, the UNCHR adopted a resolution, in which it expressed its distress at: 
"The widespread violations of the right to life, liberty and security of person, 
including the common place of torture against the regimes opponents, indinriminate 
bombing of the civilian population and deliberate destruction of cropS". 2 
It ended by urging the Government to put a stop to such violations. 
Thus, a whole range of denunciation of practices, which are essentially a violation of 
humanitarian law and the rights especially of the victims of war, and not strictly speaking 
human rights, has been seen by the UNCHR as an element of its competence. 
Also the UNCHR in its Ord session adopted a resolution in which it calls upon Sri- 
Lanka to cooperate with the ICRC in delivering humanitarian aid and continue to supply 
299 information to the UNCHR. 
Moreover, the working group on enforced or involuntary disappearances, which was 
created by Resolution XXXVI of February 29th, 1980 by the UNCHR, has done some very 
encouraging work. The group consisted of five persons, who acted in their personal 
capacity. Their mission was to seek and receive information from Governments, inter- 
Governmental organizations, humanitarian organizations and other reliable sources. The 
working group, as from 1980, has used all its influence to pressure Governments to reveal 
what happened to thousands of missing people. The group was able to visit some countries 
where disappearances were alleged to happen such as Cyprus, Bolivia and Peru. 
In 1985 the group, as an example, reported having received 4,500 allegations of enforced 
or involuntary disappearances, and it was able to transmit some 2,200 sufficiently 
2971bid, p. 311. 
29SThe Review (ICJ), No. 34,1985, p. M. Also, the UNGA in its Resolution 38/29 of Nov. 23rd, 1983 (116 
in favour. 20 against and 17 abstentions) renewed its appeaL to alt States nationat and internationaL 
organizations to continue to extend humanitarian reLief assistance in order to aLtevlate the 
sufferings of the Afghan refugees in coordination with the UN High Commission for Refugees, op. cit., 
supra. n. 283, p. 234. 
299The Review VCJ) No. 38,1987, p. 24. 
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documented cases to various GovernmentS. 300 In its report to the UNCHR in 1987, the 
group identified 39 countries in which enforced or involuntary disappearances persiSt. 301 
Also the working group in 1987 asked 14 Governments to explain 1,094 new cases of 
302 disappearances which occurred in that year. 
It should be mentioned that especially in cases of recent and new disappearances, the 
group was able to send telegrams and make appeals which have resulted in the release of 
many individuals and has caused Governments to acknowledge that they are detaining 
others. However, in relation to old cases of disappearance, the working group was able in 
some instances to clarify their situation and fate. 303 There is a general consensus that the 
working group on enforced and involuntary disappearance has over the years become an 
effective instrument of implementing human rights, in a very difficult domaine. 304 
By resolution of the ECOSOC 1982/35 of May 7th, 1982, Mr. Amos Wako, a Kenyan 
lawyer, was appointed as a Special Rapporteur to study the question of summary or 
arbitrary executions. In his first report he revealed that at least 2 million people had been 
executed arbitrarily in 37 countries over the past 15 years; he indicated that there is a close 
relationship between summary or arbitrary executions and violations of human rights, 
especially the right not to be subjected to torture, inhuman treatment etC. 305 
In his second report he made clear that summary or arbitrary executions takes place 
frequently in situations of upheaval, internal conflict etc. 306 In his report to the 44th Session 
of the UNCHR (1988), he indicated that he had asked 27 Governments to respond to 
allegations of executions and had intervened with urgent appeals to 14. He also dealt with 
the question of executions by armed opposition groups such as the Renamo insurgents in 
Mozambique. 307 
The work of the Special Rapporteur on summary or arbitrary executions is in fact, very 
useful in protecting the fundamental right to life. Thus, it helped even in indirect ways to 
stop impending killings by intervention directly to the Government concerned. Also by 
investigating past practices of summary or arbitrary execution, and finally in his 1988 report 
he indicated that he was engaging also in finding international norms of investigating 
suspicious deaths. 
On the other hand, there is no doubt that even if his work is not confined to countries 
300 D. Weissbrodt: The Three 'Theme' SpeciaL Rapporteurs of the United Nations Commission of Human 
Rights. 80 AJIL. 1980, p. 686. 
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303D. Weissbrodt: Country ReLated and Thematic DeveLopments at the 1988 Session of the United Nations 
Commission of Human Rights. 10 HRO, 1988, p. 545. 
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which experience civil war, in practice it is in civil war situations that summary executions 
occur on a large scale. Thus, indirectly the work of the Special Rapporteur will inevitably 
especially benefit the victims of internal war to escape such inhuman and cruel practices. 
2.1.3. Conclusions on the UN System and the Control of Application of Humanitarian 
Rules 
(i) The UN different organs have been able to denounce violations of human rights abuses 
and thereby violations of basic humanitarian standards, through the vehicle of human 
rights. This confirms first that human rights are accepted by States as valid limitation upon 
their sovereignty and secondly, that there is a strong link if not absolute identity between 
the minimum rules of humanitarian law and human rights, especially in the field of the 
protection of war victims. 
(ii) The near absence of any means of controlling the application of humanitarian law in 
internal conflict (apart from the pragmatic role of the ICRQ has made the role of the UN 
essential in that area. The political and moral effect of the UN action in dealing with 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law cannot be ignored. It led in practice, as 
the El Salvador case shows, to the Government being pressured to take steps towards ending 
inhuman practices. 
(iii) However, the UN's main means for supervising the application of human rights and 
humanitarian rules in internal conflicts, as the case of El Salvador shows, are publicity and 
denunciation but not direct actions to stop such violations. This is understandable since due 
regard must be paid to the legal and political obstacles in the way of any direct action. 
The role of public opinion, publicity etc., can be very effective in our world, where means 
of communication are fast and well-developed. The Government living in a state of a civil 
conflict cannot go on ignoring the calls of the international community. Some action is 
needed on its part to appease the critics and these actions will benefit human beings and the 
victims of internal wars. 
2.2. The Practice In the Context of Latin-America 
Under the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights can receive complaints from individuals (Article 44) and also from States 
(Article 45). The Commission is empowered also to conduct on-site observation of the 
situation of human rights with the consent of the Government concerned; but Government 
refusal to grant such consent does not prevent the Commission from preparing a report and 
issuing public statements that may embarrass the Government. 308 
All these mechanisms for supervising the application of the obligations contained in the 
Convention have also been used in the context of emergencies and civil wars. Thus 
indirectly they contributed to the observance of fundamental humanitarian rules. 
In fact, the very presence of the Commission in a country torn by civil war (under Article 
48 of the Convention) has sometimes led to the improvement of the situation of human 
308 See In this respect. B. G. Ramcharan (ed. ): International Law and Fact-Finding in the Field of Hunan Rights. Martinus NIjhoff, The Hague/aoston/London, 1982, pp. 20-21. 
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rights and humanitarian law standards especially in relation to the protection of the victims 
of war. One of the principal activities of the Commission, in its visits or on-site observatory 
missions in member countries, is the inspection of jails and detention centres, and the 
finding out of reasons for the detention and imprisonment and whether torture and 
inhuman treatment had taken place. There is no doubt that such inspections are very 
important during emergencies and internal upheavals, where the number of detainees and 
interned persons can be large. 
The presence, for example, of the Commission in the Dominican Republic in October 1961 
saved hundreds of lives and led to the release of large numbers of prisoners from detention 
camps. 309 This has been the result of the efforts of the Commission in the internal conflict 
in that country. 
However, here I will concentrate on the Nicaragua Case because the actions of the Inter- 
American Commission of Human Rights have induced the Government to take important 
measures to remedy violations of human rights and humanitarian law. This of course does 
not mean that other cases will not be studied, at least shortly. 
2.2.1. Nicaragua and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Control 
of Application of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 
The Commission has on many occasions brought the attention of the Nicaraguan 
Government to the fact that it had violated some important human rights of its nationals 
and even in some cases mentioned the violations of humanitarian law. Thus, in its report 
on the situation in Nicaragua in 1978 (when the Somoza regime was in power) the 
Commission noted in relation to the internal war which was taking place at that time, that 
it: 
"Deplores the loss of any human life notwithstanding the circumstances. But, at the 
same time, it is evident that with regard to this fundamental right to life, the 
contending parties have Ihe duty of respecting the unarmed population which is 
unable to protect itself. "310 
The Commission went even further: 
"Moreover, the Government of Nicaragua assumed the solemn obligation of 
respecting international norms of humanitarian law, especially those set forth in the 
Geneva Convention of civilians in time of war, signed on 12 August 1949 which also 
is applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, ratified by 
Nicaragua on December 17,1953. "311 
This indicates that the Commission went even beyond the express provisions of the IV 
Geneva Convention (on civilians) that it applies only in international wars, and considered 
that Nicaragua even in its internal conflict is bound by that Convention. It is clear that the 
3090P. 
cit., supra. n. 264, p. 481. 
310 N. Buergenthal: Human Rights. The Inter-American System. Part 3. Cases and Decisions. Vol. 4, issue 
22, may 1983. Retease 83.1. Oceana Pub., Dobbs Ferry, New York, 190, p. 67. 
311 Ibid, p. 68. 
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object a nd purpose of the Commission was to afford greater protection to the civilian 
population which was suffering greatly from the conflict. 
In the same report, the Commission found that Nicaragua was 'responsible for serious 
'312 attempts against the right to life in violations of the international humanitarian rules . 
The Commission, which is a human rights instrument, has used the human rights approach 
to denounce in express terms violations of humanitarian law. This had been done 
presumably, on the assumption that there is no difference between the two kinds of rules. 
However, it is with Sandanista Government that the Commission was able to obtain many 
concessions, which directly benefitted the victims of the civil war in that country. 
In its annual Report for 1982/83 the Commission referred to Decree 1233 of April 11th, 
1983 issued by the Government which established what is called the 'Anti-Somoza People's 
Courts' with the mandate of bringing to trial the country's own nationals for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, committed by the National Guard during the war against the 
Somoza regime. 
The Commission took a negative step vis-A-vis these courts, the reason being that 'Anti- 
Somoza Courts' were tainted from the beginning by that indistinguishable prefix 'Anti' 
which conveys or conditions their lack of impartiality, independence and autonomy'. 313 
Also, in its annual report of 1985/86, the Commission dealt with the decision of the 
Government on October 15th, 1985 to establish a State of emergency, by which many 
important human rights were suspended including habeas corpus. It indicated: 
"This suspension 
- 
runs counter to the provision of Article 27/2 in fine of the 
American Conventions on Human Rights and creates conlitions in which serious 
"3 4 abuses against the security of the individual could occur. 
The Commission then urged the Government to repeal those measures and restore the right 
of habeas corpus for all individuals detained by its security service. 
The Commission, in the same report, dealt with the prison situation especially for persons 
jailed for security reasons. It observed that: 
"... [A] substantial im rovement in the prison conditions for those jailed for political 
"PI 5 reasons is essential. 
The Commission has, in fact, raised many issues which are intimately connected with the 
civil war which was taking place, and used the machinery of human rights instruments to 
demand action from the Government to improve the situation, which would benefit the 
victims of internal war in the first place. 
The Commission has also investigated the regime's dealing with its Meskito Indian 
minority. Thus, in its report of June 7th, 1984 indicated that: 
3121bld, P. 71. 
3131bid, Part 3 Cases and Decisions 24/1, Vol. 4, Issue Nov. 1986, Retease 86.1.1986, p. 15. 
3141bid, Part 3, Cases and Decisions 24/2, VoL. 4, issue Aprit 1987. ReLease 87.1, p. 9. 
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"... [H]undreds of Miskitos Indians have been arbitrarily detain without formalities, 
under vague accusations of counter-revolutionary activities"116 
And added that many other Miskitos: 
"... [W]ere placed in isolation for long periods and in some cases the Commission 
verified they were tortured and illegally punished. "317 
The Government has never questioned the Commission's actions, it did not characterise 
them as intervention or breach of its sovereignty. In fact, all the evidence suggests that the 
Government has tried its best to heal the criticisms labled by the Commission. 
In this context, as we stated in Chapter IV Section 111, the Government granted amnesty 
to all Miskitos and even other persons who had been accused of violent actions against the 
Government (Decree No. 13523 of December Ist, 1983). The Government also satisfied one 
of the most important proposals of the Commission, namely the orderly and voluntary 
repatriation of the Miskitos who had fled the country (Decree No. 1353 of September 4th, 
1983). 318 
On the other hand, it is reported that: 
"Perhaps the most hopeful sign in Nicaragua is that the Government has demonstrated 
sensibility to criticism of human rights abuses by the Americas Watch and other 
groups and, in a number of instances, has taken measures that directly respond to 
those crItIcIsms. "319 
An example of the allegations by inhabitants of region 6, a conflict area, that widespread 
abuses by the authorities of that region has led the Government to investigate them. The 
result was the conviction of a number of military officers and others receiving prison 
320 sentences in March 1984. 
The practice in Nicaragua shows clearly how an organ for the control of application of 
human rights, serves useful to the cause of giving respect to fundamental humanitarian rules 
in situations of internal wars. The intervention of that organ leads to the reduction of 
violations of human rights, which are essential in times of upheavals and civil wars, such 
as the right to life, prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment and the right to fair trial 
and due process. 
2.2-2. Other Cases 
It must also be indicated that the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights and also 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have, over the years, dealt with various 
questions of humanitarian law in different countries of Latin America, always through the 
316 Hopkins, op. cit., supra. chapter 4, n. 461, p. 612. 
317 Ibid. 
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medium of human rights. 
In its report on the situation in Uruguay (1977) the Commission laid down, in effect, the 
minimal rules which must be observed by the Government in its treatment of captured 
combatants and political prisoners in general. It stated in this respect: 
"The Commission has repeatedly condemned practises used by groups which, in an 
attempt to impose their political and ideological opinions, resort to all forms of 
criminal activity, such as murder, kidnappings, assault, maintenance of private jails 
and cruel treatment. On the other hand on other occasions the Commission has 
generally maintained that the authorities cannot deprive subversives of the minimal 
treatment to which enemy combatants and prisoners are entitled both durin 
"32f international and during armed conflict that are not of an international nature. 
The Commission held also that the holding of detainees in prison for long and unspecified 
periods, without any charge being brought against them, even when it is allowed under 
special legislation, is a clear violation of human rights. Detainees have the right to fair trial 
and to due process of law. 322 The Commission arrived at the conclusion that captured 
insurgents must be treated as prisoners of war, even in situations of internal conflicts, hence 
it went even beyond what Article 3 and Protocol 11 lay down for this category of victims. 
The Commission and the Court also in many instances, dealt with the problem of States 
of emergencies and disappearances of persons. These problems, in fact, always arise in 
situations of internal conflict. In connection with the question of situations of emergency, 
the Inter-American Court on Human Rights in an Advisory opinion on habeas corpus in 
emergency situations, requested by the Commission, declared: 
"The Court must also observe that the constitutions and legal systems of States parties 
that authorize expressly or by implication the suspension of the legal remedies of 
habeas corpus or of 'amparo' in emergency situations cannot be deemed compa-tible 
with the international obligations imposed on these States by the Convention. "323 
In effect, the Court added a new non-derogable right which must be observed in situations 
of emergencies, since this right does not appear in the list of non-derogable rights in the 
Convention (Article 27/2) and there is no doubt the respect of habeas corpus in situations 
of civil war will benefit greatly the victims of war, since in such a situation arrests are 
frequent and abuse commonplace. 
The Commission, in one of its recommendations to member States, considered that: 
"... [E]ven in emergency situations stemming from political upheavals, an attempt be 
made to hold to a minimum the restriction on fundamental rights or the violations 
of such rights; particularly that the death sentence not be imposed for political 
offences or for common crimes linked to political offences, and that steps be taken 
for the proper punishment of those who indulge in excesses of violence, in acts of 
cruelty or torture, in abusive attacks on or affronts to personal honor and human 
3210p. 
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dignity. "324 
On the other hand, the Court in its advisory opinion on Restrictions to the Death Penalty 
of September 8th. 1983 requested by the Commission made clear that: 
"The Convention imposes an absolute prohibition on the extension of the death 
penalty to crime5 for which such a penalty was not previously proved for under its 
domestic law. "325 
This means that States which are confronted with civil wars and which have not the death 
penalty before those conflicts, cannot introduce such penalties even after the declaration 
of State of emergency. In this respect, the decision went beyond what Protocol Il stipulates 
since the latter, as we have seen, does not contain an express prohibition on the introduction 
of the death penalty once civil wars erupt. 
As to disappearances which are common practice in Latin- America, especially in cases 
of internal conflict, the Commission condemned this inhuman and cruel practice as a 
violation of the Convention on Human Rights. Thus, in its Annual Report for 1982/83 
considered that the practice of disappearances: 
"Constitutes a very serious present or potential violation of such fundamental rights 
as the right to life, to freedom and to personal security and integrity of a human 
being. Moreover, it places the victim in an absolutely defenceless position, with 
serious violation of the rights to justice, to protection against arbitrary arrest and to 
due process of law. "326 
Thus, on the basis of violations of certain fundamental human rights contained in the 
Convention, the Inter-American Commission was able to make resort to disappearances 
which are not prohibited expressly in the Convention a violation of the Convention. Thus, 
again through the vehicle of human rights rules and instruments, inhuman practices, which 
are commonplace in internal conflicts, are made illegal. 
On July 29th, 1988, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights for the first time dealt 
with the question of forced disappearance in Velasguez Rodriguez 
- 
Case, against the 
Government of Honduras. The Court made several important pronouncements in regard to 
the question of disappearance and also on the limits of State power. It noted that: 
"The phenomenon of disappearances is a complex form of hu n rights violation that 
must be understood and confronted in an integral fashion. "InY 
The Court then added that: 
"... [I]nternational practice and doctrine have often categorized disappearances as a 
324 Burgenthat: op. cit., supra. n. 310, Part 3. Cases and Decisions, VoL. 4,24 issued May 1983. Release 
83.1 1983, p. 13. 
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crime againsý humanity, although there is no treaty in force which uses this 
terminology". 28 
Then the Court invoked the basis upon which it considers disappearance as illegal and 
hence, a violation of the Convention. First, it stressed that: 
"... [W]ithout question, the State has the right and duty to guarantee its security. It is 
also indisputable that all societies suffer some deficiencies in their legal orders. 
However, regardless of the seriousness of certain actions and the culpability of the 
perpetrators of certain crimes, the power of the State is not unlimited, nor may the 
State resort to any means to attain its ends. The State is subject to law and m(2rality. 
Disrespect for human dignity cannot serve as the basis for any State action. . 529 
The second ground upon which it considered that disappearances are a violation of the 
American Convention on Human Rights was stated in this fashion: 
"The practice of disappearances, in addition to directly violating many provisions of 
the Conventions [especially Article 4 The Right to life] ... constitutes a radical breach 
of the treaty in that it shows a crass abandonment of the values which emanate from 
the concept of human dignit and of the most basic principles of the inter-American 
system and the Convention 
It then added that: 
"... [T]he existence of this practice, moreover, evinces a disregard of the duty to 
organize the State in such a manner to guarantee the rights recognized in the 
"331 Convention. 
The Court in fact, found Honduras responsible for violating the Convention and ordered 
the State to pay the necessary reparation to the victim's family. Thus, the machinery of the 
human rights instrument has, in fact, led to the establishment of an effective control for 
the application of some fundamental humanitarian rules, by holding the legal Government 
responsible legally for some actions which are widespread in internal conflicts, such 
asdisappearances. The primary beneficiaries from such control are the real victims of 
internal wars. 
, As a conclusion, 
it seems to me that the practice in the context of Latin America is a very 
welcome legal development. It shows that the system of control of application of human 
rights seems to be more acceptable to States. First, because they agreed to it when ratifying 
the Treaty. Secondly, because the consent and the cooperation of the Government is always 
sought. Thirdly, the human rights approach does not raise the question of the legal status 
of insurgents and this indirectly does not in any way question the legitimacy of State power. 
All these factors open the way for more protection of the victims of internal wars, in the 
absence of application of humanitarian rules contained in Article 3 and the Protocol 11. 
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3. General Conclusions Concerning the Contribution of Human Rights Machinery to the 
Application and Enforcement of Humanitarian Rules In Internal Conflicts 
(i) Because of the absence of any mechanisms for the control of application of Protocol II 
and Article 3 (apart from the right of initiative of the ICRC) and because of reluctance of 
States to proclaim even the application of those instruments in their internal wars, it seems 
that human rights instruments, with permanent organs, and through the existence of certain 
fundamental non-derogable rights, even in cases of emergencies and wars in those 
instruments, all these offer a good hope for inducing States to respect and apply those 
fundamental rights and freedom, which are identical with humanitarian law applicable in 
internal conflicts. 
The use of human rights machinery has the advantage of escaping the condemnation as 
intervention in the internal affairs of State or as a breach of their sovereignty, since there 
is a wide consensus that human rights constitute an agreed limitation upon State sovereignty. 
Also, the system is to some extent effective, the international community in the UN 
framework, and also in the regional framework of the OAS, have demonstrated how human 
rights organs have sometimes induced States concerned to adopt measures which contribute 
to real protection of some fundamental humanitarian rules in cases of internal wars. 
(ii) The importance of human rights organs in supervising the application of human rights 
is greater in times of internal conflicts. Since their role is to uphold that declaration of 
emergencies does not justify any gross violations of human rights. These organs can 
examine the necessity of such derogations and can always insist upon the application of 
certain fundamental human rights whatever the circumstances may be. This of course will 
automatically contribute to the making of such wars more humane, especially for the 
helpless victims. 
(iii) Practice also shows in a very clear way that States have rarely condemned the actions 
of human rights organs in dealing with specific questions of humanitarian law, such as the 
protection of detainees who committed offences in connection with the conflict, better 
protection of civilian population, the right of the victims to receive relief and assistance, 
and even of invoking humanitarian instruments, such as the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
Article 3 and Protocol II. 
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FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
My research and study of the influence of the two important principles of contemporary 
international law, namely- sovereignty and non- intervention, on the development or lack 
of development of humanitarian law applicable in internal conflicts, has resulted in 
establishing the following points: 
It is established beyond any doubt that the subject matter of humanitarian law, applicable 
in internal conflicts, touches directly, on the concepts of sovereignty and non- intervention. 
The reason being that the main aim of that branch of international law, is to regulate the 
conduct of the State vis-i-vis its own citizens, hence making the subject of their (the 
citizens) treatment, a matter which is no longer solely within the domestic jurisdiction of 
the State. It becomes a matter of international concern and subject to international law. 
This prospect frightens many States, they prefer to keep their full discretion, which 
sovereignty and non -intervention give them, so they can subdue their internal enemies, who 
take up arms against them swiftly, and without regard to any international legal restraints. 
The first and second chapters, which dealt respectively with sovereignty, and non- 
intervention from the point of view of their meaning, content, limitations, and their place 
in contemporary times, establish that those two principles, are still the basis of the 
organization of our world. 
The Westphalian model of the organization of international society, based on the existence 
of independent territorial units, on pluralism and distinctiveness still survive. 
Thus, the claims entertained by some quarters that the State model with its inevitable 
component parts, sovereignty and non- intervention. has reached its end (mainly because the 
nature of our present world problems, such as disarmament, pollution, under development 
etc., impose the necessity of universal solutions). These predictions have not materialized 
in practice. 
In fact, State practice in its different forms (treaties, UN Declarations, States 
pronouncement etc. J unequivocally confirms the contrary, and establishes that sovereignty 
and non- intervention are not withering away. They are maintained in effect, as the most 
important pillars of present day international relations. 
Moreover, it is asserted that sovereignty and non- intervention, are essential for the weaker 
units of the international community. They (the two principles) help the peoples of those 
States to keep their national identity, protect their right to decide freely their political and 
social organization, and eventually can be used as legal and political weapons in their fight 
against inequality. 
However, there is a near general consensus, that sovereignty can no longer be interpreted 
in our present era along the lines of a Hobsian outlook of international society, in other 
words sovereignty is not absolute in character. Since many developments in the context of 
international law and international relations, for example in the fields of the use of force 
and especially of human rights (which concerns us in this thesis) have restricted the 
sovereign rights of States, the effect of this limitation (of human rights) in the words of 
D'Amato is: 
[H]uman rights in international law means that the State is not the sole entity that 
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possesses rights, it is not the alpha and omega of international law". 
' 
This limitation of human rights, is very important in the context of internal conflicts, it 
indicates clearly that the relationship of the citizens to their own State even in these dire 
situations of conflict, where the most inhuman practices may be resorted to, is somehow 
regulated by international law. 
In fact, human rights law contains the idea of non-derogable rights (the right to life, 
prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment, and the right to fair trial and due process of 
law). These rights constitute, it is asserted the point of meeting, between human rights and 
humanitarian law. Since those 'sacrosaint rights' can be very useful for the protection of the 
victims of internal wars, even when the State does not acknowledge the application of 
instruments of humanitarian law, to the conflict (Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and 
Protocol 11 of 1977). 
The UN has in fact, used human rights as a door through which, it discussed issues of 
violations of human rights in internal conflicts. It seems that States have never tried to 
justify those violations, by invoking the pleas of sovereignty and non -intervention. This 
indicates that they accept human rights as a real limitation on their conduct both in peace 
and in times of war and emergencies. 
Furthermore, it is established that self-determination in our present era, that is in the 
post-colonial period, means essentially respect for individual and group rights within 
sovereign States. Self-determination is the other name of respect of human rights. Thus, a 
State which does not conduct itself in line with the requirements of human rights forfeits 
its right to claim the benefits of its sovereignty. 
However, it must be indicated that this fundamental limitation (of human rights), even 
if no one doubts its importance, does not mean that human rights are enough for a better 
treatment of the victims of internal wars. Those victims in fact, need some other rules and 
standards which can only be satisfied by humanitarian law, such as the right to correspond 
for those detained or interned for offences relating to the conflict, the right to receive relief 
and assistance, the right not to be displaced and all the rules connected with the means and 
methods of warfare. 
After these preliminary points, I will turn now to the main conclusions concerning the 
influence of sovereignty and non- intervention, on three specific areas of humanitarian law 
applicable in internal conflicts, namely: The definition of internal conflicts, the protection 
of the victims of such conflicts and the question of compliance and implementation of 
humanitarian law in the context of internal conflicts. These subjects were dealt with in 
Chapters 111, IV and V, respectively. 
A. On Definition of Internal Conflicts 
1. In Customary International Law 
It seems that customary law gave priority to the sovereignty of the State and non- 
intervention in its internal affairs, in the sense that whenever established Governments are 
'D'Amato, 
cq. cft.. supra. chapter 5. n. 1, p. 89. 
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faced with internal armed opposition, customary law protects them. That law gives them 
(the Governments) full discretion to deal with the situation on their terms. This is implicit 
in the fact that Governments faced with such upheavals are not obliged to recognize the 
application of the laws of war to the internal conflict. 
However, it must be stressed that the institution of the recognition of belligerency, was 
in fact the legal device through which customary law became relevant to civil wars. That 
institution (of recognition of belligerency) clarified to some extent the criteria which must 
exist in an internal conflict, in order to be regulated by international law. Thus, it has 
altered the term 'civil war', from a nebulous concept to an identifiable legal term. This 
means that the recognition of belligerency has afforded the legal framework for the 
definition of civil wars in customary international law. 
On the other hand, it is asserted here that the notions of sovereignty and non-intervention, 
were largely behind both the high thresholds (which must exist in the internal conflict in 
order to qualify for the granting of the recognition of belligerency), and also the rarity of 
cases of the granting of such recognition. 
Thus, States by demanding very high thresholds for civil wars (in terms of high intensity, 
duration, effective control of the national territory, and the existence of a political 
organization of the insurgents) to which the laws of war would apply. They in fact, wanted 
to retain their full discretion in the overwhelming cases of civil wars, which do not attain 
such thresholds. 
However, even when the civil war attains these very high thresholds, States (which granted 
the recognition of belligerency) always try to play down the legal significance of such an 
act, by insisting that their action (of recognition) was directed only by humanitarian 
motives. This in order to deny any legal status to their opponents, and by the same token 
maintain their claim that they (States) are the only legitimate authority. 
Besides, the granting of belligerent rights to the insurgents by third States is always seen 
by the established Government fighting an internal war. as an unfriendly act, and therefore, 
an intrusion in its internal affairs. This fact in itself, does not encourage third States, to 
rush to such recognitions, in cases of internal conflicts taking place in other countries. 
Moreover, it is established here that the rarity of cases of internal wars in which recognition 
of belligerency was granted, confirms that sovereignty and the fear of intervention were 
behind such a state of affairs. 
It seems that established Governments prefer to conduct their war against their internal 
enemies in accordance with their full discretion, which sovereignty gives them, and not 
according to the rules of the laws of war. The latter would restrict their freedom of 
choosing the means and methods of dealing with their internal enemy, would give 
respectability to the insurgents, and would finally signal that the established Government 
is far from being in control of the situation in the country. 
On the other hand, because the recognition of belligerency was in fact, a limitation of 
State sovereignty, in the sense that once it has been granted, the Government in power has 
to apply the laws of war. States faced with internal wars, claimed (on the basis of their 
sovereignty, and the duty of other States not to intervene in their internal affairs), that they 
are the sole power able to acknowledge the existence of the conditions and the criteria of 
1) 
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the recognition of belligerency. This clearly means that sovereignty has the upper hand in 
that process. 
Similarly, it is asserted here, that sovereignty and non- intervention were among the 
principal causes of the obsolescence of the institution of the recognition of belligerency. 
Since such an obsolescence would serve the interests of Governments fighting internal 
conflicts, and even the interests of third States, the former because in the absence of such 
recognition. There are no legal restrictions on their power to crush their enemies, and the 
latter (third States) it gives them, the total freedom either of meddling in the internal 
conflicts of other States, or abstaining from any action, without being obliged to resort to 
the recognition of belligerency. 
Finally, it is my belief that the institution of recognition of belligerency was in a way, an 
attempt to bring the notion of objectivity into the realm of international law, in the sense 
that whenever some conditions of fact and law are present in a situation of an internal 
strife, the laws of war would apply. 
However, in the decentralized system of the organizations of international community, 
such an attempt has no chance of success, mainly because it conflicts with sovereignty and 
non- intervention. Objectivity requires the existence of a universal agency which is above 
the States and has the competence to take binding decisions and the capacity to enforce 
them. 
In the absence of such an agency or institution (which is in itself a flagrant example of 
States' preference for sovereignty and non- intervention), the possibility that States might 
be guided by political and economic considerations in their decision to grant or withhold 
the recognition of belligerency, rather than objective and legal criteria, remains open. 
2. In the Context of Common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions of 1949 
In 1949, the ICRC, suggested a definition of 'armed conflicts not of an international 
character', which would in effect, cover a large segment of internal conflicts. It was the 
first attempt to define and regulate internal conflicts in an international instrument. 
However. the travaux prkparatoires of the Diplomatic Conference of 1949, reveals that the 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention were used extensively to limit to a greater 
degree any incursion into the domestic jurisdiction of States. 
Two tactics have been resorted to. The first stressed that the ICRC definition was 
unacceptable, because the criteria included in it (definition), were not strong enough, which 
means that many internal conflicts would be regulated by international law. 
States stressed at that stage that the condition for their acceptance of the application of 
the whole Geneva Conventions to armed conflict not of an international character was a 
strong and emasculated definition. 
The definitions advanced especially by sovereignty-oriented delegations were designed 
expressly for the protection of the sovereignty of the State, and the prohibition of 
intervention in its internal affairs. The criteria suggested for such definitions, were very 
stringent, in fact, they were to a large extent, a mere codification of the recognition of 
belligerency in customary international law. 
States wanted to make it clear, that their sovereignty must not be curtailed in any 
429 
situation of internal conflict, otherwise, their authority and legitimacy would be threatened. 
Their internal enemies would be indirectly encouraged to take up arms against them, 
because they know in advance that they would be treated in accordance with the laws of 
war. 
The second tactic, which was eventually adopted, was based on the absence of any 
definition of 'armed conflicts not of an international character' in the text of common 
Article 3. It was in fact, a compromise formula, since the need for a definition in the text 
of the article, was dropped, when it was agreed that only some minimum general rules of 
humanitarian law, would apply to internal conflicts instead of the whole Geneva 
Conventions. This means that the restrictions on State sovereignty, and the chances of 
intervention in its internal affairs, facing internal conflicts, were kept to a minimum. 
On the other hand, it must stressed that the travaux pr6paratolres do not suggest that by 
adopting the second tactic (absence of definition). States which tried to define 'armed 
conflicts not of an international character' have abandoned their earlier definitions, thus, 
opting for lower thresholds in the definition of common Article 3. Although, it seems to 
me, that humanitarian spirit, and interpretation in good faith and in accordance with the 
object and purpose of Article 3, would be clearly against such an approach. 
However, the absence of definition, and the absence in the text of Article 3, of any 
indication, of which authority has the power to acknowledge and verify the existence of 'an 
armed conflict not of an international character, has in practice played directly into the 
hands of States fighting internal strife. 
Thus, they argued in most cases of such conflicts (which occurred after the entry into 
force of Geneva Conventions) that they did not fall in the ambit of Article 3. Moreover, 
they insisted, that they are the only legally responsible authority, which can decide the 
existence of such conflict. In other words, any attempt by any third party to intervene in 
that field (of the determination of the existence of armed conflict not of an international 
character) would be easily seen as unwarranted intervention in their domestic affairs. 
The UN practice seems not to contradict the above the contention, at least until the 
beginning of 1970s. However, thereafter, the UN (through the idea of combatting 
widespread, massive and gross violations of human rights) has stressed the all importance 
of the application of common Article 3, to ongoing civil wars, in order to mitigate the 
sufferings of the victims of such unhappy experiences. Thus, the UN has not hesitated at 
least indirectly, to determine and indicate the existence of 'an armed conflict not of an 
international character'. 
3. Protocol II 
In this protocol, which is devoted wholly to the question of internal conflicts, a definition 
of 'armed conflicts not of an international character' was adopted. However, it seems on 
that precise issue (of definition), sovereignty-oriented States (most Third World countries, 
Canada, Rumania and to some extent the UK) have won the day. The criteria of the 
definition, were greatly emasculated, so as to make the application of the protocol very 
limited in practice. 
The attempt of more humanitarian -oriented delegations (the Holy See, Sweden, Norway, 
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Italy and to a certain degree Egypt and most Socialist countries) to lower the thresholds of 
internal conflicts, contained in the definition (in order to make the protocol apply to a 
greater number of civil wars) failed. 
Since sovereignty oriented-States made it clear, either a stronger definition, or no 
protocol at all. In their view. the lowering of the thresholds of the definition would result 
inevitably, in the breach of their sovereignty and hence, would open the door for foreign 
intervention in their domestic affairs. 
On the other hand, it seems that the travaux prkparatolres, of the Diplomatic Conference 
(1974-1977) establish that the overwhelming majority of States felt the need for a clear 
definition of 'armed conflicts not of an international character', in order to avoid the 
imperfections of Article 3. However, many States used the device of definition as a real 
vehicle for strengthening their sovereignty and preventing any third party intervention in 
their internal affairs, simply by making the threshold of internal conflicts very hard for 
insurgents to gain. 
In this context, Article I of the Protocol ignores the demands of guerrilla warfare, which 
is the main method of warfare used by insurgents. Since the definition stresses the 
importance of the control by the insurgents of a part of the national territory. 
Similarly, in regard to the important question concerning the moment at which the 
protocol would be applicable, Article I is silent. But, there is evidence to the fact that some 
sovereignty oriented countries continued, even after the adoption of Protocol 11, to stress 
that the acknowledgement by the established Government of the existence of an armed 
conflict not of an international character, was a conditio sine qua non, for the application 
of Protocol 11. 
Furthermore, they indicated that no third party can intervene or verify such 
determination. In other words, they claimed that sovereignty gives them that right (of 
determining the existence of an internal conflict) alone. 
However, it is my view, that in practice, the objective character of the criteria of Article 
I of the second protocol can be apparent, if the legal Government acts in good faith in the 
fulfilment of its international obligations. Moreover, it seems to me, that the arguments of 
human rights, and the need for the protection of the victims of non- international conflicts, 
would go against any pretended exclusive right of the established Government in that field 
(determination of the existence of an armed conflict not of an international character), in 
the meaning of Article 1. 
Consequently, it seems that on the level of the issue of definition of internal conflicts, 
as from customary law to Protocol 11, the principles of sovereignty and non- intervention, 
have been used, either directly or implicitly, by States to block any real progress in this 
field. 
Thus, even if Article 3 and Protocol 11 can be considered as a timid limitation upon State 
sovereignty in the field of definition, many loopholes exist in both instruments. This makes 
sovereignty-oriented States free to accept or reject the application of those instruments to 
their internal wars. 
However, there is hope that international organizations and especially, the UN can be 
instrumental in acknowledging the existence of internal wars to which either Common 
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Article 3 or Protocol 11 apply, whenever, some objective criteria exist in an internal 
conflict, such as the intensity, duration, organization of the rebels etc. 
The UN used in fact, its concern for the protection of human rights, as a basis for its 
intervention in those situations (the case of El Salvador illustrates that). However, 
everything depends in the end on the political will and determination of the international 
community to give more respect to the plight of the victims of such wars rather than to 
some absolute conceptions of sovereignty and non-intervention. 
11. The Protection of the Victims of Internal Wars 
A. In Customary International Law 
In customary international law, the laws of war'can be applied only, when the recognition 
of belligerency takes place. Thus, whenever, such recognition is granted, the sovereignty 
of the State is curtailed to some extent. Since the victims are under the protection of 
international law and not the national law. 
In this context, captured insurgents are to be treated as prisoners of war, rather than 
common criminals, also the sick and wounded are under the protection of some basic 
humanitarian standards. However, the treatment of the civilians, and especially the 'disloyal 
citizens" (those who support the insurgents) was very harsh (in order to inhibit them from 
helping the enemy). In fact, the absence of clear rules which regulates the fate of civilians 
in customary law, meant that \ tates were free to devise internal rules which protect State 
sovereignty, rather than respecting fundamental humanitarian considerations. 
On the other hand, in the abs; nce of the recognition of belligerency (which is the usual 
case in the overwhelming majoT 
I 
ity of civil wars), customary international law, leaves the 
State totally free, claims of sovereignty and non-intervention reign supreme, humanity and 
moderation, have no place. 
The practice suggests that in those situations, there is no evidence that States felt bound 
by any other standards than the dictates of their sovereignty. The victims were harshly 
treated, the idea of human rights was not born yet. 
B. The Protection of the Victims of Internal Conflicts under Common Article 3 
It seems that the tragedies of the Spanish Civil War, coupled with the rise of the idea of 
human rights, and the ICRC efforts to humanize civil wars have in different degrees, led 
to the adoption of some fundamental rules of humanitarian law for the protection of the 
victims of armed conflicts not of an international character. 
Those rules constituted modest, but important inroads into the sovereignty of the State, 
since Governments are no longer free to deal with their internal enemies, as they like. 
However, it is asserted here, that States used specifically the arguments of sovereignty and 
non- intervention, to deny the application of the whole Geneva Conventions to internal 
conflicts. 
Thus, it was fiercely argued in the case of civilians for instance, that because they hold 
the nationality of their State, they are bound by the duty of allegiance, hence they were not 
eligible for any kind of extensive international protection. 
Captured insurgents are still seen as mere criminals, protected only from summary 
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execution, in this sphere the claims of sovereignty and non-intervention were specifically 
used to destroy any attempt at giving those insurgents any legal status. 
In practice, however, even the modest humanitarian standards contained in Article 3, 
were not adhered to faithfully by States in the overwhelming majority of cases, they still 
hold to their sovereign rights and freedoms, in choosing the means for eliminating their 
enemy, the generality and vagueness of those standards have helped in opening the door to 
abuse. 
Moreover, it must be established here that the generality of the rules of Article 3, have 
not hindered the United Nations action, thus it stressed in its practice that respect for 
human rights, leads logically and necessarily to the imposition of real restraints on methods 
and means of warfare, and hence to a greater and real protection of the victims of internal 
wars. 
C. In the Context of Protocol II 
It is asserted here, that the subject of the protection of victims of war constituted the main 
contribution of Protocol Il to humanitarian law ýapplicable to internal conflicts. Thus, 
although the principles of sovereignty and non -intervention, have been used to kill many 
important rules on methods and means of warfare, and also some important rules concerning 
the protection of the victims of war (as we have seen in Chapter IV Section 111), the second 
protocol elaborates many important rules for the protection of the victims of internal wars. 
In this context, the civilian population is protected in a very effective way. Many 
important specific rules have been adopted, to limit the freedom of manoeuvre of the 
established Government and the rebels alike. Thus, compared with Article 3 of the Geneva 
Convention, there is no doubt that protocol has filled many normative gaps, which were not 
regulated before. Articles 13-17 witness to that effect. 
It seems also that the philosophy of human rights has induced States to try to give 
thorough protection to civilians, since the rules contained in the Articles dealing with that 
protection, are all designed to protect the fundamental human rights, of rights to life and 
prohibition of inhuman treatment in all its forms. 
Similarly, the sick and wounded, together with persons who care and assist them, and the 
installations used for that purpose are all protected by many detailed rules. In this context, 
no State dared to see in these rules a violation of its sovereignty and intervention in its 
affairs, the idea of humanity reigned supreme in that arena. 
Captured insurgents and civilians detained or interned in connection with offences 
committed in relation with the conflict (although still basically considered as criminals) 
are afforded better protection. The conditions of their detention and internment are 
regulated on a more humanitarian basis. Furthermore, the questions of trial, judgment and 
the sentencing of this category of victims, have been all fixed in a very humanitarian spirit. 
Thus, although the claims, of sovereignty and non -intervention still hold the balance, 
because the captured insurgents and civilians tried for offences related to the armed conflict 
are still basically seen as common criminals. The restriction of State's sovereignty is that 
those criminals are not tried and sentenced according to the Government dictates, but in 
accordance with some general standards and rules. 
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It seems that in connection with the protection of the victims of internal conflicts, we can 
confidently conclude that real developments have been enregistered. In my view, the 
concept of human rights has paved the way for the relative ease by which States accepted 
those rules. 
There was in fact, a general consensus among States attending the Diplomatic Conference 
(1974-1977), that the victims of internal strife should be effectively protected. The human 
rights limitation on their sovereignty has taught them that adherence to humanitarian norms 
in their treatment of their citizens, would not in any way, challenge their sovereignty or 
open the way for foreign interference. 
Sovereignty must mean among other things, that the established Government must respect 
certain basic standards of human treatment and human dignity. Thus, respect for 
fundamental human rights in all circumstances must be the real basis of the legitimacy of 
authority and power, not force and totalitarianism. 
It must be noticed, that with a good faith interpretation and in accordance with the object 
and purpose of the treaty (Protocol II), the rules concerning the protection of the victims 
of internal wars contained in Protocol II, can be interpreted, as implicitly containing many 
other important rules on methods and means of war, and many other humanitarian and 
human rights rules. 
In practice, although no State has accepted specifically the application of Protocol 11 to 
its internal conflicts (with the possible exception of El Salvador), it seems at least indirectly, 
that the rules of Protocol 11, on the protection of the victims of war had no real influence 
upon the conduct of civil wars over the last 10 years. There are numerous examples of 
brutality and cruelty occurring in many places. 
However, the case of the Nicaraguan Civil War illustrates that the Government made 
some effort to adhere to certain humanitarian standards, not through the acceptance of the 
application of humanitarian instruments (Article 3 or Protocol 11) but through an approach 
based on human rights. Thus, it accepted many of the recommendations of the Inter- 
American Commission on Human Rights in the field of the protection of the victims of 
war. The reason seems to be that an approach based on human rights is preferred by 
Governments, because it does not involve any implications that the State accords any legal 
status to the insurgents. 
II. The Question of Compliance and Implementation of Humanitarian Law In Internal 
Conflicts 
A. In Customary Law 
It seems that in customary law, the concepts of sovereignty and non-intervention have in 
fact, blocked any development of any machinery for the control, supervision, enforcement 
or implementation of humanitarian law, either in international or internal conflicts. 
Thus, even in the law between States, the methods for securing compliance with its rules 
Tested essentially on self-help, good faith and reciprocity. The concept of sovereignty was 
absolute, no third party machinery or intervention were thought of or proposed. 
Reprisals, and the taking of hostages were the traditional means of forcing the enemy to 
conduct itself with the laws of war, and they were both inhuman. They fell always on the 
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innocent. 
Sovereignty meant in the eyes of the established Governments, that no third party could 
actually judge their adherence to the laws of war, and any attempt in that direction could 
be characterised as intervention. 
Moreover, Governments were not ready to punish those of their soldiers who committed 
war crimes. Under sovereignty, they are protected whenever they are defending the State 
even, in doing so, they commit horrible crimes. 
B. In the Context of Article 3 
It seems that the same tradition of customary law continued. States were, in fact, more 
concerned about punishing insurgents for the violation of their national laws, rather than 
their breach of the rules of humanitarian law. Sovereignty and non- intervention were best 
served by punishing insurgents for high reason, rather than breach of some humanitarian 
standards. 
The institution of protecting power was rejected on the express ground that it constituted 
a breach of sovereignty and an intervention in the internal affairs of States. No express 
prohibition of reprisals is found, which was in itself a clear gap. However, Article 3 
expressly prohibited the taking of hostages, which must be seen as an advance. 
The practice shows clearly that the absence of any means of controlling the application 
of Article 3, means that violations go unpunished. Thus, the arguments of sovereignty and 
non- intervention which were used to end any attempt at instituting a Teal machinery for 
the control of application of humanitarian law, meant in practice, that many deaths and 
inhuman treatment of victims cannot be prevented. 
On the other hand, the ICRC has been given what is known as 'the right of initiative' 
which allows the committee to give relief and assistance to the victims, however, on the 
express consent of the State concerned. 
The ICRC through its right of initiative has, in practice, contributed effectively to the 
amelioration of the conditions of the victims of war, and especially prisoners. Hence it 
contributed indirectly to the implementation not only to the minimum rules of Article 3, 
but also to other humanitarian and human rights standards. However, the consent of the 
Government must be sought in any action of the ICRC, which means that respect of the 
sovereignty is the cornerstone of any real contribution of the ICRC in the context of civil 
wars. 
Moreover, it must stressed that the absence of penal sanctions for violations of the rules 
of Article 3, coupled with the adoption of amnesty laws at the end of internal conflicts 
meant, in practice, that imperatives of political expediency overrode demands for respect 
for the law. 
C. In Protocol 11 
Sovereignty and non- intervention arguments have been used extensively by sovereignty 
oriented States, to kill any attempt at instituting any procedural requirements for the control 
of application of the rules of Protocol 11. The only means adopted are good faith of the 
parties, and the dissemination of the rules of the Protocol. 
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This indicates clearly that suspicion of intervention and fear of breach of sovereignty had 
put an end to any speculation of the possibility of third party control. 
Even the mention of the ICRC right of initiative was not included, although it survives 
under Article 3. However, it seems, that practice shows that the instruments and organs of 
human rights can fill the gap in the area of controlling the application of humanitarian law, 
at least, to some extent. 
The examples of the UN and the Inter-American experiences in the context of some 
internal conflicts (especially El Salvador and Nicaragua) are cases in point. The explanation 
of the tacit acceptance of States of this approach lies in the fact, in my opinion, that the use 
of human rights machinery has the advantage of escaping the condemnation as an 
intervention in the internal affairs of States, or a breach of their sovereignty. Because there 
is a general consensus that human rights are a legal limitation of State sovereignty. 
The general conclusion then of this thesis is that sovereignty and non-intervention have 
been used in connection with the main three themes of humanitarian law applicable in 
internal conflicts (namely: definition the protection of the victims of war and compliance 
and implementation), in a very extensive way, either directly or indirectly. 
They (sovereignty and non- intervention) have won the day in many instances, especially 
in the domain of definition of internal conflicts and compliance with humanitarian law. 
However, many inroads into State sovereignty have been made, notably in the area of 
protection of the victims of internal war. 
Human rights and their development have, in different ways, influenced and will 
influence in future developments in the field of humanitarian law applicable in internal 
conflicts. Human rights show to the States that respect of the fundamental rights of 
individuals and groups. in peace or emergency and war times, is a sure way of gaining 
legitimacy for their authority. They (human rights), it is asserted, are not a negation or 
challenge to sovereignty, they are in fact another name for exercising sovereignty in a 
civilized way. 
Thus, despite all the cruelties and horrors of civil wars, and the efforts of sovereignty- 
oriented States, we can safely advance that many normative developments have been 
enregistered in Article 3 and Protocol 11 of 1977. This has strengthened the humanitarian 
law applicable in internal conflicts, at least from the normative point of view. In fact, the 
mere adoption of Article 3 and the Protocol 11 must be seen in themselves as fundamental 
advances for humanity. 
A final observation concerning the value of normative and legal restraints in diminishing 
the evils of civil wars is in order in my view. One should note that there are many people 
who maintain that internal conflicts are always and will be always cruet and ruthless, for 
the simple reason that each side in the conflict, seeks a total victory over its opponent, and 
not a truce or a compromise. 
In such an atmosphere of hatred and vengeance, any talk about legal restraints is 
pointless, irrelevant and impractical. According to this view, neither the test of morality nor 
restraints of legal norms have much, if any place, in situations of civil wars. 
However, it seems to me, on the contrary, legal restraints are very important in order to 
attain that very victory in cases of those unhappy experiences (civil wars). Otherwise, 
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victory will be equated with a total extermination of a large segment of the population. 
This state of affairs in my view, is not in the interests of the winning party itself, since 
its chances of gaining real political support among the governed would be very slight 
indeed. In fact, the lack of political support would encourage the reign of totalitarianism, 
and violations of basic human rights of the population, and thus the victory of one party 
in gaining political control will result in the loss of the population of their freedoms, which 
would in its turn open the way for further turmoil and war. 
In my opinion, if legal restraints especially norms concerning the protection of the 
victims of war, are not respected, the fight may be turn into a "dirty fight'. The latter has 
been correctly defined by Nigel in these terms: 
"... [T]o fight dirty is to direct one's hostility or aggression not at its proper object but 
at a peripheral target which the proper object can be attained indirectly". 2 
In my view, fighting dirty in the context of internal conflicts, by attacking the civilian 
targets for example, will never result in a lasting victory. The experiences in Algeria and 
Vietnam have firmly established that attacking the civilians, has not resulted in the breaking 
of the morale of the population or the destruction of the insurgent movement. 
On the contrary, the breeding ground for the insurgents widened and recruitment rose 
when the violations of humanitarian law become more brutal. This means that the normative 
restraints contained in Article 3 and especially Protocol II can be very useful in reducing 
events of underhanded tactics. Consequently, this would restrict resort to total war, diminish 
the sufferings of the victims of internal wars, and by the same token make sovereignty 
more human. 
2T. Niget: War and Massacre, In Ch. Beltz, M. Cohen, T. Scanton and J. Simons (eds. ): Internatio'nat Ethics. 
PUP, Princeton, New Jersey, 1985, p. 64. 
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